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THE LEGEND OF THE WANDERING JEW

A

Franciscan Headache

This story, in one form or another, circulated throughout Palestine and was fairly well established many years before the arrival of the Franciscans (1335) but had not as yet been definitely connected with any of the Holy Places. In later times, however, it acquired local coloring to such an extent that the Franciscans, as custodians of the Holy Places, were obliged to take a firm stand. To trace this legend through the old chronicles is to recover a completely forgotten tale; and one with its full quota of adventure, duplicity, gullibility, and humor.

Its first appearance was in the Byzantine period (4th-7th century) and was in this general form: A stranger, usually an Ethiopian, addresses himself to a worthy villager and says: "I am the man who struck the Creator of the world in the time of His suffering. And, therefore, I must never cease to weep." This account was popular among the monks and in the seventh century; Moschus related it in his Lemonarium. Eventually he was identified as Malchus.

In medieval times there was also known in Palestine a similar legend coupled with the name, "Cartaphilus." When Jesus was carrying His cross to Calvary, this man Cartaphilus jeered: "Go on! Faster!" To which the Savior quietly replied, "I go, but thou shalt wait till I come". This anecdote originated in Armenia during the thirteenth century; later it found its way into Europe.²

So far the legend has a twofold aspect: (a) As Malchus, who struck the blow; (b) as Cartaphilus who taunted Christ. And so far, neither has been assigned as yet to a particular spot in Jerusalem.

In the fourteenth century, the legend acquired "local habitation and a name". The name was "John Buttadeus" (Buttadeus—"strike God"). In the *Libellus de Locis Ultramarinis* written by the Dominican, Father Peter of Penna (c.1350) we read: "Here [where Simon

^{1.} Patrologia Latina, Migne, V. 74, c. 183. See also Catholic Encyclopedia, "An old Italian legend knows of...punishment inflicted on the soldier who struck Christ before the High Priest, and later this soldier was identified with Malchus whose ear was cut off by Peter." (John xviii, 10). — Arthur F.J. Remy.

^{2.} See for example, The Jewish Encyclopedia under "Wandering Jew"; or the Enciclopedia Italiana I. Treccani: "Ebreo errante". Here we find a good resumé of the legend but without any mention of Palestine.

ot Cyrene helped Jesus to carry the cross] is shown the place where John Buttadeus derided Christ when He was going to die. ... A few simple-minded people assured us that he had been seen by many, but this is not accepted by learned men, for the person to whom they were referring was known as John Devout-of-God, an equerry of Charlemagne, who lived 210 years. 3

Not long afterwards, the Franciscans were accompanying pilgrims around the "Holy Circle", i.e., in and around Jerusalem. Naturally, some pilgrims would bring up the story, but the Franciscans endeavored to give it no importance. In fact, when the record of indulgences for the Holy Places was published, all mention of Buttadeus was omitted. No indulgence meant no veneration, and since the great majority of the pilgrims depended entirely on the Franciscans for their information about the Holy Places, we can readily understand that this omission had inflicted a mortal wound. The following two chronicles bear out this point.

In 1431, the Italian priest, Ser Mariano da Siena, was visiting the shrines for the third time, under the direction of the Guardian or Custos, Fr. Luigi da Bologna. In the Via Dolorosa, they came upon this same spot and passed it by, for as Ser Mariano wrote, "There was no indulgence."

In 1480-83, the Dominican Father Felix Fabri of Wurttemberg related that when he was visiting the house of Annas on Mt. Sion, he slyly asked the Friar who accompanied him, to show him where the wandering Jew stood when he struck Christ. The Friar conducted him out of the house to an old olive-tree and said, "According to the tradition of the Oriental peoples, which they claim to have in an old book, Christ was tied to this olive tree while His judges dined." Apparently the Friar had never heard of the Wandering Jew and merely recounted his stock of tales, hoping that one or the other would answer his guest's query. 6 Moreover

^{3.} In Revue de l'Orient Latin 1902 p. 358.

^{4.} See Introduction to A Voyage Beyond the Seas by Fr. Niccolo of Poggibonsi, (Jerusalem, 1945) page xvii ff. and also the Introduction to A Visit to the Holy Places of Egypt, Sinai, Palestine and Syria by Frescobaldi, Gucci and Sigoli (Jerusalem, 1949) p. 15 ff.

^{5.} Del Viaggio in Terra Santa (Firenze, 1822) p. 29.

^{6.} If he had heard the story of the Wandering Jew, he could have pointed out a spot in the house of Annas, not outside, for it is clear from John XVIII, 22, that it was in the house that the servant struck the blow and said, "Answerest thou the High Priest so?" Afterwards Christ was sent "bound to Caiphas the High Priest." (v. 24).

Fr. Fabri wrote it as his personal opinion that the legend clashed with the Holy Scriptures and was against the Christian Tradition, "because Christ in His Passion would give a perfect example of patience, but never of vengeance." 7

The legend seemed to be dying when it received new life with charming effect. At the end of the XVI century, Peter Brantius Pennalius paid a visit to the Holy Places and on one occasion, years after his return to his native country, during a sumptuous banquet, related the following experience: "One day I was in the piazza of Jerusalem [in front of the Holy Sepulcher] when a Turk approached me and asked, 'Do you know me?'"

I looked at him carefully but had to admit that I did not know him. He replied: "But I know you! For I was a slave in your uncle's house in Turin and I received many favors from you and from your parents." He gave my parents' names correctly and also those of many prominent people in Turin. "When I was released," the stranger continued, "I went to Venice and soon gained the friendship of some Turkish merchants. They brought me in their ship to Constantinople. There I sought out my old master whom I had served in the naval forces in 1571. He received me kindly and took me again into his service. A few months later he was appointed Sangiak, or Governor, of Jerusalem. Four months later, his Police Captain died, and my master selected me for the post. Now, as a token of my gratitude for your kindness and courtesy. I hope you will do me the favor to sup with me this night. We shall be alone." He described his house and advised me to come at four in the evening, so as not to be seen. But if I were seen by any police, I was not to worry for he was their chief.

I accepted the invitation and at the appointed time I went to his house, where I was received with much display of friendship. After a splendid meal, he told me he would show me something which no other living man knew, except the Captain pro tempore of the city of Jerusalem. He mentioned too, that there was the penalty of impalement if he revealed it to any other person. He took a bunch of keys from an iron box, prepared a piece of wood for a torch, and lit a lantern which he then carefully covered. He led me out of the room, shut the door and gave me his hand to walk with him a good distance in the darkness. In a short time, we came to a large drawbridge which led to another room. He shut the door from the inside and uncovered the lantern. Then he trudged an equally good distance to an iron door. He opened it and we walked low in a corridor all worked in mosaic. Near the end we passed five iron doors and entered a large hall ornamented with very fine marble

^{7.} The Wanderings Vol. VII of Palestine Pilgrims' Text (London, 1897) p. 317.

and mosaic work in the vault. At the left end of the hall there was a man, well-armed in the old fashion, with a halberd on his shoulder and a sword at his side. The man was continually marching from one side of the hall to the other without rest. The Turk said to me: "See if you can stop him." I tried two or three times with all my strength but it was impossible for me to hold him. He lighted the torch and gave it to me so I could see the man more clearly. I observed that he was of middle stature, thin and emaciated, with hollow eyes, black beard and black hair. I asked the Turk who this man was and he answered, "I will tell you only if you swear by your Christ not to reveal it for ten years." This, I knew, was the extreme limit of office for a Captain of Police. Curious to know, I gave my solemn pledge.

"This man," he said to me, "is the servant who struck your Christ before the High Priest Annas. For punishment of his grievous crime he was condemned by your Christ to remain here. We too believe in the old traditions. In this place he stays, never eating nor drinking; never sleeping nor taking rest; but always walking as you see him, and always,—look, my friend,—always the arm that struck, twitches!"

We left and returned to the room where we had dined. At my departure he tactfully reminded me of my oath, and said that if I met any Turk on my way back to my lodgings, I was not to salute him for such was the custom in this quarter. He begged me to remember him to his friends in Turin and offered me money if I had need. I told him I lacked nothing and thanked him warmly for his kindness, and following his instructions, found my way to the inn. I came back to my native country, spent some fifteen years in Candia, Corfu and Zara, and now I can tell what I saw without scruple, having observed the oath.

This much we do know; that the tale appeared in several works and was transmitted by many writers in substantially the same form. There were some important differences. According to Fr. Quaresmi⁸ it all happened to a certain nobleman of Vercelli, one Charles de Rancis. According to D. Laffi, it happened to a Charles Carini. We have good reason also to think it was at one time connected with the name of the well-known musician and author, John Francis Alcarotto, Canon of the Cathedral of Novara. In Fr. Quaresmi's book, the Turk was from Vicentia; in Laffi's, from Turin. These differences taken together, imply at least some fabrication—but this may be accounted for by the wiles of publish-

^{8.} Terrae Sanctae Elucidatio (Venetiis, 1881) Vol. II, p. 142.

^{9.} Viaggio in Levante (Bologna, 1683) p. 161.

^{10.} Alcarotti in his book *Del Viaggio in Terra Santa* (Novara, 1595) says nothing about Malchus, but Quaresmi and Laffi testified independently that the tale was published in this work. Probably they found it in some pamphlets.

ers seeking to acquire printing rights. Moreover the name, "Pennalius" is not found in the Navis Peregrinorum, 11 a collection of the names of pilgrims from 1561 till 1695. Still, it is also true that these lists are not absolutely complete, having been based mostly on the guest-registers of the Franciscans. Practically all pilgrims availed themselves of Franciscan hospitality, but not necessarily all. In fact, Pennalius himself related that he stayed at an inn, i.e., an arab khan.

So much for the objections. On the other hand, only a man who was reasonably familiar with the precincts of the Dome of the Rock, could have described so well the mosaic work, the iron doors, the finest marble, etc. And also it is well to note that the prohibition against Christians entering the mosque area was not such an iron-clad rule that there were never any exceptions. With the use of bribes in the right places, access was quite possible. One who had this experience in 1514 was the Venetian merchant (later consul at Damascus) Barbone Morosini. He wrote a very interesting redaction, unedited till now, in the Marciana of Venice. 12 For July 28-29, he writes: "I was in the house of the Cadi Ambely. This house is situated in Solomon's Temple Area. From his quarters, he showed me a great part of it." For August 15, he has this to say: "On the invitation of the Cadi of Al Agsa Mosque, I went to his home one day at the noon hour. At this time no one else is walking around because of the great heat. His house was inside the old wall of the temple. There I remained incognito for the rest of the day, being refreshed by my host with excellent fruits and good waters. At sunset when the Moors go into the mosque for prayers, I went with the Cadi into the Temple of Our Lady (Al Agsa Mosque), dressed exactly as the others. In external actions I followed them closely; internally, I experienced great devotion in this Holy Place... When the prayers of the Moors were ended and the people went out, I explored the interior with the Cadi. It was as bright as day inside, for, as the Cadi told me, there were more than seven hundred lamps... Afterwards, we went to Solomon's Temple (Dome of the Rock) and saw everything inside and out. Then I returned to Our Lady's Temple (Al Agsa) for I could not see enough of it. I remained there till the second time of

^{11.} Zimolong Bert. Navis Peregrinorum, Ein Pilgerverzeichnis aus Jerusalem von 1561 bis 1695 (Köln, 1938) and Lemmens' Collectanea Terrae Sanctae (Quaracchi, 1933) p. 254.

^{12.} Fr. G. Guzzo, Commissary of the Holy Land in Venice sent me a faithful copy of this Ms.

prayer, i.e., around 2:30 A.M. and later. At last, going out the Golden Gate, I arrived at Mt. Sion, accompanied by the Cadi's slaves. To the Cadi, I left a generous offering, for it is impossible otherwise to receive such a favor."

From this account and from his interesting descriptions elsewhere, there comes to our mind the possibility that the correctness of detail we noted above in the record of Pennalius, might have been due to these narrations of Morosini, or of some similar visitor. But granting that Pennalius saw all that he claimed to have seen, it is still possible that his friend the Turk might have had an agreement with the guard to play upon the pilgrim's gullibility. Remembering that access to a mosque was prohibited to Christians under penalty of death, we shall find that the elaborate precautions taken by the Turk were by no means unreasonable. We might justly be accused of too much skepticism, were it not for the fact that the history of the times records other instances of similar skulduggery.

In 1573, the Franciscan, Father Bonifatius Stefani of Ragusa, Bishop of Stagno, published his book, Liber de Perenni Cultu Terrae Sanctae, 13 composed in Jerusalem during his years of guardianship (1552-1564). Describing the Flagellation Chapel, then in Moslem hands, he writes: "Only in 1558, my seventh year as Guardian, was I able to enter and see and adore in the place where such abundant Blood was shed. An old woman took me there one day when the bad man [the Governor] was away worshipping in Hebron. Shortly after we arrived at the place, I heard a noise as if Christ were again being scourged. I asked the old woman and the other Friars, and they too heard it. The old woman said she had heard it day and night for 60 years—the whole time she had been with this family. I asked her what caused it and she said, 'The Jews! They are confined in that dark prison over there and after the final judgment they will be flung headlong into hell, for they flogged your Christ.' I remarked that it was the Roman soldiers who scourged Christ. But she replied with animation: 'Those soldiers are the accursed Jews!' Nor could we persuade her otherwise, so I gave her the promised money and we left."

Obviously Fr. Bonifatius had little faith in the old woman's story but in his book he failed to make that fact perfectly clear. As his book soon became famous throughout the Christian world,

^{13. (}Venetiis, 1875) p. 223. Fr. E. Roger in *Terre Sainte* (Paris, 1664) p. 123, relates the same things, but as heard by Mustala Bey, son of Muhamed Bascia of Jerusalem, after the year 1623.

everyone heard the tale. When the story of Malchus as told by Pennalius appeared a score of years later, it was to simple-minded people a confirmation.

Pilgrims began arriving with the added hope of seeing "the strange man" and of hearing "the miraculous noise." Franciscans who accompanied all pilgrims soon found themselves at a loss for argument. The best proof was to pay a visit to the place. However, it was the house of the Sangiak (Governor) and this individual proved himself unfavorable to the idea of having an endless stream of pilgrims roaming through his apartments. But the Friars did whatever they could. In 1616, the well-known explorer of Rome, Peter Della Valle, visited Jerusalem and the Franciscans were his guides. Probably at their suggestion, he wrote in a letter: "The story printed in Naples, which our Signor Andrea sent to me in Constantinople, makes mention of a place with a miraculous noise of scourging. This is a lie. Also the story of the man who struck the blow is a fable. I have the story here with me, have investigated and have found there was nothing to it. If there were, the Turks would gladly show for money. "14

During these years from 1616 to 1626, Fr. Francis Quaresmi was composing his monumental work, *Llucidatio Terrae Sanctae*, which was first published in 1637. He devoted many pages to a refutation of the old woman's story and of the story of Malchus, although he did admit the possibility of the latter. ¹⁵ This work had great influence on later writers.

A similar denial was voiced by Fr. Antony Del Castillo in a guide for Spanish pilgrims. ¹⁶ But the tale was so attractive that pilgrims ignored or speedily forgot all repudiations and through their influence it continued. What was needed was a new and stronger argument against it, something much more decisive.

For this reason, Fr. Mariano Morone da Maleo, Custos of the Holy Land (1652-1658) availed himself of the friendship of the Emir of Gaza, as he tells in his valuable work, 17 while the Emir's son—Governor of Jerusalem—was absent from the city. He begged the Emir to reveal to them whether or not there was something of

^{14.} Viaggi parte I. (Roma, 1660) p. 509.

^{15.} Elucidatio, II. p. 142 ff.

^{16.} El Devoto Peregrino, Viage de Tierra Santa (Madrid, 1705) p. 163.

^{17.} Terra Santa Nuovamente Illustrata Vol. I. (Piacenza, 1669) p. 88.

great interest to Christians to be found in his house in Jerusalem. The Emir, who probably knew the story of Malchus, roared with laughter, but did them the favor of showing them every part of his house. Fr. Mariano was attended by his Vicar, by the Procurator and by a dragoman. Together they made a thorough search but failed to find any sign of Malchus. Following this, he wrote a blistering denial of the whole story of the supposed Jew and added the following points: "(1) No one ever heard of his existence before Pennalius wrote of it; (2) Christ was struck when He was in the house of Annas on Mt. Sion, not when He was in the Pretorium (then the palace of the Emir); (3) The Turks always have an eye peeled for ready cash and are likely to see or hear or show anything the market will bear. And furthermore this name, "Pennalius" was not to be found on any of the Franciscan guest-lists and so I. Fr. Mariano, personally believe that Pennalius never saw the Holy Land."

Despite his wrath, perhaps fomented by poorly suppressed Moslem mirth, Fr. Mariano did not reject the absolute possibility of the story, for, as he said, "Elias and Henoch remain alive and the Seven Holy Sleepers miraculously existed for centuries."

Nevertheless there still appeared writers, some of them Franciscans, who loved to report the myth and who casually neglected to identify it as such,—a circumstance which probably made many weary writers turn over in their graves.

The German Franciscan, Fr. Francis Ferdinand of Trolio, describing his voyage in 1666-70¹⁸ dedicated some pages to this and to similar stories. About 1670, the French Franciscan, Fr. Leonard of Clou, who had been a Councilor of the Holy Land, likewise repeated it, omitting any judgments against it. ¹⁹ In 1679, the Italian priest, Ser Dominicus Laffi, related it, leaving all responsibility for it to other authors. He hastened to say, however, that he thought the Jew "had not been punished as much as he deserved." (!!) ²⁰ In 1700 another Italian priest, Ser Didacus Angeli, told how he visited the places but had heard no scourging and had seen no strange man pacing the floor. But he did observe that "the writer of the story of Malchus described details so well as easily

^{18.} Orientalische Reisebeschreibung (Dresden, 1676) pp. 174-178.

^{19.} Itinerarium breve Terrae Sanctae (Florentiae, 1891) p. 161.

^{20.} Viaggio in Levante, p. 161.

to deceive the unwary." 21

In 1704, the Franciscan, Fr. Peter of Vicentia, wrote a guide to the Holy Places in which he mentioned all the arguments of Fr. Mariano and suggested that Rome prohibit any further publication of the fable. ²² In 1713 a noted Latin poet, the Franciscan, Fr. Conrad Heitling, at one time Guardian at Bethlehem, condemned it again. ²³

More than any prohibiting laws or vehement denials, the one thing that contributed most to its collapse was simply opening the door of the place in question and letting everyone see for themselves.

By the middle of the nineteenth century the local coloring of the legend was quite dead, when the renowned architect, Hermes Pierotti, who lived in Palestine from 1854 till 1862, in his work on ancient and modern Jerusalem, 24 noted a Jewish house (really of crusader time) near the VIIth station and identified it as "the house of the Wandering Jew".(!) Perhaps he was unduly influenced by the itinerary of Ser Mariano da Siena. However, in his great work, Jerusalem Explored 25 he wrote: "Farther on after Veronica's house the street is arched over, and in the side-walls are remains of ancient masonry. Here, some place the house of the Wandering Jew. This tradition, however, (or rather legend) is not accepted by the Christians of Jerusalem." In the mind of Pierotti, it is safe to say, the "Christians" are the Franciscans. When the fable was entirely excluded from the Guide to the Holy Places of Brother Lavinus of Hamme (Ghent 1875) the deathblow was finally given. Today, no one connects the Wandering Jew with any specific remains in Palestine. To which we add a fervent. Amen.

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^{*}Appreciation is hereby expressed for the work of Fr. Peter Eichelberger, O.F.M., in helping to prepare the Ms. for publication in English.

^{21.} Viaggio in Terra Santa (Venezia, 1737) p. 84.

^{22.} Guide fedele alla Santa Città di Gierusalemme (Venezia, 1704) pp. 80-81.

^{23.} Peregrinus affectuosus per Terram Sanctam et Jerusalem (Graecii, 1713). Vol. I. p. 107.

^{24.} Plan de Jerusalem ancienne et modernepar le Docteur Ermete Pierotti, Architecte, Ingénieur, Ancien Commandant du Génie Sarde, (Paris chez Kaeppelin).

^{25.} Jerusalem Explored, being a Description of the Ancient and Modern City, translated by Thomas George Bonney (London, 1864) p. 199.

THE BREVIARY OF ST. CLARE

A CORRECTION

In my attempt to date more precisely the so-called Breviary of St. Clare. 1 preserved in the Franciscan friary of San Damiano near Assisi, I had to disprove those arguments which unduly neglect the fact that the copying of manuscripts is primarily a mechanical occupation. Amongst other things I opposed the conclusion that the date 1227, given in the title of the Easter table, indicates the year in which the codex actually was written and proved the untenability of such an argument with the aid of other liturgical manuscripts, which appear to have been copied many years after the date given in either the title of their Easter tables or the introduction of the martyrology. The conclusion then was drawn that the Breviary of St. Clare could be dated by internal arguments only; these show in fact that the codex was written in the years 1231-41. The end of this period seemed more likely, since the Ordo for grace before and after meals results to be an almost contemporary addition, made in virtue of Haymo's Ordo breviarii, which in its turn dates from 1243-44.3

Meanwhile, I came across one of the expert publications of Henry Mariott Bannister, calling attention to calendarial tables as means for dating manuscripts. My general conclusion about initial dates of Easter tables is fully in accordance with the results of Bannister's study and till now neither the Breviary under discussion can be dated by the year 1227, marked in the title of the Easter table. Nevertheless, it seems that the table itself furnishes a striking indication of the year in which the scribe started his work. If this is so, it was not at the end of the period 1231-41, but in or shortly before 1234.

Bannister gives a list of not less than fifty cases, in which copyists of paschal and other tables drew attention to certain

^{1.} A. van Dijk, O.F.M., The Breviary of Saint Clare in Franciscan Studies VIII, 1948, 38 ff.

^{2.} Loc. cit., 42 f.

^{3.} Loc. cit., 44 and 46.

^{4.} H.M. Bannister, Signs in calendarial tables in Mélanges offerts à M. Émile Chatelain (15 Avril 1910), Paris, 1910, 141 ff.

years by adding to the letters or cyphers concerned either a simple dot or stroke, or any other kind of special mark. He shows that this was a well known practice of indicating the date on which the tables—and therefore the codices—were about to be used in the near future.

Two of the three Franciscan codices with an Easter table of 1228—the Breviary of St. Clare and the diurnal of the Poor Clares of Assisi, now in the Bodleian library, Oxford, Miscell. liturg. 248 (Sum. Cat. 19353)—appear to have such indications. The latter, in the previous article erroneously called "a primitive Franciscan breviary with strong pre-Haymonian influences", is written in the second half of the thirteenth century, according to additions in the calendar after 1269. In the Easter table there is a black dot and perhaps a pen prick under the c for April 24, 1272. Because of the inaccuracy of c instead of ce, it may be that somebody intended to make a correction. In any case the diurnal was in use at that time. In a second table based on the Golden Number, fol.7, there is a pen prick under the first letter of Marcius in the line with the Golden Number V. In the second half of the century this corresponds either to Easter, 1277, or to Easter, 1296.

In the Breviary of St. Clare the case is somewhat more complicated. There are four cases with an addition: 6 the z for April 23, 1234 (line 4, n. 7) has a single dot underneath; the f for April 6, 1292 (line 9, n. 5) the vj for March 26, 1312 (line 11, n. 1) and the c for April 3, 1317 (line 11, n. 6) have each the same dot, but they are also "corrected" with another letter, respectively n, c and r.

^{5.} Franciscan Studies, loc. cit., 41. This breviary, however, is cod. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Canonic. liturg. 171 (Sum. Cat. 19301). It has already been mentioned in Franciscan Studies VII, 1947, 430 ff., and will be described in the near future.

The diurnal is a small codex, 95 x 75 mm., of 2 \pm 335 vellum leaves, written by different hands. In the calendar, the feast of St. Clare is in red; in the litany her name is the first of the Virgins; at the end of the litany there is a versicle and prayer proministro vel abbatissa nostra (fol. 10^{r-b} , 11^{r-a}); at the end of the psalter, fol. 144^{V} , a contemporaneous hand added a prayer of St. Rufinus, titular Saint of the cathedral of Assisi. The num who wrote the calendar noted in the upper margin of fol. 1^{r} : Anno domini m^{o} cc^{o} lv v^{o} ldus lanuarii o[biit] p[ater] m[eus]; in that of fol. 2^{V} : Anno domini m^{o} cc^{o} xliiij, vj ldus aprilis o[biit] m[ater].—The Easter table is obviously not a copy from that in the Breviary of St. Clare.

^{6.} They have been noted in the variants, loc. cit., 42.

So far I have considered these additions as erroneous or rather curious and inexplicable "corrections". As a matter of fact, in the last three cases they still remain a mystery, since the original f, vj and c did not need correction whatsoever. Yet, the dots underneath may well have the same significance as the signs mentioned by Bannister. Especially the single dot under the z for Easter, 1234, may indicate the year in which the table either was written or was used for the first time. In the latter case the copying of the manuscript must have taken place between 1231 and 1234.

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THE BREVIARY OF SAINT FRANCIS

Almost every pilgrim, who has prayed on the tomb of "Santa Chiara" in Assisi, has stood in silence and recollection before the simple but invaluable treasures of the adjacent convent of the Poor Clares, before a collection of Franciscan relics exhibited behind the iron gate in the chapel of the Blessed Sacrament. None of them perhaps recalls so vividly the most intimate life of "the most sympathetic of all Saints" as the book enclosed in a small glass case and known as the Breviary of St. Francis of Assisi. Precious though it is as a relic, the codex is also the most ancient document of the reformed liturgy of Pope Innocent III and as such is practically unknown.

A short description given by E. d'Alençon, O.F.M. Cap., ¹ so far the most extensive note ever published on the subject, remains insufficient from a liturgical point of view; an article of O. Kammshof² is almost inaccessible; a few rubrics copied at haphazard by E. Clop, O.F.M., ³ are not always correct, while his evaluation of the manuscript itself is rather misleading. The many references to and transcriptions of the dedication written by Brother Leo⁴ do not reveal more than a single detail, however interesting, of early Franciscan history.

In this review, 5 the so-called Breviary of St. Clare (C) has been

^{1.} De Breviario S.P.S. Francisci in Analecta Ordinis Minorum Capuccinorum XIV, 1898, 175 ff.

^{2.} Das Brevier des hl. Franziskus in Der Katholik I, 1902, 335 ff.

^{3.} Saint François et la liturgie de la Chapelle papale in Archivum Franciscanum Historicum (AFH) XIX, 1927, 764 ff. The valuation of the codex is much better in Il Santorale nel Breviario francescano in Studi Francescani I, 1914.

^{4.} T. Locatelli, Vita breve di santa Chiara, Assisi, 1882, 178 ff., reprinted from Il settimo centenario della nascita di san Francesco III, 1881, 169 ff.; Faloci Pulignani, O.F.M. Conv., La calligrafia di S. Francesco in Miscellanea Francescana VII, 1898, 70 ff.; P. Sabatier, Speculum perfectionis seu S. Francisci Assisiensis legenda antiquissima auctore fratre Leone in Collection de documents pour l'histoire litteraire du Moyen Age I, Paris, 1898, 175 f., note 2; L. Lemmens, O.F.M., in AFH I, 262 and Testimonia minora saec.XIII de S. Francisco, Ad Claras Aquas, 1926, 61.

^{5.} A. van Dijk, O.F.M., The Breviary of Saint Clare in Franciscan Studies VIII, 1948, 22 ff. and 35ff.

studied and described. Now that of St. Francis (F) may be considered in the same way, i.e., in so far as it depends on Innocent's Ordinary and, consequently, is related to both the Breviary of St. Clare and the breviary compiled according to the Franciscan Rule. The order followed previously has been reversed for practical purposes, the description and the history of the codex preceding the more detailed notes on the content.

Vellum; 320 leaves, 170 x 120 mm., including the two blank fly leaves, numbered recently with pencil in the right hand side of the upper margins of the rectos. The 32 gatherings are composed as follows: gathering 1 originally 10 leaves, now missing the first leaf (the title page) and the corresponding 10th leaf; gatherings 24 and 26: 4 leaves; gathering 32: 6 leaves; gatherings 2-8 (incl.), 15, 18-23, 25 and 27-31: 10 leaves; gatherings 9-14 and 16: 12 leaves; gathering 17: 14 leaves. After the 23rd gathering, one gathering seems to have been taken out; there is still the binding thread. In the 24th gathering, more exactly, between fol. 262 and 263, a leaf has been torn out, the text, however, continues.

The different handwritings are all of the thirteenth century and,

except that of the gospel book, of Central Italian character.

The most ancient part, the breviary, fol.2^{r-a}-198^{v-b}, is written in double columns of 38-41 lines, 130 x 83 mm., and dates from the first quarter of the century. The characters are very small but regular and clear, still lacking the break of the Gothic type. On a good number of pages the sepia-colored ink has become very faint. The initials are flourished and alternately red and blue; rubrics always in red; lessons, prayers and chapters in a somewhat larger character.

Slightly later, but still belonging to the first quarter of the thirteenth century, is the gospel book, fol.265^{r-a}-319^{v-b}. Its text, in double columns of 37 lines, 127 x 85 mm., is written in a very regular, clean and rather heavy handwriting, which does not seem of pure Italian type; French influence is likely. The initials of the gospels are flourished and alternately in blue and red, occasionally with a motif of animals, e.g., fol.267^{v-a}. The text and punctuation are thoroughly corrected, either by the scribe himself, fol.311^{r-a}, or by others, fol.312^{v-a}, 313^{r-a}, 313^v, 314^r, 315^v. On the first page of the gospel book, actually fol.265^r and the first page of the 26th gathering, the text in the lower part of the second column is almost entirely faded and the whole page thumb-marked. The book has apparently been used separately before it was bound up with the other parts.

The psalter, fol.199^{r-a}-249^{r-b}, is written in double columns of 35-37 lines, 125 x 83 mm., in strong characters, which reminds one of the *littera bononiensis* before its complete formation. At the beginning of the first psalm fol.199^{r-a}, there is a large initial B; with the following *eatus vir*, written vertically at the right hand side, it forms a closed square. The first verse of each psalm has alternately a blue or a red initial, the following verses have a smaller one, always in red.

A fourth hand of about the middle of the thirteenth century wrote the dedication at the beginning of the codex, fol.1^V, erased and rewrote the greater part of the litany at the end of the psalter, fol.247^{V-D}-249^{r-D}, added rubrics to the Offices of the dead and Our Lady, fol.252^r-263^r, which are written again by another hand, and made in the psalter and throughout the breviary several corrections and marginal notes: fol.105^{V-a}, the prayer Absolve quesumus instead of the Excita; fol.113^V on an erasure, the last three lessons and the prayer for the feast of Sts. Marius, Audifax and Abachus; fol.146^{V-D} the ninth lesson for St. Christopher's: fol.175^{r-D} in the margin, a lesson of St. Mennas; fol.175^{V-a} in the lower margin, a lesson of St. Elizabeth; fol.177^{V-b} the prayer of St. Catherine; etc. From the similarity of this open, irregular and easily recognizable character, with the postils on the benediction of St. Francis, given to Brother Leo and still preserved in the Sacro Convento in Assisi,⁶ I believe it to be the handwriting of Leo himself. The palaeographical character is quite in conformity with the style of the dedication on fol.1^V and the personality of Brother Leo as described by Paul Sabatier.⁷

In the calendar, finally, there are several additions made by at least three thirteenth century hands. The most ancient of them is the marginal note against July 16: Obitus domini Innocentii avunculi dominj Stefani Cardinalis. Stephen was one of the three sons of Innocent III's brother Richard. In the middle of 1208, he had a benefice in Bayeux, about which he had a correspondence with his uncle. In the first half of 1216, he was created cardinal deacon of St. Adrian by Innocent, in 1228, cardinal priest of St. Mary in Trastevere by Gregory IX. As Vicar of Rome he continued in that office under Innocent IV. He died at Naples—the day after the

^{6.} See A. Cresi, O.F.M., La benedizione di fra Leone scritta da San Francesco alla Verna in La Verna XI, 1913, 110 ff.

^{7.} Speculum perfectionis, ed. cit., passim.

^{8.} Innocentii Regesta, lib.IX, n. 128 in PL 215, 144 ff., dated July 15th, 1208.

pope—Dec. 8, 1254.9 The note in the calendar must have been written by someone who was closely connected with the cardinal. This fact opens up so many possibilities that none of them offers more probability than another. It only confirms what is already evident from both the content and the dedication of the Breviary, viz.:—that the first part of the manuscript belonged to a chaplain of the papal court between the years 1216 and 1223.

The musical notation of the responsory Duo seraphim on fol.81^{r-b}-81^{v-a} is the only music in the book. On the recto side of fol.81, it is on staves of four, on the verso of five red lines. The neums are of ordinary Italian type of that time, i.e., Beneventan notation which has lost the rigidity of its angular design, while the points are already horizontally prolonged. The Common of the Saints for Eastertide, fol.125^{v-a}-127^{v-a}, was supposed to have a notation on three or four black lines; the neums were never copied on to them.

The binding dates from the time that the codex was made up in its present form: wooden covers, measuring 173 x 122 mm., with three strings in the spine. The whole is covered with white sheepskin, which is now worn off at the back. Later on, this binding was covered with black silk; this too is now almost entirely gone. In the center of the covers there are two sixteenth century silver medallions of niello—55 mm. square—set diagonally. The medallion on the front cover has a bust of St. Francis, that on the back, St. Clare. The flanges of the missing clasps are of the same material and display the arms of the Moriconi and Pucci families. St. Francis was believed to be a descendant of the Moriconi, whose arms are: (azure) a fess between three geese (argent). Whether there was put any relation between St. Clare and the Pucci—their arms are: estoile eight points 2—could not be established; perhaps

^{9.} I did not trace any special relationship between the cardinal and the friars; the story told by I. Palatius, Fasta cardinalium omnium sanctae Romanae ecclesiae cum stemmate gentilitio ...I, Venetiis, 1701, 427, on the authority of Iacobillus and Ciotto, has still to be checked.

^{10.} Good photographs of the cover are to be found in Miscellanea Francescana VII, 1898, 70 f.

^{11.} See L. Bracalonis, O.F.M., Casa, casato e stemma di San Francesco in Collectanea Franciscana (Assisi) III, 1933, 95 ff.

^{12.} According to the manuscript Stemmi delle famiglie mobili e civili d'Assisi. Raccolta per commissione del Comune, Assisi, 1926, 33 and 37.

they were the donors of the new covering. The corners of the covers are protected with repousse brasswork, inferior in workmanship to the medallions and the flanges.

The codex is well preserved; only in the breviary-part a few margins have been cut out, leaving, however, the text intact.

With the aid of the dedication, written by Brother Leo on the verso of the first leaf, the history of the manuscript can easily be traced. After the promulgation of the Rule in 1223, St. Francis acquired a breviary from a chaplain of the papal court. Apparently he wanted to recite the Divine Office according to the new liturgical ordinance of his Rule, even before an authentic compilation of the breviary was published by the Order. According to Leo's note, Francis intended the book to be for his companions Leo and Angelus. This may well have been so, even though the Rule explicitly permitted the friars to have breviaries. Because of the ideal of poverty the Saint possibly refused to regard the book as his own. Meanwhile, Leo stresses the fact that he actually used both the breviary and the gospel book.

When the breviary (with a calendar and a hymnal) came from Rome, it was probably incomplete. Neither, as will be seen later, did the chaplain, who provided it, give up his best copy! The Offices of the dead and Our Lady were missing. Those actually contained in the codex have their rubrics taken from Haymo's Ordo breviarii and, on palaeographical grounds, cannot be prior to the middle of the thirteenth century. Whether the breviary had a psalter, is difficult to say. If this were the case, it would almost certainly have been a so-called Roman psalter, which would have been of no use to the friars; in virtue of their Rule, they followed the generally accepted Hexapla version, the Gallican psalter. A copy of this is bound up with the breviary; yet, there is no indication whatsoever that St. Francis used it. In my opinion, the character of its Bolognese handwriting is rather too well developed for assigning it to the first quarter of the century. The gospel book, finally, was written at Francis' personal wish and it has already been stated that because of the marks on the first page, it must have been used separately before it was bound with the other parts.

After the death of St. Francis, his companions continued using the separate books. Shortly after 1244, when Haymo's Ordinary was published, Leo made several corrections in the breviary. Meanwhile, a formal request of the Chapter general of Genoa had given rise to an intense historical research on the life of St. Francis. The "Three Companions", Leo, Angelus and Rufinus, took an active part in

it ¹³ and Leo especially seems to have been eager to preserve for posterity both the precious relics and his personal notes. The occasion for this came, when about 1257, the Poor Clares moved from San Damiano to the new convent within the sheltering walls of the city. Leo completed the breviary, the psalter and the gospel book with the additional Offices of Our Lady and the dead, duly adapting the rubrics of the latter for the nuns. The books were bound into a single volume and offered, possibly with his rotuli, ¹⁴ to Blessed Benedicta, the second abbess of the community of Assisi. Benedicta died in 1260; ¹⁵ the explicit wish of Leo and Angelus, ¹⁶ that she and her successors should preserve the "Breviary" in the monastery of St. Clare, places the gift between the years, 1257, and 1260. And if we are to believe the tradition that Angelus died already in 1258, ¹⁷ it must have happened in 1257-58.

The nuns, in their turn, continued using the manuscript, probably not for a long time, but long enough to show the close relation that

^{13.} See J.H.R. Moorman, The sources for the life of S. Francis of Assisi in Publications of the University of Manchester, n. 274, Historical series, n. 79, Manchester, 1940, 89 ff.

^{14.} The Declaratio Regulae of Ubertino of Casale, quoted by Moorman, loc. cit., 97, gives as a tradition of his day, that Leo some of them commendavit in monasterio S. Clarae custodiendos ad futurorum memoriam. However, cum multo dolore audivi illos rotulos fuisse distractos et forsitan perditos, maxime quosdam ex eis. The fact that the Breviary of St. Francis was given to the nuns throws an interesting light on these words and it seems not unlikely that the "simple" relic escaped the hands of those who were "making" history.

^{15.} According to the Martyrologium Franciscanum, ed. Ign. Beschin and Jul. Falazzolo, Vicetiae, 1939, 99, on March 16; see, however, loc. cit., note 9.

^{16.} It is worth noting that Rufinus is not mentioned in the dedication. It is generally accepted that he died on November 14, 1270, cf. Martyrol. Francisc., ed. cit., 439 f., but according to the thirteenth century tradition in Assisi it was the day before. The testimony of the addition in the calendar of Francis' Breviary is confirmed by a note in the calendar of the Franciscan capitularium, written in Assisi at the end of the century, cod. Assisi, biblioteca communale, 261: Nov. 13. Obitus sancti fratris Rufini socii sancti de quo beatus franciscus testimonium perhibuit quod vivus iam canonizatus esset in sanctum ab ipso. Eodem die revolutis xxii annis obiit sanctus frater Leo anno domini m° cc $^{\circ}$ lxx $\{i\}$. ?

^{17.} Cf. Martyrol. Francisc., ed. cit., 58 f., under February 13. Cod. Assisi, 261, however, see note 11, gives his obit under March 11.

existed in those days between the convents of Assisi and southern Germany. At the end of the litany of the Saints, fol.249^{r-b}, in the margin against the prayer Omnipotens sempiterne Deus qui vivorum dominaris simul et mortuorum and on the blank space under the final versicle Exaudiat nos, one of the nuns wrote in irregular and heavy characters:

Bertholdus
Bathavien
sis episcopus
obiit frater
eius Ratisspo
nensis episcopus

Albertus Ratisponensis episcopus Jehebehardus comes frater suus. Heleieuiis Abbatissa de ulma. Lucardis. Agnes.

Berthold, count of Sigmaringen, ¹⁸ was appointed bishop of Passau in 1250 by the papal legate Peter de Collemedio and died April 10, 1254. ¹⁹ His brother Albertus, count of Peiting (Pietengau), was elected bishop of Ratisbon in 1247 and removed in 1259. ²⁰ He retired into the Benedictine monastery of Seitenstadt. His tomb was in the Franciscan Church of Vienna. ²¹ Everhard, apparently another brother, was the lord of the Hertingsberg, near Nuremberg, ²² of whom Wadding refers that he gave arcem suam Pergensem cum toto monte ²³ for the building of the convent of the Poor Clares.

- 18. Gabr. Bucelini, O.S.B., Germania topo-chrono-stemmato-graphica sacra et prophana I, Ulmae, 1604, 45^b, calls him comes de Pietengew, Zigenhaim et Sigmaringen.
- 19. Cf. J.F. Boehmer, Regesta imperii V, vol. 2, Innebruck, 1892-94, nn. 7995, 8009, 8215, 8246-47, 11592, 11600, 11652, 11657-58, 11664.
- 20. Cf. Regesta imperii V, vol. 1, Innsbruck, 1881-82, nn. 4528ⁿ-30, 4847^a, 7995-97, 8001-2, 8053, 8091-92, 8197, 8207, 8218, 8220, 9120, 9126, 9155, 9157, 9207-08, 11664, 11671.
- 21. Cf. V. Greiderer, O.F.M., Germania Franciscana seu Chronicon geographo-historicum Ordinis S.P. Francisci in Germania I, Oeniponte, 1777, 506, n. 426; Bucelini, loc. cit., 44^b.
- 22. Cf. Regesta imperii, ed. cit., nn. 2272, 4144, 4227, 4255, 4268-69, 4298, 4338, 4361, 4364, 4371, 4378, 14775, where his name occurs in documents ranging from 1230 till 1237.
- 23. L. Wadding, O.F.M., Annales Ordinis Minorum, ad ann., 1278, n. 39, ed. Quaracchi, 1931, vol. V, 67. It was impossible for me to check Minges, Geschichte der Franciskaner in Bayern, München. 1896, 36, who treats of the convent.

His wife and three daughters, Guta, Liutgard and Agnes became nuns. Two of these may be mentioned in the Breviary. *Heleieuiis*, is unmistakably the first abbess of the convent in Ulm, where the Poor Clares arrived in 1237 and obtained a place called "uff dem griess".²⁴

Together with the obit of Brother Rufinus in the calendar, the two additions just quoted seem to be the latest ones written in the thirteenth century. None of the feasts introduced by the general Chapters in and after 1269, have been noted either in the calendar or in the margins of the Proper of the Saints, and it may be accepted that neither the names of St. Basilla (May 20) and St. Valentine (October 14) 25 have been added in the calendar for liturgical purposes. In any case, the feasts written on May 23-25, June 13 and October 2-5, were evidently intended as "pious" covering of the ancient additions of the feasts of St. Francis and St. Anthony. The nuns were no experts in palaeography but clever enough to understand that in a relic of their Holy Father, he could hardly be mentioned as a Saint. The remedy for this, a few rough erasures, seemed to be very simple. But the octave of St. Anthony escaped the "corrector's" attention.

fol.1°. Blank; there is an erasure of circa ten lines of text, of which only the red initial B is still visible.

fol. 1^v. Beatus franciscus acquisivit hoc breviarium sociis suis fratri Angelo et fratri leoni, eo quod tempore sanitatis sue voluit dicere semper officium sicut in regula continetur, et tempore infirmitatis sue cum non poterat dicere volebat audire, et hoc continuavit dum vixit. Fecit etiam scribi hoc evangelistare, ut eo die quo non posset audire missam occasione infirmitatis vel alio aliquo manifesto impedime[n] to: faciebat sibi legi evangelium quod eo die dicebatur in ecclesia in missa, et hoc continuavit usque ad obitum suum. ²⁶ Dicebat enim. Cum non audio missam

^{24.} Cf. Wadding, op. cit., ad ann., 1237, n. 16, ed. cit., II, 492; Regesta imperii, loc. cit., n. 4407.

^{25.} It seems rather impossible to identify this Valentine, bishop and confessor. The feast of St. Valentine, bishop of Terni, martyr and patron against epilepsy is February 14 or July 30 (Translation); that of the Roman martyr, companion of Marius and Setericus, October 24.

^{26.} Cf. I Celano, pars 2, cap. 8, n. 110, Analecta Franciscana X, Ad Claras Aquas .1926-41, 85; II Celano, pars 2, cap. 163, n. 217, loc. cit., 255.

adoro corpus christi oculis mentis in oratione quemadmodum adoro cum video illud in missa. 27 Audito vel lecto evangelium beatus franciscus ex maxima reverentia domini obsculabatur semper evangelium Quapropter frater Angelus et frater leo supplicant sicut possunt domine Benedicte abbatisse pauperum[do]minarum monasterii sancte Clare et omnibus abbatissis eiusdem monasterii que post ipsam venture erunt. ut in memoria et veneratione[?]sancti patris librum istum in quo multotiens legit dictus pater semper conservent in monasterio sancte Clare ::

Addition written by Brother Leo; for the details concerning the codex see above.

fol.2^{r-a}-9^{v-b}. I igneas in celo acies viderimus et ipsum postea... sicut scriptum est in libro sermonum.I

fol.11^{r-a}-107^{v-b}. I non magnificasti leticiam. Letabuntur coram te...tabernacula non sua. Verbum domini quod factum est.

Proper of the Season, beginning in the eighth lesson of the first Sunday of Advent (homily of St. Gregory). The first leaf and the corresponding 10th leaf are missing. The ninth folio ends in the eighth lesson of the fourth Sunday of Advent, while the following leaf begins in the first lesson of Christmas.

The order of this part is that of Innocent's Ordinary and the breviaries "according to the use of the Roman Curia", except for the Sundays after Pentecost, which have been inserted in the lessons of the holy Scripture and the responsorial "historiae" of the last months of the liturgical year.

From the 12th till the 20th Sunday after Pentecost there are no titles; fol.93^{r-a}-102^{r-b}.

The extracts of the papal Ordines, see the description of C, are to be found on:

fol.40°. Non est hic pretermittendum de officio cineris. Cineres fiunt de palmis preteriti anni et cum benedicuntur a sacerdote cantatur hec ā. Exaudi domine ... Postmodum imponit sacerdos cinerem dicens ... Post hec si fiat processio cantantur iste ant. Iuxta vestibulum... Solet dominus papa hac die ad missam ... postea orat super populum.

^{27.} Cf. Speculum perfectionis, cap. 87, ed. cit., 175.

fol.58^{v-b}-59^{r-a}. [Feria quinta in cena domini]...Ad missam dicitur alta voce Gloria in ex[celsis]. Item decantetur a cantoribus. Introitus sine. Gloria patri ... Confecto igitur sacrificio pontifex solus communicat super altare ... Missa igitur sollempniter peracta. Indutus pontifex sicut cantavit.... Pontifex vero ingreditur basilicam sancti. laurentii ... Pontifex vero cum aqua calida. lavit pedes eorum. et tergit linteo. et deosculatur pedes eorum ... hanc ant. Diviserunt sibi vestimenta. cum ps. Deus deus meus respice in me.

fol.60^{V-a}-61^{r-a}. [D] ie sancto parasceve hora sexta. conveniant omnes ad laterani basilicam vel ad aliam ecclesiam. Tunc dominus pontifex. induat se omni ornatu ...et cum clericis suis dicat vesperum preteriti diei. non cantando. sed recitando.

fol.62^{r-b}-63^{v-a}. Ordo officii de sabbato sancto. hora sexta. a ministris ecclesie ignis excutitur de cristallo. sive de lapide et accenditur. lunior presbiterorum cardinalium. sacerdos indutus vestibus....Qua completa diaconus dicit lte missa est.

fol.64^{r-b}-64^v. [Dominica sancto [sic] pasche]... Ad missam celebratur officium, sicut consuetum est, et laudes profitiuntur. [sic]sicut in politico habentur. In secreta vero, descendunt duo diaconi.... Sed incipit Pater noster et cetera que secuntur.

fol.107^{v-b}-108^{r-a}. [1.] In omnibus festivitatibus que in sabbatis veniunt...

2.] Si vero festum trium lectionum in dominica venerit ...

[3.] De omnibus vigiliis in quibus ieiunium celebramus ...

[4.] Sciendum quod oratio A cunctis nos quesumus domine dicitur a festo purificationis ...

[10.] Adventus domini celebratur ubicumque dominicus dies... quarto nonas eius dem mensis.

Incomplete series of general rubrics for both Mass and Office; see the description of C.

fol. 108^{r-a}-177^{v-b}. In festo sancti saturnini. oratio. Deus qui nos beati saturnini ... In sancti grisogoni. [Oratio.] Adesto domine ...liberemur. Per. (Oratio sancte katherine. virginis et martiris. Deus qui dedisti ... Qui vivis.)

Proper of the Saints, ranging from the feast of St. Saturninus (Nov. 29) to that of St. Chrysogonus (Nov. 24). Brother Leo added the prayer for the feast of St. Catherine in virtue of and in accordance with Haymo of Faversham's Ordo breviarii.

A short extract of the papal Ordo for Candlemas Day is on fol.120°. Hodie conveniunt omnes ad ecclesiam Sancte. martine. pontifex. clerus. populus. tunc presbiter iunior presbiterorum cardinalium sacris indutus vestibus benedicit cereos ... Demum [sic | preparat se ad officium misse celebrandum. Celebratque sollempniter more solito.

fol.177^{v-b}-188^{v-a}. In natalitiis apostolorum ad vesperas. capitulum. Iam non estisalia oratio plurimorum Concede quesumus omnipotens deus ut sicut ... In festo unius martiris ... In festo plurimorum martirum ... In festo unius confessoris pontificis ... In festo doctorum ad vesperas capitulum Ecce sacerdos ymnus Iste confessor V. Amavit ad magnificat ant. O doctor optime ut supra. Oratio Innocentii iii pape Deus corona pontificum et lucerna doctorum ... In festo confessoris non pontificis ... In festo virginum ... In dedicatione ecclesie ... dei et porta celi. Oratio ut supra.

Common of the Saints. Except for the common of the Doctors (with prayer and lessons according to Innocent's Ordinary), the same arrangement is to be found in both the Ordinary and Franciscan books.

fol.188^{v-b}-189^v. Blank.

fol.189v-192v-a. Calendar, to be transcribed presently.

fol. 192^{v-a}-198^{v-a}. () lux beata trinitas et principalis unitas ... qui supernum tenet regnum, per eterna secula.

Hymnal, beginning with a hymn of the holy Trinity, a feast which is not to be found in the book. Here ends the most ancient part of the codex.

fol.199^{r-a}-247^{v-b}. [Ant.] Servite domino. [ps.] Beatus vir qui ... crediderit . salvus esse non poterit.

Hexapla version of the psalter, arranged according to the days of the week and with the corresponding antiphons inserted. By tradition it was referred to as the psalmista. After the psalms follow the Canticles of both the Old and New Testament, the Te Deum and Quicumque. The handwriting has been described above.

Litany of the Saints, originally written by the hand of the psalter, but erased and rewritten mostly by Brother Leo according to the version of the Franciscan breviary founded on Haymo's Ordo breviarii. The original was most probably the pre-Haymonian litany of the friars. 28

In the margin against the prayer ()mnipotens sempiterne deus qui vivorum and under the final versicle there are two additions, written in a heavy character; see above.

fol.249 v-252r. Blank.

fol. 252^r-257^r. Incipit officium mortuorum. Ad matutinum absolute dicitur. Invitatorium. regem cui Deinde |- Istud | Invitatorium cum suo psalmo numquam dicitur nisi ... fratrum vel sororum si funus fuerit presens Orationes ut supra.

(Oratio in die depositionis Deus cui proprium ... Oratio pro defuncta femina Quesumus domine ... Oratio. In anniversario. Deus indulgentiarum domine ... Oratio pro uno defuncto vel pluribus. Inclina domine ...)

Office of the dead with rubrics according to Haymo's Ordo breviarii and adapted to the use of the convent of St. Clare. The prayers at the end have been added later and are not in Leo's handwriting.

fol.257^r-263^r. Incipit officium Beate Marie Virginis. Ad matutinum Domine labia mea aperies ... ora pro nobis deum. alleluia.

Office of Our Lady with rubrics as in the Office of the dead; the handwritings also by the same scribes.

fol.263 v-264. Blank.

fol.265^{r-a}-319^{v-b}. Incipiunt evangelia (domini nostri hiesu christi.) Dominica prima de adventu. Sequentia sancti ev[an]G[elii] secundum lucam. În illo tempore et ego resuscitabo eum in novissimo die.

Gospel book, written as has been described above. In the title the words put in ordinary brackets have been rewritten on an erasure. The gospels are ordered according to the liturgical year in a Proper of the Season, and a Proper and Common of

^{28.} Cf. A. van Dijk, The litany of the Saints in the breviary of the Roman Curia and the Friars Minor before Haymo of Faversham in Franciscan Studies, VII, 1947, 426 ff.

the Saints. They are mostly in accordance with those of the actual Roman missal, but for the weeks following the Epiphany, Easter and Pentecost there is one for each Wednesday and Friday. In the Passions of St. Luke and St. John, fol.284 v-b-293 r-b, the parts of the dialogue have been indicated by Cleleriter, +(Christus = trahe) and Slursum; in that of St. Matthew the S is substituted by an F (= fa ?). The Passion of St. Marc is missing; just before that of St. John there is a blank space for another gospel, fol.291 r-b. Other noteworthy details are the gospels of the feasts of St. Thomas martyr, (Dec. 29) and St. Silvester (Dec. 31), which are to be found in the Proper of the Saints, fol.317 r-a; further:

fol.269^{r-a}: a second gospel for the octave of the Epiphany: In eodem die. secundum lucam. Factum est autem dum baptizaretur omnis populus ...regressus est ab iordane.

fol.288^{r-a}. Feria .iij. | maioris ebdomade | secundum lohannem. In illo tempore. Dixit iesus discipulis suis. Amen amen dico vobis non est servus maior... et continuo clarificavit eum.

fol.312^{r-b}. Vigilia sancti andree apostoli. et festivitas sancti Nathanaelis discipuli domini. secundum lohannem. In illo tempore. Stabat iohannes et discipuli eius duo ...et descendentes supra filium hominis.

fol.315^{r-a}. In sancte felicitatis. secundum Matheum. In illo tempore. Loquente iesu ad turbas. ecce mater eius. Require retro in feria .iiij. prime dominice quadragesime.

fol.320. Blank.

THE CALENDAR

in the

BREVIARY OF ST. FRANCIS

The reason why the calendar of the Breviary of St. Francis has to be transcribed in its entirety does not need much explanation. Thirteenth century Roman calendars are extremely scarce, even though at that time the liturgy according to the use of the Roman Curia must have known at least four official calendars.

Shortly before the death of Innocent IV, a uniform calendar was published for a group of churches in Rome. It is the calendar belonging to the sacramentaries in the Vatican library, Ottobon. lat. 356, and the City library of Avignon, 100, and the lectionary in the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris, lat. 755. Since 1924, the sacramentaries have been regarded as documents of the papal court; 2 so is since 1934 the lectionary. 3 Soon I hope to prove in greater detail that these codices are the relics of a liturgical movement in Rome, developed most probably under the supervision of Cardinal John Cajetan Orsini, who became Pope Nicholas III in 1277. Strictly speaking, the books and their calendar are "according to the use of the papal court". Yet, they are so overloaded with local feasts and feasts new or traditional, introduced for a special purpose, that the whole can hardly give a picture of the real calendar of the court.

The Friars Minor published two revisions of their Roman, i.e., Curial, calendar. That belonging to the breviary and missal based on Haymo of Faversham's Ordinaries (1243-44) is well known. It is to be found in the many Roman breviaries and missals used by Franciscans, Augustinians, Servites, etc. up to the sixteenth century. Its prototype dates from shortly after 1260, more precisely from after the introduction of the feast of St. Bernard (August 20)

^{1.} Cf. Th. Klauser, Ein Kirchenkalender aus der römische Titelkirche der hl. Vier Gekronten in Scientia sacra. Theologische Festgabe für Kardinal Schulte, Köln, 1935, 11 ff.

^{2.} M. Andrieu, Le Missel de la Chapelle papale à la fin du XIII^e siecle in Miscellanea Francesco Erhle II, Studi e Testi vol. 38, Roma, 1924, 348 ff.

^{3.} V. Leroquais, Les Bréviaires manuscrits des bibliothêques publiques de France IV, Paris, 1934, 369 ff.

into the Franciscan liturgy — the result of a "festive" rivalry between the Franciscans and the Dominicans — and before the first correction officially prescribed to be made in the feast of St. Bibiana (December 2). The forty years following the promulgation of the Franciscan Rule (1223) were a period of great liturgical activity for the friars. The "Haymonian" calendar is a development of that belonging to the books published, in virtue of that Rule, between the years 1223-43. New Franciscan feasts have been added as well as Saints more generally venerated, such as St. Catherine of Alexandria and St. Bernard of Clervaux. Other

^{4.} Chapter general of Narbonne, AFH IV, 504, n. 18: De sancto Bernardo fiat officium die suo; i.e., in opposition to the rubric of Haymo's Ordinaries: De festivitatibus que infra octavam assumptionis beate Marie veniunt, nichil tunc agitur, sed post octavam celebrantur, on August 20 instead of August 23.—The exception was canceled by the general Chapter of Lyons, AFH VII, 681 and Miscellanea Francescana XXXIII, 18, which was held in 1272, and not in 1274; see Gallia Christiana III, Paris, 1876, 357, n. 20.

^{5.} After the canonization of St. Francis in 1228, the Cistercians celebrated his feast as a commemoration. In 1255, two years after the canonization of St. Peter of Verona and thirteen years after that of St. Dominic, they introduced also these two Dominican feasts, not as simple commemorations but as feasts of "twelve lessons". The favor is officially said to have been requested by the pope and Hugh of St. Cher but actually their request must have been formulated at the instigation of Humbert de Romans, who at that time was revising the liturgy of his Order. Humbert returned the compliment by introducing the feast of St. Bernard into the Dominican calendar. The Franciscans then, anxious that the Founder of their Order should not be neglected, asked the Cistercians to grant him the same honor, which in fact was accorded by the Chapter of 1259. St. Bonaventure, the Minister general, answered in his turn as Humbert had done before, introducing the feast of St. Bernard into the Franciscan calendar .-Cf. J.M. Canivez, O. Cist., Statuta Capitulorum Ordinis Cisterciensium II in Bibliothèque de la Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, fasc. 10, Louvain, 1934, 65, n.2; 410, n. 4 (cf. 421, n. 2); 450, n. 9; W.R. Bonniwell, O.P., A History of the Dominican liturgy, New York, 1945, 114, is not entirely correct in stating the reason why St. Bernard is to be found in the Dominican calendar.

^{6.} General Chapter of 1266 or 1269: In kalendario in festo sancte Bibiane addatur: et martiris; Miscellanea francisc. XXXV, 232. See also the kalendars of C and F, and A. van Dijk, Notae quaedam de liturgia franciscana mediante saeculo XIII in Ephemerides liturgicae LIV (XIV), 1940, 127, note 28.

^{7.} Cf. A. van Dijk, Il carattere della correzione liturgica di fra Haymone da Faversham, O.F.M. (1243-44) in Ephem, liturg. LIX, 1945, 213 f.

feasts were suppressed, such as the Dedications of the Roman basilicas of the Lateran and of Sts. Peter and Paul, which till then had survived even in the books of the friars. It cannot be established whether this "Haymonian" compilation contains still other alterations.

The calendar prior to Haymo's correction, or, more precisely, prior to 1260 circa, is practically unknown. A presumably reliable copy of this pre-Haymonian calendar is to be found in the breviary-antiphonal in the Franciscan friary of Munich, but here again the question arises how far this (and its exemplar) agrees with the common source from which all Franciscan calendars have been derived.

This common source is the calendar corresponding to the Ordinary of Innocent III, composed in the years 1216-23. No copy of this calendar is known to have survived, except that in the Breviary of St. Francis of Assisi. The book is in no way an official one; nor can it be regarded with certainty as actually having been used at court. Its calendar, moreover, has been altered according to the later additions and changes of both the pre-Haymonian and the Haymonian calendars. Nevertheless, it will be fundamental for further study, until another more reliable manuscript is discovered.

In the following description the original spelling has been retained with all its corruptions and blunders, though in a few cases these have been pointed out in the notes or corrected in the text with the aid of square brackets Original punctuation and use of capitals have been kept; the few entries in red are printed in italics. The columns of Sunday Letters and Golden Numbers have been omitted, as they have no liturgical significance. For practical purposes the Roman dating had to be replaced by the modern cyphering. Additions and corrections have been printed in ordinary brackets. Since the original is written in double columns, the marginal additions were made alternately either before the column of dates or after that of the lessons (N1). This lay-out has been followed in the transcription, except that the double columns could not be printed on the same page.

^{8.} Cf. van Dijk, Il carattere, loc. cit., 215 ff.

^{9.} Cf. A. Le Carou, O.F.M., L'Office divin chez les Frères Mineurs au XIII^e siecle, Paris, 1928, 151, 153 ff.

inuarius habet dies :	xxxi luna xxx.			
.xvi. dies.	1 Circumcisio domini Basili i et Martine virg.	D		
viii.)	2 Octava s. Stephani Telesphori pp et m.	(.i.l)		
	3 Octava s. Johannis et Aucteri pp et m.	(.i.l.)		
	4 Octava Innocentum	NI		
	5 Vigilia epyphanie			
	Epyphanie domini nostri ihu xpi (A festo stelle nu			
	7 merando perfic	e luna		
	8 post. xl. dies	terminus		
	9 septuagesime	fiet)		
	10 (Sancti pauli primi heremite	T)		
	11 Sancti Ygini(j) pp et mar	Nl		
	12			
	13 Octava Epyphanie (S. ylarii epi)	Nl		
	14 Felicis in pincis conf. et (pbri)	Nl		
	15 Sancti Mauri abbatis	Tl		
	16 Sancti Marcellini pp et mar(aquario)	Nl		
(Ante diem prisce	17 Sancti Antonii heremite (Sol in	Tl		
numquam deponitur	18 S. Aquile et Prisce m et v.	Nl		
Alleluia)	19 S. Marii. Marthe. Audifax et Abbacuc	Nl		
	20 S Fabiane pp et mr et Sebastiane mr	Nl		
	21 S Agnetis virg. et mr	Nl		
	22 S Vincentii et Anastasii mrm	Nl		
	23 S [E] Merentiane. virginis (et mr) 24	Tl		
	25 Conversio Sancti Pauli (D. h. v.)	NI		
	26			
	27_			
	28 S Agnetis Secunde (Claves .xl.e)	Nl		
	29			
	30_			
	31 S Cyri et Johannis;	Nl		

² Telesphori generally Jan. 5—(.i.l) written over the original Nl, which therefore was added after the octave day.

³ As under 2; Aucterus for Anterus, Antherus or Antherius.

⁵ M.p. del. epyphanie

¹⁶ Marcellini sic cod. for Marcelli

¹⁸ M.p. del. S. Aquile et

²⁰ Fabiane. Sebastine sic cod.

²⁸ Secunde sic cod.

Februarius habet dies xxviij quando non est (et quando est) hisestus (habet) xxviij (Nox habet horas.xiiii.dies vero

1 S Ygnatii pp et mr. 2 Purificatio S Marie. virg. 3 S Blasii epi et mr. 4 S Giliberti conf. D (h.viiij) 5 S Agathe virg. et mr. 6	Nl Nl Nl Nl
8	
10 S Scolastice. virg et mr.	Tl
11	
12	
13	
14 S Valentini epi et mr	Nl (Ultimus ter minus. xl ^e .)
15 (Sol in pisce.)	minus. xi ./
16	
17 18	
19	
20	
21 (Preveniens cathedra dat tardius Alle[luia] vacare)	
22 Cathedra sancti Petri apostoli.	(Cedit) Nl (yemps retro)
23 (Vigilia locus bisestus.)	(cathedrato symone)
24 S Mathie apostoli	Nl (petro)
25 26 D (h.x.)	
26 D (h.x.) 27	
28	

¹⁰ et mart.] sic cod.

Marcius habet dies xxxi. luna .xxx.

```
1 Marcii (Nox habet) D (h.i.)
2 (horas .xii. dies vero .xii.)
3
4
5
6
  (virginum)
Sanctarum Perpetue et felicitatis
                          (D h.i.)
8
  (ctorum)
San... Quadraginta mrm
                                                                             NI
10 (Obiit f [rate.] r Petrus Cattanji)
11
                   (Claves pasce.)
12 S Gregorii pp
                                                                             NI
13
14
15
16
17
                (Sol in ariete)
18
19
20
21 5 Benedicti abbatis. (equinoctium)
                                                                             NI
22 (Post festum 3. Benedicti ubicumque
23 .iiii. decima luna invenitur. ibi
24 dominica proxima resurrectionis domini
                                                                             NI
25 Annuntiatio s Marie W. (celebretur)
26
27 Resurrectio domini nostri ihu xpi
28
                           D (h.ii.)
29
30
31
```

⁷ Apparently no indication of the lessons.

¹⁰ Addition made in black ink; Obiit (19) in 1221.

Aprilis habet dies xxx. luna xxviiii.

```
1 Aprilis (Nox habet horas.x.dies xiiii)
2
3
4
5
6
7
                            D (h.i.)
8
9
10
11
12
14 S Tiburtii. Valeriani. et Max [imi] (mrm) .
                                                               Nl
15
16
17 S Aniceti pp et mr
                                                 (Sol in tau) Nl (rum)
18
19
20
                            D (h.ix.)
21 (orum mm)
22 Sanct Sotheris pp et mr et Gaij pp et mr
                                                               NI
23 S Georgii mar
                                                               NI
24 (Extrema pasce. tua docet passio marce.)
25 S Marci eug. letanie maiores.
                                                               Nl (Vitimum pasce.)
26 S Cleti pp et m. Marcelii(ni) pp et m.
                                                               Nl
27
28 S Vitalis mar.
                                                               NI
29
30
```

¹⁷ taurum] sic cod.

Madius habet dies xxxi. luna .xxx.

(Nox habet horas	1 Madius \$\overline{S}\$ Philippi et Jacobi	Nl
	3 Inventio 5 +. et Alexandri. Eventii the	
	4 odori et Juvenalis mrm D	Nl
	5	
	6 \$\overline{S}\$ Johannis apostoli ante portam latinam	NI
	8 Apparitio S Michaelis	Nl
	9	210
	10 S Cordiani et Epymachi mrm	Nl
	11	
	12 S Nerei et achillei.et Pancratii mr[m]	Nl
	13 Dedicatio s marie ad m [arti] res	
	(orum martirum)	
	14 Sanct Bonifetii(mris)	NI
	15 16	
	17	
	18 (Sol in geminos.) 19 S Potentiane. virg.	Nl
	20 (S bascille virg. m)	146
	21	
	22	
	23	
	24	
	25 (s vrbani pp et mr) D (.x.)	NI
	26 S Eleutheri i pp et mr	NI
	27 S Johannis pp et mr	Nl
	28	
	29	
	30 S Felicis pp et mr	Nl
	31 S Petronille virg.	Nl

¹⁴ The word martiris is added on an erasure of the original victoris en corone. The addition in black ink as on March 10th.

¹⁸ geminos sic cod.

²⁰ Recent addition in heavy characters. Bascilla. Basilla or Basillissa, Rome.

²³⁻²⁴ Erasures.

²⁵ Addition made by a recent hand. Here, like in the two previous days, there was probably an addition concerning the translation of St. Francis. After this was erased, St. Urban was replaced again on his original date.

Junius habet dies xxx. luna xxviiii

1 Junii 5 Nichomedis m ^r	(Nox habet horas.vi.
2 S Marcellini et petri atque herasmi m ^r	Nl dies vero.xviii)
3	
4	
5	
6 (Ultimus terminus pentecostes)	
7 (D h.v.)	
8	
9 S Primi et feliciani mem	Nl
10 _ D	
11 S Barnabe ap osto li .	Nl
12 S Basilidis cirini. Naboris et Nazarii m	NI
13 (S Antonij)	
14	
15 S Viti Modesti m ^r et Crescentie .v.	Nl
16 D (h.iiii.)	
17 (Sol in cancrum)	
18 5 Marcelliani et marci mrm	Nl
19 S Gervasi[i]. et Protasii. mrm _	(Sol) Nl (stitium)
20 S Silverii. pp. et mr. (et oct ava s ant	Nl
21 tonii)	
22 S Paulini epi et conf.	Nl
23 Vig[ilia].	
24 Nativitas Sancti Johannis bapt[ist]e	
25 (orum mrm)	Nl
26 S[anct] Johannis et pauli	Nl
27	Nl
28 Vig[ilia].s.petri et pauli.et leonis pp et conf.	NI
29 S.apostolorum Petri et Pauli	NI
30 S Pauli ap[osto] li (Com.)	NI

¹ Dedication of his basilica on the Via Nomentana; feast day September 15.

¹³ The addition, written in black ink (see March 10 and May 14), has been erased and covered with *luciani et crecenciani* by the scribe who noted the Saint of May 20.

¹⁷ cancrum sic cod.

²⁰ The addition written by the same hand as that of June 13.

Julius habet dies xxxi. luna .xxx.

,	3 7 7 11 0 7 1 1 7 7	
	1 Julii Octava 5. Johannis bapt ist e	NI
	2 S[anct] Processi et martiniani m ^r [m]	Nl
	3	Νί
	4	Ni Ni
	5	
	6 Octava apostolorum. Petri et pauli	Nl
	7	Nl
	8	
	9 (Rufine et secunde.v.)	
	(11411110 01 00041120111)	8.72
	10 S. vii. fratrum et mater eorum (felicitas)	Nl
	11 S Pii pp et mr	Nl
	12 S Naboris et felicis mrm	Nl
	13 S Anacleti pp et mr D (h .xi.)	NΙ
	14 (Dies caniculares) (S Margare)	
(01: 1:	15 S Quirici et Julite m [m]	Nl
(Obitus dni	16 (Ca[nonisatio s. franci]sci) (Dh.ix.)	
Innocentii	17 S Allexi confessoris (Sol in leone.)	NI
avunculi dnj	18 Simphorose cum .vij. filiis suis	Nl
Stefani Cardinalis)	19 (A .iiii.º decimo kalendis augusti usque no nas Septembris non minuas san	
Car a sisterio y	guinem)	
	20_	
	21 S Praxedis vit (Officium fit pro defunctibus fratribus)	Nl
	22 S Marie magdalene	Nl
	23 S Apolenaris epi et m ^r	Nl
	24 S Christine .v. et vig [ilia] Jacobi	NI
	25 S Jacobi apostoli.et S Christofori m.(.i.l)	Nl
	26 5 Pastoris conf. et p[res] b[ite]ri	tr l.
	27 § Pantaleonis m. et innocentii pp	Nl
	28 S Nazarii.et celsi.et victoris pp et mr	NI
	29 S Felicis pp et m ^e .ii. Simplicii Fausti	NI.
	30 S Abdon et senaes m ni et beatricis	Nl
	31	140
	31	

³⁻⁵ N [ovem] l [ectionum], because of the octave of the apostles.

⁹ Cf. 10.

¹⁰ Rufine ... and felicitas, both additions by the same hand.

¹⁴ S Margarete, originally on the 20th of this month, where actually the erasure is hardly to be seen.

¹⁶ Only the first and last letters of the Canonization are legible.

²¹ defunctibus] sic cod. Handwriting as on the 14th.

^{29 .}ii.] sic cod. for et.

et horas .	х.		
.xiiii.)			
1 Vincula S petri et s Machabeorum (D)			
2 S Stephani pp. et mr			
3 Inventio corporis S stephani protomris			
mrm	Nl		
frm predi	catoru	m .nl.)	
i	Nl	(Autumnus oritur)	
mFm	Nl		
	Nl	(Eodem die 3 Rufi	
		ni ēpi et mrīs ix l.)	
	Nl		
irgineus)	Nl		
	NI		
	NI		
(et)	NI	(octava sancte marie)	
Regnat	t in aut	cumno (festum cle	
-	Nl	mentis ad usque)	
	Nl	·	
	Nl		
m (.i.l.)	Nι		
29 Decollatio S Johannis baptiste et sabine .v.			
30 S Felicis et Audacti. m ^f [m]. D (h.vii.)			
4 mrm] original handwriting, belonging probably to the Saints erased on the 5th.			
	mrm frm predi i mrm (et) [Regnal	s Nl Nl s Nl frm predicatoru i Nl N	

- 5 Addition in black ink, see June 13.
- 12 Erasure of the feast of St. Clare, added in red.
- 16 N [ovem] l [ectionum], because of the octave of Our Lady. 18 virgineus] sic cod.
- 19 For the erasure of Nl, see the 16th. The word Clare almost illegible.
- 21 See the 16th.
- 23 The addition of the verse in hardly legible. The obit in the handwriting of July 14 and 21.
- 24 Autperte for Aureae (Ostia and in Via Iulia). The feast has been canceled by dots under the text.
 - 27 In original handwriting, probably a mistake concerning the last letters of the 29th.
- 28 Audacti instead of Adaucti a slip of the pen common in the calendars; see the Brev. of St. Clare.

September habet dies xxx. luna xxx.

(Nox habet horas.	1 S.xii. fratrum et s egidii abbatis (.i.l)	NI
xii.dies vero.xij)	2 S Antonini martiris	Nl
	3 D (.h. iii.)	
	1	
	5	
	6	
	7 (vi rg ,) (.i.l)	
	8 Nativitas S Marie et S Adriani mr	NI
	9 S Gorgonii m r . et dorothei m r	NZ
	10	141
	11 \overline{S} Proti et Jacinti m\overline{rm}	Nl
	12	14.6
		
		0.7.2
	14 Exaltatio S.+et S corneli[i] et cy	Nl
	15 S Nicomedia mr	Nl
	16 S Euphemie .v. lucie et Geminiani	NI
	17 (Sol in libra)	
	18	
	19	
(Equinoctium)	20 S Eustachii cum uxore et filiis mrm (Vigilia)	Nl
(D'.h.iiii.)	21 S Mathei apostoli et evang. (Autumnale)	NI
	(cum sociis suis)	
	22 S Mauritii et sociorum eius mr[m]	NI
	23 S Lini pp et mr	Nl
	24	
	25	
	26 S Justine v. et mr et Cypriani epi et mr	Nl
	27 S Cosme et Damiani mrm	Nl
	28 (Officium fit pro defunctis fratribus)	
	29 Dedicatio Basilice S Michaelis	Nl
	30 S Jeronimi p res b [ite] ri et conf	Nl

²² et soc.eius has been canceled by dots under the words; the final m of martyrum has been erased.

²⁸ Addition in the handwriting of July 14, 21 and August 23.

Octuber habet dies xxxi. luna xxviiii (Nox habet noras.xiiii. dies vero.x.)

1 \$\overline{S}\$ Remigii epi et conf. 2 (\$S\$ eleuteri mart.) 3 (\$S\$ Dionisii mart.) 4 (\$S\$ Marci et. marciani mart) 5 (\$S\$ Apolinaris epi)	NI	
6	NI	
7 S Marci pp et conf. Sergii bachi Mar 8 celli et apulei mm	141	
9 S Dionisii rustici et eleuterii m rm	NI	
10 S Cerboni il epi et conf.	NI	
11		
12		
13 (S faustini. ianuarij mart)		
14 S Calisti pp et mr (viiii. 1 et Sancti)	Nl (valenti	ni
15	epi et confi.l.)	
16		
17	(0.1. \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	١.
18 S Luce evangeliste	(Sol in scor) Nl (pione	e <i>)</i>
19 20		
21 S Ylarionis abbatis	Tl	
22 D (.h. ix.)		
23		
24		
25 S Crisanthi et Darie [mrm]	Nl	
26 S Evaristi pp et mr	NI	
27 Vigilia		
28 Sanc(orum) apostolorum Symonis et iude	Nl	
29		
30 (Sancti Germani capuani epī et conf.)		

31

Vigilia omnium sanctorum

²⁻⁶ The erasure of these five days has been covered with the four feasts, written by the hand which noted May 20 and 25, and June 13, see note.

¹³ Rather late addition.

³⁰ Thirteenth century addition, almost illegible. Origin of the feast: Montecassino.

November habet dies xxx. luna xxx.

(Nox habet horas.xvi. dies vero viij)	1 Festum Omnium sanctorum et S. Cesarii mr	NI
	3	
	4 S Vitalis et Agricole mrm	NI
	5 D (.h. viiii.)	146
	6 S Leonardi conf.	NI
	7	116
	8 Quatuor coronatorum mr[m]. dori mr (.i. 1.)	Nl
	9 Dedicatio Basilice salvatoris et theo	NI
	10 S. triphonis et Respicii et nimphe.v. (.i.l.)	NI
	11 S Martini epi et conf.et Menne mr (.i.l.)	NI
	12 S Martini pp et mr.	NI
	13 S Bricii epi et conf. (Obiit	NI
	14 sanctus noster frater Rofinus	
	15 qui fuit socius sancti patris nostri	
	16 Francisci)	
	17 (Sol in sagittarium.)	
	18 Dedicatio Basilicarum petri et Pauli	Nl
	19 S. Pontiani pp et mr (Eodem	Nl
	20 die sancte helisabeth.) (Primo fa cimus festum sancte helisabeth et sequen til die) facimus festum sancti pontiani)	3/1
<i>(f</i> . 1	22 S Cecilie virg. et mr	NI
(festum cle mentis yems	23 S Clementis pp et mr (et Sancte Felici 24 S Grisogoni mr tatis)	NI NI
capud est ori		IVL
entis)	25 (Sancte Caterine. virg et martiris ix.l.) 26 S Petri alexandrini epi et mr	NI
	27	14.0
	28 D (.h. iiii.)	
	29 S. Saturnini mr. vig [ilia].	NI
	30 S.Andree ap ostolli	Nl
	30 2. Villarce ab Costol 11	246

¹³⁻¹⁶ Addition in black, see June 13 and August 5: Rufinus died in 1270; see the history of the codex.

¹⁷ sagitt.] sic cod.

¹⁹⁻²⁰ Eodem...helis. Handwriting of Brother Leo. (?)

²⁰⁻²¹ Handwriting as on July 14, 21 and 23, August 28.

²³ The addition in black as on 13-16.

²⁵ Addition written twice by the hands of 23 and 20-21 (red).

December habet dies xxxi. luna xxviiii (Nox habet horas xviii.dies vero.vi.)

1 Decembris 2 \$\overline{S}\$ Viviane vir. 3	Tl	(Officium pro defunctis fratribus fit die lune post dominicam sep tuagesime.)
4 5 Barbare vir. (et mr)	Nl	
5 Sabe conf.	Nl	
6 S Nicolai epi et conf.	Nl	
7 S Ambrosii epi et conf. D (.h.i.)	Nl	
8		
9		
10 S Melchiadis. pp.et mr	Nl	
11 S Damasij pp et conf.	Nl	
12		
13 S Lucie. virg. et mr	Nl	
14		
15		
16		
17 (Sol in capriolis)		
18		
19		
20 Vigilia. (Solstitium)		
21 S Thome ap ostoli	NI	
22 D (.h.vii.)		
23		
24 Vigilia Natalis domini (mr.)		
25 Nat. Domini nostri ihū christi. et s.Anastasie		
26 S Stephani protomr.		
27 S Johannis ap osto li et evangeliste		
28 S[anct] Innocentum		
(archi)	Nl	
29 S Thome epi et conf.		
30		
31 S Silvestri pp et conf.	Nl	

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²⁻³ In the margin: septuages.] sic cod.

²⁹ conf. sic cod.

³⁰ N(ovem) l(ectionum), because of the octave of the Nativity.

THE TERMS

"IUS POSITIVUM" AND "SIGNUM POSITIVUM"

IN TWELFTH-CENTURY SCHOLASTICISM

Through the researches of Dom Lottin¹ and more especially those of S. Kuttner,² we know that the term "positive law" entered into the vocabulary of the theologians and canonists during the twelfth century, and that it assumed three slightly differing forms, namely ius positivum, iustitia positiva and lex or constitutio positionis, in opposition to ius naturale, iustitia naturalis and lex naturae.

The first, ius positivum, is already used in the Dialogue of Abelard (1140-1142), 3 and then in several of the works of the Decretists: the Summa Coloniensis (1169), 4 the Summa of Odo of Dour (c. 1170) and the Summa Reverentia Canonum (1184-1192). 5 The second, iustitia positiva, has so far been discovered only in one place, namely in the Introductio ad decretum, a work widely diffused in the twelfth century. 6 As to the variants, lex positionis and positionis constitutio, they are met respectively in the Disputationes of Simon of Tournai (1169-1200) 7 and in the Compilatio decretorum of Cardinal Laborans (1162-1182). 8

Of the seven occurrences note, five come from French Decretists

^{1.} O. Lottin, Le Droit naturel chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs, 2nd ed., Bruges, [1931].

^{2.} Sur les origines du terme "droit positif", in Revue hist. Droit franç. étr., Series IV, 15 (1936), p. 728-740; Repertorium der Kanonistik I, in Studi e Testi 71, Città del Vaticano, 1937, p. 175-176 and 455.

^{3.} PL 178, 1656 B. Quoted by Lottin, op. cit., p. 28.

^{4.} Also quoted by Lottin, op. cit., p. 105.

^{5.} Texts in Kuttner, Repertorium, p. 173 and 195, n. 1.

^{6.} See Kuttner, Repertorium, p. 455.

^{7.} Disp. XXIX, 1 (ed. J. Warichez in Spicilegium sacrum lovan. 12, p. 89-90). First quoted by Lottin, op. cit., p. 28. See also infra, p. XXX.

^{8.} See text in Kuttner, op. cit., p. 175, n. 6. Cardinal Laborans is an Italian but studied in France.

and two from Masters of Theology in Paris (Abelard and Simon of Tournai). The term is therefore most assuredly of French origin, and according to S. Kuttner it is not found in the vocabulary of the school of Bologna before the year 1210.9

The same author has tried to detect the sources from which the French theologians and canonists might have drawn the term, and his researches point in the first place towards the Commentary of Chalcidius on the *Timaeus* of Plato. This work of Chalcidius, very widely used in the twelfth century, had its part in the philosophical formation of the early Scholastics, and provided them with at least a partial text of one of Plato's writings. 10

In chapter six then of his Commentary, Chalcidius distinguishes between iustitia naturalis and iustitia positiva as follows:

Ex quo adparet in hoc libro principaliter id agi, contemplationem considerationemque institui non positivae, sed naturalis illius iustitiae atque aequitatis, quae inscripta instituendis legibus describendisque formulis tribuit ex genuina moderatione substantiam. 11

On the face of things, it is probable that this passage of Chalcidius inspired the theologians and canonists of the twelfth century. It is a certainty in the case of the Summa Reverentia sacrorum canonum, wherein S. Kuttner discovered the interesting remark:

—dicitur et generali vocabulo mos prout nomen moris in primo cap. huius dist. sumitur; hoc autem apud pl'onem in timeo ius positivum dicitur... 12

Actually the reference is not accurate: the term is not to be found in the text of the *Timaeus*, but in the accompanying Commentary, and, moreover, its correct wording is not *ius positivum*, but *iustitia positiva*. As it is though, the text speaks clearly enough. However, S. Kuttner hesitates to extend the benefit of his discovery

^{9.} Cfr. Kuttner, op. cit., p. 175.

^{10.} M. Manitius (Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters, t. III, Munich, 1931) quotes not less than eleven authors who make use of Chalcidius' Commentary; see the references in the Index, ibid., p. 1098.—On the importance of Chalcidius, cfr. Ueberweg-Geyer, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, t. III, 11th ed., Berlin, 1928, p. 148.

^{11.} Taken from Kuttner, Repertorium, p. 176, n. 2.

^{12.} See Kuttner, *ibid*. The lack of accuracy seems to indicate that the anonymous author of the Summa Reverentia only disposed of second hand information.

to each and everyone of the authors who, since Abelard, have used the same or a similar term. He rightly thinks that a general conclusion would require a thorough investigation of the entire literature of the period. 13

The present article does not pretend to supply that want, or to solve the problem. It aims simply at producing a few texts hitherto unnoticed, and pointing out another twelfth-century application of the antithesis naturalis-positivus to the vocabulary of the sacraments.

1. "lustitia positiva" in the work of Hugo of Saint Victor

If Abelard is the first author known to have employed the term ius positivum, Hugo of St. Victor has nevertheless preceded him by several years in the use of the scarcely different form, iustitia positiva. In his Didascalion, 1. III, c.2, composed about 1130, he writes:

Ethicae inventor Socrates fuit, de qua XXIV libros secundum positivam iustitiam tradidit. Deinde Plato discipulus eius libros multos de republica secundum utramque iustitiam, naturalem scilicet et positivam, conscripsit.¹⁴

In 1. VI, c. 5, he says likewise:

In illa enim [tropologia] naturalis iustitia est, ex qua disciplina morum nostrotum, id est, iustitia positiva nascitur. 15

These two passages, especially the first, are important in more than one respect. First of all, they advance the first known use of the term "positive law", by a dozen years. Secondly, they provide a strong confirmation of S. Kuttner's suggestion of the origin of the term. Indeed the words Plato...multos libros...secundum utramque iustitiam, naturalem scilicet et positivam, conscripsit betray a dependence on the Commentary of Chalcidius, which was, as is said above, the only work by which the early Scholastics came into direct contact with Plato's writings. Hugo made abundant use of that Commentary in several of his treatises, and most of all in his Didascalion. And in his still unpublished Epitoma in philosophiam,

^{13.} Cfr. Kuttner, ibid.

^{14.} PL 176, 766 B.

^{15.} Ibid., 805 C.

which is a recast of the first chapter of the *Didascalion*, he intended to imitate Plato's style in the *Timaeus*. ¹⁶ This explains how, in characterizing the political works of Plato, he remembered from his reading of Chalcidius the terms *iustitia naturalis* and *iustitia positiva*.

Finally, one should not forget that, throughout the twelfth century, Hugo's writings, especially the De Sacramentis and the Didascalion, exercised a powerful influence not only on the theologians but also on the canonists both of Paris and Bologna. This does not mean that all the subsequent uses of the term "positive law" need to be explained by a direct or indirect dependence on Hugo of St. Victor. It is not even proved that he introduced the term into theology, but it is certainly no exaggeration to say that his example assisted in propagating its use.

2. "Natura-positio" in Simon of Tornai and Magister Martin.

As already noticed, 18 Simon of Tournai and Cardinal Laborans prefer the terms lex positionis and positionis constitutio to the adjectival forms iustitia positiva and ius positivum. Considering that these variants appear at a later date, one might conclude that they proceed directly from the earlier forms, but one must beware of over-simplifying the question. S. Kuttner has drawn attention to a text in the Noctes atticae of Gellius, who was a favorite author in the Middle Ages. Gellius makes the grammarian Nigidius say that the nomina are divided into naturalia and positiva, and that they do not originate fortuito positu but quadam vi et ratione natura. 19 Such terminology, which opposes the nouns natura and positus as well as the adjectives naturalis and positivus, might easily have impressed the theologians and canonists of the twelfth century. It is in any case noteworthy that Simon of Tournai, in one and the same sentence, opposes lex naturae to lex positionis and also natura to positio. 20

Regardless, however, of the origin of the term lex positionis,

^{16.} Cfr. Manitius, op. cit., p. 115.

^{17.} Cfr. J. de Ghellinck, L'Essor de la Littérature latine au XII^e siècle (Museum Lessianum, Sect. hist. 4), t. I, Brussels, 1946, p. 51-52.

^{18.} See above, p. 41.

^{19.} Quotation in Kuttner, Repertorium, p. 176, n. 2.

^{20.} Disp. XXIX, 1 (ed. Warichez, 89-90). The text is quoted infra, p. 45.

the antithesis natura-positio in the juridical sense deserves to appear on the list of the first attestations of the term "positive law".

Dom Lottin, who first quoted the text of Simon of Tournai, 21 published on the same occasion another passage of similar import. It is taken from the still unedited Summa theologica of Magister Martin, which is commonly dated from the end of the twelfth century. 22 The passage in question opposes natura to positio, lex naturae to lex civilis, and humana positio to ius naturale. Magister Martin's mode of expression so closely resembles that of Simon, that it is very likely to have been inspired by it; he has copied Simon to a large extent, and on the point under examination he has transcribed an opinion from Simon's Disputationes. We need not wonder then that he has combined therein ideas and expressions which in his model are to be found in different places. An arrangement in tabular form of the text of Magister Martin and its parallels in the Disputationes of Simon of Tournai, will facilitate their comparison:

Magister Martin

Paris, B.N. lat. 14556 f. 356^{ra}

Coniunctio maris et femine de iure naturali est. Verbum est I-sidori. Set positio non tollit naturam, nec ius naturale tollitur civili. Ergo nulla positio humana fecit ut coniunctio maris et femine non esset de iure naturali. Ergo coniunctio maris et femine in concubinatu est de iure naturali. Ergo non est peccatum.

Simon of Tournai

Disput. XXIX, 1 (ed. Warichez, 89-90)

Sunt enim due leges: una nature, alia positionis...Quia lex nature et prior est et dignior lege positionis... prejudicet natura positioni.

Disput. XCVIII, 2 (ib. 284)

Item queritur an coniunctio maris et femine sit ius naturale. Quod sic probari videtur. Ait enim auctoritas: "De iure naturali descendit maris et femine coniunctio, filiorum propagatio. E contra. Si enim est ius naturale, ergo est bonum. Sed in fornicantibus est coniunctio maris et femine, que damnabilis est.

^{21.} See above, p. 41.

^{22.} Cfr. A.M. Landgraf, Einführung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Frühscholastik, Ratisbon, 1948, p. 89.

Respondetur a quibusdam quod coniunctio maris et femine est de iure naturali sive in coniugibus sive in fornicatoribus; set in fornicatoribus talis coniunctio est peccatum, quia destituta est ornatu civili, et privata est debita forma solempnitatis que dicitur matrimonium; nec enim caret aliquo debito nature talis coniunctio, set debita solempnitate.

Reditur. Coniunctio maris et femine est ius naturale, sive in coniugibus sive in fornicantibus; sed in coniugibus bona, ut dictum est, in fornicantibus vero mala, que privata est debita forma sollemnitatis, que dicitur matrimonium: nec enim caret aliquo debito necessarie, sed debita sollemnitate.

3. "Signum positivum" in the Sacramental theology of the twelfth century.

At the beginning of his IVth Book of Sentences, Peter Lombard accumulates nearly all the descriptions of sacramentum which were current at the time. After quoting the Austustinian definitions of sacramentum in the wide sense and of signum in general, he uses a text of St. Augustine in order to divide all signa into two classes:

Signorum vero alia sunt naturalia, ut fumus significans ignem: alia data (S. Aug., *De doctr. christ.*, c. 1, n. 2); et eorum quae data sunt, quaedam sunt sacramenta, quaedam non: omne enim sacramentum est signum, sed non e converso.²³

Lombard's distinction of the signa, like the test of his expose, was generally accepted by the theologians of the second half of the twelfth century. But whereas most of them were content merely to quote the text of Lombard, a few used it as a starting point to build up a new definition of sacrament in the strict sense, viz., sacramentum est rei sacrae sacrum signum. This interesting question will be treated elsewhere, but for the moment it is sufficient to note that the same group of authors are at one in introducing a significant change of terminology. Indeed, instead of speaking of signa naturalia and signa data, as did Peter Lombard after the example of St. Augustine, they all use the terms signa positiva.

^{23.} Liber Sentent., IV, d. I, c. 4 (ed. Quaracchi, 746).

The first author to adopt this terminology, as far as we know, is Simon of Tournai. This is what he writes in his Summa or Institutiones ad sacram paginam: Paris, B.N. lat. 14886 f. 53 vab:

Signorum enim alia sunt sacra, alia non. Non sacrorum alia naturale, alia positiva. Naturalia sunt, ut quando per antecedens significatur consequens, ut rubore matutino imber futurus, vel per consequens antecedens, ut fumo vel cinere ignis. Positivorum vero, quoddam nec est sacramentum nec sacre rei signum, ut circulus venalis; quoddam non sacrum signum sed rei sacre, ut serpens in palo non erat res sacra,—eum enim fregit Ezechias ydola—trie persecutor,—tamen signum rei sacre, quia Christi in cruce pendentis; quoddam vero et sacrum signum et rei sacre, ut sacra baptismi ablutio signum sacre mundationis anime. Omne vero signum, sacrum vel non sacrum, dum tamen rei sacre, sacramentum dicitur: non sacrum signum rei sacre, veteris testamenti, sacrum signum rei sacre, novi testamenti sacramentum dicitur. Differunt enim sacramenta: veteris testamenti non sunt signa sacra, quia non iustificantia; novi vero testamenti sacramenta sacra sunt quia iustificantia, et sacre rei quia rem sacram significant.

Simon's attempt to define and classify the sacraments on the exclusive basis of the notion of signum met with some success, and persisted until the middle of the thirteenth century. Before the year 1200, we can quote at least three authors who, in accepting the same doctrine, accepted also the division of signa into naturalia and positiva. They are Radulph Ardens, Magister Martin and Lothair of Segni (later Pope Innocent III). In order to illustrate the strict dependence of these theologians upon Simon of Tournai, it will be necessary to reproduce the texts of each one in extenso, the more so since the writings of Radulph Ardens and Magister Martin have not yet been published.

Radulph Ardens, Speculum universale, 1. VIII, c. 31 Paris N.B. lat. 3239 f. 110^{ra} and Vat. lat. 1175 f. 123^{ra}:

Signorum vero alia sunt sacra, alia non. Non sacrorum, alia naturalia, alia positiva. Naturalia sunt, ut quando per antecedens significatur consequens, ut rubore matutino imber futurus, vel per consequens antecedens, ut cinere ignis. Positivorum vero quoddam nec est sacrum nec est sacre rei signum, ut circulus vini venalis; quoddam non est sacrum, sed sacre rei signum, sicut eneus serpens in palo non erat res sacra,—eum enim fregit Ezechias idolatriae persecutor,—tamen erat signum sacre rei, quia Christi in cruce pendentis; quoddam vero est et sacrum signum et rei sacre, ut baptismus. Omne autem signum, sive sacrum sive

non sacrum, si tamen est signum sacre rei, sacramentum dicitur. Sed signum non sacrum sacre rei, veteris testamenti, signum vero sacrum et sacre rei, novi testamenti dicitur sacramentum.

Magister Martin, Summa, Paris, N.B. lat. 14556, f. 349 va:

Signorum alia sunt sacramenta, alia non. Non sacramentorum, alia sunt naturalia, alia positiva. Naturalia sunt, quando per antecedens significatur consequens, ut rubore matutino ymber significatur, vel [per] consequens antecedens, ut melle favum vel cinere ignis. Positivorum vero quedam sunt nec sacra nec sacre rei signum, ut eneus serpens in palo non erat res sacra, -eum enim fregit idolatrie persecutor Ezechias; - tamen erat signum sacre rei, quia pendentis in cruce; quoddam vero est sacrum signum et etiam rei sacre, ut sacra baptismi ablutio est sacrum signum sacre mundationis animae. Omne vero sacrum signum vel non sacrum, dum tamen rei sacre signum sit, sacramentum dicitur non sacrum signum rei sacre, veteris testamenti, sacrum signum rei sacre, novi testamenti sacramentum dicitur. Differunt itaque sacramenta veteris et novi testamenti, quia sacramenta veteris testamenti non sunt signa sacra, quia non iustiticantia: tamen sunt rei sacre, quia rem sacram significantia. Sacramenta novi testamenti, sacra iustificantia et rei sacre quia sacram rem significant.

Lothaire de Segni, De sacro altaris mysterio, 1. IV, c. 39 (PL, 217, 881):

Signorum autem alia sunt naturalia, et alia positiva. Naturalia sunt quae secundum naturam significant. Quorum quaedam sunt quae per antecedens significa[n]t consequens, ut rubore vespertino significatur serenitas matutina. Alia sunt quae per consequens significant antecedens, ut fumo vel cinere significatur ignis. Positiva sunt illa quae secundum impositionem significant. Quorum alia sunt signum (!) rei sacrae, ut serpens aeneus erectus in eremo; alia sunt signa rei non sacrae, ut arcus triumphalis erectus in bivio. Signorum rei sacrae, alia sunt sacra, ut baptismus; alia non sacra, ut agnus paschalis. Sacra sunt signa novi testamenti, non sacra veteris. Quamvis enim utraque sunt signa rei sacrae, id est rem sacram significantia, non tamen utraque sunt sacra signa, id est iustificantia, licet nonnulli dixerunt legalia iustificasse. Haec est enim differentia inter legalia et inter evangelica sacramenta, quod illa significant tantum et non justificabant, haec autem significant et iustificant. Verum, quandoque large, quandoque stricte sacramentum accipitur. Large, secundum quod omne signum rei sacrae. sive sit sacrum [sive non], dicitur sacramentum: unde signa legalia sacramenta dicitur; stricte, secundum quod sacrum solummodo signum dicitur sacramentum.

Notwithstanding minor divergences, the texts just quoted show so close a resemblance that their dependence, direct or indirect, upon Simon of Tournai cannot be doubted. The identity of the vocabulary, of the comparisons, of the construction and of the notions and definitions is sufficient proof. On the other hand, the substitution of the term signa positiva for signa data is found in this group of authors and nowhere else. For this reason, Simon of Tournai must be given credit for the spreading of a terminology which afterwards became classical in theology. Moreover, it is most likely that he created it, since it is to be found only in his works and in those of authors who copied him.

As to the origin of the term signum positivum, it is almost evident that it results from a transposition of the antithesis naturalispositivus from the juridical field to the domain of sacramental theology. Simon of Tournai has a liking for neologisms, as may be gathered from his use of the term lex positionis. 24 But why, in the latter case, did he prefer the substantival form, in spite of the accepted usage, whereas in sacramental theology his choice fell upon the term signum positivum? That of course is a difficult question. Perhaps the matter of terminology was only a matter of taste on his part. After all, he shares the same peculiarity with Cardinal Laborans and more so with Magister Martin. However that may be, everything points to the fact that the term lex positionis is of more recent origin, and that consequently the authors who prefer it were aware of the older forms ius positivum and iustitia positiva.

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^{24.} Supra, p. 44 and p. 47.

CHRIST JESUS, CENTER AND FINAL SCOPE OF ALL CREATION ACCORDING TO ST. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR

St. Maximus the Confessor, according to the eminent patrologist, Bardenhewer, is without doubt one of the keenest dogmaticians and deepest mystics that the Greek Church produced. Authors who have written about the theology of this staunch defender of Christ against the monothelists, have readily acknowledged that Christ is the center of it. Pourrat, when treating of his spiritual theology, writes:

The Word Incarnate, therefore, is the one center of the theology and spirituality of St. Maximus. The end of all creation is the deification of man, his assimilation with God by charity.... Wan possessed this participation in the divine nature before the fall; it was then lost. It must be restored by the Word, which deifies human nature by uniting Himself with it and has merited by Ilis death that each one should become deified. The Incarnation, then, is the great event of the world, which God ordained from the beginning and which makes the object of creation possible. It is why Christ unites everything in Himself, in the same way that the Church unites within itself all the different nations of which she is composed.³

Others hold that St. Maximus quite clearly teaches the Absolute Primacy of Christ in keeping with Franciscan theology. For instance, Risi in his voluminous work on the motive of the Incarnation sums his doctrine up thus: "Gesu Cristo e il principio, il centro, lo scopo, la sintesi della creazione. Distinzione tra la sostanza ed il modo del mistero. Fine primario di questo fu la deificazione, e salute universale; fine secundario la Redenzione di genere umano." ⁴ J.B. Petit-Bornand, O.F.M. Cap., cites our

^{1.} O. Bardenhewer, Patrologie (Freiburg: Herder, 19012), p. 510.

^{2.} E.g., loc. cit.; and Grumel, "Maxime le Confesseur," in Dict. de la Theol. Cathol., 10, 458; E. Mersch, S.J., Le Corps Mystique du Christ, 2 vol. (Paris: Desclée, 1936), I, 525, fn. 2: "Le centre de sa doctrine est notre divinisation dans le Christ.... Le mystère central, c'est le Christ qui unit tout en lui."

^{3.} P. Pourrat, Christian Spirituality, translated by W.H. Mitchell and S.P. Jacques, 4 vol. (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1922), I, 299.

^{4.} Franc. M. Risi, Ord. S. Joan. a Deo, Sul motivo primario dell'Incarnazione del Verbo, 4 vol. (Roma: Desclée, 1898), III, 309-311.

author for several of his theses.⁵ Lot-Borodine, in a thorough treatment of deification according to the Greek Fathers wrote: "D'après S. Maxime et les Byzantins, le Verbe serait incarné, en tout état de cause, mais n'aurait pas été mis a mort. Seule la Croix a donc eté necessitée par le péché originel qu'aucun Grec n'a nie quoiqu' on ait pu dire." M. Jugie, A.A., in his monumental work on Oriental theology clearly agrees that St. Maximus, though he usually mentions the motive of salvation, does not do so exclusively and teaches that Christ is the center and end of all creation. J.M. Bissen, O.F.M., includes our Doctor in an article on the Absolute Primacy of Christ from the 7th to the 9th century.

Even those who oppose the Franciscan doctrine that Christ has Absolute Primacy over all creation to the extent that He was first predestined for His own glory and then as the Final Scope and Exemplar and Mediator of all creatures,—even they must admit that St. Maximus teaches the Franciscan doctrine. F. Struyf, for example, though he defends the Thomistic view as more probable and more in keeping with piety, claims that St. Maximus is the first of the Fathers to teach the opposite. M. Th. Disdier, in an article on the dogmatic principles of the spirituality of St. Maximus, objects that Struyf should make of our Saint the creator of the Scotist conception of the Incarnation on the force of one text, whereas there are innumerable texts that support the Thomist view, and the one cited for the Scotist view is more Suarezian. As we shall see, such an analysis is superficial and incorrect.

Now, although authors usually quote only one text from St. Maximus to support the Franciscan doctrine, we shall show that there are other texts, and that there is nothing in St. Maximus that militates against the Franciscan doctrine.

^{5.} J.B. du Petit-Bornand, O.F.M. Cap., Proludium de Primatu Domini Nostri Jesu Christi et Causa Motiva Incarnationis; translated by Ambrosius a Saldes, O.F.M. Cap. (Barcinone, apud Subirana Fratres, 1902), pp. 205, 208, 310.

^{6.} M. Lot-Borodine, "Da doctrine de la deification dans l'Eglise greque jusque au IX^e siecle," Rev. de l'hist. des religions, Paris, 107 (1933) 30, fn. 1.

^{7.} M. Jugie, Theologia dogmatica orientalium Christianorum, (Paris, 1926), II, 678-9.

^{8.} J.M. Bissen, O.F.M., "La tradition sur la predestination absolue de Jesus-Christ du VII^e au IX^e siecles," *La France Franciscaine*, (1939) 14f.

^{9.} F. Struyf, "Christ ou Jesus. Le Motif prochain de l'Incarnation du Verbe," Rev. Augustinienne 2 (1903) 197f.

^{10.} M. Th. Disdier, "Les fondements dogmatiques de la spiritualité de saint Maxime le Confesseur," Echos d'Orient (1930) 312f and fn. 2.

Christ the Final Scope of Creation

First, we shall analyze the text that is often quoted. It is rather long but beautiful and to the point.

The word of Scripture called Christ the mystery of Christ, And the great Apostle clearly testifies to this, speaking thus: "The mystery which has been hidden for generations is now clearly shown" (Col. 1: 26); plainly he calls Christ the mystery of Christ. This is manifestly the unspeakable and incomprehensible union of the divine and human nature according to subsistence... For it was becoming to the Maker of the universe and to Him who by virtue of the Economy became in [human] nature what lie was not, to preserve both what lie was by nature as God and what He became by nature as Man in virtue of the Economy This is that great and hidden mystery. This is that blessed end (\(\tau_{\epsilon}^{\epsilon} \gamma_{\epsilon} \)) for which all things u ere created. This is the divine scope foreknown before the beginning of creatures, which we define to be the end that was foreknown, on account of which all things [exist], but itself [exists] on account of nothing. With this end in view, God produced the essences of creatures. This is properly the end (TELAG) of providence and of the things foreknown, by means of which end there exists the recapitulation to God of the things made by Him. This is the mystery that contains all the ages and that manifests the great plan of God which is infinite and pre-existed the ages in as infinite manner (cf. Eph. 1: 9f). He who by essence is the very Word of God Himself became the messenger of this plan. naving become Man, and He made manifest, if it is right to say so, the inmost depths of the Father's goodness, and He showed in Himself the end (réhoc) that is, He showed Himself to be the [end] for which, clearly, the things made received the beginning of their existence. Really, it was for the sake of Christ, that is, the mystery of Christ, that all the ages and the things in the ages themselves received the beginning and the end of existence in Christ. For the union was known before the ages, [the union] of limit and Illimitability, of measure and Immensity, of boundary and Boundlessness, of Creator and creature, of Rest and motion. This [union] was made when Christ appeared in the last times. By itself it is the fulfillment of the foreknowledge of God. 11

^{11.} Ad Thalassium, q. 60 (P.G., 90, 620f).

That passage leaves not even the slightest doubt that, according to St. Vaximus, Christ was foreknown from all eternity as the Final Scope of all creation. And this, not merely in the sense that by this knowledge Christ was eternally in the mind of God as the Final Scope of the redeemed world, but in the sense that He was in the mind of God as the first one in the world plan and as the End of all other beings in that plan. That is what St. Maximus' insistence on Christ's being foreknown before all the ages means, as it does for St. Cyril of Alexandria. 12 And this is certain from the fact that Christ could not be the End of the very existence and creation of all other beings as our Saint insists, if He had not been in the mind of God before these other creatures were in the mind of God. Our Doctor repeats that Christ is the very reason for the existence of all other creatures. He could hardly have stated the Franciscan doctrine more emphatically. Without Christ there would have been no creation at all. because He is the very End of its existence. When St. Maximus says that Christ exists "on account of nothing," he means that no created being is the final cause of Christ, Often elsewhere he tells us that the Word became incarnate "for us," or "for our sakes," namely as mediatorial cause. So he does not contradict himself.

Moreover, when St. Maximus writes that "all the ages and the things in the ages themselves received the beginning and the end of existence in Christ," he says that Christ is the Mediator of all things from the beginning. All things were created to have their supernatural and natural gifts from Christ and in intimate union with Him. God always intended all creation to form a mystical union in Christ as well as for the sake of Christ.

Again, our Doctor strikes a truly Scotistic note when he tells us that the Incarnation is the revelation of "the inmost depths of the Father's goodness"; that is, the Father willed that His Son become incarnate precisely because of the Father's immense love.

Authors quote this passage as proof of Christ's Absolute Primacy even over the angels, so that they received their original grace and glory through His mediation. As is clear, our Saint does not mention the angels; but if Christ has Absolute Primacy over all creation, then He has it also over the angels. So this is a legitimate deduction from his passage.

^{12.} Cf. Dominic J. Unger, O.F.M. Cap., "Christ Jesus the Secure Foundation according to St. Cyril of Alexandria," Franciscan Studies, VII (1947) 2-8, esp. 5-6.

When the last word on the Absolute Primacy of Christ shall have been spoken, the above passage of St. Maximus will be a golden page in the treatise. In the light of that passage we must understand the statements in which he speaks of Christ as the End of nature, the law, and grace. In question 18 of the same treatise to Thalassius, he tells us that

those who give service according to the externals of the law, bodily, fall away from divine grace entirely, since they ignore Christ the End and the perfection of the spiritual law through grace, which cleanses the mind of every stain.¹³

And in question 19 he writes:

The Word of God, Jesus Christ, as Creator of all things, is also the Maker of the law of nature. Just as He is Provider and Legislator, He is also clearly the Giver of the written law and of the spiritual law, that is, grace. "For the end of the law is Christ" (Rom. 10: 4), that is, of the written law understood spiritually. Since, therefore, in Christ as Creator, Provider, Legislator, and Propitiation, the natural and written law and the law of grace are centered (σινά γεται) what the Apostle says is true that God will judge the hidden acts of men according to His Gospel, that is, according as it was announced.... For the Word of God is the Maker of all things that are in nature and the law and cult and order. For there is no law without the Word's promulgating it. So if anyone is judged by the law, he is judged as if in Christ; or if, without the law. He is again judged in Christ. For the Word as Creator is the beginning and middle and end of all things that exist and are understood and spoken. 14

Taken by itself this passage is true inasmuch as Christ is the-Word who created all things and is the end of all things. However, that does not exclude the fact that Christ as God-Man is the Final Scope and Mediator of all creation from the beginning, as was expressed in question 60; and in the light of that more definite expression of the doctrine, we can say that this present passage does not express the full doctrine of finality as far as Christ is concerned.

Now we can consider other independent texts for Christ as Final Scope. In question 22, St. Maximus states quite plainly that Christ

^{13.} Ad Thal., q. 18 (P.G., 90, 308).

^{14.} Ad Thal., q. 19 (P.G., 90, 308).

is the End of the ages through deification.

Hather, since Our Lord Jesus Christ is both the beginning and the middle and the end of all the ages, of the past as well as of the present and future, rightly does lie come to meet us by the power of faith, who will be the end of the ages through deification by the power of grace of those who are worthy. 15

In his work entitled Mystagogia, St. Maximus teaches that God is the beginning and the end of all things. That must be understood as the ultimate beginning and end, because he follows up immediately by saying that the "holy Church of God is, in the same manner, manifested as the image actualizing the same things as God, who is the archetype. That is then, of course, a fortiori true of Christ since He is the Head of the Church, as St. Maximus states. And he himself draws that conclusion.

[Christ] who by one simple, most wise power of His goodness includes all things in Himself, as the Center of certain lines which depend on Him by one simple and single cause and power. He does not permit the beginnings of creatures to be separated from the ends, by a circle circumscribing their tendencies to separate, and drawing to Himself the divisions of the creatures and of the things made. [This He does] in order that the creatures and creations of the one God might not be estranged from one another and enemies, not having the means and place for showing friendship and peace and concord toward each other, that the very fact that they are separated from God might not be a danger for them to fall into nothingness. ¹⁶

^{15.} Ad Thal., q. 22 (P.G., 90, 320. The scholia to these questions are not from the hand of Maximus, but from some later unknown author. However, they are this author's interpretation of St. Maximus and so are worthy of being noted. In the scholion to question 22 we find the plain statement that the deification of man is for the sake of, for the glory of, Christ: "The Incarnation of God is a firm pledge for human nature of the hope of deification, which Incarnation makes man God to the extent that He Himself became man. For He who, apart from sin, became man will deify the nature of man short of changing it into God. And for His own sake He will raise man up to the extent to which He lowered Himself for the sake of man." (P.G., 90, 321). Scholion 4 practically repeats that idea. Scholion 18 to question 54 expressly states that the Incarnation is the origin of all the ages and the basis for the continuance of the life of grace throughout eternity: "For in the doctrine of the divine Incarnation is contained the origin of the ages and of the things in the ages; likewise the continuance of the life of grace of creatures, which tends toward illimitability and is above the ages." (P.G., 90, 532A).

^{16.} Mystagogia, 1 (P.G., 91, 664D-665B).

This is a very graphic and emphatic way of saying that Christ is the Mediator and the End who unites all things to God; He is their reason for existence, and prevents them from falling into nothingness. This is really a commentary on Col. 1: 16-17. Let no one object that he means Christ as Word; for he means Christ as such, as the Head of the Church.

Christ, the First in Creation

That Christ is the First in the divine plan of creation can be deduced from the foregoing that Christ is the Final Scope of all creation. But St. Maximus saves us the trouble of trying to figure out whether he holds that by stating explicitly that he does. Having cited a combination of Eph. 1: 22; Col. 1: 26; and Eph. 1: 9, he continues:

For "the mystery has been hidden from ages and generations but now is clearly shown" (Col. 1: 26) by the true and perfect Incarnation of the Son of God, who united our nature to Himself inseparably and inconfusedly, according to subsistence, and He conjoined us as first fruits to Himself by means of His holy flesh, which is intellectually and rationally alive, which is from us and our own; and He deigned in His kindness that we be one and the same with Him, just as we were pre-ordained before the ages in Him to be the members of His Body (cf. Eph. 1: 3-6. 22-23). This lie did by joining and knitting us closely together with Himself in spirit and leading us to the measure of the spiritual maturity which springs from His own fullness (cf. Eph. 4: 13-16). Thus He manifested that we too were made for this purpose], and [He manifested] the most kind scope of God in our regard, which is indeed not to be received as a novelty, but as [having] its own reason [for existence], and which came to fulfillment by another, newer mode that was clearly superimposed. For it was proper that God who made us like Himself (in order that we have careful signs of His goodness through participation), and who saw that we were in Him before the ages, and who led us to this most happy end (having given us the mode by which we might use the natural powers well, but man voluntarily rejected this mode by the abuse of the natural powers)—[it was proper], in order that man should not be too far estranged from God, to introduce another mode in place of the former more wonderful and more divine than the former, inasmuch as that which is above nature is superior to that which is according to nature. And this is the mystery of the

most mystic sojourn of God to men, as we all betteve. "For if the first testament," the holy Apostle says, "had remained faultless, place would not be sought for a second" (Hebr. 8: 7). For it is clear to all that the mystery in Christ made in the end of the age is undoubtedly the achievement and fulfillment of that which was transgressed in the beginning of the age in the first parent. 17

In the first part he is certainly telling us that God ordained our incorporation into Christ from all eternity and that before (in the order of finality) He ordained the world. The Mystical Body with Christ as Head was in God's plan from the beginning. Then he clearly states that this idea of incorporating us into Christ was not something novel; it had its own reason for existing. So far he is really alluding to and commenting on Eph. 1: 3-6, Actually, however, this mystery did not remain as God first planned it, because man abused his powers and spoiled the plan somewhat. So God superimposed another plan, namely, of the redemption, over the first: that is the correct meaning of the Greek verbs with the double preposition as prefix: "Superimposed," ε'πειναχθέντος, that is, introduced on top of the first; "introduce in place of, άντεισαγθήναι. And thus through Christ, God did realize the first plan in spite of sin, as St. Maximus states in the last sentence quoted. Here he is alluding to and commenting on Eph. 1: 7-10. He considers the execution of the plan in Adam as something natural in relation to the much superior order through Christ; not as if Christ was not Mediator and End of that first part of the plan. He was, as St. Maximus had stated very emphatically and repeatedly, but the world without Christ's actual presence was considered inferior to the world with Christ actually present. In other words, St. Maximus here distinguishes between the substance and the accidents of the Incarnation as did many Scotists later. The Incarnation as such was willed from the very beginning as the foundation of the supernatural order, the actualization of that through a suffering Christ was due to the foreknowledge of sin and the need of redemption, which in God's mind followed, logically, the foreknowing of the Incarnation as such.

Christ is Man's Deification

Page upon page of our Doctor's works are illuminated with the

^{17.} Ambiguorum liber (P.G., 91, 1097).

beautiful and encouraging doctrine of man's deification, ¹⁸ which God brings to perfection in eternal glory. ¹⁹ No small wonder, then, that this gift was part of the original plan that God had for creating man. St. Maximus repeatedly asserts that God became man for the very purpose of making man God.

Therefore, let us give ourselves entirely to the Lord that we might in turn receive Him entire. Let us become gods for His sake; because for this reason He became Man, though by nature He is God and Sovereign. 20... If for this reason God the Word and Son of God the Father became the Son of Man and Man that He might make men gods and sons of God, then we may trust that we shall be there where Christ Himself now is as Head of the whole Body, who has also become Forerunner to the Father for us with His human body. 21

Christ was foreknown as the cause of our deification.

So Christ was foreknown, not what He was by nature for His own sake, but what He was manifested to be when by virtue of the Economy He later became Man for our sakes. For it was truly becoming that the Creator of the substance of creatures, according to nature, should also become the author of the deification, according to grace, of the things made, so that He who was the doner of existence would also be manifested as the bestower of the grace of always being happy. 22

Here, then, it is clearly implied that God always wanted to be part of His creation and thereby lift that creation up to His very self by deification. And so it is true that not merely is it a matter of fact that Christ deifies us, but it was God's eternal plan that all deification of man from the beginning should be through the mediation of the God-Man. This follows, too, as logical conclusion from the thesis that Christ is the Final Scope of all creation; but St. Maximus himself tells us that the original plan of God included the Incarnation of God as the means for making gods of men. When explaining how God will show His riches in the future ages (namely,

^{18.} Cf. e.g., Ad Thal., q. 6 (P.G., 90, 280D); q. 9 (285); q. 11 (292D); q. 13 (296A); q. 22 (318); especially q. 61 (628-641).

^{19.} Opuscula theologica (P.G., 91, 338); Ad Thal. q. 9 (P.G., 90, 285).

^{20.} Liber asceticus, n. 43 (P.G., 90, 953).

^{21.} Capitum theologica et oeconomica centuria, 2, 25 (P.G., 90, 1136BC).

^{22.} Ad Thal., q. 60 (P.G., 90, 624D).

after the coming of Christ, and especially in glory) according to Eph. 1: 17f, if the end of the ages has already come upon us, according to 1 Cor. 10: 11, he writes:

He who by the simple nod of His will gave existence to every creature both visible and invisible, before all ages, even before the very origin of the things created, had concerning these things an unspeakably kind plan. It was this: He Himself. without changing, would be united to human nature by means of the true union according to subsistence and would unite human nature, without change, to Himself, in order that He Himself might become Man, in the manner [only] He knows, and He would make man God by this union to Himself. Thus He would wisely divide and separate the ages; the ones in which fle would actually become Man; the others in which He would make man God. Now of the ages predetermined in which He would actually become man, the end has come upon us, namely, the divine will has been realized by the events according to the flesh. When the saintly Apostle perceived this-namely, when he was beholding the end of the ages of the plan according to the will of God to become Man, -he said that the ends of the ages have come upon us by the very Incarnation of God and the Word.... It is necessary that we expect the future ages for the realization of the mystic and unspeakable deification of men, during which God will show us the superabundant riches of His goodness, perfectly achieving the deification in the saints. For if He Himself brought to a close the mystic work of becoming Man, in every regard becoming like us save only sin, and, having descended to the lower parts of the earth, there destroyed the tyranny of sin, then by all means He will bring to a close the mystic work of deifying man, making man like Himself in every regard save only identity with Himself in essence, and raising him above all the heavens, whither the naturally great grace, in keeping with His immense goodness, invites man who dwells here below. 23

That passage leaves no room for doubt as to the mind of St. Maximus: Christ was willed by God from the very beginning as the Mediator of man's deification.

Thomistic minded theologians who try to pull St. Maximus to their side, point out that he frequently says that Christ was not incarnate for His own self, but for us. That he does. But that

^{23.} Ad Thal., q. 22 (P.G., 90, 317B, 320).

means nothing else than that He did not become incarnate to add any benefit to Himself as Word, as we explained at length in the doctrine of St. Athanasius. ²⁴ His human nature definitely was the first recipient of the great gift of deification, as St. Maximus asserts in a passage to be quoted below.

Furthermore, our opponents tell us that practically on every page St. Maximus speaks of God's becoming Man for our salvation. We admit that he keeps telling us that rather frequently in some of his works, but in other works this motive is not very prominent. But even if it were mentioned on every page, what would that prove? As long as we have one clear passage in which St. Maximus states that Christ is the end of all creation and the very reason of creation's existence, we may not cast this statement to the winds simply because it is outnumbered. We must line the others up with it. And that can easily be done—in the Scotistic doctrine, but never in the Thomistic untraditional or Suarezian contradictory view: God willed Christ for His own glory and for the glory of man and angels; but God also saw that man would sin. so He willed this same Christ as Redeemer. This explanation is given to us by St. Maximus himself when in a rather long passage he tells us that there are two reasons for the Incarnation, the deification and the Passion.

> Perhaps the present passage of Scripture (Zach. 4: 2-3) is understood in a more intellectual sense: by the two olives. one on the right and one on the left, it indicates the providence and the judgment. In the middle of these, as on a golden candelabrum (which is the holy Catholic Church or also the soul of each saint), has been place the Word, who brings to all the light of truth and, as God, contains the universe, and reveals by virtue of providence and judgment the true and most general reasons for the conservation of creatures. The mystery of our salvation is made up of these two reasons. It was determined before all ages and was fulfilled in these last times. Providence, which is the olive on the right of the candelabrum, we preceive only through faith, in the ineffable mode of union according to subsistence of the Word with the flesh that is alive with a rational soul. Judgment. which is on the left, we understand to be in an unspeakable way in the mystery of the life-giving Passion of the incarnate God for our sakes. For on the one hand, being good,

^{24.} Franciscan Studies, VI (1946) 175-181.

He became [Man] primarily according to the will of the Father], inasmuch as He was by nature the Savior of all. On the other hand, secondarily, He suffered by voluntary endurance as Redeemer. For God did not become man primarily that He might suffer, but that He might save man by His sufferings, which man made himself liable to by the transgression of the divine precept, and from which he was immune in the beginning. So the mystery of the Incarnation of the Word in regard to providence is on the right—the mystery which achieves the supernatural deification of those who are saved by grace, which [deification] was determined before the ages. On the left is clearly the mystery of the Passion of the life-giving God who willed to suffer according to the flesh. 25

A little later he speaks of providence as the Incarnation and of judgment as the Passion. ²⁶ So according to our Doctor there were two general reasons for the Incarnation: the first is the deification of human nature—Christ's own human nature was to be deified primarily and perfectly;—the second, which was superimposed because of sin, is redemption from sin. The first was foreknown before the ages, obviously, to be achieved in Christ. Again, since St. Maximus most clearly and repeatedly asserts that Christ is the Final Scope of all creation and the very reason why there is a creation at all, these two reasons for the Incarnation cannot be logically simultaneous, in Suarezian style. They are both in the eternal mind of God, because God plans all things eternally. But the reason of deification, especially of Christ's human nature, logically preceded the redemption.

Jugie notes one passage that the adversaries might adduce against us: "For this is the only reason of His [Word's] fleshy birth, the salvation of nature." I Jugie points out that he is explaining St. Gregory of Nazianzen. He is not speaking of the Incarnation pure and simple, but of the Incarnation from the human race that was infected with sin, with a mortal and passible body. For by birth (yévyyou) he means birth from a sin-infected race, which he distinguishes from origin (yéveous). Some have tried to argue from this that he meant there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. We do not consider that fantastic opinion probable in Maximus. He meant generation by concupis-

^{25.} Ad Thal., q. 63 (P.G., 90, 682C-684B).

^{26.} Ibid., B.

^{27.} Amibuorum liber, (P.G., 91, 1040B).

^{28.} Cf. Ad Thal., q. 21 (P.G., 90, 312-318); Jugie, Theol. Orient., II, 679, tn. 1.

cence, which is due to sin, as is actually the case, would not have existed. St. John Damascene, we explained, ²⁹ has to be explained in the same manner. Christ came from the human race in a virginal manner; so He had some of the Yéveou of Adam, and some of the Yéveou of the rest of men, namely, a passible flesh. However, we think it might be just as easy to explain the above-supposed objection by holding that "salvation" does not mean mere liberation from sin and then deification, but primarily deification, which would have been verified even in a perpetual state of innocence. That is in keeping with St. Maximus' notion of deification, and of redemption. ³⁰

To conclude, the great defender of Christ's perfect human nature, St. Maximus the Confessor, clearly and emphatically teaches that Christ is the Final Scope of all creation in the sense that creation was intended primarily for His own sake and would never exist but for Him; he also teaches that Christ is the divinely willed Mediator of man's deification, foreknown as such before the ages. All this was due to God's ineffable goodness. But because of man's abuse of God's goodness Christ had to propitiate God and buy back those privileges for man through the redemption. So, all glory and honor to Christ our Final End.

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^{29.} Franciscan Studies, VIII (1948) 248.

^{30.} Cf. fn. 25 and the passage quoted there; and Franciscan Studies, V (1945) 114-124; VIII (1947) 401-404.

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Among the volumes of great rarity and special interest to be found in the Library of the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure College, are approximately one hundred books printed before 1500. These incunabula editions were acquired by the Very Reverend Mathias Faust, O.F.M., Procurator General of the Friars Minor, to whom the Institute wishes to make public expression of sincerest thanks. Because these volumes were obtained after the publication of Stillwell's Census, and because in several instances only one other copy is known to exist in the Americas (in three cases no other copy is listed in American catalogues), it was thought advisable to publish a list of our collection in the Franciscan Studies as a sort of supplement to what has already been done in the field.

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ADELARDUS BATHONIENSIS.

A41 Quaestiones naturales. [Louvain: Johann de Paderborn (Westphalia), about 1475.]

AEGIDIUS (COLUMNA) ROMANUS.

A59 In Aristotelis analytica priora commentum (Ed: Johannes Antonius Scotius). Venice: Simon de Luere, for Andreas Torresanus, 27 Sept. 1499. f°.

A60 In Aristotelis de anima commentum. Pavia: Christophorus de Canibus, for Hieronymus de Durantibus, 26 July 1491. f^o.

Ff. 3, 17, 22, 112 lacking.

^{1.} Stillwell, M.B. Incunabula in American Libraries. 2nd Census. The Bibliographical Society of America, New York, 1940.

^{2.} Hain, L. Repertorium bibliographicum. Stuttgart, 1826-38. Copinger, W.A. Supplement to Hain's Repertorium bibliographicum. London, 1895, 1898, 1902.

Pellechet, M.L.C. Catalogue général des incunables des bibliothèques publiques de France. Paris, 1897-[to date].

Gesamtkatalog Der Wiegendrucke. Leipzig, 1925- to date].

A67 In Aristotelis de sophisticis elenchis commentum (Ed: Augustinus de Meschiatis). Venice: Bonetus Locatellus, for Octavianus Scotus, 6 Feb. 1496/97. f°.

A75 In Petri Lombardi sententiarum lib. II commentum (Ed: Jacobus Grasolarius). Venice: Lucas Dominici, 4 May 1482. f°.

Ff. 1, 2-5, 7, 515 lacking. F 6 misplaced after f. 519.

A77 In quosdam Aristotelis metaphysicorum locos quaestiones (Ed: Johannes Baptista Tolentinas). Venice: Petrus de Quarengiis, for Alexander Calcedonius, 23 Dec. 1499.

Bound with a 1515 edition of Aristotle's Rhetorica and Poetica.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS.

A269 Philosophia pauperum, sive Philosophia naturalis. Venice: Georgius Arrivabenus, 31 Aug. 1496. 4°.

ALBERTUS de SAXONIA.

A318 Quaestiones in Aristotelis libros de caelo et mundo. Venice: Otinus de Luna, Papiensis, 9 June 1497. f°.

ALEXANDER de ALES.

A349 Summa universae theologiae (Pars II). Pavia: Franciscus Girardengus and Johannes Antonius Birreta, 20 Oct. 1489. 4°.

F. 472 lacking.

ALPHONSUS de SPINA.

A482 Fortalitium fidei, Nuremberg: Anton Koberger, 25 Feb. 1494, 4°. F. 300 lacking.

ANDREAE, Antonius,

A518 Quaestiones super XII libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis. Vicenza: Hermann Liechtenstein, for Nicolaus Petri, 12 May 1477. f^o.

F. 116 lacking.

A521—(Ed: Lucas de Subereto). Venice: Bonetus Locatellus, for Octavianus Scotus, 23 Aug. 1487. f^o.

A526 Quaestiones de tribus principiis rerum naturalium. Padua: Laurentius Canozius, de Lendenaria, 1475. f°.

A527—Ferrara: Laurentius de Rubeis, de Valentia, 11 May 1490. 4°.

A530 Scriptum aureum super Metaphysicam Aristotelis. Venice: Antonius de Strata, de Cremona, 21 Nov. 1482. f°.

ANSELMUS, S.

A671 Opera, Strassburg: Printer of the 1483 Jordanus de Quedlinburg (Georg Husner), after 1496?. I fo.

ANTONINUS FLORENTINUS.

A776 Summa theologica (Pars IV). Nuremberg: Anton Koberger, 29 Apr. 1479. f°. F. 1 lacking. F. 2 misplaced after f. 3.

ANTONIUS de BITONTO.

A799 Sermones in epistolas dominicales et quadragesimales. Venice: Johannes Hamman, for Nicolaus de Frankfordia, 17 June 1496; 1 July 1496. 8°. Ff. 1, 65-68, 164 lacking.:

ASTESANUS de AST.

A1032 Summa de casibus conscientiae. Venice: Johannes de Colonia and Johannes Manthen, 18 Mar. 1478. f^o.

BARTHOLOMAEUS ANGLICUS.

B125 De proprietatibus rerum. Strassburg: [Printer of the 1483 Jordanus de Quedlinburg (Georg Husner)] 11 Aug. 1491. f°.

BARTHOLOMAEUS de CHAIMIS.

B141 Confessionale. [Nuremberg:] Friedrich Creussner, 27 Mar. 1477. f°.

F. 1 lacking.

B144 [Nuremberg: Fratres Eremitarum S. Augustini] 31 May 1480, 4°.

F. 1 lacking.

Bound with the Tabula to Johannes Nider's De morali lepra. cf. N171.

BARTHOLOMAEUS PISANUS.

B153 Quadragesimale de contemptu mundi. Milan: Uldericus Scinzenzeler, 1498. 4º. BENICNUS, Georgius.

***Dialectica nova. Florence: [Printer of the Benignus] 18 Mar. 1488/89. 4°. Ref: H 2780=HC 2781; Pell 2041; GW 3841.

BERNARDINUS SENENSIS.

B301 Quadragesimale de christiana religione. [Basel: Johann Amerbach, not after 1490.] f⁰.

BIBLIA

B541 Biblia latina (cum glossa ordinaria Walafridi Strabonis aliorumque et interlineari Anselmi Laudunensis). [Strassburg: Adolf Rusch, for Anton Koberger, shortly after 23 Sept. 1481.]f°.

BONAVENTURA, S.

B776 De castitate et munditia sacerdotum. Leipzig: Conrad Kachelofen, [14]98.4°. Pseudo-Bonaventura.

B795 De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione (Lib. II and III) [Latin]. [Deventer: Richardus Pafraet, about 1480.] 4°.

Pseudo-Bonaventura: David of Augsburg.

B831 Opuscula. Brescia: Bernardinus de Misintis, for Angelus Britannicus, 31 Dec. 1497. 4°.

2 ff. misplaced. Read: 164, 163, 166, 165.

BURLAEUS, Gualtherus,

B1148 Expositio in Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea (with text). Venice: Octavianus Scotus, 10 May 1481. f°.

BUSTI, Bernardinus de.

B1184 Rosarium sermonum (Pars II) (Additions by Illuminatus Novariensis and Samuel Cassinensis). Venice: Georgius Arrivabenus, 16 Aug. 1498. 4° .

2 ff. misplaced. Read: 157, 156, 159, 158.

CARACCIOLUS, Robertus.

C122 Opera varia. Venice: Georgius Arrivabenus, for Bernardinus Rasina (Rasma?) and Benedictus Fontana, 16 May 1496. 4° and 8°.

Ff. 1, 2, 240-245 lacking.

C137 Sermones de laudibus sanctorum. Venice: Bernardinus Benalius, 1 Oct. 1490. 4°.

C146 Sermones quadragesimales de peccatis, etc. Venice: Andreas Torresanus, de Asula, 27 Sept. 1488. 4°.

2 copies. Copy II: ff. 187-192 lacking.

C.148—Venice: Johannes and Gregorius de Gregoriis, de Forlivio, 11 May 1490. 4°. Ff. 1, 158 lacking.

C152 Sermones quadragesimales de poenitentia. Venice: Franciscus Renner, de Heilbronn, 1472. f^o and 4°.

Ff. 257-270 lacking.

C.154- Venice: Bartholomaeus Cremonensis, 1472. fo and 40.

Ff. 1. 11-20, 342 lacking.

CARCANO, Michael de.

C179 Sermonarium de peccatis per adventum et per duas quadragesimas. Venice: Franciscus Renner, de Heilbronn, and Nicolaus de Frankfordia, 1476. f^o and 4°. On f. 3 a miniature, presumably a representation of the author. If so, it is the only one known to exist.

C182 Sermonarium de poenitentia per adventum et quadragesimam. Venice: Georgius Arrivabenus, 28 Sept. 1496, 4° and 8°.

DEZA, Didacus de.

D114 In defensiones S. Thomae, Seville: Meinardus Ungut and Stanislaus Polonus, 4 Feb. 1491, 4°.

Ff. 1, 80 lacking. Ff. 65-72 doubled.

DIALOGUS inter CLERICUM et MILITEM

Di20 Dialogus inter Clericum et Militem super dignitate Papali et Regia. [Ulm: Johann Zainer, about 1487.] 4°.

DUNS SCOTUS, Johannes.

D298 Quaestiones in Aristotelis libros de Elenchis, Venice: [Johannes Hamman] 3 Oct. 1499, 4°.

Bound with D300.

D299 Quaestiones in Aristotelis Metaphysicam. Venice: Bonetus Locatellus, for Octavianus Scotus, 20 Nov. 1497. f°.

D300—Venice: Johannes Hamman, for Andreas Torresanus, de Asula, 20 Aug. 1499. 4°.

Bound with D298,

D305 Quaestiones in quartum librum Sententiarum cum textu Petri Lombardi. Paris: André Bocard, for Jean Richard, Jean Petit and Durand Gerlier, 23 Nov. 1497. f°. Bound with D310.

D310 (Quaestiones in quattuor libros Sententiarum (Partes I-III) (Ed: Philippus Bagnacavallus). Venice: Bonetus Locatellus, for Octavianus Scotus, 18 Dec. 1497. f^o.

2 copies. Copy I: bound with D305; ff. 123-138 lacking.

Copy II: Partes II and III only. F. I lacking.

D316 Quaestiones in Universalia Porphyrii (with other tracts). Venice: Joannes and Gregorius de Gregoriis, de Forlivio, 5 Jan. 1492/93. f°.

F. 1 lacking.

D317——(—) Venice: Simon de Luere, for Andreas Torresanus, de Asula, 20 Mar. 1500. f°.

Ff. 1-62 lacking.

GAIETANUS de Thienis.

G26 Commentum in Aristotelem De Anima. De sensu agente. De sensibilibus communibus et de intellectu. Venice: Bonetus Locatellus, for Octavianus Scotus, 23 Dec. 1492. f°.

G27 Expositio in libros Aristotelis De caelo et mundo. Venice: [Andreas Torresanus, de Asula, et socii] 1484. f°.

Ff. 72-106 lacking.

G33 Recollectae super Physica Aristotelis, Vicenza: Henricus de Sancto Ursio, Zenus, 23 Apr. 1487. f^o.

Ff. 1, 66, 117, 118 lacking.

GUILLERMUS, Episcopus Parisiensis.

G641 Opera. [Nuremberg: Georg Stuchs, after 31 Mar. 1496.] fo.

HENTISBERUS, Gulielmus.

H51 De sensu composito et diviso... Venice: Bonetus Locatellus, for Octavianus Scotus, 27 May 1494. f^o.

HOLKOT, Robertus.

H257 Quaestiones super IV libros Sententiarum (Ed: Jodocus Badius Ascensius). Lyons: Johann Trechsel, 5-20 Apr. 1497. f^o.

JOHANNES GALLENSIS.

J294 Summa collationum, sive Communiloquium. [Ulm: Johann Zainer, 14]81. f°. JOHANNES de JANDUNO.

J316 Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis magistri Johannis de Ganduno. Venice: Hieronymus de Sanctis, and Johannes Lucilius Santritter, for Petrus Benzon and Petrus Plasiis, 20 Nov. 1488. f°.

Ff. 165-172 lacking.

LUDOVICUS PRUTHENUS.

L340 Trilogium animae. Nuremberg: Anton Koberger, 6 Mar. 1498. 4°.

F. 354 lacking.

MAGISTRIS, Johannes de.

M18 Quaestiones super tota philosophia naturali. Venice: Bonetus Locatellus, for Octavianus Scotus, 30 May 1487. 4°.

***—Venice: [Bonetus Locatellus] for Octavianus Scotus, 25 Sept. 1490. 4°. Ref: H 10449.

Bound with M21.

M20 Quaestiones super totum cursum logicae. Heidelberg: Friedrich Misch, 19 May 1488. f°.

M21-Venice: [Bonetus Locatellus] for Octavianus Scotus, 1490. 4°.

M24 Summularum Petri Hispani glossulae. Venice: [Bonetus Locatellus] for Octavianus Scotus, 9 Sept. 1490. 4°.

F. 1 lacking.

MEDIAVILLA, Richardus de.

M363 Commentum super quarto Sententiarum, Venice: Christophorus Arnoldus 1476-78], f°.

M365—(Ed: Franciscus Gregorius), Venice: Dionysius Bertochus, 10 Nov. 1489, f⁰.

2 copies. Copy 1: ff. 1, 218 lacking. Copy II: mutilated at end; f. 1 lacking.

MICHAEL de HUNGARIA.

M465 Sermones dominicales, Biga salutis intitulati. Hagenau: Heinrich Gran, for Johannes Rynman, 22 Jan. 1498. 4°.

MONTE, Johannes de.

***Expositio super Logicam Petri Hispani. Venice: Peregrinus Bononiensis, 20 July 1490. 4°.

Ref: HC 11578.

Ff. 169, 176 lacking.

M715—(Ed: Petrus de Cruce). Venice: Albertinus Vercellensis, 10 Jan. 1500, 4°. NESTOR, Dionysius.

N12 Vocabularius. SULPITIUS Verulanus: De quantitate syllabarum. [Venice: Guilelmus Anima Mia, Tridinensis, 26 June 1488. f°.

F. 1 lacking.

NICOLAUS de AUSMO.

N46 Supplementum Summae Pisanellae et Canones poenitentiales fratris Astensis. Venice: Franciscus Renner, de Heilbronn and Nicolaus de Frankfordia, 1474. f°. Ff. 334, 335 lacking. Ff. 238, 239, 257, 260 lacking but supplied in manuscript.

N56— —et Consilia Alexandri de Nevo contra Judaeos foenerantes. Venice: [n, pr. 1 Jan. 1479/80 4°.

NICOLAUS de LYRA.

N96 Postilla super Epistolas et Evangelia quadragesimalia (cum Questionibus Antonii Betontini et Alexandri de Ales). Venice: Johannes Hamman, for Octavianus Scotus, 13 Dec. 1494, 8°.

NIDER. Johannes.

N145 Consolatorium timoratae conscientiae. Paris: Ulrich Gering, 16 Dec. 1478. 4°. N171 De morali lepra, Paris: Jean Bonhomme, 30 July 1490. 4°.

Ff. 73-76 (Tabula) only.

Bound with B144.

NIGER, Petrus.

N226 Clypeus Thomistarum sive Quaestiones super arte veteri Aristotelis. Venice: Reynaldus de Novimagio, 1481. f^o.

F. 1 lacking.

OCKHAM, Guilielmus.

08 Dialogorum libri septem adversus haereticos: Tractatus de dogmatibus Johannis XXII (Ed: Jodocus Badius Ascensius). Lyons: Johann Trechsel, after 12 Sept. 1494. f°.

Bound with 011.

011 Opus nonaginta dierum et dialogi (Ed: Jodocus Badius Ascensius). Lyons:

Johann Trechsel, 16 July 1495. fo.

Bound with 08.

Compendium errorum contra Johannem XXII vot included.

ORBELLIS, Nicolaus de.

071 Expositio super textu Petri Hispani. Venice: Bernardinus de Choris, de Cremona, and Simon de Luere, 7 Nov. 1489. 8°.

Ff. 1-16 lacking.

PAULUS FLORENTINUS.

P156 Quadragesimale de reditu peccatoris ad Deum, Milan: Leonardus Pachel and Uldericus Scinzenzeler, 10 Sept. 1479. f°.

PHILIPPUS de MONTE CALERIO,

P573 Dominicale. Milan: Uldericus Scinzenzeler Jabout 1498. 4°.

PICUS de MIRANDULA, Johannes.

P579 Opera (Pars I). Bologna: Benedictus Hectoris, 20 Mar. 1496. fo.

Ff. 81, 161-176 lacking.

PLATEA. Franciscus de.

P684 Opus restitutionum, usararum, excommunicationum. Padua: Leonardus Achates, de Basilea [not after 28 July] 1473. f^o.

PLOTINUS.

P743 Opera. Florence: Antonio di Bartolommeo Miscomini, 7 May 1492. f°.

ROBERTUS Grosseteste LINCONIENSIS.

R198 Commentaria in Posteriora Aristotelis. Venice: Bonetus Locatellus, for Octavianus Scotus. 10 Nov. 1494, f^o.

SANSON, Franciscus, de Senis.

S155 Quaestiones super Physicam Aristotelis. Venice: Joannes Rubeus Vercellensis, for Alexander Calcedonius, 8 Feb. 1496. f°.

F. 2 lacking.

SILVESTER de PRIERIO.

S469 Compendium in Johannem Capreolum cum additionibus, Cremona: Carolus de Darleriis, 15 and 28 Apr. 1497. 4°.

2 copies. Copy II: ff. 231-246 lacking.

SIRECTUS, Antonius.

S484 Formalitates moderniores de mente Scoti. [Bologna: Henricus de Harlem, and Johannes Walbeck, after 1484.] 4°.

THOMAS ATTRABATENSIS.

T314 Quaestiones super quattuor libris sententiarum. Lyons: Engelhart Schultis 4 Dec. 1491. 4°.

TROMBETTA, Antonius.

T418 De humanarum animarum plurificatione. Venice: Bonetus, Locatellus, for Octavianus Scotus, 25 Oct. 1498. f°.

T419 Opus doctrinae Scoticae in Thomistas (Ed: Joannes Antonius Patavinus). Venice: Hieronymus de Paganinis, 15 Nov. 1493; 23 Dec. 1493; 8 Nov. 1493. f°. F. 2 misplaced after f. 3. Ff. 13-78 misplaced after f. 96. Ff. 97-102 lacking.

UBERTINUS de CASALI

U46 Arbor vitae crucifixae Jesu Christi. Venice: Andreas de Bonetis, 12 Mar. 1485. f°.
2 copies. Copy I: ff. 1, 250 lacking. Copy II: ff. 1, 250 lacking.

VARGAS, Alphonsus de

V83 Lectura super primo Sententiarum. Venice: Paganinus de Paganinis, 31 Oct. 1490, fo.

GAUDENS E. MOHAN, O.F.M.

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Don Fray Juan de Zumarraga, O. F., M. First Bishop and Archbishop of Mexico City



FRANCISCAN ITEMS OF INTEREST

THE SOLEMN CELEBRATION

-0---

OF THE FOURTH CENTENARY OF FRAY JUAN DE ZUMARRAGA

The Academy of American Franciscan History, Washington, D.C., recently commemorated the four-hundredth anniversary of the death of Fray Juan de Zumarraga, O.F.M., first Bishop of Mexico City. This famous prelate, who died on June 3, 1548, was one of the most distinguished figures in the colonial history of Mexico. He was appointed protector of the Indians by the Spanish Crown, and was renowned for his humanitarian efforts to secure kindly treatment for the aborigines. A great founder of schools and the trade-schools for the natives, he likewise is remembered for having brought the first printing press to the New World. The first book printed in either the North or South America was his own Doctrina Breve, a book of instruction in Christian Doctrine, issued at Mexico City in 1544.

Sunday, December 12, 1948, the feast of our Lady of Guadalupe, was chosen by the Director of the Franciscan Academy, the Rev. Alexander Wyse, O.F.M., for the liturgical commemoration of the anniversary because of its special association with Zumarraga. In the history of the popular Mexican devotion to the Virgin of Guadalupe, Archbishop Zumarraga has a leading role. It was during his term as bishop that the miraculous apparition is said to have taken place, and it was to him that the Indian, who saw it, was directed to go. The Bishop, demanding a sign in proof of the truth of the message, was the first to see the image of the Virgin impressed on the poor cloak of the lowly native. That image, still fresh and perfectly preserved on the roughly woven cloak after four centuries, is on display in the famous tourist-spot, the Basilica at Guadalupe, a few miles outside Mexico City.

The celebrant of the Mass on this occasion was the Apostolic Delegate to the United States, the Most Rev. Amleto G. Cicognani. The Deacons at the Throne were the Very Rev. Romuald Mollaun, O.F.M., Minister Provincial, Cincinnati, Ohio and the Very Rev. Fidel Chauvet, O.F.M., Minister Provincial, Mexico

City, Mexico. The Assistant Priest was the Very Rev. Bertrand J. Campbell, O.F.M., Minister Provincial of the Province of the Most Holy Name. The Deacon of the Mass was the Very Rev. Charles J. Tallarico, O.F.M., Commissary Provincial, New Canaan, Conn.; the Subdeacon, the Rev. Mathias Kiemen, O.F.M., professor of Church History, St. Joseph's Seminary, Teutopolis, Ill., representing the Very Rev. Juvenal Emanuel, O.F.M. (recently deceased); the Master of Ceremonies, the Rt. Rev. Joseph McShea, Secretary to the Apostolic Delegate and the Rev. Michael Harding, O.F.M., professor of Canon Law, Holy Name College, Washington, D.C. The preacher for the occasion was the Rev. Alexander Wyse, O.F.M., superior of the Friary of our Lady of Guadalupe and Director of the Academy.

On Monday, December 13, 1948, a formal academic session, signalizing the fourth centenary of the death of Don Fray Juan de Zumarraga, O.F.M., was held in Pilgrimage Hall, Franciscan Monastery, Washington, D.C. The Academy rewarded Dr. Pablo Martinez del Rio of Mexico City, with The America's Award for 1948. Dr. Martinez del Rio was so honored for his solendid cooperation in promoting cultural ties between the United States and Mexico. This distinguished scholar was educated at Oxford and the National University of Mexico. Thereafter, he filled several distinguished governmental posts in the educational field. In 1929, he was the Secretary of the Mexican Delegation to the International Congress of Educators at Ilavana and served as the Rector of the National University. For many years he has been the sponsor of the Mexican-United States Institute, of which the Biblioteca Benjamin Franklin is an integral part. Under the auspices of the United States Department of State, he has lectured at several American Universities.

Dr. Martinez del Rio has taken a scholarly interest in the archeological relics of the Aztec civilization. His personal research and excavations, carried on for over two decades, have been described in the leading journals of this field. His most notable contribution has been the unearthing of the Aztec Temple at Tlatlelolco.

The Most Rev. John M. McNamara, D.D., V.G., Auxiliary Bishop of Washington, presided at the Academic Session, as the personal representative of Archbishop Patrick A. O'Boyle. The Chairman was the Very Reverend Thomas Plassmann, O.F.M., S.T.D., Ph.D., LL.D., Rector of the Seminary of Christ the King and President of St. Bonaventure College.

Among the noteworthy guests present at the presentation were the Charge d'Affaires of the Mexican Embassy, Sr. D. Rafael de la Colina, and other members of the Embassy Staff. Included also among the guests were the following: Officials of the Pan-American Union, Latin American diplomatic corps, representatives of the Department of State, the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the Smithsonian Institute, the American Council of Learned Societies and the Carnegie Institute of Washington.

The editorial staff of Franciscan Studies congratulates the members of The Academy of American Franciscan History upon their selection of Dr. Pablo Martinez del Rio as the recipient of the Academy Award.

BONAVENTURE A. BROWN, O.F.M. Managing Editor

Franciscan Studies, St. Bonaventure, N.Y.

BOOK REVIEWS

Imperial Government and Catholic Missions in China during the Years 1784-1785.

By Bernward H. Willeke, O.F.M. St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1948. Pp. xiv-227. \$2.25.

The first volume in the Missiology Series of Franciscan Institute Publications sets a very high standard. It is a model historical investigation, based on a thorough examination and study, not only of printed and unprinted sources of the west, but also of contemporary Chinese documents.

After introducing his subject by a short survey of the medieval and earlier modern Catholic missions in China, Father Willeke presents an accurate and detailed account of the persecution of the Catholic Church in the various provinces of China during the years 1784 and 1785.

There is a valuable Appendix, consisting of fourteen Chinese documents translated into English (pp. 168-195); and this is followed by a Bibliography of eighteen pages (pp. 196-213), a Glossary of Chinese terms (pp. 214-218), and a good Index (op. 219-226).

The persecution of 1784-1785 began on August 27, 1784, when four Franciscans who were destined for the province of Shensi were taken prisoners. In Shensi, just at this time a dangerous uprising of the Mohammedans had broken out; and since the Chinese, even the better educated, looked upon Wohammedanism and Christianity as one religion, the missionary prisoners were thought to be in league with the rebels.

A far-reaching investigation was launched, and the statements of imprisoned and tortured Christians revealed the presence of Christians also in other provinces; and thus, by imperial orders, the persecution spread from one province to another. Forty priests were taken away from their flocks; the foreign priests were cast into prison and the native priests were banished to Ili (Sinkiang). Thirty leading lay assistants of the missionaries, mostly catechists, were likewise exiled. The trials held in Peking showed indeed that the missionaries and Christians were in no way connected with the Mohammedan rebellion; and in the end, the foreign missionaries who had survived the hardships of prison were permitted to stay in Peking or were deported from the country. However, greater precautions were taken to prevent new missionaries from entering China.

The decline of the missions in China in the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries has been ascribed by historians to the missionaries themselves. By presenting a true account of the persecution of 1784-1785, Father Willeke has corrected this error and indicated the real reasons for the decline of the missions.

It may be well to mention here the titles of several works which in the opinion of Dr. J. Beckmann (in a review of Father Willeke's book, appearing in Neue Zeitschrift fur Missionswissenschaft, vol. IV, no. 4) should have been added to the Bibliography. They are: Jos. de Moidrey, Confesseurs de la Foi en Chine, 1784-1862 (Shanghai, 1935); A. Launay, Memorial de la Societe des Missions Etrangeres, vol. II (Paris, 1916); and F.M. Gentili, Memorie di un Missionario Dominicano nella Cina (Rome, 1887).

To the reviewer it seems also that more detailed bibliographical information, or at least references to the pages containing such information, would have been helpful in the explanation of abbreviations (p. xiv). The initiated may know, but others will have to go hunting among the footnotes and the bibliography. Thus TLHP and WHTP are further explained on p. 196; APF, on p. 197 and footnote 46, p. 16; LE, NLE, and NMO, on p. 212; BM, on p. 213. KTSL was somewhat of a puzzle to the reviewer until he found it to be the same as Ta-ch'ing kao-tsung ch'un-huang-ti shih-lu (The veritable records of Kaotsung ch'un-huang-ti of the great Ch'ing dynasty) on p. 196 and p. 13, foofnote 38. T'oung Pao, abbreviated TP, is the name of a review about the Far East published in Europe - Leyden, Holland, if my informant is correct.

This is a minor defect, if any. Father Willeke's scholarly book is an important contribution to the history of Catholic missions in China; and it shows how necessary for the writing of this history is a knowledge of Chinese and the use of Chinese sources.

MARION A. HABIG, O.F.M.

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Julianus Pomerius. The Contemplative Life (De Vita Contemplativa). Translated and annotated by Sister Mary Josephine Suelzer. No. 4 of Ancient Christian Writers. Westminister, Md.: Newman Bookshop, 1947. Pp. 220. \$2.50.

Julianus Pomerius, the teacher of the famous St. Caesarius of Arles, had carved quite a prominent niche for himself in the early Middle Ages. However, due to a few twists of circumstances, the name of Julianus Pomerius was almost completely forgotten for many years, even by patrologists. Fortunately, his legitimate place is again recognized, and this translation into English by Sister Mary Josephine Seulzer of his only extant work should help to establish his popularity in the English-speaking world.

The Contemplative Life was written towards the end of the fifth century at the request of a certain Julianus, a bishop of Gaul. The bishop submitted ten practical questions to Pomerius, dealing with the nature of the contemplative life, the active life, the relation between the two, the treatment of sinners, the nature of virtues, etc. Julianus Pomerius answers the questions of the bishop

in three books, all together entitled *The Contemplative Life*. The first book deals with the contemplative life and its relation to the active life. The second outlines the conduct towards sinners, the correct attitude towards poverty, and abstinence. The third book deals with vices and their remedies, concluding with an analysis of the cardinal virtues.

As is evident, the title for the entire work, The Contemplative Life, is really borrowed from the first book. The greater part of the book does not deal with the contemplative life, as it is commonly understood. But since the author's concept of the contemplative life is not so restricted and exclusive, the title could be justified for the book as a whole.

Pomerius defines the contemplative life as that life in which God will be seen and possessed. In this life such a possession can only be imperfect. Its perfection comes only with beatific vision. He clarifies his definition of the contemplative life by comparing it with the active: The active life "makes a man holy"; the contemplative "makes him perfect." (p. 32) "It is characteristic of the active life to inflict injuries on no one; of the contemplative, to bear inflicted injuries calmly." After devoting an entire chapter to similar comparisons between the active and the contemplative, the author shows how priests can become sharers in the contemplative life, even though active in the ministry.

The second book presents some pastoral directions. While having as his main purpose the outlining of a pastor's conduct towards those entrusted to his care, Pomerius repeatedly insists on the priest's obligation to preach in word as well as in action.

The third book, being concerned with the vices and the virtues, could be classified as a treatise on asceticism. According to Pomerius there are four capital vices, pride, cupidity, envy and vanity. In this section the author shows how the vices disguise and manifest themselves and how they can be overcome. It is interesting to note that in this connection the author stresses particularly salutary fear and charity. Before treating the four cardinal virtues Pomerius first proves the thesis "that the number four is consecrated to perfection."

A careful analysis of *The Contemplative Life* reveals that Pomerius was an Augustinian student. The notes to the text corroborate this finding. Besides, the author himself expresses his great esteem for Augustine, and says: "him I have followed in these little books to the best of my ability." (p. 165).

Sister Mary Josephine Suelzer is to be commended for being the first ever to translate The Contemplative Life into English. In general the translation is quite smooth. However, a few brief lapses in style have been noticed. For example in Book One, Chapter 10 (p. 30), the second sentence is somewhat obscure, unbalanced and too long. The same could be said for the first sentence in Chapter 12, Book Three. An evident typographical error in the second sentence of paragraph 4, page 46, results in a bit of obscurity. These few minor lapses

are altogether forgotten, when we consider the excellence of the work as a whole.

The Contemplative Life must have had a great value at the time it was written. It could very well have served as a "Pastoral Guide" or "Pastoral Handbook" for several centuries after its composition. It has not lost its value even at the present time. In fact it has many chapters that will never grow out of date.

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Intuitive Cognition. A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics. By Sebastian J. Day, O.F.M. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1947. Pp. xiii-218. \$2.00.

This dissertation, though professedly a study in the history of philosophy, has much of value to offer the epistemologist and the psychologist. Most students of scholastic philosophy have not been completely satisfied with the current explanation of ideogenesis as presented in their Scholastic textbooks. The continual objections that are made in the class room are a proof of this intellectual dissatisfaction. Father Day's discussion of the origin of the current Scholastic theory on cognition will offer such students many new viewpoints and may pave the way to a more acceptable modern psychological and epistemological theory of knowledge.

The difficulties are discussed in the first part, which is entitled Aporetical. Aided by the results of modern historical research Father Day is able to trace the dependence of Aristotle on Plato in the matter of his theory of cognition. and in turn the influence of Aristotle on St. Thomas and the other Scholastics. Detailed treatment is given to two basic principles of the Thomistic theory, namely the theory of abstraction and the theory of the cognition of particulars. The difficulties inherent in both these principles are fully brought out. One of the chief merits of this first part of Father Day's work is the systematic analysis of the origin of the whole Thomistic theory of cognition. This analysis leads him to the conclusion that the Thomistic theory is based on only one principle that is universally admitted by all the Scholastics, namely the immateriality of the intellect. The other three principles on which the theory is based have always been controversial. These three controversial principles are the principle of individuation by matter, the origin of all knowledge in sense cognition, the role of the active intellect and the genesis of universal ideas by abstraction. To many the strictures made on the a priori method of forming the Thomistic theory may prove quite distasteful, especially since the second part of Father Day's work makes it clear that both Scotus and Ockham made liberal use of a priori arguments. The first part concludes with the Thomistic and the Franciscan classification of intellectual acts. According to the Thomists there are only three intellectual acts, the concept, the judgment, and the inference. The Franciscan classification includes two extra acts, namely the immediate or direct apprehension of singulars and an immediate apprehension of particulars which abstracts from the existence and presence of the thing known.

The second part delves into the history of intuitive cognition in the works of Scotus and Ockham, more attention being given to the former. In the opinion of Father Day, his findings warrant the conclusion that Scotus has shown that an exclusively abstractionistic explanation of intellection is false and impossible and that Scotus has established the fact of intuitive cognition. Father Day deserves special credit for his painstaking analysis and collation of the various works of Scotus and for the critical examination given to the works of Scotistic writers on the points in question. On the other hand, many might object to the intrusion of systematic conclusions in a part of the work that professes to be primarily a historical treatment of the problem. The treatment of Ockham is less exhaustive than that of Scotus. But all the relevant data of Ockham's writings are discussed. Much has been made of Ockham's opposition to Scotus. Father Day does not minimize this opposition where it exists; but at the same time he points out that there is in general an agreement of views and that Ockham may be said to have developed the ideas of Scotus.

In the third part of his work, Father Day discusses the consequences of the doctrine of intuitive cognition. In his opinion, the discussion of the views and the arguments of Scotus and Ockham justify the acceptance of intuitive cognition and the consequent rejection of exclusive abstractionism. In addition he finds it necessary with Ockham to reject all species. These and other conclusions deserve attentive consideration, but not all philosophers will grant them the certainty attributed to them by Father Day.

The work of Father Day is a worthy successor to the other volumes that have gone forth from the Franciscan Institute. It gives evidence of painstaking effort. The conclusions which Father Day has reached will prove of help in clarifying the situation of ideogenesis. They will lead to many discussions both for and against the position taken by Father Day. The psychologist will note many points of resemblance between the views of Scotus and Ockham and those of the few modern psychologists that have really gone into the problem of intellectual knowledge. Especially noteworthy are the similarities between many points of Ockham's theory and the modern findings of Spearman as presented in his noegenetic laws, the investigations of Lindworsky, Geyser, and T.V. Moore. Lindworsky has demanded of a theory of ideogenesis that it explain how concepts can grow and become more distinct, how in recalled

concepts only parts of the total object are present in consciousness, how imageless thought is possible, and how false judgments can be formed. Geyser calls attention to the fact that St. Thomas was aware of some of these difficulties and offered some solutions. Thus Summa Theologica 1. q. 13 ad 8, q. 77, ad 1, and 7, Commen. in Post. Anal. 1. lect. 42. However, it would seem that the solution offered by Scotus and Occam is closer to the results of modern experimentation.

VINCENT FOCHTMAN, O.F.M.

Our Lady of Angels Seminary, Cleveland, Ohio.

The Driving Forces of Iluman Nature and Their Adjustment. By Dom Thomas Verner Moore, O.S.B., Ph.D., M.D. New York: Grune and Stratton, 1948. Pp. viii, 461. \$6.50.

Readers familiar with the writings of Father Moore will recognize the title of the present work to be identical with that of one of the parts of the author's earlier *Dynamic Psychology*. In fact, the present volume may be regarded as a substantially enlarged revision of this earlier work, though some sections of the latter have been either dropped completely or notably shortened, as for instance, the account of the psychoanalytic theories of Freud, Jung and Adler. The substance of the first work has been retained, as a brief analysis of the contents of the present volume will reveal.

The first of seven parts is entitled "Historical Introduction to Psychology" In addition to the opening chapter on the concept of psychology (identical with that of the earlier edition), Father Moore has added a second, summarizing the the development of psychology in the United States. Included is an interesting account of the origin, growth and contributions of the Department of Psychology and Psychiatry at the Catholic University of America with the history of which Father Moore was so intimately connected.

The second part, called "Consciousness and the Unconscious", with the exception of one chapter on the Unconscious, is practically unaltered. The section dealing with emotional life, however, has been greatly enlarged. It is broken down into two parts. The first, "Human Emotional Life", contains.

besides the chapters on the psychology and expression of the emotions of the earlier work, four other chapters touching on the physiology and development of the emotions, affective experience, and the factorial analysis of emotional life. The last named chapter embodies much of the results of research conducted at Catholic University under Father Moore's direction.

The fourth part, "The Psychopathology of Emotional Life", is new. Here the author discusses the nature and causes of some of the forms of psychoneuroses, concluding that there is no one essential causal factor that is responsible for these psychosomatic disorders.

Part five, which bears the same title as the book itself, is taken over without change from Dynamic Psychology with the exception of the few introductory paragraphs. From the viewpoint of the general reader, this section is perhaps the most practical portion of the work. This distinction between instinct (characteristic of animals) and impulse, its analogon in man, is discussed. Desire results from frustrated impulses and leads to conflicts, where psychotaxic and parataxic factors come into play. Psychotaxis is a term coined by Father Moore to designate the natural or spontaneous tendency of the mind to adjust itself to pleasant and especially unpleasant situations. The negative psychotaxes (those concerned with unpleasant situations and conflicts) include depression and anxiety, defense reactions, compensations and sublimations. When these natural impulses are carried to excess, they represent abnormal emotional adjustments, which Father Moore calls parataxes. The nature of each of these various classes of parataxes and their cure is discussed briefly.

Part six, "The Will and Voluntary Action", has been in part revised and contains two new chapters on the psychology and philosophy of the will. The three remaining chapters on sensations and kinetic units involved in voluntary action, together with pathologies of the same, will be familiar to the readers of Dynamic Psychology.

The last part, "Problems of Volitional Adjustment", is new and contains much practical material. It is interesting to find a special chapter devoted to man's adjustment to God.

This bare summary of the contents of this valuable work should suffice to verify the author's explanation that, while it has much in common with the earlier work, nevertheless "so much new material has been added and so much eliminated that the final form has seemed to represent a new work, warranting a title of its own" (Preface).

Not only will this work of Father Moore be welcome to one embarking exprofesso on the study of psychiatry who will find in it a much needed "synthesis of the various currents of modern psychological thought", but its intelligible style, for the most part unencumbered with technical language, should make it widely read among all those who have exercised the role of spiritual director or

confessor.

This work forms a fitting close to the career of Father Moore, who has retired from active teaching and research work. In this connection the reviewer would like to quote a passage from the present work which indicates how fully Father Moore has captured the genuine spirit of the true scholastic, who, not content to rest with the achievements of the past, was constantly modifying and transforming the traditional doctrines to fit in with new discoveries.

It is of importance in the study of the human mind to turn to the mind itself rather than to the commentaries of Aristotle and St. Thomas. The commentaries have their value, but if there is to be progress in psychology we must not only interpret the past but make investigations in the present and bring ancient truths into contact with the developments of the present. This task was the life work of St. Albert the Great, to whom St. Thomas owed so much. The study of empirical data is of even more importance in our day than in the time of St. Albert, because of the vast amount of material waiting to be synthesized. The data available at the present transcend in importance anything that St. Albert could even have dreamed about. Let us look up from the texts and commentaries at least long enough to have a glance at what is available in the present. (pp. 44-45)

ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M.

Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N.Y.

Catholic Library Practice. Edited by Brother David Martin, C.S.C. Portland, Oregon: University of Portland Press, 1947. Pp. viii, 244.

This book poses the answer to a question frequently asked of those in charge of our book collections: What is the *Catholic* library practice? There are as many reasons to justify a volume on Catholic librarianship as there are for the existence of Catholic educational institutions.

This series of some twenty essays, by authorities in their field, will prove a helpful source of information to both Catholic and non-Catholic librarians. The following are some of the topics treated: The library in Catholic Education; Book Selection for elementary, secondary and college libraries; The Major Seminary library; Diocesan Bookshop and library; Adult Education and the Catholic reader; Catholic bibliography; Library administration; Catholic Subject

Headings: Education for librarianship as exemplified in five approved Catholic library schools; Censorship and the library; Early contributions to librarianship; The history of the Catholic Library Association, and a fine chapter on Catholic commercial publishing in the United States.

Of particular interest to Franciscans is the reference to the pioneer work of the English friers, who as early as the thirteenth century compiled what is in all likelihood the first Union Catalogue. Registrum Librorum Angliae they called it, and it listed the holdings of one hundred and eighty-three English Franciscan monastery libraries.

Authoritative, practical and quite up to date, this symposium should prove a source of information to all interested in the apostolate of the good book, as well as a well-spring of inspiration. It may serve as a picture of the advances made by Catholic librarianship during the past two decades. The volume gives sufficient evidence not only that Catholic libraries are an important force in the world today, but also of the fact that there is such a thing as a Catholic library practice. The editor, and authors deserve high praise for a work well done.

IRENAEUS HERSCHER, O.F.M.

St. Bonaventure College Library, St. Bonaventure, N.Y.

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
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THE ALLEGED FOURTH BOOK ON THE SENTENCES OF ODO RIGAUD AND RELATED DOCUMENTS*

DO RIGAUD came into prominence some seventy-five years ago through the connection of his writings with those of the Seraphic Doctor. Fidelis a Fanna in searching out the manuscripts of St. Bonaventure in view of the forthcoming edition came across not a few of these of Rigaud, and that the alliance of these two authors doctrinally speaking did not escape our connoisseur, may be seen from the unpublished notes left by him in this regard. The author of these different Rigaldian manuscripts was, in fact, in the light of this doctrinal affinity, considered not the teacher but the disciple of St. Bonaventure. The present article constitutes an attempt to clarify whatever remaining insecurity rests with the outstanding work of Rigaud, namely his Commentary on the Sentences, and in particular the fourth book of this Commentary.

The problem of this book may be said to have been placed by the edition of the *Opera Omnia* of St. Bonaventure. Here we read:

Troyes Bibl. Civit. In eadem bibliotheca est cod. membr. in 8, sign. 1862, qui sub nomine S. Bonaventurae refert commentarium in III et IV Sent.; redactor ejus est Odo Rigaldus Ord. Win., Archiepiscopus Rothomagensis.²

In the judgment of the editors of St. Bonaventure it would seem, then, that Rigaud could lay claim to having finished his *Commentary*. Such a judgment gained strength on the

^{*}We extend here our thanks to Fr. Damian van den Eynde, O.F.M., Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, Rome, as also to Frs. Victorin Doucet, O.F.M. and Fr. F.M. Henquinet, O.F.M. of the Collegium S. Bonaventurae of Quaracchi, for timely assistance.

^{1.} Cf. F. M. Henquinet, Les manuscrits et l'influence des écrits théologiques d'Eudes Rigaux O.F.M., in Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, XI (1939)324-350, cf. p. 349.

Since there shall be numerous occasions for citing this article throughout the present pages, it shall be referred to solely by the first words of the title, soil. Les Manuscrits.

^{2.} Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Quaracchi, I (1882) lxix; cf. also F.M. Henquinet, Les manuscrits, p. 339, n. 53.

appearance of a twin manuscript to the above, that of Troyes City Library 824, ff. 217r-306r, which likewise was described and catalogued first by Fidelis a Fanna and later by E. Smeets. While the attribution of Troyes 1862 to Rigaud was evidently due to its being found in association with an easily recognizable third book, Troves 824 in addition to being associated with the other three books has the added evidence of an explicit attribution. On its last folio, 306r, we find the predominant inscription Summa fratris Rigaldi de Ordine Minorum, and above this Summa Magistri Rigaldi super quattuor Sententiarum, while below L. 24 Liber Sanctae Mariae Clarevallensis. Fractatus magistri Rigaldi super IIII libros Sententiarum. 4 This last is in a contemporary hand. Since all four books judging from the manuscript were already copied in the middle thirteenth century and as a unit come under the attribution of the scribe, viz. "Tractatus magistri Rigaldi super IIII libros Sententiarum", there would seem to be little reason for doubting either the authenticity of Troyes 1862 or 824, or the completion of the commentary. No doctrinal contradictions of any sort whatever had been proposed between the fourth book and the other three, and no contender had entered the field.

In 1927, however, and thereafter, A. Landgraf repeatedly cited another fourth book, that of the *Bibliothèque Royale of Bruxelles 1542*, ff. 179a-253b, which he attributes to Rigaud, and continues to cite as belonging to that author. ⁵ The doctrinal

^{3.} Cf. F.M. Henquinet, Les manuscrits, p. 337, 23. With reference to this and the preceding note, cf. also F.M. Henquinet, Le Commentaire d'Eudes Rigaud, O.F.M. sur le IV^{me} Livre des Sentences, in Collectanea Franciscano, X (1940) 481-493, cf. p. 482.

Since this second article of F.M. Henquinet is an ex professo treatment of the problem of these pages, it likewise shall be referred to on many occasions; for that reason the abbreviated title *Le Commentaire* shall be used. All the literature pertinent to Odo Rigaud, in his scholastic and pastoral career, may be found in these articles of F.M. Henquinet.

^{4.} F.M. Henquinet, Les manuscrits, p. 337, and Le Commentaire, p. 482.

^{5.} A. Landgraf, Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 51 (1927) 178 and 184; loc. cit., 53 (1929) 108. Cf. also the different articles by this author appearing in

superiority in general of this later-cited book needed no encomium—being evident—while in apparent completeness and detail it corresponded more closely to the genre of books I, II, and III. P. Glorieux in his Répertoire cites Bruxelles for the fourth book, and omits any mention of the others found in Troyes 824 and 1862, only later to receive correction from V. Doucet. In 1936 F. Pelster describes Troyes 824, notices the discrepancies with Bruxelles for the first folios, but attests to the agreement of the last part of the codices; with respect to the general content he remains indecisive.

The most definite and ex professo treatment of this problem came to us in the articles of F. Henquinet appearing in 1939 and 1940 where the entire weight of criticism turns in favor of Bruxelles. At first, in his article of 1939, he cites the earliest evidence to the existence of any such fourth book, namely that of the catalog of books once found in the library

The New Scholasticism, Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, Franziskanische Studien, and Collectanea Franciscana in 1927 and thereafter. A. Landgraf makes mention of the fact that the ms. of Rigaud found in Bruges 208 does not have a fourth book; nevertheless he considers this of Bruxelles 1542 genuine without any hesitation. In point of fact—at least according to the catalogs—Bruxelles 1542 bears no attribution to Rigaud for any of the books. It is presented by van den Gheyn as quite ornately decorated; yet its scribe nowhere mentions the author.

Since there will not be occasion to return to the consideration of the entire ms. again, we may advert here to the problem posed by Fr. Henquinet, Le Commentaire, (1940) p. 488. Having confronted the text of Bruxelles and Bruges for book III, Fr. Henquinet finds that now one and then the other draws out the endings of the distinctions or their parts. Furthermore, Bruxelles contains divisiones textus for books II and III—something foreign to the other manuscripts. May the connection between the texts of Melitona and Bruxelles established in the following pages, especially the reference to the additions found in Bruxelles, not offer a solution to this problem?

- 6. P. Glorieux, Répertoire des Maîtres en Théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle, Paris, J. Vrin (1933) n. 303.
- 7. V. Doucet, Maîtres Franciscains de Paris, in Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 26 (1933) 11.
- 8. F. Pelster, S.J., Beiträge zur Erforschung des schriftlichen Nachlasses Odo Rigaldis, in Scholastik 11 (1936) 521.
- 9. Cf. the two articles of F.M. Henquinet already mentioned, namely, Les manuscrits, and Le Commentaire.

of St. James of the Marches; 10 assured of the authenticity of either one of the divergent claimants, he proceeds to identify Bruxelles with Rigaud more especially on the ground of its doctrinal maturity. Other considerations were the simplicity of style of Troyes, its seemingly belonging to a bachelor of an age well anterior to Rigaud, or in a word its inferiority to Bruxelles. The presence of some sixteen distinctions common to both Troyes and Bruxelles prompted F. Henquinet to attribute this phenomenon to the involuntary error of a copyist. 11 A parallel was afforded by a somewhat like occurrence in a manuscript of Albert the Great.

In 1943 V. Doucet 12 gave us the last word on this problem. In the Prolegomena to the fourth volume of the Summa Fratris Alexandri the above-mentioned editor took a stand less enthusiastically in favor of Bruxelles; in his judgment the asserted authenticity of Bruxelles "minus certe constat," and in fact the contrary "quasi probabilius (nobis) videretur." His doubts with reference to Bruxelles found their justification in the presence of material in B taken verbotenus in part from some questions of Alexander, as also in a dependence upon the Commentary of Alexander as seen from the passages published by A. Landgraf, and furthermore, perhaps, upon the Quaestiones of Melitona. Due, however, to a like dependence from the Quaestiones of Alexander on the part of Troyes, he concludes that perhaps not "immerito quis cogitaret de duplici redactione ejusdem Commentarii."

In the course of some studies we were making in the

^{10.} Cf. Les manuscrits, p. 347, and p. 334, 14 and n. 43; Le Commentaire, p. 482.

^{11.} Cf. Le Commentaire, p. 487.

^{12.} V. Doucet, Summa Theologica seu sic ab origine dicta "Summa Fratris Alexandri", T. IV, Prolegomena, p. 228; cf. also pp. 191, 192 n.2, 198, and particularly p. 145 n.6, with reference to Bruxelles; with reference to Troyes 1862, cf. p. 190 and 230. In these pages the Summa Theologica shall be referred to as the Summa Fratris Alexander for convenience sake, and this also when reference is had to the IV pars of that Summa; the Prolegomena to Tome IV of the critical edition shall be referred to as Prolegomena.

authors of the early Franciscan School, we found it imperative to devote considerable attention to the present problem, not merely for reasons of chronology, but especially because of the manifest and numerous points of contact which now one and then the other author revealed. These points of contact when assembled confronted us with a medley of texts drawn from five different authors, viz. William of Melitona (M). Bruxelles Bibl. Royale 1542 (B), Troyes 1862 (T), Alexander of Hales (A) (in his Commentary and Quaestiones) and Vatican lat. 691 (V). The following table of concordance represents the results of our findings; it by no means presumes completeness, but simply presents the points of contact which have been noticed. The Commentary of Alexander showed the most sustained influence throughout all other authors, and for that reason the table has been arranged in the sequence of this Commentary. The titles are assigned according to the subject-matter of the actual item and not necessarily according to the subject-matter of the question in which it appears in one or the other author. When two or more authors agree ad verbum, an asterisk is affixed to their folio numbers.

The Quaestiones de sacramentis of William of Melitona are found in the following mss.: Paris Nat. lat. 15920, ff. 2a-128d; Klosterneuburg, Library of the Canons Reg. of St. Aug., 309 ff. 79a-85d and 119a-217b; Assisi 182, ff. 96d-103c, 112a-135b; Padua S. Ant. 152, ff. 1a-102c Vat. lat. 4245, ff. 214a-300a, and University Library Turin D. III, 28, ff. 158b-d (abbreviation-continuation, cf. V. Doucet, Prolegomena p. 240). All these manuscripts end in the course of the sacrament of penance. This is indicated in the table. The references in the table refer to Klos. 309. Throughout the succeeding pages this ms. (K) is sometimes supplemented by Paris Nat. lat. 15920 (P) and Vat. lat. 4245 (Vat. lat.).

The references to the *Commentary* of Alexander of Hales are to the Assisi manuscript, viz. *Assisi Bibl. Comm. 189*, ff. 116a-176c(=A). This *Commentary* expires with dist. 39 in

course of the sacrament of matrimony.

It has been impossible to consult the presumably twin ms. to Troyes 1862, scil. Troyes 824. The remaining references 13 are, then: Bruxelles Bibl. Royale 1542 (=B), Troyes 1862 (=T), and Vat. lat. 691 (=V).

13. All reference to two works bearing a relation to the documents M and B cited in this table, viz. Summa Fratris Alexandri, IV Pars, and Assisi Bibl. Comm. 182 ff. 76a-79d is omitted. Though many of the arguments pro and contra, as likewise the responsa common to M and B, are found in the Summa Fratris Alexandri ad verbum and in Assisi 182 ff. 76a sqq. ad sensum or aliquo modo ad verbum, each of these may be eliminated from the MB relation as appears from the following comparison of texts: (Cf. B f. 179a; Melitona Klos. f. 84d; Summa [ed. Venice 1575] Q. I, m. 11, a. 1); Assisi Bibl. Comm. 182, f. 76b sqq., where the several authors deal with the necessity of the sacraments ante lapsum.

MB

Duplex est status hominis, naturae conditae et lapsae, et huic duplici (duplici om. B) statui duplex respondet gratia, scil. perficiens et reficiens.

А

Duplex est status naturae, scil. institutae et destitutae, sic etiam duplex gratia, perficiens ad gloriam, et reficiens per opera.

Summa vacat

and:

MBS

Praeterea, impeditur aspectus ejus per intentionem in opera sensitivae et vegetativae nunc magis quam tunc.

Assisi Bibl. Comm. 182

Praeterea, aspectus animae impeditur per opera generativae et vegetativae

That there would seem to be some dependence between Assisi 182 and B appears from the following collation of texts (loc. cit.):

B (M and S vacat)

Item, per exercitium sacramentorum subicitur homo creaturae inferiori se, sed hoc indecens fuisset in statu innocentiae et inconveniens; ergo in statu innocentiae sacramenta non fuerunt necessaria ad salutem.

Assisi Bibl. Comm. 182

Vel per exercitium sacramentorum homo subicitur creaturae; sed hoc indecens fuisset in statu innocentiae, quia talis subiectio fit ex decreto divinae iustitiae propter culpam. Igitur, non fuerunt ibi sacramenta.

The Summa Fratris Alexandri is repetitious and arbitrary at times; an item may not appear in the same place in which it is found in its source, only to turn up later on and verbatim from that source but with reference to another, or an allied, question. At any rate, we have not noticed the passages marked vacat in the Summa Fratris Alexandri, IV Pars.

TABULA CONCORDANTIAE

DE SACRAMENTIS IN GENERE	М	B	T	A	V
Prologus IV Sent. Alexandri: "Dixit					
Eliseus ad Naaman"	107 14	100		116ab	121a
De numero sacramentorum N. Legis	137cd*	182c		116c*	121b
De definitione sacramenti			134a	116d	121c
De necessitate sacramentorum ante	0.4.10	100.0			
lapsum	84d*	179a*			
De necessitate sacramentorum post	016 */10	±1501 ±			
lapsum De necessitate sacramentorum	216v*(V)	1795			
tempore gratiae	197-6	170 - 18			
De sufficientia sacramentorum V.	137a*	179cd*			
Legis	125bd*	100-8			
De utilitate sacramentorum Legis	12300.	180a*			
scriptae secramentorum Legis	125d-126	-#100L#			
Utrum sacramenta Legis Scriptae	123Q-120	a.tonb.			
erant solum ad signandum an					
etiam ad efficiendum	126b*	180b*			
Utrum efficiebant quod figurabant	126c*	180v*			
De definitionibus sacramenti	119a-	180c-			
20 doillition 200 out among	120b*	181b*			
De causis institutionis sacramentors		181b*			
Utrum sacramenta Novae Legis		10.2			
efficiunt quod figurant ratione					
operis operati	120b-	181r*			
• •	121a*				
In quibus consistit materia					
sacramentorum	138ab*	181b*			
Utrum efficiunt gratiam disponendo					
vel efficiendo	121b*	181c*			
In quo est illud in quo animam					
sanctificat	121b*	181c*			
In quo est illud virtus disponens					
et characterizans	120b*	181d*			
De circumcisione	126d-	181d-			
	132b*	182c*			
De sacrificiis legalibus (Quaestio					
Alexandri, Vat. lat. 782, ff. 77b-79	₽b)		134a- 136a		
De sacrificiis in genere (Quaestio					
Alexandri, Vat. lat. 782, f. 71a-7	3d)		135ab		
De effectu ex opere operato			137b	117b	
De gratia in circumcisione				117d-118d	122c
De remedio mulierum			138a	118Ь	
De effectu fidei parentum respectu					
parvulorum			139Ь	118bd	
De impressione characteris in					1001
circumcisione				118d	122d

TReference is to Vat. lat. 4245.

DE BAPTISMO	М	В	T	A	V
De baptismo Ioannis	138b-	182c-			
	139c*	183b*			
De definitione baptismi	139b-140b*	183Ь*			
De verbo et elemento in baptismo			141c	120b	
De forma baptismi			141d-142a	120cd	125c
De institutione baptismi				120d	124b
De aqua in baptismo				121a	124b
Sacramenta efficient quod					
figurant			145d	122a	
De ficte accedentibus			146a	122b	
De effectu fidei parentum			146bc	122b	
De charactere in ficte accedentibus					
De baptismo sanguinis et				122c	125b
fluminis			146c	100 - 1	1051
Utrum martyrium supplet			146d	122cd	125b
De baptismo poenitentiae			147c-	123a 123ab	1051
De Daptismo poemientae			148a	14380	125 d
De parvulis decedentibus			148b	123b	
De resurrectione Christi			1405	1230	
respectu baptismi			148bc	123bc	
De suppressione fomitis			148c	123c	
••					
Multi sunt effectus baptismi					
in adulto				123c*	126a*
De charactere				123c	126a
Gratia plures habet effectus:					
de relatione naturalium et					
gratuitorum			149b	123cd*	126b
De ficte accedentibus	147b*			123d-	
D. liff of continue				124a	126b
De differentia gratiae et					
virtutis, de habitu in			140	204.1	
parvulis De ministris indignis			149a	124ab	100.4
De ministris indignis	,		149c	124b*c	126c*
De characteris impressione			149c	124bc	126c
De baptismo Ioannis			1470	124c	126d
De potestate excellentiae et			149d-150c		1204
ministerii			1124.1000		
De potestate dimittendi peccata				125a	127b
De sanctificatione loannis in				_ m - u	24.5
utero			151b	125cd	
De corruptione formae baptismi			151d	126a	
De tempore institutionis etc.			152ab	126b	
De exorcismo		152	a-153a	127ab	

DE CONFIRMATIONE	М	В	T	A	V
De confirmatione (d. VII) De confirmatione	151b- 154d*	189cd*	153d- 154a	127bc	
DE EUCHARISTIA	М	В	T	A	V
De sacramento altaris	154d- 155d*	190ad*			
De unitate sacramenti De manducatione sacramenti	156a*	191a*			
spirituali et sacramentali De numero modorum comedendi	172bc* 172d-	191r*			
Utrum corpus Christi intrat	173a*	191b*			
ventrem Utrum Christus sit in qualibet	173Ь*	191c*			
parte hostiae totum	168r*	192v- 193r*			
De modo praedicandi de eucharistia	171c- 172b*	194c*			
De conversione De operatione transubsant-	171d*	194cd*			
tiationis circa species De substantia panis et vini	166b*	195r*			
ejusque permanentia Utrum species possint	164d*	195r*			
reficere? Initium tractatus de eucnar-	167b*	195v*		127c*	128c*
istia De baptismo et eucharistia respectu					
temporis institutionis			155e	127d- 128a*	129bc*
De duplici re eucharistiae (de carita- te aliisque virtutibus resp. euch.)	-		155b- 156a	128ac	129cd
De indigne sumentibus De dando panem benedictum	1		157b 157e	128cd 129a	130a
Utrum Christus est in pluribus locis? De conversione specierum De apparatione Christi in vera			159e	129a* 130b	130c* 131c
forma De passibilitate corporis Christi				130d	131d
in coena; de admiscenda aqua			160d- 161a	131a	
Utrum manducavit spiritualiter solum			156cd	131b	
Utrum accidentia sint sine subjecto De videndo et tangendo corpus			l6lc	131d*	132c*
in eucharistia				132a*	133b*

	М	В	T	A	V
De continentia Christi			161d-		
			162a	132b*	133ab*
De immolatione			163a	132d	
De potestate excommunicatorum			2004	1024	
respectu corporis Christi			164a	133a	
Toposta corpora			2014	2000	
De celebrando indigne			157c	133a	133Б
DE POENITENTIA	М	В	T	A	V
De secunda tabula			164c	133d	
De poenitentia respectu virtutis			~010	1000	
et gratiae			164c-		
			165a	134ac*	135bc*
De contritione respectu doloris			1004	20240	10000
et gaudii			166c	134cd	135b
De solemni poenitentia			166cd	135a	135b
De flagello peccatoris			167d	135b-	1005
Do nagono poceatoris			1014	1002	
An contritio sit gratia				140b	139cd
De definitione poenitentiae					
secundum Ambrosium	190cd*	98ab*			
An dolor pro peccatis praecedens					
baptismum sit poenitentia?	210d*	200r*			
De fundamento poenitentiae	210d-				
	212b*	200rv*			
De poenitentia in generali		200c-	168a-		
		201c*	170d*		
De poenitentia in generali		201d*	171bc*		
De constitutivis poenitentiae		202a-	172b-		
		202Ь*	173c*		
De partibus integralibus poenit-					
entiae		202c*		138ab*	
		203b*	173c-		
Onid annulainum manialia annania		203r*	174c*	100 1#	
Quid expulsivum venialis peccati?		2031+		139cd*	
De IV quae exiguntur ad iustificat- ionem		205rv*		1403#	
		205FV+		140d*	
De tempore an non inter expul- sionem culpae et infusionem					
gratiae	197d*	205b*			
Utrum infusio gratiae praecedat	1974.	2030			
expulsionem culpae	197b*	205c-206	J#		
expulsionem culpae	Ex- plic-	2030-200	u ·		
De satisfactione	plic- it M	202r*	173c*	140a	
Utrum attritio possit fieri contritio	80 278				139d
An confessio sit sacramentum				141c-1	
veteris an Novae Legis		205b*			
Quaestio Alex. De contritione			174d-175	sa	
Poenstentia ad baptismi purit-					
atem conatur ducere (d. XV,c)		206b*		137d*	

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M	В	T	A	V
De effectu contritionis				
maioris minorisve quantitatis	208v*	178d-† 179a*	144d-* 145a	141d
De clavibus	208d- 209b*	11/4	145b- 146b*	
4 4	209b* 212a*		146b*	
Dist. XX. De reconciliatione	222-		1-100	
poenitentium	212c-	182d-		
No. 1777	214a*	184c*		
Dist. XXI. De purgatorio, de remissione venialium, de				
confessione venialium, de			151b;	
sigillo	214a-	184c-	152a-15	3b
Dist, XXII. De redditione	215c*	186b*		
peccatorum. De sacramento et	215c-	186b-		
re in poenitentia.	216b*	187b*		
*				
De scandalo			142cd	140ab
De absolutione			143cd	141a
De superbia			144ad	141c
De clavibus respectu potestatis sacerdotis				
De vinculis peccati		1001+	146be	142bd
De commutatione poenae vermis		180b* 180c	146c* 146d	142c
De excommunicatione		180d-	147b-	143d
		181b	148b	145u
De correctione fraterna		182d-		
		183a	149ab	
De iustitia in iustificatione				
impii		183 a	149d	
De remissione venialium		185a	151b	
Dist. XXI,c.3. Qui vero super- aedificant			151c	149b
Utrum venialia puniuntur aeternal-			1510	1490
iter		185c	152a	
De redditione peccati		186d	153ab	147c
De unitate sacramenti poenitentiae			153a	153bc
DE EXTREMA UNCTIONE	В	T	Α	V
Dist. XXIII. De extrema				
unctione	216cd*	187b-		148bd cum
		188c*		A153c-155b
De unctione tamquam		187c	153d	
materia in sacramentis		100		
De oratione in ext. unct.		187c	153d	
De significatione materiae				
in baptismo, confir. et		187c	154a	
extr. unct.		1070	1948	
B et T differt aliquando				

De susceptibili extr.unct. De charactere	B T A V 188b 154c 188c et 154d 143c-144ac
DE ORDINE	B T A V
Dist. XXIV	217r- 188c- 219r* 191a*
De definitione ordinis	188d- 155be 189a
De essentia ordinis Dist. XXV	190c 158a 219c- 191a- 221b* 192d*
DE MATRIMONIO	B T A V
De gratia in matrimonio:	193a* 160d* 152c*
matr. et poenitentiae De oleo in sacramentis ejusque relatione cum	193c 161be 152c
diversis gratiis. De institutione matr.	193d 161cd 152v 162a 152d
De trina bonitate matr.	198b 165c
Dist. XXXVI Dist. XXXVII	234a* 204a* 234cd* 172a- 172c*
Dist. XXXVIII (Divisio textus)	235a* 204ab*
Dist. XXXVIII	235ad* 204b- 172c- 206a* 175b*
Dist. XXXIX	236r- 206a- 237v* 207b*
Dist. XL	237c- 207b- 238b* 207d*
Dist, XLI	238c- 207d- 239d* 208b*
Dist. XLII	240a- 208b- 241a* 208d*

DE NOVISSIMIS

Since even a cursory view down the columns convinces one of any mutual spheres of influence being by no means reserved to B and T, perhaps a closer study of each commentary in its relation to the others may supply us with the very key necessary for the identification of each.

Melitona and B come first into consideration. As seen from the table, the contents of ff. 179a-183b in B is (with the exceptions we shall later on consider) common to Melitona. This includes the three long questions relating to the necessity of the sacraments ante lapsum, post lapsum and in tempore gratiae spoken of by F. Pelster and F. Henquinet. 14 With reference to the sacrament of baptism at least the beginning of the tract (f. 183 in B, and ff. 139b-140b in Welitona) likewise reappears verbotenus in both Melitona and B. Since the checking of each question of Melitona against B would entail an immense labor unnecessary for present purposes. only random questions here and there throughout the duration of Melitona have been subjected to comparison. In the next tract, then, that dealing with confirmation, the same identity of material reappears. In fact the entire duration of f. 189cd in B with insignificant exceptions again appears common to M and verbotenus. The same phenomenon repeats itself in the succeeding tract on the eucharist. The tract on penance in Melitona extends over sixty-four folios of two columns each (ff. 185r-217r). 15 The last major question found in all the extant mss. of these questions of Melitona introduces the consideration of the sacrament of penance with reference to its constitutive parts:

Quaeritur utrum contritio, confessio et satisfactio sunt partes poenitentiae sacramenti (f. 215c)?

This is followed by the treatment of contrition, which continues until f. 217b where the tract terminates either mutilated or unfinished, with the question:

Quaeritur utrum contritio sit sensualitatis aut partis rationabilis? (f. 217b). In B the treatment of penance similarly merits considerable attention

^{14.} F. Pelster, Beiträge zur Erforschung des schriftlichen Nachlasses Odo Rigaldis, Scholastik, 11 (1936) 518-542, cf. P. F.M. Henquinet, Les manuscrits, p. 332, and 347, as also Le Commentaire, p. 483ff.

^{15.} Here and elsewhere, at times, reference is had to folio numbers not appearing in the tabula concordantiae previously given since this tabula does not represent by any means a complete comparison of all the manuscripts mentioned.

extending over ff. 197c-216b (Dists. XIV to XXII inclusive). A thorough comparison of Melitona and B over the entire extent of the otherwise unrecognized material seemed unnecessary; however, as seen from the table the same community of matter continues and ad verbum in the treatment of this tract. The last question recognized in Melitona and recurring in B bears on the treatment of penance in generali (Melitona f. 210d-212b; B f. 200rv).

While ' litona breaks off in the course of the treatment of contrition. B continues, and it is exactly here that the correspondence between Alexander and B and between Troyes and B commences. We may notice here that our comparison of Troyes, Alexander and B has been complete. Such a comparison shows that the greater part of the remaining matter on the sacrament of penance in B is found verbatim in either Alexander or Troyes. Again, for Dist. XXIII (B ff. 216cd) a corresponding set of folios treating the same subject, extreme unction, is found en bloc in Troyes (ff. 187b-188c). Dists. XXIV and XXV dealing with the sacrament of orders (B. 217r-221r; Troyes 188c-192d) reappear as common to both Troyes and B, while the succeeding tract on matrimony continues to present this same phenomenon of a community of material. The treatment of De Novissimis in B presents us with two questions of Alexander which are ad verbum though incomplete. 16 A reflection of the conclusion later to be shown from this evidence already dawns up n us. Something needs be mentioned, however, of the concurrence between Troyes and Alexander.

Here but a few brief remarks may suffice. F. Pelster and F. Henquinet have already adequately described the manuscript of *Troyes* attributed to Rigaud and the latter has thoroughly examined its contents with relation to B. ¹⁷ To the published results of this comparison we are indebted for the data pertinent to the *Troyes-B* relation submitted in the above table. Our attention needs be called only to the sustained interdependence of *Troyes* and Alexander. The *Assisi* codex of the fourth book of Alexander

^{16.} These questions were identified in B by V. Doucet; cf. Prolegomena, p. 228 as also pp. 191 and 198.

^{17.} Cf. F. Pelster, Beiträge zur Erforschung des schriftlichen Nachlasses Odo Rigaldis, loc. cit., and F.M. Henquinet, Le Commentaire, the table of comparison composed by the latter appears in pp. 485 and 486 of his article. We are indebted to F.M. Henquinet for additions and corrections later added to this tabula.

extends over the treatment of the sacraments in general and in particular, and ends before the tract De Novissimis. Throughout this entire codex, sacrament after sacrament, a manifest interdependence with Troyes is sustained. This consists in a repetition of the content of one author in the other oftentimes ad verbum but generally ad sensum. In fact, as we may notice from the table, any alliance ad verbum is so generally interspersed with material taken predominantly ad sensum that it offers a strong contrast to the similarity between Melitona and B. We notice the oresence of two of the questions of Alexander in Troyes, viz. De sacrificiis in genere and De sacrificiis legalibus 18 where this same mode of dependence perdures. It may be mentioned that other passages showing a similar dependence have been omitted from the table due to their insignificance for present purposes.

In the fifth column are to be found the corresponding references from Vatican lat. 691. 19 While this codex does not have any too great importance for the present study, sufficient references have been submitted to show the interdependence of its sources with the other authors. Indeed, here precisely rests—in our opinion—the importance of Vatican lat. 691 in that it affords us unmistakable evidence of hitherto unrecognized authors. Though at times many of the passages found in common to Alexander and Vat. lat. 691 might just as well be termed ad verbum as ad sensum, on the strength of the minute differences intervening, we have abstained from such a notation. These minute differences may have value in recognizing the intervening author.

1. DEPENDENCE OF B FROM MELITONA

The sustained concordance of B with Melitona can be explained only if we admit that B borrowed from Melitona. This can easily be proved from a great number of arguments only the principal ones of which need

^{18.} Cf. V. Doucet, Prolegomena, p. 228 as also pp. 190 and 230.

^{19.} For data pertinent to this codex of. A. Fries, De Commentario Guerrici de S. Quintino in libros Sententiarum, in Arch. Fr. Praedicarum, 5 (1935) 326-340; A. Landgraf, Bemerkungen zum Sentenzenkommentar des Cod. lat. 691 in Franziskanische Studien 26 (1939) 183-190; O. Lottin, RTAM Bull. 3 (1939) n. 1186; F. Henquinet, Notes Additionelles sur les écrits de Guerric de S. Quintin, RTAM 8 (1936) 369-388, and V. Doucet, Prolegomana p. 227.

be adduced here.

The first is provided by the question common to *B* and Melitona: "An Christus totus sit sub forma totali vel totus sub qualibet parte?" The entire question in both *B* and Melitona runs as follows:

B. f., 192c.

Septimo quaeritur an Christus totus sit sub forma totali vėl totus sub qualibet parte?
Quod totus sub totali videtur:
In Elucidario Hugo.......
Item, istud requirit forma

Item, in hostia sive pane sunt quasi partes infinitae.... Contra: Hilarius Papa de Consecratione....

B vacat
Item, fractione facta....
Unde, Innocentius III: "Reor..
Respondent quidem dicentes...
Sed contra hoc obicitur....

Igitur a simili videtur ex quod existente forma est semper corpus Christi sub forma, quod fracta forma, non erit corpus integrum sub partibus. Melitona K f. 169b; Vat. lat. 266b

Quaeritur an Christus totus sit sub
forma totali vel totus sub qualibet
parte?

Quod totus sub totali videtur:
In Elucidario Hugo....
Item, istud requiritur, scil. forma
verborum...

Item, in hostia sive pane consecrando sunt quasi partes infinitae... Contra: Hilarius Papa de Consecratione

Respondeo: Intentio canonis est...
Item, facta fractione.....
Unde Innocentius III: "Reor....
Respondent quidem dicentes....
Sed contra hoc obicitur...

A simili videtur ex quo existente forma, est semper corpus Christi sub forma, quod fracta forma, non erit corpus Christi integrum sub partibus......

While Melitona now continues to deal with the different opinions prevalent in his time with reference to this problem, before he finally comes to state his personal solution, B skips this intervening argumentation to respond as follows:

B f. 193a

Respondeo, praetermissis multis oppositionibus, fri Wmo videtur dicendum quod secundum quod vult Innocentius et plane apparet ex rationibus suis, quod corpus Christi sit sub tota forma et sub singulis partibus; quod manifeste apparet, quia cum sit conversio panis in corpus Christi ex verborum prolatione, existente prolati-

Melitona K f. 168d; Vat. lat. f. 266d

Mihi autem videtur dicendum quod secundum quod vult Innocentius, et plane apparet ex rationibus suis, quod corpus Christi sit sub tota forma, et sub singulis partibus; quod manifeste apparet, quia cum sit conversio panis in corpus Christi, ex verborum prolatione aliquo modo sit one aliquo modo fit ipsa conversio, et sic ante fractionem fit illa. ipsa conversio, et sic ante fractionem fit illa.

As seen in line two under B, an appeal is made to the authority of fri W mo. 20 Apart from all argumentation the letters fri W mo offer no other possible reading but FRAIRI GUILLELMO. On the evident reading of the text, then, the author of Bruxelles appeals to Fratri Guillelmo, and in theological writings of the thirteenth century having a Franciscan origin the name Frater Guillelmus refers to William of Melitona. In this regard it is sufficient to recall the references found in Assisi 182, and 186, viz. Assisi 186, Rationes et solutiones ad oppositum requirantur in questione Fratris Guillelmi (A. 186 f. 58c), and later on in the same codex ... Guillelmus; in Assisi 182, f. 103c, huc usque Fr. Guillelmus. In the second place, as seen from the parallel text from the Quaestiones de sacramentis of Melitona, the reference suits Melitona as closely as any evidence might possibly suit, namely ad verbum. Evidently then the author of B is referring to the questions of William of Melitona and copying them. The whole block of questions, therefore, entitled (Juaestiones de sacramentis fratris Guillelmi de Melitona constitute the predominant source of B, as the latter slavishly repeats them throughout the sacraments in general and baptism, confirmation, the eucharist and penance in particular. Any consideration of a fons or rivulus of Melitona as intervening is pretty much out of the question.

The above text of B has the added value of giving us another testimony to the genuineness of Melitona's authorship of these Quaestiones de sacramentis, which brings us to the second argument.

A second argument for the almost complete dependence of B on Melitona throughout the limits specified may be taken from the references found in Assisi 186.²¹ The value of this argument lies in its assuring

^{20.} We wish to extend our thanks to Fr. Victorin Doucet, who has kindly verified for us the reading $fri\ W^{mo}$.

^{. 21.} With reference to this codex cf. F.M. Henquinet, Un brouillon autographe de S. Bonaventure, in Etudes Franciscaines, 44 (1932) 633-655; 45 (1933) 59-81; and the same author, De causalitate sacramentorum iuxta codicem autographum S. Bonaventurae, in Antonianum 8 (1933) 377-424, Trois petits écrits théologiques de S. Bonaventure, à la lumière d'un quartième, inédit, in Mélanges Auguste Pelzer, Louvain, 1947, 195-216; cf. also V. Doucet, Prolegomena, pp. 340, 343, 346, and p. 146 where a cursory analysis is given.

us of the authenticity of the set of questions bearing the name of Melitona and which recur throughout the first part of B. F. Henquinet has proved beyond doubt that Assisi 186 contains the draft and a good deal of the material for the Commentary of St. Bonaventure. He has, moreover, gathered plenty of evidence to show that it was written in St. Bonaventure's own handwriting. This last point has no importance for our purpose; the main point is this, that Assisi 186 is the immediate source of St. Bonaventure's Commentary, and that it contains a number of reliable references to contemporary authors from whom it took its material. Among many such references the name of William of Melitona (Fr. Guillelmus), as we have already seen, appears twice. Now one of these references is also found in B, namely that accompanying the question: "Utrum corpus Christi sit in qualibet parte hostiae totum?" (Assisi 186, f. 58c; B f. 192c-193a; Welitona K f. 168b, Vat. lat. 266b). In B and Melitona it reads: Quaeritur an Christus totus sit sub forma totali vel totus sub qualibet parte? Though the draft of this question in Assisi 186 is indeed very brief, a comparison of the whole question which passed into the Commentary of St. Bonaventure with the long question of Melitona mentioned above, convinces one beyond a doubt that one depends from the other. When Bonaventure came to fill out the draft of this particular question of Assisi 186 he simply went over to the question of Melitona. 22 We have not succeeded in finding the other reference of Assisi in B. This does not affect the point at issue though. It is clear that Bonaventure cites a single body of questions since the other citation of Assisi 186 is definitely identified in Welitona. 23 It is further clear from what has been said that B depends on one of these questions, and ad verbum; when he agrees ad verbum again and again with other questions in the collection from which the particular one identified is taken, his source is then always the same and always Melitona. The points of contact are too numerous and too literal to admit of any other possibility.

^{22.} It is not asserted that St. Bonaventure copied the question of Melitona, but rather that the argumentation of St. Bonaventure—independently of his style and development—reflects the argumentation of Melitona too closely to be accidental.

^{23.} Cf. V. Doucet, Prolegomena, p. 241.

The third argument to prove the dependence of B on Melitona is taken from the erasions found in B. If erasions are found in a text occuring verbatim in another author who continues the material erased, then without a doubt that first author in the particular instance is not original. When such erasions occur in widely different parts of the work of one author, and the mutilated texts are found in their integrity in all the manuscripts of another author, this coupled with corroborating arguments, ²⁴ with certainty discriminates the source.

The first sample of such erasions is found immediately before the treatment of baptism proper, when the two authors treat of the baptism of St. John:

B f. 182d

Ad quod obicitur quod baptismus Christi coeptum non cessavit, dicendum quod hoc dictum est eo sensu quo dicitur lex Moysi non tolli sed adimpleri lege perfectiore succedente. Unde Augustinus III libro de quaestionibus Novi Testamenti

Melitona K f. 139a Ad quod obicitur quod baptismus Christi coeptum non cessavit. dicendum quod hoc dicitur eo sensu quo dicitur lex Moysi non tolli sed adimpleri lege perfectiore succedente. Unde Augustinus Libro de quaestionibus Novi Testamenti: Interpretatio accessit ad baptismum loannis cum significatione latentis dudum mysteriii; accessit et amplius donum, ut baptizati, accepto Spiritu Sancto, sint filii Dei; amplificatum est ergo, non evacuatum. Haec Aug.....

VII. Quaeritur quando cessavit? Quando baptizato Christo

Quaeritur quando cessavit? Quando baptizato Christo videtur....

The material erased in B is dotted; that same material found in Melitona with its continuation is italicized. It is evident, then, that B at first wished to include all the material found in his source, but having begun to quote Augustine he changed his mind and continued with the next question of Melitona. The only reason we can see for this is the little space left him around the text of Lombard in his parchment; if he included

^{24.} The presence of other arguments is necessary, since the other documents pertinent to the present article, namely *Troyes*, *Vat. lat.* 691, and *B* might possibly supplement one another in this very way, yet the *Commentary* of Alexander could be the direct source of each one copying independently.

the entire question he foresaw that he would have to leave out some other more important ones.

Such erasions are rare; in fact only one other has appeared but sufficiently far removed from the former to be very indicative of plagiarism throughout the entire text.

B f. 194c

Quaeritur utrum haec sit vera: Panis potest esse corpus Christi; quod videtur ex hoc quod panis mutatur sive Contra: Duplex est potentia...

Respondeo quod hoc secundum communem modum loquendi.... pro toto vel pro parte virtus ordinata secundum naturam Ad hoc quod dicit Ambrosius

B vacat

B vacat

Contra: Quod est relativum idemptitatis, unde eandem significantur habere substantiam quae mediante illo ad invicem comparantur...... est corpus Christi post consecrationem. Quod concedimus proprie loquendo.

Melitona K f. 171c, V 268a, P 174d Quaeritur utrum haec est vera: Panis potest esse corpus Christi; quod videtur ex hoc quod mutatur sive convertitur...

Contra: Duplex est potentia...

Responded good hoc secundum communem modum loquendi pro toto vel pro parte virtus ordinata secundum naturam. Ad hoc quod dicit Ambrosius quod quod est panis potest esse corpus Christi consecratione, dicendum quod per hoc quod dicitur "potest" non notatur potentia cuius appetitui est virtus ordinata secundum naturam satisfactive, sed notatur ibi potentia panis existentis in integritate secundum esse ad transmutationem, quae transmutatur ad esse corpus Christi mediante virtute super naturam....

Quaeritur utrum haec est concedenda: Quod erat panis ante consecrationem est corpus Christi post consecrationem......

Item, Augustinus:.....

Contra: Quod est relativum idemptitatis, unde eandem significantur habere substantiam quae mediante illo ad invicem comparatur... est corpus Christi post consecrationem. Quod concedimus proprie loquendo.

Here again B, for the evident purpose of saving space, curtailed the long response of Melitona; carelessly enough, though, instead of taking up with the succeeding question, he resumed with the contra to that question, and thus entirely mutilated the text.

The fourth argument is that taken from the homoeoteleuta, truncated questions, and various inconsistencies which follow the text of any author too closely copying his source, and which abound in B. So as not to belabor these pages with tedious repetitions of parallel texts we cite an example manifesting two tell-tale errors at the same time:

B f. 180b
Ad secundum dicendum quod

Melitona K f. 125c, Vat. lat. 222, P 12a Respondeo

unctio extrema duo habet significata, quorum unum est conferendum in praesenti, scilicet remissio peccatorum venialium; aliud in futuro, scilicet plena unctio sive gratia habenda in susceptione stolae et utriusque est hoc sacramentum aliquo modo causa. Sacramenta.....Unde dico quod haec...dico in quantum huiusmodi...Unde sicut virtus Legis Veteris, quae est lex timoris, est in declinatione, similiter et sacramenta Legis Veteris

B vacat

in remissione. Virtus Legis Novae est in declinatione et operatione; similiter et sacramenta

in remissione et in promotione in merito.

in remissione et in promotione in merito.

The homoeoteleuton here is evident. Another and graver fault, though, is committed when B begins "Ad secundum dicendum quod unctio extrema...", which is the answer to a subsidiary question found in the text of Melitona but left out by B when he transformed that text. The question in Melitona reads: "Item, quaeritur quare non institutum fuit in lege sacramentum exeuntium, scil. extrema unctio, sicut intrantium?" In folio 183a of B we find a somewhat similar mistake; here we read the phrase "concedendae sunt igitur rationes ultimae", but are forced to go to the text of Melitona to find these "rationes concedendae".

The above question, "Ad secundum dicendum quod unctio extrema..." supplies a plethora of Melitona's formulas, unde dico, unde virtus, dico in quantum huiusmodi. This abundant use of dico and unde recurs in the quaestiones disputatae as well as throughout the Quaestiones de sacramentis of Melitona, and are therefore pretty indicative of his authorship in the above case.

Before passing on the dependency of B on Alexander it may be serviceable to indicate the extent of the dependency of B on Welitona throughout baptism, confirmation, the eucharist and penance.

In the first place all the material from B f. 179a to f. 182c is found solidly ad verbum—minor additions excepted—in the text of Melitona. This material has to do with the subject-matter common to the medieval authors of this particular period in their writings on sacramental theology, viz. de sacramentis legis naturae, scriptae etc., de cessatione legalium, de circumcisione and most interesting of all—on account of the problem of sacramental causality—the dispensation of grace through the sacraments of the Old and the New Law. Here we find the exhaustive treatment of the virtus ornans et characterizans attributed to the sacraments of the New Law, a treatment of very great importance for the history of sacramental theology. Next, as we may see from the table, comes the treatment of the baptism of St. John the Baptist. In B f. 182c we read:

Secundo principaliter quaeritur de baptismo loannis de quo septem quaeruntur; primo est de nomine: quare magis dicebatur baptismus loannis quam baptismus Petri vel Pauli?

and f. 182d:

Quaeritur quando cessavit; quando baptizato Christo videtur: Aug. super illud lo. I. Vidit lohannes Spiritum venientem ad se...hoc est postquam positus fuit in carcere.

Although Welitona does not enumerate his questions, his principal ones devoted to the baptism of St. John turn out to be exactly the same principal ones found in B:

Melitona K 138b:

Quaeritur de baptismo Ioannis, et primo de nomine; quare magis dicebatur baptismus Ioannis quam baptismus Petri et Pauli?

and f. 139a:

Quaeritur quando cessavit; quod baptizato Christo videtur: Aug. super illud Io. I: Vidit Ioannes spiritum venientem ad se...hos est postquam positus fuit in carcere.

This same concordance continues throughout the treatment of the sacrament of baptism. Nothing of Alexander of Bales or *Troyes* seems to correspond with any of the questions of B, and any material extraneous

to Melitona may most likely then be sought for, or rather attributed to, some unknown Franciscan author posterior to Alexander and prior to St. Bonaventure.

The sacraments of confirmation and extreme unction merited but slight attention from these early scholastics and in their brief treatments one has always the impression-even in Alexander of Hales-of reading something collected and adapted merely to fill in the less interesting distinctions of their commentaries. The problem of the institution of these sacraments, of course, as well as the consideration of the character in the sacrament of confirmation, and the long justification of its absence in the sacrament of extreme unction, give their folios not a little interest. Melitona offers a refreshing change in this regard for the sacrament of confirmation. Here he turns his attention more to the nature of the sacramental grace of baptism in contrast to that of confirmation, the bestowal of sanctifying grace in confirmation, its augmentation and loss, and different suchlike questions. In the treatment of the augmentation of baptismal grace by that of confirmation he shows a familiarity with the terminology, at least, of Rigaud in his Quaestio de Gratia. B dedicates but one folio to this sacrament in which he repeats the material of Melitona (B f. 189cd; Melitona K ff. 151c-154d), abbreviating it by omission and leaving out the more interesting, but somewhat labored, facets of the questions.

The tract De eucharistia of B (dists. VIII-XIII, ff. 190a-197b) has been recognized for a great part in that of Melitona (ff. 154d-184a). B opens his treatment with a divisio textus as yet unidentified, and then immediately proceeds to incorporate his source:

B f. 190a

Hic primo quaeritur de necessitate illius sacramenti quantum ad tempus, de quo sic:
Existente morbo, necessaria fuit medicina; sed statim post esum ligni vetiti fuit morbus, igitur tunc fuit necessaria medicina....

Respondeo. Ut dicit Hugo, divinae dispensationis ratio et ordo hoc poposcit..... convenienter distulit providMelitona K f. 154d

Quaeritur de sacramento altaris,
et primo de necessitate illius
quantum ad tempus. Circa
hoc sic: Existente morbo
necessaria fuit medicina;
sed statim post esum ligni
vetiti fuit morbus, igitur
tunc fuit necessaria medicina...
Respondeo. Ut dicit Hugo, divinae
dispensationis ordo et ratio
hoc poposcit.....
convenienter distulit providentia

entia divina collationem gratiae. divina collationem gratiae.

F. Henquinet makes reference 25 to the concordance of B and T for some folios in distinction M (B f. 194v; T ff. 160b-161b), though as he warns us the concordance throughout these folios is not always maintained. In fact, the particular passage is an addition in another hand in B. The passage has its interest in indicating that the inauthenticity of B was not most likely any secret to the scribe who made this addition. This scribe very probably failing to read down through the dense folios of B found a vacant space at the foot of f. 194 and proceeded to copy in from T and some other author some questions which he presumed omitted. The result is that we find one question repeated in B and supplying a different answer in each case:

B. f. 191a (1st hand)
Tertio quaeritur utrum sit
unum sacramentum vel plura?

B. f. 194d (Troyes 1862, f. 160d) (2nd hand) Quaeritur utrum unum vel plura sacramenta? Melitona K. f. 156a Quaeritur de unitate huius sacramenti, et quaeritur utrum sit unum sacramentum vel plura?

Here B reminds us of that so far enigmatical commentary, Vat. lat. 691, where now this and then that succeeding hand may be seen to add this or that item from one or the other author.

In connection with this same question of the unity of the sacrament of the eucharist we find another incongruity worthy of mention seeing that it shows the unreliability of the text.

B. f. 191a.

Hic incidenter tria quaeruntur. Primum est an eucharistia sit sacramentum Novae Legis; secundum, quid sit ibi sacramentum et res; tertium est utrum sit unum sacramentum vel plura. Habito primo, secundum.....

The first of these questions to which B supplies no further answer than "habito primo" finds its corresponding extensive treatment in Melitona K, f. 155cd; the others are taken from Melitona and generally ad verbum, though shortened considerably by omission.

^{25.} Le Commentaire, tabula p. 484.

F. Henquinet has called attention to the incomplete state of dist. XII in B_{*}^{26} On f. 196b we read:

His restat quaerere de sumentibus digne et indigne. Item, de fine et effectu huius sacramenti.

Although the scribe inserts an X on the margin nearby this question, no continuation seems to be found anywhere else on this folio or on the succeeding folios. All the pertinent material may be found, however, in Melitona, 1. 174a (K) sqq. f. 181a sqq. Here at least Melitona treats of the worthy and unworthy consumption of the eucharist as well as its effects with respect to the remission of sin, the augmentation of the virtues, and suchlike pertinent matter. Some of this material is included in B in the folios posterior to 196b.

The sacrament of penance merited quite an exhaustive treatment in B (ff. 197c-216b; dists. XIV-XXII incl.). This was occasioned undoubtedly by the similar extensive treatment which it provoked from the other early Franciscan authors who went to compose his sources, a treatment merited more by the confusion of the virtue of penance with the sacrament properly speaking, as well as by the uncertainly of the power of the keys with reference to the remission of sin and consequent infusion of grace. than by the clarity of these authors on the subject. Even in Welitona where a very definite progress is evidenced much of this abstruseness prevades (cf. Melitona, K ff. 185a-217b). While even a cursory glance down the table submitted above convinces one of the great dependence of B on Melitona also in this tract, no hasty generalizations may be made. The additions made by B to the questions of Melitona, though savoring of originality, may nonetheless be drawn from one or the other unknown author. What interests us particularly though is the fact that, as before mentioned, the known manuscripts of Melitona's Quaestiones de sacramentis all end with the consideration of contrition, the first of the integral parts of the sacrament which he proposes for consideration. If we glance down the table of correspondence we may notice that the dependence of B on Melitona is sustained for the duration of his extant (\)uaestiones while other correspondences, hitherto foreign, enter the list on Melitona's expiration. May this not be interpreted as an indication that the Quaestiones of Melitona were even at this date unfinished? There shall be occasion later to return to this matter.

The dependence of B on Welitona and the fact that this dependence is similar to that seen for the other tracts may be judged from the following question.

B f. 198a

Quaeritur quid sit poenitentia, et describitur materialiter ab Ambrosio in sermone Christi: Ecce nunc tempus acceptabile etc. Poenitentia est dolor cordis......

Item, Aug. in Ecclesiasticis
Dogmatibus...sic idem dicit
Ambrosius.....
Item, super illud Mc. III:
Populientiam agite Closse:

Poenitentiam agite, Glossa: Item, Aug. libro de Poenitentia.

Item, in littera: Poenitentia est virtus vel gratia... Item, Aug. libro V Retract. Item, Damascenus: Poenitentia. est ab eo quod est..... Item, D.... ad Clementem IV

Libro De Articulis Fidei...
Circa hoc opponitur: Si unius unum est esse...una definitio.
RESPONDEO quod pocnitentia secundum diversam considerationem...vel potest comparari ad finem... et comparatur poenitentia ad subiectum...
Et potest aliter dici quod haec "poenitentia est dolor cordis.....

licet aliquo modo etiam convenit poenitentia in quantum est sacramentum.

B vacat
Quaeritur de definitione
Ambrosif: Poenitentia vera
est dolor cordis.....

Melitqna K f. 190c Quaeritur quid sit poenitentia, et describitur materialiter ab Ambrosio in sermone Christi: Ecce nunc tempus acceptabile etc. Poenitentia vera est dolor cordis..

Dogmatibus...et idem dicit
Ambrosius.....
Item, super illud Mc. III: Poenitentiam agite, Glossa:....
Item, Aug. libro de Poenitentia...

Item, in IIII Sent. Poenitentia
est virtus vel gratia....
Item, Aug. libro V Retract.:
Item, dicit Damascenus: Poenitentia
est ab eo quod est.....
M vacat

Circa hoc, ut solet, opponitur:
Si unius unum est esse...una definitio.
RESPONDEO ad hoc quod secundum
diversam considerationem
vel potest comparari ad finem...
Datur etiam comparationem ad subiectum.

Vel potest aliter dici quod haec poenitentia est dolor cordis...

Et hoc est reversio ab eo quod est praeter naturam, ad id quod est secundum naturam.

Dubitabitur de illa definitione Aug...
Quaeritur de hoc definitione Ambrosii.
Poenitentia vera est dolor cordis...

As we see at a glance the two authors follow word for word, minor changes excepted, throughout the entire question. While Welitona con-

tinues with the definition of Augustine, B vacut to resume with the definition of Ambrose. Here as in the above question he paces Melitona throughout. It is important for what is to follow in these pages to appreciate the way in which B uses his source, viz. ad verbum. This has been seen to be standard from the first folio on, and is useful in detecting a change of source in B, as he never changes authors in the middle of a question, or but very rarely.

From the foregoing it is clear that *B* depends on Melitona. The reason why the critics failed to see that at once is due mainly to the way in which *B* incorporated the material of Melitona. The style of Melitona, being definitely different than that of the usual scholastic literature, offered itself willingly to such plagiarism. To illustrate this difference let us take the following fictitious question as an example; it represents the format of any run-of-the-mill question likely to be found in the usual commentary on the Sentences:

Status quaestionis: 3º quaeritur utrum sacramenta tempore gratiae necessaria sunt ad salutem?

Argumenta pro:

1. Dixit Ambrosius....

Item, Bernardus....
 Item, Cor. 6.

Argumenta contra:

Contra: 1. Matt. 11.

Item, Magister in Littera....
 Item, ratione videtur.......
 Item, dicebat Innocentius III...

5. Item, Magistri dicunt......

Responsum:

RESPONDEO QUOD......

Ad objecta:

Ad quod obicitur de Matt. 11, dicendum quod... Ad illud de Magistro quod...dicendum quod...

Ad tertium...dicendum quod....
Ad quartum ...dicendum quod....

Ad quod ultimo obicitur quod...dicendum quod...

As evident there is but one main response, and around this everything else is centered. Now if William of Melitona were to present just this same question and just the same material, according to his style of question formation it would run as follows:

Status quaestionis: Quaeritur utrum sacramenta tempore gratiae

necessaria sunt ad salutem?

Et videtur quod sic:

Argumenta pro: 1. Dixit Ambrosius....

Item, Bernardus....
 Item, Cor. 6.

Argumenta contra: Contra: 1. Matt. 11

Responsum: RESPONDEO QUOD......

Ad obiectum: Ad quod obicitur de Matt. 11quod......

respondeo quod.....

2^{um} argumentum

contra:

Item, Magister in Littera....

Ad 2um argumentum

contra: Be

Respondeo quod.....

3^{um} argumentum

contra:

Item, ratione videtur

Ad 3um argumentum

contra:

Respondeo quod

4^{um} argumentum

contra:

Item, dicebat Innocentius III...

Sum argumentum

contra:

Item, Magistri dicunt...

Ad objecta 4^{um}
et 5^{um}:

Respondeo quod dictum Innocentii intelligitur de....

Ad quod obicitur quod Magistri dicunt.....

dicendum quod...... .

When B took over the questions of Melitona he simply transformed the question formation immediately preceding into the first one given. Here and there he might change the order of the items in the pro or contra of Melitona's question, or even substitute one of the longer arguments given in the pro section for a main response. This alteration plus the addition of artful repetitions in his own words at the end of the responsa of Melitona secured him pretty well from immediate detection.²⁷

^{27.} While a thorough study of the additions made to the questions of Melitona which are found in B would constitute a study in itself, a sample of some additions may be seen in the following text:

B f. 181c, Melitona K f. 120d, P 8c

Ad (aliud add. B) quod igitur obicitur quod ignobilius non agit in nobilius (etc. add. M), respondendum est quod (hoc est verum add. B) opere naturali, sed

2. DEPENDENCE OF B UPON ALEXANDER'S COMMENTARY AND QUAESTIONES

Next in sequence of dependence come the borrowings from Alexander in his Commentary and Quaestiones. Here the technique employed by the author of B—whom for the present we may anticipate as the borrower—shows less color and interest.

A. Landgraf in 1939 and later in 1943 made us aware of the interdependence of the Paris ms. of the Commentary of Alexander, and B for the following passages: Bruxelles 1542 (B) f. 203r—Alexander Paris Nat. lat. 16406 (A) f. 192ry;

bene potest opere mirabili (et virtute mirabili add. 3). Vel potest dici quod per se loquendo hic non agit minus nobile in nobiliori, quia materialia non virtute propria agunt, sed virtute mirabiliter data, et hoc coagente fide, et hoc in anima in quantum est in defectu aliquo, non ratione suae substantiae; unde non aguntur materialia ratione qua materialia, sed ratione virtutis mirabilis sibi collatae; unde illa virtus est agens; nec agunt in anima nisi ratione defectus; unde agunt in id quod est defectus in anima et ita, licet anima in sua substantia sit nobilior quam illa materialia in se, nobilior est quam patiens, hoc est quam defectus in anima pro quo patiatur; unde, loquendo hic formaliter de agente formaliter et de patiente, hic agit nobilius in ignobilius.

The matter which is italicized constitute the addition to Melitona by B. First, we notice that it draws out the response of Melitona to twice its former length, and that by an addition which through the use of the word unde and a style resembling the genuine Melitona almost certainly give the impression that Melitona is, on the contrary, but an extract from B. This type of addition recurred so often that we were certainly tempted at first to consider the questions of Melitona the rivulus and B the fons. If we consider this, (or any such addition) more closely, though, it becomes evident that it is merely a repetition of what has already been said in the part common to Melitona and B, a repetition which is tedious seeing that further up in the same question we find the following passage common to B and Melitona:

Dico igitur quod materialia in sacramentis virtute data illis desuper, et virtute fidei possunt agere in animam ratione alicuius defectus ipsius, et non agere ad purgationem, sicut ignis purgatorius, sed ad ornandum sive decorandum sive imprimendum, ratione qua virtus mirabilis est ad sanctificandum.

and immediately preceding this:

Similiter dico in proposito quod in sacramentis, quae sunt opera mirabilia, habent materialia virtutem supra naturam....

The above has to do with one type of addition found in the first part of B; the other type, scil. the addition of material absent entirely from Melitona but fitted into his converted questions would require too great a digression in these pages.

B = 205 rv - A = 193 v; B = 208 v - A = 198 v; B = 215 - A = 208 v. At the time A. Landgraf was under the impression that the Commentary of Alexander was the borrower and B the lender One of these passages (B f. 215) proving to be identical with Troyes 1862 (and Troyes 824), and the others not being too extensive, little genuine grounds for any conclusion seemed present. To determine more definitely the priority of either author, longer and more widely separated passages must be found. Fortunately some such passages turned up in the course of our studies, viz. A (Assisi Bibl. Municip. 189) f. 137d-B f 206b; A f. 138b—B f. 202c; A f. 141c-142b—B 205b; A f. 145b-146b-B f. 208d-209b; A f. 148b-B f. 212a; A f. 172ab - B f. 234cd (dist. 37); and finally A f. 172b-75aB f. 235ad (dist. 38). As we notice these passages include the long treatment of De Clavibus (B f. 208d-209b) and two entire distinctions, viz. 37 and 38. Notwithstanding all this though, without the identification of the Commentary of Alexander it would have been difficult to tell just who was the source of the other For that reason, for a while we were tempted to doubt even the genuineness of dist. 37 and 38 of the Commentary of Alexander. The different renvois found common to the two texts, namely B and Alexander, proved ambiguous since they might equally refer either to the text of Lombard or the commentary on that text found in either of the authors. It was then that the quotation from the Summa luris of Henry of Meersburg, used to identify the Commentary of Alexander, proved valuable since it appeared in this very distinction (38th dist.). In the Summa luris we read:

Respondeo cum magistro Alexandro, omnibus opinionibus omissis, quod papa in omnibus dispensare potest de plenitudine potestatis suae, praeterquam in articulis fidei....Dicendum ergo quod, quando dicitur: votum continentiae non recipit dispensationem, intelligitur quoad genus rei, quia nihil potest continentiae aequipari. Ex causa tamen ardua et valde necessaria bene recipit dispensationem, scil. propter necessitatem

^{28.} Cf. Ein anonymus Werk aus dem Bereich des Odo Rigaud, in Coll. Fran. 13 (1943) 5-12; Bemerkungen zum Sentenzenkommentar des cod. Vat. lat. 691 in Franziskanische Studien 26 (1939) 183-190.

multiplicationis fidelium in aliquo tempore aut etiam (pro) vitanda strage animarum.

(Munich, Staatsbibl. Clm. 22278, f. 91r)29

In dist. 38 of B, f. 235b we read:

Si autem quaeratur de voto continentiae utrum recipiat commutationem, dicendum est quod non secundum genus rei. Et sic intelligitur cum communiter dicitur. Secundum necessitatem tamen multiplicationis fidelium in aliquo tempore posset fieri dispensatio. Non autem fit commutatio cuiusque in quodcumque melius sicut patet in II. De voto et de voti redemptione, c. Perpendimus, ubi dicitur quod redemptio illa de constructione altaris non sufficiebat voto ieiunii in singulis sextis feriis in pane et aqua. Oportet enim si poenale fuerit votum, mutari in poenale; aliter non esset satisfactorium

This quotation from B coincides ad verbum, minute differences excepted, with Alexander's Commentary, f. 173b-173c, dist. 38. The entire distinction in which it is found then belongs, not to B, but to Alexander.

The other quotations used for the identification of the Fourth Book of Alexander's Commentary likewise appear in B, but in common with Troyes. For that reason we shall not treat of them here. F. Henquinet had left a very good clue when he mentioned that the divisio textus between dist. 37 and 38 of B was common to Troyes. 30 Upon checking the 37th distinction in B we found that it likewise came from Alexander, for the very good reason that Troyes does not have a 37th distinction. As far as the other passages common to Alexander's Commentary and B are concerned, their originally belonging to Alexander follows from all that has been said. Any supposition of their being interpolated into Alexander from B is preposterous; furthermore, it is only on the expiration of the test of Melitona that a dependence on Alexander began to manifest itself.

^{29.} Our quotation from Henry of Meersburg is taken from the *Prolegomena*, p. 210. Here this and all other quotations used in the identification of this *Commentary* of Alexander, and referred to in the following pages on account of their relation to *Troyes* and *B*, may conveniently be found with the pertinent bibliography.

^{30.} Le Commentaire, p. 486.

Thus far, then, the dependence of B on two authors rests assured. This dependence applies to a very great part of the material found in the treatment of the first four sacraments. as well as to a substantial part of the treatment of matrimony. As noted by V. Doucet³¹ two quaestiones, one of which is received as definitely of Alexander, viz. De locis animarum exutarum a corpore (Vat. lat. 782, ff. 81c-82d), and the other not without some reservations, viz. De veritate humanae naturae (Toulouse Municipal Library 737, ff. 277a-283b), are also found in part in B where the latter deals with De Novissimis. We have not consulted these questions, but, as will be seen later when we deal with the chronology of B, their anteriority is assured. To prove that the question De veritate humanae naturae, which is less securely attributed to Alexander, is or is not in reality his, does not, at any rate, interest us here. The mode in which it is accepted into B-by means of verbatim excerpts and incompletelypretty securely indicates plagiarism on the part of B rather than the opposite. Since all the extant mss. of the Commentary of Alexander terminate with a mutilated fourth book it is impossible to gauge its influence on B in the latter's eschatology.

As far as the alteration of the text of Alexander is concerned any comparison of formulas is out of the question. The formulas of B differ from question to question and from folio to folio with the exception to be adverted to later on. We may say, however, that there is a tendency to simplify the rather awkward or unusual formulas of Alexander, e.g. Ad quod respondemus quod becomes Respondeo and Respondemus quod becomes Respondeo quod.

With reference to other discrepancies found in the texts little may be said since the different mss. of the Commentary of Alexander afford not a little difference one with the other; all depends on what particular redaction of this Commentary B had before him when writing.

^{31.} Cf. n. 18 above.

3. DEPENDENCY OF TROYES 1862 ON ALEXANDER, AND ON THE SOURCES OF VAT. LAT. 691.

The other contender for Rigaldian honors, namely *Troyes* 1862, needs next be considered. What are its immediate sources, and how extensively has it drawn from them?

As we see from the table of correspondence the affinity of Troyes and the Commentary of Alexander is evident throughout the entire extent of each. In distinguishing dependence care must be taken to separate in Troyes those passages which are ad verbum with B from those which are not. Distinction 38 in Troyes is a case in point; though throughout this distinction both B and Alexander, as shown, agree ad verbum, Troyes agrees with Alexander but not ad verbum. In this very distinction we find the opinion attributed to Alexander by Henry of Meersburg with reference to the possible commutation of the vow of continence. (Alexander Assisi 189 f. 173bc; Troyes 1862, f. 204v). Since for chronological reasons later to be shown Troyes cannot be copying from B, he is therefore copying from Alexander.

As far as the other passages used in the identification of Alexander's Commentary are concerned they are of little use to us here; although they may all be found in the text of Troyes, there they are literally the same as the redaction of B (cf. Troyes 1862 f. 186a; Alexander Assisi 189 f. 153b, as also the preceding folio in both authors; and Troyes f. 189b; Alexander f. 155b—definitio ordinis). One of these may be adduced as illustrating the style of variation undergone by Alexander:

Alex. Assisi 189 f. 153b

Ad illud quod obicitur utrum ingratitudo sit actuale peccatum vel circumstantia, dicimus quod accipitur ingratitudo multis modis. Uno enim modo dicitur ingratitudo omissio referendi gratias vel contemptus pro beneficiis impensis. Alio modo dicitur reditio mali pro bono. l'ertio modo dicitur immemoria habitualis beneficiorum prius acceptorum, secundum quem modum accipitur hic ingratitudo. Est ergo nec originale peccatum nec actuale, sed dispositio sequens actuale cum recidivat peccator.

Troyes 1862 f. 186d.

Quod quaeritur de ingratitudine potest dici quod ingratitudo dicitur multipliciter. Uno modo omissio vel contemptus agendi Deo gratias, et sic est peccatum; secundo dicitur reditio mali pro bono (bonum pro malo cod.) et sic iterum est peccatum; tertio dicitur habitualis immemoria beneficiorum Dei, et hoc modo non dicitur peccatum actuale vel originale, sed dispositio consequens peccatum actuale cum recidivat peccator.

Another example of more value since it is independent of *B* is the following:

Troyes 1862 f. 151b

Respondeo. Quia sanctificatio fuit in utero secundum illam Glossam: "quia lingua non poterat utero exultante exultat." Est enim sanctificatio ab originali peccato cum confirmatione aliqua: major fuit sanctificatio in Beata Virgine quia fuit purgata a pronitate venialis peccati quamvis in ipsa maneret fomes secundum substantiam. Unde Hieronymus: De Conceptu Virginali: "Decebat sane quod de purissima matre fieret conceptio Filii Dei et illa puritate quam sub Deo maior nequit intelligi."

Alexander Assisi 189 f. 125cd Respondeo quod sanctificatus fuit in utero secundum illam Glossam: "Ouem lingua non poterat, anima exultante salutat." Est autem sanctificatio purgatio a mortali peccato cum confirmatione: est autem plenior sanctificatio cum purgatur a pronitate venialis peccati, quo modo sanctificata fuit Virgo in conceptione Christi. licet enim remaneret in ea malum (bonum!) poenae in quantum in peccatum inclinativum. Unde remansit: unde dicit Anselmus: in libro de Conceptione Virginali: Decebat ut illius hominis conceptio de matre purissima fieret, ea autem puritate qua maior sub Deo vel Christo neguit intelligi.....

The discrepancies in the text of *Troyes* may easily be explained by the condition of the text of Alexander. Since the text from Alexander presently serves mere critical and not doctrinal purposes it has not been checked for variants.

It is interesting to see how the opinion of Alexander though retained and proffered still finds its correction or modification throughout the folios of T. The following example is particularly characteristic since it shows at once the relative antiquity of Alexander's Commentary and its revision—we might say—by T. Alexander speaks of the sacrament of the eucharist:

Assisi 189, f. 133b

Responded quod in hoc sacramento triplex figuratur unitas, scilicet

fidei, gratiae et caritatis, quae est gratia communionis (marg. non est haec vera opinio); quia ergo hoc sacramentum per se figurat hanc triplicem unionem in corpore mystico ei opponitur triplex peccatum; scilicet infidelitatis notatur, simonia quae ponit gratiam quae est impretiable sub pretio et ita non esset gratis, et excommunicatio iusta quae per se opponitur gratiae communionis in corpore mystico. Quia ergo praecisi sunt omnes huiusmodi peccatores ab unitate corporis mystici-et secundum se et secundum caput corporis mystici-non habent executionem potestatis secundum ordinem. Executio enim ordinate descendit a capite principali usque in ministros Ecclesiae qui vicem capitis gerunt. Licet tamen baptizare, quia baptismus fit in fide Ecclesiae; sicut enim per alium contrahitur peccatum originale, ita per alterius fidem fit regeneratio spiritualis in parvulis. Non sic autem est in sacramento altaris; virtute enim ipsius confertur gratia iam adultis. Convenit enim eum qui tenet vicem ministri Ecclesiae fidem habere in qua fide consecret. Si vero non habet fidem, dummodo credatur fidem habere et ab Ecclesia approbatur tamquam habens, etsi non ei valeat consecratio, valet tamen communicantibus.

This antiquated opinion of Alexander, denying the execution of the power of orders to the excommunicated, simoniacal, and heretical ministers does not find ready acceptance from T, nor at the same time enough conviction of the opposite opinion to warrant the rejection of this one. For these reasons he first gives the above opinion almost in the words of Alexander, and continues:

Troyes 1862 f. 164a:

Nota tamen quod haec est communis opinio quod si sit haereticus praecisus vel degredatus, vel quocumque alio modo se habet, dum tamen sit sacerdos, quia semper habet caracterem, si consecrat, consecratum est, quia numquam privatur ab eo potestas sed usus. Non est simile de potestate ligandi et solvendi qua ista potestas non est universalis, sed tantum super sibi subditos, sed potestas consecrandi universaliter super debitam materiam datur in ordine, et ideo non potest auferri, et ideo si consecrat, consecratum est. Simile dicendum est de ordine, quoniam si ordinat, ordinatum est.

Since this same technique of first giving the opinion of Alexander and then modifying it by the submission of another with the words "tamen aliter dici potest", recurs in Troyes from dist. I to dist. 38, there is no difficulty in seeing throughout the pages of T a strong, and lasting dependence.

In comparison with the type of dependence manifested by B, that of T is certainly less strictly to the word of Alexander. The text is remade somewhat even when the opinion

of Alexander is given though later to be reconsidered. Throughout a long passage brief passages ad verbum intersperse with brief passages ad sensum, then the introduction of new material, and interestingly enough a plentiful supply of divisiones textus. By contrast these latter are conspicuously absent from the fourth book—and, as far as we know, also from the other books—of Hales.

V. Doucet ³² has noted the presence of two of the questions of Alexander postquam fuit frater (to use the terminology presently applied in dealing with these questions) in Troyes, viz. De sacrificiis legalibus and De sacrificiis in genere (respectively Vat. lat. 782 ff. 71a-73d and ff. 77b-79b). To these may be added the question De contritione et attritione (Assisi Bibl. Comm. 138 ff. 126b-127c; for the correspondence with Troyes 1862 cf. table of correspondence). The important thing to note with reference to these is their reception into Troyes after the fashion of that Commentary, that is, broken down and remade a little.

4. DEPENDENCY OF TROYES 1862 ON VAT. LAT. 691 (OR ITS SOURCE)

Mention has already been made of the value of *Vatican lat.* 691 in securing at least the existence of other commentaries on the Sentences than the ones presently known. Such information comes in very useful here in searching out the other constituent elements in *Troyes*, that is, other than the *Commentary* of Alexander.

The following passages from *Troyes* and *Vat.* 691 point to the existence of such another commentary and its assimilation by *Troyes*. The texts fortunately enough may be associated with their source:

^{32.} Cf. n. 16 above.

Troyes 1862, f. 165a.
Respondeo quod poenitentia potest tripliciter
considerari, scil. in quantum ordinat ad deletionem
culpae, et sic dicit gratiam indistincte se ad omnes virtutes habentem;

secundo potest sumi in quantum satisfacit pro culpa specialiter quantum ad poenam sibi debitam, et sic aliquando habet usum unius virtutis, secundum quod contra diversa peccata per diversas virtutes satisfacere contingit;

tertio modo potest considerari in quantum comparatur ad Deum pro iniustitia sibi illata in poena quae illi debetur, et sic poenitentia continetur sub iustitia in quantum actus eius est unicuique reddere quod suum est.

T vacat

Vat. lat. 691, f. 135a.
Solutio: Poenitentia potest multipliciter considérari, scil. in quantum ordinat ad deletionem culpae, et sic dicit gratiam indistincte se habentem ad omnes virtutes:

secundo potest sumi in quantum satisfacit pro culpa spiritualiter quantum ad poenam sibi debitam, et sic aliquando habet usum unius virtutis, aliquando alterius, secundum quod contra diversa peccata habet satisfacere per diversas virtutes: tertio modo potest considerari in relatione ad Eum cui satisfacit pro iniuria illata, et hoc in poena debita. Sic poenitentia continetur sub iustitia in quantum actus (eius) est reddere unicuique quod suum est. Sic ergo secundum unum esse est poenitentia gratia indistincte, non ponendo esse virtutis: secundum reliquum modum est gratia quae est virtus indistincte tamen ad singulas; secundum tertium modum est iustitia et hoc patet per auctoritates supra positas.

Vat. lat. vacat.

A. f. 134b; P. 185c Respondeo. Sicut supra dictum est, poenitentia habet multipliciter esse: habet enim unum esse secundum guod per eam culpa deletur, et quoad hoc habet esse gratiae ad omnem virtutem. Respectu ergo deletionis culpae est poenitentia (ergo om. A) gratia indistincte ordinans ad omnem virtutem. In quantum autem satisfecit pro culpa per poenitentiam, habet poenitentia aliquando usum unius virtutis, aliquando alterius, ut pro diversis sit satisfactio.

Inquantum autem Deo satisfecit in poena quae sibi debetur est generalis iustitiae.

Sic ergo secundum unum esse est poenitentia gratia indistincte, non ponendo esse virtutis; secundum reliquum vero modum est poenitentia gratia quae est virtus indistincte ad singulas; secundum tertium modum est iustitia et hoc patet per auctoritates prius positas.

Ponitur autem poenitentia in duplex genus, quia poenitentia remissionem duplicis mali respicit, scilicet culpae, quod fit per se a gratia, et poenae quod fit per se a iustitia virtute vel ab unaquaque virtute indistincte, si consideretur id quod est

Ad aliud dicendum quod lugere dicitur dupliciter, pro peccatis et pro incolatu praesentis miseriae. Primo modo lugere non dicitur esse beatitudo luctus. sed secundo modo dicitur esse pertinens ad beatitudinem luctus. Ita notandum quod secundum quod poenitentia dicitur luctus, non sunt ejus partes contritio confessio etc., sed sunt partes illius in quantum est sacramentum, et tunc definitur hoc modo: Poenitentia est sacramentum Ecclesiae ordinatum quantum ad culpam et quantum ad poenam, et ita non consistit in sola contritione, nisi in quantum contritio vicem tenet satisfactionis.

Ad ultimum dicendum quod lugere dicitur dupliciter, vel pro peccatis propriis, vel pro incolatu huius miseriae. Primo modo non dicitur beatitudo luctus, sed secundo modo. Et nota quod prout poenitentia dicitur virtus, non sunt ejus partes contritio, confessio et satisfactio, sed sunt motus procedentes a poenitentia. Sunt autem partes ejus in quantum poenitentia est sacramentum. Et potest tunc definire sic.: Poenitentia est sacramentum Ecclesiae ordinatum ad delendam culpam et poenam et sic non consistit in sola contritione, nisi in atum ad delendum pecc- quantum contritio, immo satisfactione, vicem tenet satisfactionis.

poena non sub ratione poenae.

Ad ultimum dicimus quod alterum est lugere pro peccato suo, et alterum pro incolatu hoc et dilatione patriae. Poenitentiae est lugere pro peccato; beatitudinis pro superiori et inferiori.

> (Assisi 189=A; Paris Nat. lat. 16406-P)

As may be seen at a glance down the parallel columns, the Commentary of Alexander is the font of both Vat. lat. 691 and Troyes 1862 basically; again, Troyes and Vat. lat. are too closely affiliated in their difference from Alexander to be considered independent of one another. That Vat. lat. is the source of Troyes may be seen from the fact that it adheres more closely to the original source as evidenced in the use of "multipliciter" which becomes "tripliciter" in Troyes, as also by the continuance of the dependence of Vat. lat. "sic ergo secundum unum esse....per auctoritates supra positas" where Troyes on the contrary abbreviates its immediate source by omission. It is very unlikely that Vat. lat., should

it be the borrower from *Troyes*, would revert to the term "multipliciter" when it had the more perfect term "tripliciter" in its immediate source.

The following passages in *Troyes 1862* and *Vat. lat. 691* exhibit a similar relation. It is unfortunate that we do not presently have the font of the twin texts which certainly seems to recall Alexander's *Quaestio de clavibus*. ³³ As seen from the columns, the font of the continuance in *Vat. lat.* is the *Commentary* of Alexander. Even without the original source for the entire passage though one may be seen to depend from the other:

Vat. lat. 691, f. 142ab Solutio: Sicut dicunt quidam scientia ista est habitus, non infusus vel adquisitus, sed innatus, secundum quod quilibet scit naturaliter guod omne peccatum mortale est vitandum, et bonum est faciendum. Hoc enim scriptum est in corde hominis cuiuslibet: quamvis quilibet habent hanc potestatem discernendi, sive habent scientiam, tamen non habent usum vel executionem huius potestatis, see illis solum quibus datur in ordine sacerdotali, et sic dicebat Praepositinus, scil. quod minima scientia sufficeret ad rationem clavis.

Aliter potest dici et melius, quod ista scientia non dicit habitum innatum nec adquisitum, sed dicit auctoritatem discernendi quid bonum, quid malum. Haec autem auctoritas datur etiam idiotis sacerdotibus, etsi non possunt umquam habere discretam executionem, sicut videmus in foro causarum quod multis id-

Troyes 1862, f. 179d.

Respondeo: Sicut dicunt quidam quod scientia ista est habitus, non acquisitus vel infusus, sed innatus, secundum (quod) quilibet naturaliter scit quod peccatum mortale est evitandum et bonum faciendum. Hoc enim scriptum est in corde cuiuslibet, et quamvis omnes habeant potestatem istam discernendi naturaliter, non tamen omnes habent usum huius potestatis, sed datur usus in ordine sacerdotali—ita dicunt.

Nota, aliter potest dici quod ista scientia non dicit habitum innatum vel acquisitum, sed dicit auctoritatem discernendi quid bonum quid malum. Haec autem auctoritas datur etiam idiotis, etsi numquam possint habere exectutionem, sicut videtur in foro causarum quod multis per delegationem

^{33.} Assisi, Bibl. Comm. 138 ff. 131a-132d; London, British Royal Museum 9 E 14 ff. 101c-103b.

iotis per delegationem datur auctoritas discernendi inter iustum et iniustum qui tamen nesciunt discernere, ut dictum est. Et iterum multi sunt periti juris qui sciunt discernere inter justum et iniustum, et tamen non habent auctoritatem, cum non sint iudices ordinarii nec delegati. Eodem modo est in foro poenitentiali. Igitur sicut ille peccat qui dat auctoritatem discernendi inter iustum et iniustum ipsi idiotae, et etiam qui suscipit; similiter est in foro poenitentiali. Et sic in foro iudiciali aliquis habet auctoritatem sive potestatem discernendi inter iustum et iniustum, non tamen habet usum potestatis exequendae, sic est quod multi sacerdotes non habent usum primae clavis licet habent auctoritatem: tamen habent se usum, et talibus est consulendum ut alios consulant qui habent scientiam discernendi.

Ad aliud dicendum quod usus clavis est aperire-et claudere. Aperire autem et claudere est iudicis ordinarii ecclesiastici, qui debet esse iustus iudex, et ideo ad ipsum pertinet scientia ut potestas. Et ideo penes hoc sumuntur claves. Bona autem vita, praedicatio et huiusmodi sunt communiter. Similiter dicendum quod penes illos actus sumuntur claves qui respiciunt clausionem et apertionem; cuiusmodi non sunt benedicere, consecrare et huiusmodi, sed potius ligare et solvere.

datur auctoritas, discernendi inter justum et iniustum qui tamen nesciunt discernere, et iterum multi iuris periti inter justum et injustum qui tamen non habent auctoritatem discernendi cum non sint iudices ordinarii nec delegati. Eodem modo est in foro poenitentiali. Unde sicut ille peccat qui dat auctoritatem discernendi inter iustum et iniustum homini idiotae, et qui suscipit; similiter est in foro poenitentiali. Et sicut in foro iudiciali aliquis habet potestatem exequendi iudicium, qui tamen non habet usum potestatis discernendi, sicut est qued multi sacerdotes habent usum ultimae clavis, non tamen primae, et ideo talibus consulendum (consistendum?) guod illos consulant qui habent scientiam discernendi.

Ad aliud dicendum quod usus clavis est aperire et claudere. Aperire autem et claudere est iudicis, et ideo penes illa sumuntur claves quae pertinent ad judicem ecclesiasticum in quantum debet esse iustus iudex. Ad iudicium autem pertinet scientia et potestas. Bona autem (est?) vita et huiusmodi sunt communiter omnium, et ideo penes scientiam et potestatem sumuntur claves; similiter dicendum est quod penes illos actus sumuntur claves qui respiciunt clausionem et apertionem, huiusmodi autem sunt ligare et solvere, non consecrare et benedicere, et huiusmodi sacerdotes habent, immo minister sacerdotis quia habent ordinem, et si consecrant, consecratum est.

Alexander, Commentary, Assisi 189, f. 145d.

Si vero quaeratur quare potestas consecrandi, iniungendi et aliae potestates non sunt claves sicut et potestas solvendi et ligandi. respondemus: clavis proprie respicit clausionem et apertionem. Clausio autem fit per vinculum peccati, apertio autem per solutionem ipsius vinculi. Et propter hoc quod istae potestates referuntur ad vinculum peccati vel poenae dicuntur claves: sed aliae . potestates respiciunt effectum gratiae, qui non est proprie nisi in illis qui sunt intra Ecclesiam et propter hoc nulla meretur dici clavis.

Clausio autem fit per vinculum peccati vel poenae, apertio per solutionem triplicis vinculi. Et ideo quia illae potestates referuntur ad vinculum peccati vel poenae removent quasi impedimentum et sic aperiunt, dicuntur claves; sed aliae potestates respiciunt effectum gratiae, qui non est proprie nisi in illis qui sunt inter Ecclesiam, et ideo nulla meretur dici clavis.

That Troyes is the copyist here is evidenced from two considerations. In the first place the opening paragraph in Troyes is clearly an abbreviation of Vat. lat. (or its source as already pointed out); the "ita dicunt" of Troyes quite clearly indicates the greatly revered source of all these authors explicitly quoted by Vat. lat., namely, Prepositinus. In the second place Troyes parts company with Vat. lat. and its source Alexander on the distinction of the power of orders and jurisdiction. We have already in these pages given the texts from Alexander and Troyes with reference to the power of orders. Troyes then sustains his opinion here to point out that the power to consecrate is something innate in the priesthood and independent of jurisdiction; Vat. lat., following Alexander, takes over his opinion ad verbum.

There are many other such instances of interdependence between Troyes and Vat. lat. some of which coincide with B.

The above demonstrate adequately enough, though, the presence of other authors besides Alexander in the compilation of this manuscript attributed to Rigaud.

The relation of *Troyes* to its rival B may now be undertaken.

5. THE DEPENDENCE OF B (BRUXELLES BIBL. ROYALE 1542) ON TROYES DIRECTLY, AND ALEXANDER AND VAT. LAT. 691 INDIRECTLY

F. Henquinet, who has undertaken the collation of Troyes and B, presented us with the rather curious fact that these two manuscripts, which from a doctrinal and chronological point of view show a world of difference, yet, for passage after passage and sometimes distinction after distinction, run word for word identically. 34 How to explain this was indeed not a little baffling. No other codex of B was accessible for comparison. Since the text of Albert the Great had been found intermingled with that of Hugh of St. Cher giving origin to a hybrid commentary, and all through the error of a scribe who found the two texts around a text of Lombard in a marginal commentary, might not this same type of error on the part of a scribe account for the melee in this case?35 Such was the explanation which F. Henquinet presented as possible. Criticism from then on—on no grounds of proof proceeded to regard Troyes as the winner in obtaining through this error, or for some other reason, equivalently thirteen distinctions of the superior text of B.

Due to this statement of the question now prevalent it is necessary to restate it thus: objectively, of the 348 columns of *Troyes 1862* more than 190 reappear in *B*, or in other words, about one-third of the content of *Troyes 1862* is identical with *B*. To whom do these passages really belong, *Troyes* or *B*?

^{34.} Le Commentaire, p. 485-486.

^{35.} Cf. n. 11.

As far as can be determined from the text of *Troyes* or *B* no easy ready answer presents itself. Four arguments may be offered though that these common texts or passages belonged originally to *Troyes*.

In the first place there is—what may be called in this case—a negative argument from the formulas. Clearly standard formulas, with the exception of the one soon to be considered, are of necessity absent from B; when he copies Alexander we find the formulas of Alexander, where he copies William of Melitona we find the formulas of Melitona. In Alexander in his fourth book we find every possible variety of formula. and when B copies from this book he takes this variety with him; in Melitona ad quod obicitur quod and Dicendum(est) quod or Respondeo quod do not fail to appear in almost every question, and when these questions reappear in the folios of B they bring these formulas with them. Can any relation then be established between B and Troyes by reason of the latter's formulas? And the answer is no, because the formulas of Troyes like those of Alexander vary at will from this distinction to that. In other words, in both Alexander and Troyes we are dealing with authors too young Scholastically speaking to have developed the stylistics of formulas to standarization.

B, though, despite his enormous borrowings, injected something of himself into his commentary when he showed a fondness for grouping his questions in numerical order, viz. Quaeritur primo, Quaeritur secundo, tertio, quarto, and even sexto and septimo. This characteristic of B does not prevail throughout the passages which he has in common with Troyes, and here then we have an indication that Troyes in this case is the lender and not the borrower.

The second argument in favor of the originality of *Troyes*, and these common passages originally belonging to him, comes from the mode of assimilation of their sources. As we see from the *tabula concordantiae* given in the first pages of this article, *B* adopts the sources *M* and *A* with literal fi-

delity. T, on the contrary, shows a dependence which is at the same time more extensive and less literal-speaking from the point of view of Alexander as the base. The following passages are common to B and Alexander but independent of Troyes: B 202c; A 138b B 206b; A 137d B 203r; A 139cd B 205rv; A 140d-141a B 205b; A 141c-142b B 206b; A 137d B 208d-209b; A 145b-146b B 208d-209b; A 145b-146b B 212a; A 148b B 234v; A 172ab B 235ad; A 172ab-175a. Throughout these passages B copies ad verbum. Throughout the following passages where B and Troyes in common show points of contact with Alexander the type of dependence is not solidly ad verbum in any particular case: T (Troyes 1862) 183a; A 150a T 185a; A 151b T 173c; A 140a T 185c; A 152a A 185a; A 152a T 186d; A 153ab T 188rv; A 154d T 188d-189b; A 155bc T 204b-206a; A 172b-173d. Since these latter passages display the characteristics of Troyes when it copies independently of B, the originality of the sections where they are found should with greater likelihood be attributed to Troyes. Distinction XXXVIII in Alexander, B and Troyes may be fittingly taken as a basis of comparison. The present argument labors admittedly under two defects, namely, that it is not exhaustive of all the material taken from Alexander by both B and Troyes when copying in common or independently, and that the differentiation between ad sensum and ad verbum may, perhaps, be arbitrary. This latter defect is due to the text of Troyes and Alexander, which is oftentimes quite defective.

The third argument is taken from the place in *B* where the concurrence of *B* and *Troyes* commences. A wholesale community of material with *Troyes* occurs only sometime after the expiration of the first source, Melitona. The evident solution, then, is that *B* upon exhausting his first source now adopts another principal one, viz. *Troyes*. And when he did not find suitable material in *Troyes* to fill up his commentary, he resorted to the primary source, viz. the commentaries used by Val. lat. 691, and the primary source of all, Alex-

ander.

last argument favoring the integrity of Troyes as against B finds its strength in the weakness of the contrary hypothesis. As stated in the opening paragraph of this section dealing with B's dependencies, critics explain the concurrence of B and Troves for certain distinctions and parts of distinctions by postulating the involuntary error of a copyist. These concurrences are not then borrowings on the part of Troyes; rather, it is assumed, both B and Troyes were in some case each written on the same folios of the same manuscript, and presumably around the text of Lombard. Later on a copyist copying out Troyes separately wandered now and then into the text of B, and in this way the mixture of B and Troyes occurred. Aside from the fact that the same critics sustain the textual identity of Troyes 1862 and Troyes 824, and possibly explain this identity by having one copied from the other, their contention lacks all proof; on the contrary, perhaps, these concurrences may be otherwise explained. In the preceding argument it has been stated that Troyes prefers to remake his source somewhat; this does not preclude, however, his oftentimes being ad verbum throughout this or that passage with Alexander. As we have seen, B likewise borrows from Alexander. It is quite possible that the two, viz. Treyes and B, each borrowing independently, take over exactly the same material. This would certainly seem to be the case in Dist. XVIII in the two authors. Here the two differ throughout the entire distinction except for some lines in B f. 208a, and Troyes 1862 f. 178d-179a, viz. "Respondeo quod est duplex dolor, spiritualis et sensibilis, et penes spiritualis doloris quantitatem..." The reason for their concurrence here rests in the fact that they are both borrowing from the Commentary of Alexander, Assisi 189 f. 144d-145a. Without a knowledge of the common source, it would certainly seem plausible to explain the breaking of this distinction through the wandering error of a copyist. The same explanation suits the concurrence

of the authors later on in the same distinction, as they break their divergence to incorporate the text of Alexander:

llabet enim gratia per se quemdam effectum, alium secundum quod coniungitur cum dolore spirituali, sive voluntate detestandi peccatum, tertium secundum quod coniungitur dolore sensibili, quartum....Effectus enim gratiae secundum se est delere culpam...Praeterea, praeeligenda est vita animae vitae corporis cum omnibus ejus circumstantiis. (Assisi 189, f. 145a)

In fact all this material from the Commentary of Alexander is found more or less ad verbum with Vat. lat. 691, f. 141d. so with just as much reason Vat. lat. 691 could be said to be interwoven in B. Distinction 38, as so often mentioned, affords many such examples of B and Troyes intermittently differing and agreeing. Again, the text of B between folios 200c-203b is found exactly in Troyes within the folios 168a-174c, with the exception of some lines in folio 171a of Troyes and 201d of B, and the passage 171c-172b of Troyes and 202c-202d of B. 36 As to the first divergence of texts,-T 171a, B 201d—we have not found any independent source of either T or B; in the second passage though - T ff. 171c-172d; B ff. 202c-202d—the source of the difference in B lies partly in his borrowing from the Commentary of Alexander, Assisi 189 f. 138ab, which he incorporates ad verbum. As is evident, in the present argument only those passages are considered which suggest the wandering errors of a copyist either because they appear common to the two authors in the midst of long passages otherwise differing entirely, or because they are found as differing in the midst of long passages otherwise held entirely in common. Where the two authors go hand in hand for five or six distinctions at a time (e.g. T ff. 213b-221a; B ff. 245b-253b) any error of a copyist betrays vincible ignorance.

Intervening differences and agreements are not merely fortuitous, then, but quite susceptible of another explanation.

^{36.} Cf. Le Commentaire, p. 485-486.

It is by no means intended to take the mere obiter dictum of F. Henquinet as if he presented it as a studied conclusion; rather it is intended simply to present the Commentary of Troyes as a composite whole composed well anterior to B and copied by him.

Our conclusion based on the evidence so far accumulated is as follows: Of the two claimants to the fourth book of Rigaud one, B, is an accumulation of material taken verbally largely from William of Melitona in his Quaestiones de sacramentis, as also from the anonymous Commentary Troyes 1862 and Alexander of Ilales in his Commentary and Quaestiones; B also indirectly depends on the Commentary of Alexander through the intervening Troyes 1862 and unknown authors attested to by Vat. lat. 691. The other claimant to Rigaldian authorship, Troyes 1862, presents itself as a composition greatly depending throughout its entire extent on Alexander's Commentary, but showing a dependence also on the Quaestiones of Alexander and the unidentified commentaries evidenced in Vat. lat. 691.

Now that the sources of both *B* and *T* have been identified, it is possible to give an answer to the two following questions, the solution of which is the main purpose of these pages: 1) Can either *B* or *T* be considered as the authentic fourth book of Rigaud, and 2) Did Rigaud ever compose such a fourth book?

1) THE INAUTHENTICITY OF BOTH B AND T

In the light of what has been already said with reference to the text of B its inauthenticity as the fourth book of Rigaud is abundantly evident. In this sole manuscript so far known the major part of the material is seen to come literally from other sources; its incorporation of material from Alexander, Melitona, and as also claimed, Troyes, with nothing of genuine originality, and over complete distinctions, of itself pre-

cludes Rigaldian authorship. Perhaps books I, II, and III of the real Rigaud show a dependence also on Alexander, and perhaps, on Philip the Chancellor, but such a dependence is far from wholesale plagiarism from one distinction to the next.

In confirmation of this plagiarism doctrinal incongruities too become apparent. The following texts occurring in two widely separated parts of B bear witness to this fact:

In the following text B copies Melitona to state:

B f. 191b (taken over from Melitona K f. 173a)

Responsio: (Ad tertiam dicendum quod B) actiones sacramentorum in signando et in efficiendo sunt respectu personarum non naturarum. Aliquid enir agunt circa personam primo et per se, non primo et per se circa naturam. Verbi gratia, ablutio baptismi figurat ablutionem baptizati, non corporis tantum vel animae tantum, sed ipsius personae; similiter efficit ablutionem spiritualem circa ipsam personam. Similiter est de aliis.

In the treatment of the sacrament of matrimony *B* poses the popular question: Since there is a sacrament against incontinence, why also is there not one against gluttony? In his answer he states:

B f. 222b.

Gratia vero sacramentalis, non in quantum gratia sed in quantum sacramentalis, respicit non personam, nec personam non etiam in natura, sed naturam, sive naturam in persona. Unde semper respicit corruptionem naturae in persona ista. Quia igitur vis nutritiva est proprie personae, nec respicit naturam in persona, sed personam prout est in natura, quia secundum istam non est homo principium alterius, quia proprium est naturae, ut natura est, esse principium alterius in natura; vis autem generativa respicit naturam ut naturam, et naturam in persona, quia per illam est homo principium alterius; ideo patet quod gratia in virtutibus bene potest respondere actui nutritivae, non autem gratia sacramentalis et ideo illi assignatur virtus, non autem sacramentum.

Prescinding from the functions of sacramental grace in the different sacraments, the texts as they stand, and as found in widely different places in B, are incompatible.

Without any further accumulation of evidence the inauthenticity of *Bruxelles* is assured, and as before intimated, there is no evidence whatever found in the manuscript itself that it

should ever have been considered genuine.

What may be said of Troyes 1862 (=824)?

In the estimation of the critics *Troyes 821* and *1862* are alike. ³⁷ Since 824 is presently inaccessible, such a judgment must be accepted; the notes on which this judgment rests seem reliable, and need not be questioned here.

The argument against the authenticity of these codices of the fourth book found in the City Library of *Troyes* is twofold, viz. a) the rudimentary style employed by the author of these *mss*. as compared with that of Rigaud in his recognized writings, and b) the lack of any certain evidence, internal or external to the manuscripts of Rigaud, that he ever composed a fourth book. The second point of this argument is developed later on, so for the present only that from the point of view of style need be treated.

Rigaud both in his Commentary, books I, II and III (dist. 1-39) presents us with a composition finished, integral and characteristic. His formulas are standardized, and his thoughts well-developed and doctrinally mature. His Commentary furthermore, for books one and two, at least, is very lengthy, and far-removed from the literal-commentary style exhibited by Alexander. All this is quite different in Troyes. Here we find a style repeatedly reminiscent of Alexander. The letter of the master of the Sentences is very closely adhered to in many distinctions. In fact as the opinions of Alexander appear again and again sometimes followed by an opinion which begs to differ, one gets the impression of reading an early disciple of Alexander who wished to differ with his teacher as little as possible in either doctrine or style.

Again, *Troyes* exhibits notable lacunae difficult to explain should Rigaud be postulated as its author. In this connection room for comparison with likely contemporaries is unfortunately absent, seeing that the writings of Guerric of

^{37.} Cf. Les manuscrits, p. 337.

Saint Quentin and possibly, John of Rupella, on the Sentences as yet remain unfound. The doctrine of *Troyes* with reference to the causality of the sacraments, for example, shows no foreshadowing of the great exploitation it underwent in William of Melitona. When *Troyes* writes on this, he is still guided by the simile of Hugh of St. Cher:

Sed etiam significandi etc. Nota: Deus significat ut causa efficiens prima; gratia ut causa efficiens proxima, gratia dico causata; sacramenta ut causa gratiae continentia, sicut herba sanat, ut in qua est virtus contenta. (Troyes 1862, f. 137a)

At least the type of causality defended here is that proposed by Hugh of St. Cher:

Ad tertium dicimus, quod vis illa, qua sacramenta novae legis iustificant, creata est sicut vis, quae est in herbis, et lapidibus et verbis. 38

Surely if this were the fourth book of Rigaud some glimpse of the theory of William of Melitona might reasonably be sought. The same may be said for other questions, viz. the augmentation of grace, the connection of the grace of baptism and confirmation and the like.

These items lead one to the conviction that *Troyes 1862* (-824) does not represent the writings of Odo Rigaud, but that it belongs to a bachelor or master of a preceding era; its rescue from oblivion its owes to some scribe who appended it to the completed first and second book, and incompleted third, in order to give that commentary an air of completeness.

What then are the approximate dates of composition of each of these two attempts to complete the commentary of Rigaud? A terminus a quo is given us explicitly by the author

^{38.} For quotation from Hugh of St. Cher cf. H.D. Simonin, O.P. et G. Meersseman, O.P., De Sacramentorum Efficientia apud Theologos Ord. Praed., Pont. Institutum Internationale Angelicum, Romae, 1936, p. 9, 11. 13-15. As to the text preceding, that from Troyes 1862, though very evidently imperfect in the codex, it suffices to establish the relationship claimed.

of Troyes, scil. f. 199a and elsewhere, when he quotes the Decretals of Raymond of Pennafort (1235) under the name of Gregory IX. In line with the chronology of the questions of Alexander of Hales this date may be advanced at least a couple of years. As already mentioned, the questions "Postquam fuit frater" De Sacrificiis in genere and De sacrificiis legalibus are incorporated in the text. Seeing that Alexander entered the Order in late 1235, or more presumably, in 1236, the diffusion of any questions so-entitled could scarcely permit their being used prior to 1238. 39

The finding of a terminus ad quem presents considerably more difficulty; to state anything with absolute security would require a knowledge of all the fonts of Troyes—something necessary to a critical edition but non requisite to the present study. Looking at this manuscript, though, from another point of view, something of an approximation may be made. In the first place, that Troyes should be written after the Quarta Pars of the Summa Fratris Alexandri is inconceivable; again, there is nothing that reminds one of St. Bonaventure in Book IV of his Commentary; the forceful and at the same time restless thought of William of Melitona is absent; finally it is difficult to realize that its author could have gone back again to the literal commentary style of Alexander if he had already known the finished style of Odo Rigaud. This brings us to 1245. And so with reasonable security the dates 1238-1245 may be given for Troyes 1862(824).

As to the author, these very dates at the present stage of research preclude any possible suggestion. Though the twin codex to 1862, namely 824, is annoted as coming from the Cistercians, its fondness and reverence for the opinions of

^{39.} Cf. F. Henquinet, Les questions inédites d'Alexandre de Halès sur les fins dernières, in RTAM, 10 (1938) 56-78, 153-172, 268-274; and the same author, De centum et septem quaestionibus halesianis cod. Tudertini 121, in Antonianum, 13 (1938) 335-366, 489-514.

For the analysis of all these questions as found in the grouping antequam esset frater and postquam fuit frater cf. Prolegomena, pp. 153ff. With reference to the time element cf. ibid. p. 152.

Afexander not alone in his *Commentary*, but also in his questions "Antequam et postquam fuit frater", with no little likelihood betray a Franciscan origin.

Bruxelles 1542 gives us a terminus a quo by the very fact that it copies the Quaestiones de sacramentis of William of Melitona. These may not be earlier than 1245. On the other hand, though the compiler of this long commentary draws immense borrowings from William of Melitona, Alexander of Hales, and—as stated—Troyes, he seems unaware of the Commentary of St. Bonaventure. As generally admitted, this latter presently may not be justifiably ante-dated beyond 1253-54. Consequently, Bruxelles 1542 falls within the liberal span of 1245-55.

Admittedly there is the difficulty that this manuscript in the opinion of the makers of the catalog, at least, may come from the 14th century. Should F. Pelster⁴⁰ be correct, however, it would rather be dated as a middle 13th century hand. The fact that the author, though careless enough about other formulas, yet groups his material into questions running according to numerical order, e.g. Et de hoc quaeruntur sex, I°, 2°, 3°, etc., insinuates a deliberate attempt to conform to Rigaud in the other books, and thus to give the impression of a continuation. To try give such an impression more than half a century, or even a century after Rigaud's departure from a life of studies, would seem not a little naive. The fact that his sources are those immediately preceding St. Bonaventure confirms the opinion of F. Pelster.

Who may have the author of *Bruxelles 1542?* A very likely name soon disappears on the strength of his own evidence. The wily author of Bruxelles in treating of the sign in the sacrament of matrimony anterior to the Fall of Man espouses the opinion of Rigaud in connection with the predestination of

^{40.} Cf. F. Pelster, op. cit. re this codex.

Christ:

Bruxelles 1:542, f. 222c:

Quod ergo primo obicitur quod si homo stetisset ille unio naturarum in Christo non fuisset, verum est secundum illam opinionem quam credimus esse verum; tamen praevisum erat quod homo caderet, et ideo ad hanc unionem quae futura erat fuit matrimonium institutum a Deo.

It is interesting enough that the very opinion of Rigaud is here expressed in his own formula quod obicitur quod.

Here is what we read in Odo de Rosny, a possibly strong contender to the authorship of Bruxelles:

Troyes 1245, f. 146

Item, sacramentum matrimonii quod fuit institutum in paradiso, ante lapsum, non esset penitus signum proportionale nisi Deus uniret (sibi) Ecclesiam in conformitate gratiae et naturae, quod (non) fieret nisi Deus esset homo. Propter hoc igitur et consimilia, conveniens fuit Deum incarnari lapsu etiam circumscripto. 41

The entire text of this ardent defense of the predestination of Christ by Odo de Rosny may be read in the edition of F. Henquinet. The text cited is sufficient to exclude his authorship of *Bruxelles*. What may be said of Adam of Puteorunville in this connection, may be added at some other time should it prove noteworthy.

2) RIGAUD'S COMMENTARY UNFINISHED

This last point of greatest import of all may now be considered: Did Odo Rigaud ever complete his *Commentary* or ever supply a fourth book on the Sentences?

The arguments in favor of such a completion are two.

The first is afforded us by Troyes 824. This manuscript bears the inscription Summa magistri Rigaldi super IIII Sententiarum, and Summa fratris Rigaldi de Ordine Minorum. It comes from the middle 13th century and purports to give us four books of Rigaud. Its genuineness for the last book,

^{41.} Cf. F. Henquinet, Eudes de Rosny, Eudes Rigaud et la Somme d'Alexandre de Halès in Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 33 (1940) 3-54; for the text quoted cf. p. 26.

though, is very doubtful in the light of what has been already said from a critical and stylistic standpoint. As far as Troyes 1862 is concerned, there is no inscription or explicit attribution to Rigaud found in the codex. It finds itself associated with an anonymous third book which is genuine and lacking a fortieth distinction; in addition, the same codex contains an abbreviation of that same third book plus a forged fortieth distinction. On these grounds there is no reason why this fourth book should be considered Rigaldian; in fact, the opposite would seem more probable. Is it not striking in fact that all the mss. of the Commentary of Rigaud found in this library are mutilated by omission or alteration?

The second argument in favor of Rigaud's having finished his Commentary rests on his own words:

Ad aliud quod obicitur de circumcisione, dicendum quod non fuit circumcisio propter se, sed propter exemplum...Similiter respondendum est de baptismate, et alia de causa, sed hoc alibi (et alia...alibi om. Bruxelles 1542). 42

As we see from the text the reading of Bruxelles and Bruges disagrees; while Bruges attests Rigaud's intention to write about baptism later on, or elsewhere (alibi), the manuscript of Bruxelles omits such a promise. At any rate, the mere expression of an intention by no means guarantees its fulfillment.

Finally, although Assisi 182 makes mention of a Fourth Book of Rigaud (Cf. *Prolegomenon*, pp. 154, 155), the only possible sizeable extracts, *viz.* ff. 76a-95d, show a plurality of authorship. It offers no proof of a *completed* Fourth Book.

Against the fulfillment of such an intention are the following arguments. First, there is no mention whatever of a fourth book by the earliest known testimonies; rather, they supply evidence to the contrary. As shown in the article of F. Henquinet the convent of St. Francis of Bologna, rich in 13th century manuscripts, possessed no copy of the fourth book of Rigaud,

^{42.} Cf. Bruges 208, f. 361.

though it did possess three of the first, two of the second, and three of the third. Again, in the environs of 1255, the Dominican convent of St. Catherine at Barcelona possessed "opus Thomae super sententias in IIII voluminibus, opus S (more presumably B or Bonaventure) super sententias in IIII voluminibus, opus Rigaldi super III libros sententiarum in I volumine." (Cf. F.M. Henquinet, Les manuscrits, p. 330). While the writer does not mention which three books of Rigaud he possessed, the fact remains that his set of Rigaud was incomplete while that of the more recently edited Commentary of St. Thomas as well as that of S (?) were complete.

F. Henquinet ⁴³ in both his articles alludes to the oftentimes quoted memorandum of St. James of the Marches bearing an itemized list of works onetime existing in the latter's library. In the first edition of this catalog by A. Crivellucci ⁴⁴ the particular item alluded to read "et Rigaldi super 3 ^{um} et 4 ^{um}" In the new edition put out by G. Caselli ⁴⁵ the item reads in toto:

Lectura Ioannis de Rupella super 3^{es} libros Sententiarum. Et Rigaldi super 3^{um} et Iohannis da Parma super 4^{um} et 5^{um} Sententiarum in uno volumine.

When G. Caselli speaks about the number of separate volumes once existing in this library, he goes on to say that when different authors were bound together in one volume, the original maker of the catalog indicated this, e.g. "in uno volumine." As an example G. Caselli quotes the above item and has it read "et Rigaldi super 3 um et 4 um." It seems pretty evident though that he is quoting heedlessly for the sake of an example. On the testimony of this catalog, then, there is

^{43.} Les manuscrits p. 334; Le Commentaire, p. 482.

^{44.} A. Crivellucci, I Codici della Libreria raccolta da S. Giacomo della Marca nel convento di S. Maria delle Grazie presso Monteprandone, Livorno, 1889, p. 104.

^{45.} Don Giuseppe Caselli, Alcuni codici della Libreria di S. Giacomo della Marca existenti nella Bibl. Vaticana (fondo Rossiano), con appendice delle tre Tabulae Librorum e indice dei codici rimasti nel Municipio di Monteprandone, Montalto Marche, 1934; cf. 43 and 25.

likewise no evidence to a fourth book of Rigaud. Is not this entire item a little untrustworthy—as F. Henquinet himself suggests? Until the existence of something more than book three of Rigaud has been vindicated, its accuracy as to any other author may be taken cum grano salis.

A second argument against the existence of a fourth book is afforded by the manuscripts of the Commentary themselves. For the first book we possess indubitable evidence for 12mss., 14 for the second, 20 for the third, and each with its derivatives. When we come to the fourth book two differing claimants meet us, one of which is absolutely, and the other almost certainly, inauthentic. The latter exists in two manuscripts, viz. Troyes 1826, and Troyes 824. On such a manuscript tradition there is little evidence for a fourth book of Rigaud. Likewise the existence of the only possible claimant to the fourth book, viz. Troyes 1862 and 824, in but two manuscripts, certainly by comparison with the wide diffusion of the other books, renders its authenticity still more dubious. This is all the more so, since, as we have seen, another contender for these honors existed in Bruxelles Bibl. Royale 1542. The present argument should not be contrued into implying that the existence of an author in but one or two manuscripts ipso facto renders the authenticity doubtful. The existence of the Praelocutio of St. Bonaventure to his second book in but one ms. may be quoted to the contrary; though, in point of fact, this example is not so convincing since the more or less personal, or at least subjective, tenor of this Praelocutio certainly favored its removal from a Commentary on the Sentences. What is implied here is this: while the mss. of books I, II, and III of Rigaud favor their authenticity, the mss. of book IV favors its inauthenticity.

A third argument against the completion of the Commentary of Rigaud at all, and consequently of the commentary on the fourth book never having been undertaken, comes from the incomplete state of the third book. Since this has been investigated by F. Henquinet who placed his conclusion in the words: "The fortieth distinction is lacking in all the commentaries of Rigaud for the very good reason that ne never wrote one," we need not press this point further. 46 Again, if it be argued that Bonaventure completed his fourth book before he undertook the third, it may be answered that, according to the latest research, Rigaud commented on the three first books in sequence, and beginning with the first. 47

As a corollary to the above the silence of the draft of the Commentary of St. Bonaventure, 4ssisi 186, may be adduced as evidence against any alleged fourth book of Rigaud. In this draft which oftentimes makes mention of the sources used, the names of William of Melitona, Guiard de Laon, Guerric of Saint Quentin, and Alexander of Hales occur. But, although Rigaud is quoted once for the other books, and his presence is abundantly felt throughout them, he does not enter the folios which deal with sacramental theology. May such silence be paradóxically interpreted as betraying the main source? And the answer is no, since no indication so far demonstrated or pointed to by the text would indicate Troyes 1862(824) as sharing these honors with Melitona.

At the present stage of research, then, although there are many arguments against the existence of a fourth book, there is no strong argument in favor of one. In fact everything tends to the conclusion that Rigaud never wrote one. Such a conclusion would be in complete accord with modern research which would present Rigaud as beginning his reading as a bachelor in 1243, to present a very thorough and elaborate commentary on all of the first two and the first 39 distinctions of the third book of the Sentences, only immediately to ascend

^{46.} Cf. F.M. Henquinet, Les manuscrits, no. 12 and passim.

^{47.} Cf. V. Doucet, Prolegomena, p. 228, and La date des condemnations parisiennes dites de 1241. Faut-il corriger le Cartulaire de l'Université. Mélanges Auguste Pelzer, Louvain, 1947, pp. 183-193.

to the chair vacated by Alexander of Hales in 1245. During the intervening years (1245 to the first months of 1248 when he ascended to the See of Rouen) before he vacated his chair, he showed an exceptional activity as a lector, preacher, and composer of many elaborate well worked-out quaestiones. To this busy career coupled with his sudden elevation to the episcopacy may be attributed the incomplete state of his Commentary.

To sum up, then, of the two contending versions of the alleged fourth book of Rigaud, one, Bruxelles 1542, is definitely inauthentic, being composed of immense borrowings from the questions of William of Melitona and the Commentary and questions of Alexander of Hales, as well as almost certainly from an earlier commentary, anonymous Troyes 1862 (=824). This latter manuscript, which in the instances numbered substitutes for a fourth book of Odo Rigaud, with little likelihood seems authentic. Finally, all available evidence points to any fourth book never having been supplied by Rigaud.

On the positive side, another testimony to the authenticity of the Quaestiones de sacramentis of William of Melitona has been uncovered, and with that a mutilated text of these same questions. Since this text has been mutilated mainly by omissions, though, its secondary value in the making of any critical edition of Melitona scarcely seems negligible. If the chronology of B has been established with somewhat of accuracy, the relation of B to the very problem of the questions of Melitona is essential. On the one hand, B changes his dependence on the expiration of the Questiones de Sacramentis as these are presently known; this may indicate, then, that even in the time of the composition of B these Quaestiones were incomplete; on the other hand, the most likely place to look for the answer to this problem is among the unidentified parts of B. The knowledge of the technique and formulas of William of Melitona and the mistakes likely to be found in the conversion of his questions gives considerable assistance in examining these unidentified parts.

The immense influence exercised by the Commentary of Alexander of Hales also showed itself at every step. This too may be of no little aid in consideration of the oftentimes defective text of the fourth book of that Commentary.

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THE LOVE OF GOD THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THE INCARNATION ACCORDING TO ISAAC OF NINEVEH

SAAC OF Nineveh was bishop of Nineveh about the middle of the seventh century. He resigned his office after five months to become an anchorite since he was not interested in administering temporal affairs. Later he lived in the convent of Rabban Schabour where he lost his sight because of excessive study of the Scriptures and abstinence. He died about 680.

Isaac wrote in Syriac. He is known chiefly for an asceticomystical work titled, De vita spirituali et de mysteriis divinis et iudiciis et tentatione. The work was very popular and widely read, as is evidenced by the many translations in tireek, Arabic, Ethiopian, Latin, Italian, German, English. It hardly betrays the fact that he was infected with the heresy of Nestorius. And so for practically one thousand years he was able to nourish souls to inner piety. 2

Paulus Bedjan, P.C.M., had contemplated a three volume edition of all Isaac's works. But after completing the first volume he was disuaded from continuing by the fact that he had only one manuscript as a guide for the rest of the work. He did, however, add a few appendices to the first volume which had been intended for the other volumes. Among these there is one of special interest to us. It deals with the reason for the Incarnation. In it he explicitly rejects the view that redemption from sin was the reason for the Incarnation; he insists that the manifestation of God's love was the reason both for the Incarnation and for the redemption. The text was published for the first time in the Western world by I. Hau-

^{1.} This work was edited by Paulus Bedjan, P.C.M., in Mar Isaacus Ninivita, De perfectione religiosa (Paris and Leipzig, 1909). The Latin translation is found in P.G., 86, 799-888, and in P.L., 44, 919-994. It was translated into English by A.J. Wensink, Mystic Treatises by Isaac of Nineve (Amsterdam, 1923).

^{2.} Cf. I. Hausherr, S.J., "Un precurseur de la theorie scotiste sur la fin de l'Incarnation: Isaac de Ninive (VII^e siecle)," Recherches de science religieuse, 22 (1932) 316f.

sherr, S.J., in 1932.³ Father Hausherr made a literal Latin translation from the Syriac original. So that we might be able better to follow the sequence of thought, we shall give the English translation of the whole passage; this we shall follow with an outline and commentary.

(A) If envy were useful for the direction of men, why did the Word God put on a body so that He might convert the world to His Father by means of meekness and humble virtue, and [why] was He extended on the cross for sinners, and why did he hand over this body to suffering in behalf of the world? (B) I say in truth, God did this for no other reason than to manifest to the world the love that He had, so that by the love of us, which would appear greater because of this sentient perception, the world would be captivated toward loving Him, and thus the great power of the King who lives (est) by love, would find an occasion to operate through the death of His Son. (C) By no means did the death of the Lord take place that He might redeem us from sins, nor on account of anything else, but only that the world might experience the love that God had toward creation. (D) If all the wonderful operation had been only on account of the remission of sins, it would have sufficed for Him to redeem us in some other manner. Who would have opposed Him if He had done what He did [redeem us] by a simple death? He did not die a simple death, but experienced it in the hard suffering of the cross, that you might understand what kind of a mystery this is [namely, of love]. Besides, what necessity was there for the contumely and the spittle? Death would have been sufficient; and this death alone, without the other things that were done, would have been sufficient for our redemption.

(E) O wisdom of God full of life! Now you understand and fully sense the reason for the Coming of Our Lord, and for all these things [e.g., death] that were consequent upon it, inasmuch as it is contained in the splendid utterance of His holy mouth. "For God so loved the world," He said, "as to give His Only-begotten Son," namely, for the Economy of His recapitulation.

(F) Does it, therefore, not put us to shame to harbor such a thought

^{3.} Ibid., pp. 318-319.

about the mystery of the Economy of Our Lord so as to belittle the death of Christ and IIIs Coming into the world by ascribing our redemption from sin as the reason for it? (G) Was the power of sin so much stronger than the power of God that when IIe wished its destruction, he was not able to destroy it except through the death of Christ? (H) If this were the mystery of the Economy of Our Lord, namely, that IIe redeemed us from the servitude of sin, then, if we had not been sinners, the Coming of Christ would have had no reason; nor would Christ have died, since the Word God could not have put on our body, which he put on because of the sins of the world— that is if we consider only the outer surface of Scripture. To continue, if death had not held dominion over us because of the tyranny of sin, as is clear, this mystery of the manifestation [of God's love] in flesh would have ceased, and men and angels would have been deprived of all this light and knowledge.

- (I) So it would be proper for us to return thanks to sin, since indeed we received all these blessings on its account. And should we think that sin is the cause of all these wonderful [blessings] so that even the holy angels received these very great present blessings by reason of sin, which made them worthy of the Coming of Christ? Indeed, unless sin had been committed, we would have to say that neither they [angels] nor we would have any hope of a future world, in which [hope] we would find our joy, as we now find our joy.
- (J) So why should sin be blamed, which brought all these blessings, if indeed the death of the Lord and the Passion and the entire mystery of His Coming and sojourn on earth took place in order to redeem us from sin, and to save us from hell, since the Judge Ilimself is the same one who suffered and paid the debts? (K) Nor are there other mysteries hidden in it [sin], for in comparison to these [mysteries] sin is nothing, which needed all that care in order to subject the Son of God to all these afflictions! So, as I said, let us acknowledge that we received all these wonderful [blessings] from sin, since, unless we had been enslaved to the servitude of sin, we would have lacked all these [blessings]! And sin gave us the very thing that we would have been unworthy of if we had continued in justice!
- (L) That is not true. Far be it from us to be like infants in contemplating the Economy of the Lord and the mystery that is so efficacious

to [inspire] trust, inasmuch as we adhere to the surface of the Scriptures. Even though it is not given to every man to open this door, and to remove the limits put to nature, still in the silence of the tongue, which is a secret and mystic place, it is possible for the sons of the mystery to examine with fear and to admire the Economy of God and the secret riches hidden within the manifest sayings of Scripture. They know the Economy of Christ, which is full of admiration, not only in the manifest and known [sayings],—that is, those who have acquired knowledge through grace and have received the gift of understanding and have entered into the inner parts of the mysteries [of Christ], which have been expressed corporally on the outer surface.

(M) To the Trinity, the admirable mystery, of which the secret of the difference of subsistent Persons shone on us by the mystery of love, which [mystery] was revealed in our flesh for the solace of all: glory and adoration and thanksgiving in the beginning of our race, now and always, and unto endless ages. Amen.

We have marked off the various sections with letters to make reference easier. To give a summary, Anastasius develops his thought as follows: (A) He begins by asking why the Word became incarnate and why this Incarnate Word died on the cross in behalf of the world. (B) He answers that it was to manifest His love toward the world in order that men might love Him in return. (C) Then he emphatically asserts that Christ did not die to redeem men from sin, but to show His love. (D) This he proves by saying that if redemption had been the only purpose, a simple death, not the terrible death on the cross with all its attendant afflictions, would have sufficed. (E) Then he repeats that love was the reason for Christ's Coming, and he adduces John 3:16 as a Scriptural proof. (F) Once more he states that sin is not the reason for the Incarnation; (G) then by way of argumentation he states that God is more powerful than sin, (H) and if Christ came only to redeem us, there would have been no Incarnation with all its blessings for angels and men if there had been no sin-an absurdity-(I) and that we would have to give thanks to sin for all the blessings of grace and glory to men and

angels. (L) Next he states that that is not true. That is an infantile view of the Incarnation, based on a superficial reading of the Scriptures, which yield the true mystery of love when probed to their depths by a kind of mystic knowledge. (M) He concludes with a beautiful doxology to the Triune God for revealing Himself through the mystery of love in the Incarnation.

This outline shows that our writer proceeds rather logically. In general his ideas are clear. First, he certainly very clearly insists that redemption from sin is not the first and only reason for the Incarnation and death of Christ, but that it is the manifestation of God's love in order to receive a return of love. How much he had this idea at heart is evident from the number of times he repeats it: "God did not do this for any other reason than to manifest to the world the love that He had, so that by the love of us, which would appear greater because of this sentient perception [of Christ as Man], the world would be captivated toward loving Him, and thus the great power of the King who lives by love, would find an occasion [to operate] through the death of His Son" (B); "but only that the world might experience the love that God has toward creation" (C); John 3:16 (E); "this mystery of the manifestation of God's love in flesh would have ceased, and men and angels would have been deprived of all this light and knowledge" (H); the blessings of grace and glory to men and angels are due to God's love, not to sin (I); "To the Trinity, the admirable mystery, of which the secret of the difference of subsistent Persons shone on us by the mystery of love, which [mystery] was revealed in our flesh for the solace of all" (M).

One thing, then, is certain, love was the reason for the Incarnation and death of Christ. It is well to note that he insists that not only the Coming of Christ but Ilis death as well was motivated primarily by the manifestation of God's love, not by the redemption of man from sin. God's and Christ's love hold the primacy here, too, rather than man's benefits.

This point St. Lawrence of Brindisi insisted on so wisely some thousand years later. 4

But there is a difficulty here. Our author states so absolutely that sin, the redemption from sin, in no way influenced God's becoming man and dying for us: "By no means did the death of Our Lord take place that He might redeem us from sins, nor on account of anything else" (C); "Does it, therefore, not put us to shame to harbor such a thought about the mystery of the Economy of Our Lord so as to belittle the death of Christ and His Coming into the world by ascribing our redemption from sin as the reason for it?" (F) "If indeed the death of the Lord...took place in order to redeem us from sin" (J). Now, at first reading these statements might make one think that he is excluding the redemption as a purpose for Christ's Coming and dying as well. But that would be sheer folly, since Christ actually died to save us from sin, a fact which he could not erase. In fact, if we were not redeemed, how could we return Christ's love (B)? So he can only mean that the redemption was not the primary reason; and the primary reason is, after all, the reason. He as much as admits that when he says that "if all this wonderful operation had been only on account of the remission of sins." (D) "Only" here has the force of "primary." Many a theologian has voiced the Thomist opinion with "only" instead of "primary." Again, when he says that a simple death would have sufficed to redeem man (D), he implies that the terrible death also redeemed man, besides, primarily showing how much God loved us What is more, just to have Christ die for us, even the most terrible death, without redeeming us,

^{4.} Cf. St. Lawrence, Mariale (Opera Omnia: Patavii, 1928), I, 81. The love of Christ dominates Isaac's spiritual theology as expressed in his popular Liber de contemptu mundi: The man of prayer should kneel and look into the face of Christ on the cross (ch. 10: P.G., 86, 820A). The contemplative person will understand the reason for Christ's Coming (Ibid., D). Christ died out of love for us (ch. 28: P.G., 86, 857D); (cf. ch. 29: 858f). Christ is the bread of charity which we must eat and by which we must live (ch. 48: P.G., 86, 875D). The fact that he stresses love so much in the fragment we are considering, is an argument in favor of its authenticity.

would not have been a manifestation of God's love for us, and would not have evoked a return of love from us (B). So there can be no doubt that in the context Isaac means that sin and the redemption from sin was not the first reason for the Incarnation and death of Christ. In his mystic treatise, De contemptu mundi, he states explicitly that Christ tasted gall on the cross in behalf of [the Christian]. He also prays for grace from Christ, which supposedly Christ merited for him.⁵

So Isaac has the correct view of the Incarnation and redemption: The Word became Man primarily to manifest God's love externally and to give a return of love to God. Even His death was meant primarily to manifest God's love, and only secondarily to give salvation to man. Still he might have stated his position more expressly.

What proofs does he offer for his view? He has two negative proofs taken from the absurdity of the opposite view. First, if the Incarnation and the death of Christ had had as primary purpose the redemption from sin, then this absurdity would follow that if there had been no sin there would have been no reason for the great good that the Incarnation is for men and angels (II). Second, if the primary reason for the Incarnation were redemption from sin, we should have to thank sin for all our blessings, including eternal glory (I-K): "And sin gave us the very thing that we would have been unworthy of if we had continued in justice!" (K). Throughout this argument there are ironical statements and questions. St. Cyril of Alexandria had developed this absurdity rather well in his day. I saac also ridicules the opposition by saying they are like infants viewing the Incarnation (L).

Our author also appeals to the fact that Christ died such a terrible death, and not merely an ordinary death, as proof that

^{5.} Ch. 28: P.G., 86, 857D and 859A.

^{6.} Cf. "Christ Jesus the Secure Foundation according to St. Cyril of Alexandria," Franciscan Studies, VII (1947) 12-13.

God's love is the primary reason for the Incarnation (D). In fact, God in His power could have destroyed sin without dying at all (G).

Lastly, he appeals to Scripture in support of his doctrine. He quotes John 3:16 explicitly to show that God was motivated by love in becoming man and in redeeming men (E). Later he says ironically that "if we had not been sinners, the Coming of Christ would have had no reason....if we consider only the outer surface of Scripture" (H); and "to adhere to the surface of the Scriptures" is to be like "infants in contemplating the Economy of the Lord" (L).

He explains that not everyone can probe the depths of this mystery. Those who have supernatural knowledge—those who "remove the limits put to nature" (L), who are "the sons of the mystery" (L), that is, who are Christians, "who have acquired knowledge through grace and have received the gift of understanding, and have entered into the inner parts of the mystery [of Christ]" (L),—these can "examine with fear and admire Economy of God and the secret riches hidden within the manifest sayings of Scripture" (L). "They know the Economy of Christ...not only in the manifest and known sayings" (L)

In our terminology does he mean that the reason of the Incarnation and death of Christ is to be found not in the literal sense, but in a higher, spiritual sense of Scripture? Hardly, for he quotes a passage (John 3:16), which is very explicitly in its literal sense in favor of Isaac's doctrine. He must mean that all the texts, not only those that speak plainly about the redemption from sin and are well-known, but also others less known, when correctly understood and correlated will yield the true doctrine. Really, there is no text in Scripture which in a non-literal, spiritual sense would yield his doctrine. We must regret that he did not cite more passages explicitly. In (E) he seems to allude to Ephes. 1:

^{7.} Hausherr, op. cit., p. 320, seems to think so.

3-10, for the love of God in willing the Economy of His recapitulation (cf. Ephes. 1:9-10). He is then, using the same Scriptural proof that St. Cyril and St. Maximus and Anastatius stressed. He is certainly not referring to a kind of non-literal sense of Scripture.

One more point needs consideration. Isaac is very plain in attributing the blessings of the angels (H), even the hope of their glory to Christ (I), to the Incarnation. In other words, before the angels were actually in glory they had to believe and hope that they would attain glory through Christ, their "light and knowledge" (H). The "angels would have been deprived of all this "light and knowledge" which they actually have through the Incarnation if there had been no sin and if sin were the primary reason for the Incarnation. In other words, their faith and their Vision come from Christ.

To conclude: First, Isaac deserves credit for stressing the love of God in the mystery of the Incarnation and redemption, and in so far he can be considered a precursor of the Scotist theory. 8 But he only made more explicit something that was insisted on, at least implicitly, already by St. Irenaeus, St. Athanasius, St. Cyril of Alexandria, and St. Maximus, and Anastatius. Secondly, he deserves credit for explicitly making Christ the sole Mediator of the grace and glory of the angels. But here too, there is no innovation. He is merely drawing out more explicitly what his predecessors had taught implicitly. Thirdly, he deserves credit for explicitly stating that this view is contained in Scripture positively. But again, his predecessors had always backed their statements about Christ as the Final Scope and absolute Mediator and Exemplar on the Scriptures. Lastly, he deserves credit for being the first, as far as we know, who openly discussed both sides of this problem and professedly rejected the later so-called Thomist view. Others prior to him defended the Absolute Primacy of Christ, but they did not say that the opinion which

^{8.} J.M. Bissen, O.F.M., "La tradition sur la predestination absolute de Jesus Christ du VII^e au IX^e siecle, "La France Franciscaine" (1939) 12-14.

bases the Incarnation primarily on the redemption from sin is to be rejected. So with Isaac of the middle of the seventh century, it seems, we have reached a new stage in the doctrine of the Absolute Primacy of Christ. Isaac is, moreover, a clear witness that in his day, long before the Scholastics, there was an opinion other than the so-called redemption theory, which he rejected outright.

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CHRIST THE EXEMPLAR AND FINAL SCOPE OF ALL CREATION ACCORDING TO ANASTASIUS OF SINAI

NASTASIUS WAS a priest and abbot of Mount Sinai. Often he left his solitude to fight against the Monophysites, the Jews, and the Severians. Since there were a number of writers called Anastasius, it was almost natural that confusion should arise in regard to works attributed to them. Authors are still doubtful about the authenticity of some works ascribed to this Anastasius. However, we have found pertinent matter only in the explanation of his Hexaemeron, which is certainly authentic. The one quotation from Questiones et Responsiones we shall discuss in its place. In general the doctrine of Anastasius is in every way Çatholic.

In view of the fact that he speaks rather plainly on the Absolute Primacy of Christ, his neglect by authors who treat of this doctrine is surprising. Risi in his rather thorough treatise of all the ancient Christian writers does not give him a special treatment. He merely mentions him once in connection with the exegesis of Col. 1:16. Petit-Bornand quotes him a number of times for the various theses relative to the Absolute Primacy. M. Jugie gives him a paragraph in his chapter on the motive of the Incarnation according to the Byzantine writers. J.M. Bissen also gives him a brief treatment. 4

Perhaps this neglect is due to the fact that in his explanation of the Hexaemeron he indulges exclusively in a mysti-

^{1.} Francesco M. Risi, Ord. S. Joan. a Deo, Sul motivo primario dell'Incarnazione del Verbo, 4 vol. (Roma: Desclee, 1898), IV, 46.

^{2.} J.B. du Petit-Bornand, O.F.M. Cap., Proludium de Primatu Domini Nostri Jesu Christi et Causa Motiva Incarnationis; translated by Ambrosius a Saldes, O.F.M. Cap. (Barcinone, apud Subirana Fratres, 1902), pp. 150, 153, 168f, 170, 174, 213, 231, 265, 269, 296, 303, 310, 321.

^{3.} M. Jugie, A.A., Theologia dogmatica orientalium Christianorum (Paris, 1926), II, 680.

^{4.} J.M. Bissen, O.F.M., "La tradition sur la predestination absolue de Jesu-Christ du VIIe au IXe siecle," La France Franciscaine, (1939) 15.

cal interpretation. He does not deny the literal historical sense. In fact, in the fourth book he explicitly admonishes the reader that he explained "the corporal creation" spiritually by way of allegory not as if he were destroying the history of the works of God contained in the letter, nor to overthrow the explanations of the Fathers, but because Paul said that the Old Scripture and the Law is the shadow of the truth of the things of Christ and the Church. 5 Nevertheless, even though the Holy Spirit did not intend these references to Christ and the Church in the individual passages of Gen. 1-2 (excepting 2:23), and since therefore Anastasius himself would not claim that he is giving us a strict Scriptural argument for the Absolute Primacy, still he would hardly have thought up all those things. He found them in tradition. And as we shall see, he found them in Col. 1:16 and Ephes. 1:10; 5:32. With that as a basis he accommodates the first chapters of Genesis to these doctrines. So, even though his Scriptural basis, as far as Genesis is concerned, is merely the accommodated sense, sometimes rather far-fetched, still the statements made are his expression of a traditional doctrine with a basis in St. Paul. We can, therefore, rest heavily on Anastasius as a true witness of tradition, agreeing with the great Doctors of the Eastern Church.

Christ the Exemplar of all Creation

The fundamental principle of Anastasius in explaining the first three chapters of Genesis is that they foreshadow what was realized through Christ and the Church. For example, the light of 1:3, the sun of 1:16; the tree of life of 2:9, are Christ. However, from this we cannot conclude immediately that, according to Anastasius, Christ was the first predestined, and so, prior to the fall, because some of these things, according to him, foreshadow points in the redemption. Our argumentation, then, must rest on explicit statements

^{5.} In Hexaemeron, Praef. 4 (P.G., 89, 856B).

^{. 6.} In Hex., 1 (P.G., 98, 863 BC); 4 (890D); 8 (972D).

that Christ was predestined before all creatures. And such statements are frequent.

All creation, both visible and invisible, was first constructed and prefigured according to her [Church's] image and of Christ, her Spouse. For this is the mystery which God first predestined before the ages and generations. Hence God is also said to have brought all things to a head and restored them in Christ (cf. Ephes. 1:10). What else does it mean to bring to a head and to restore than that the things that were prefigured and adumbrated in Himself by ideas, were actually fulfilled in Him by facts? [He quotes Col. 1:16]...Now when the Apostle of God said "all things, both visible and invisible, were created in Christ," he plainly shows and teaches that even the invisible creature was prefigured and made in Christ and the Church. 7

So Anastasius clearly tells us that both Christ and the Church were the exemplars of all other creatures in heaven and on earth. He bases his argument, as a genuine Scripture proof, on Ephes. 1:10 and Col. 1:16. Christ brings all things to a head by the fact that they were planned and created according to His image. When the Word became incarnate the Image was made visible to all and the "summation" of creation was complete. This is certainly not a novel idea in the tradition of the Church. It was taught by Saints Irenaeus, Athanasius, and Cyril of Alexandria. Again, Col. 1:16, according to Anastasius, and many other Fathers, means that all creation was created in Christ inasmuch as He was its Exemplar. This, too, is not a new idea in Greek Christology. To conclude, in this citation Anastasius bases his doctrine not on an accommodated interpretation of Genesis, but on a correct interpretation of St. Paul: and only then does he see, by accommodation, this doctrine reflected in the story of creation.

St. Paul's passage in Ephes. 5:32: "This is a great mystery, I mean in Christ and the Church," with reference to Gen. 2: 23, gave Anastasius the idea that all creation was modeled

^{7.} In Hex., Praef. (P.G., 89, 854BC).

on Christ and the Church, as he himself informs us.8

In particular, Anastasius claims that Adam was made according to the image of Christ. He expresses his opinion on this when speaking of Gen. 1:26: "Let us make man to our image..." "The carnal man cannot show us any man, besides Christ, who is made to the image of God; for no one of those born in the world...has held dominion....over all the things on earth." Evidently, he means made perfectly to God's image, because he admits the historical meaning of the text as referring to Adam. A little later he says, "'And God created man, he made him to God's image,' (Gen. 1:27) that is, Christ's image and pattern." So Christ is the Exemplar of man. Prior to these two texts he had written that in this passage of Genesis "man" means Christ, and it was spoken at the Incarnation. "1

After Adam had committed his sin, when God was about to drive him from paradise, He said ironically: "Behold Adam has become one of us" (Gen. 3:22). By a queer type of accommodation, Anastasius applies even this to Christ, as if it meant that man has become like the God-Man who is one of the Trinity. ¹² Illicit though this accommodation is, it shows how deeply rooted in the mind of Anastasius was the idea that Christ is the Exemplar of man in creation.

In a fragment ascribed to Anastasius, entitled "According to the Image," he teaches the same doctrine that man in creation was patterned on the God-Man.

He [man] images in himself as in some mirror and natural picture, not typical, the mystery of the Three-personed Godhead: But that is not all. He clearly prefigures also the Incarnation of one of the Trinity, of

^{8.} In Hex., 4 (P.G., 89, 890D-891A); 9 (1002D); 10 (1007BC).

^{9.} In Hex., 6 (P.G., 89, 935B).

^{10.} Ibid., D.

^{11.} In Hex., 6 (P.G., 89, 930B).

^{12.} In Hex., 12 (P.G., 89, 1058A).

the Word God. Perhaps, the soul in itself is according to the image of the Godhead in itself; whereas our composite of soul and body is according to the likeness of the Incarnation of the Word. 13

Christ Is the Final Scope of Creation

Anastasius is equally clear in making Christ, the God-Man, the Final Scope of all creation. When accommodating Gen. 1: 3, "light," to Christ, he wrote:

And so he sang, "And God said, Let there be light," that is, Christ the true light, which "enlightens every man coming into the world" (John 1:9). "Let there be," namely, let there come to birth, let there be formed and let a body be made, that He might show you that the Incarnation of the Word is more necessary than all things, and that on its account all things were made, and that without it all things are empty and useless—made useless by sin and returning to nothingness. In the very beginning of Scripture it [Incarnation] is handed down to you, namely, when it says, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," in other words, He created in the beginning of time, or, it pleased Him that heaven be made as God. and that the earth be made for the sake of the Man Jesus. "And the same of the Man Jesus."

This is, in a sense, a fantastic accommodation, but it clearly conveys the doctrine of Anastasius that Christ is the final cause of creation. The fact that through sin man was heading toward nothingness, does not mean that before that he did not need the Incarnate Word; sin only added to his helplessness. Even before that, by God's will, he needed the Incarnation for which he was created. And this Incarnate Word was already in God's mind when He created heaven and earth. Anastasius repeats the doctrine that Christ is the final cause of all things; he bases it on Col. 1:16.

All things were created in Christ, both the things on earth and the

^{13. (}P.G., 89, 1143).

^{14.} In Hex., 1 (P.G., 89, 863BC).

^{15.} Ibid., D.

things in heaven, both the visible and the invisible (Cf. Col. 1:16) ¹⁶..... And thus is fulfilled the passage (Col. 1:16) which says that all things were created through Christ and in Christ.... ¹⁷ For if Paul applies to the Church the fact that every creature was made on account of Adam and Eve, when he says, "This is a great mystery, I mean in Christ and the Church," then without doubt every creature that is made for the sake of man and his spouse is referred to Christ and the Church. ¹⁸

And so all creation is made for the sake of Christ and Ilis Church. Elsewhere he writes most plainly that Paul said, "All things were made on account of Christ and as tending toward Christ, both the things in the heavens and the things on the earth" (Col. 1:16). 19 Could he have stated this doctrine plainer?

In this connection Anastasius voices the objection to the adversaries of the Absolute Primacy, which already St. Cyril expressed so forcefully. ²⁰ He writes that those who take the story of the serpent in Gen. 3 entirely too literally, as the Ophites did,

give greatest thanks to the serpent as to a benefactor when they claim that we received food through the serpent; through food, the recovery of sight; through this, marriage; through marriage, the world [of men]; on account of man's sin God became man. From this came the kingdom of heaven and the eternal blessings, whose author and conciliator for us was the serpent! So, lest we too fall into their impiety, let us understand of Christ and the Church whatever was written historically or happened in paradise.²¹

We certainly do not have to discard the historical meaning in order to escape that error. He is no doubt speaking in hy-

^{16.} In Hex., 7 (P.G., 89, 952B).

^{17.} In Hex., 7 (P.G., 89, 957D).

^{18.} In Hex., Pracf. (P.G., 89, 856B).

^{19.} In Hex., 4 (P.G., 89, 890D).

^{20.} Cf. Franciscan Studies, VII (1947) 12.

^{21.} In Hex., 10 (P.G., 89, 1021BC).

perbole. Still he gives form to the objection that has often been leveled against the opposition.

Foundation of All Blessings

Following the doctrine of St. Cyril once more, Anastasius teaches that the Incarnation is the foundation and source of all blessings.

This is the mode and the reason of the Incarnation of Christ: It is the source and beginning and root and foundation and security of all the blessings that were made by God in the creation of the six days in heaven and on earth, in keeping with the voice of Paul who tells us that "all things were created in the type and image of Christ" (Cf. Col. 1: 16). 22 So Christ is the Mediator of all blessings to all creatures from the beginning of creation, even for the angels; they are the creatures in heaven referred to.

Anastasius follows many of the Fathers when he accommodates "In the beginning" (Gen. 1:1) to mean "In Christ" all things were created, ²³ namely, in Christ as the foundation and exemplar and final scope.

Christ the Primate of the Angels

Above we noted that Anastasius claims the invisible creatures, by which he certainly means the angels, were created according to the image of Christ and for His sake. He also teaches explicitly that the angels praised God at the creation of the sun, because it reminded them of Christ who would be born. Quoting Job 38:7 rather freely thus, "When the stars were made, all my angels praised me with a loud voice and celebrated me with hymns," he asks:

What was the reason? Was it that the stars were made? Certainly not for that reason. But when they saw the sun rising from the earth, they

^{22.} In Hex., 4 (P.G., 89, 893AB).

^{23.} In Hex., 1 (P.G., 89, 861C).

learned by way of mystery what would happen in the last times, namely, the Incarnation of Christ and [His] assuming [human nature] from the earth. And so when they saw Him rise from the holy Virgin as from an abyss, immediately they cried out saying, "Glory be to God in the highest" (Luke 2:14).²⁴

From this we conclude that the angels had been given a revelation of Christ and Mary before the fall of Adam, even before the fall of the angels themselves, at the creation of the sun and stars. This fact of the angels' having had a revelation of the Incarnation in the time of their trial implies that they sinned by not accepting Christ. But does not Anastasius himself deny that in the following question and answer?

There are those who say that the Devil apostatized by not wanting to adore man. But these fables come from the workshops of the Greeks and Arabs; for from the Prophets, especially from the great Ezechiel, we learn that before Adam was made, Satan was cast down because of pride. For when God created this visible world, the Devil hoped he would be made its king. So when he noticed that Adam was created by God and set over the works of His hands and that all things were put under his feet, he [Devil] armed himself against him and laid him prostrate. 25

First we must note that some of the *Questiones et responsiones* are spurious. It is not possible to tell whether this one is genuine. Supposing it is, we can explain that he wishes to say that the Devil had apostatized through pride before Adam was even created, so he could not have apostatized by not wanting to adore Adam. This he proves, too, from the fact that he was operative as Devil already when Adam was created and hoped as Devil to get dominion over all creation. He does not deny that the Devil refused to adore the God-Man who had been revealed to him. It is strange that he did not hit upon this idea since he referred so many things that were

^{24.} In Hex., 4 (P.G., 89, 899C).

^{25.} Questiones et Responsiones, q. 126 (P.G., 89, 775C).

said of man to Christ. Perhaps that is an argument against the genuineness of this particular responsio.

Again, in his explanation of the Hexaemeron he claims the men, shepherds, and Magi saw Christ face to face, in fleshy form, before the angels did. ²⁶ This does not militate against their having had a revelation of Ilim in their time of trial. St. Athanasius, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Chrysostom, ²⁷ and others, stressed that only the Son of God can see God in His essence naturally. The angels saw the Son of God as God-Man in actuality after men did, if one follows the chronological order of events in the Gospel, which Anastasius is here doing.

All in all, the Christ of Anastasius, which we think is the Christ of tradition and reality, is a glorious masterpiece of God, willed for Ilis own glory primarily, because willed as the Final Scope and Exemplar and Mediator of all creation. No wonder Anastasius has the Father rejoice at the Incarnation, symbolized by the light of Genesis:

He made the light, so that by this, "Light was made," you might understand the good pleasure, voluntary, personal, and joyful, of the Word together with the Father concerning the Incarnation...when the Father saw Him [Word] bearing flesh, He rejoiced.²⁸

And why should He not have rejoiced? It was His greatest work, for whom and according to whom all His other creations were willed and made.

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^{26.} In Hex., 1 (P.G., 89, 867AB).

^{27.} St. Athanasius, Contra Arianos, Orat. 4, 36 (P.G., 26, 524D); St. Gregory of Nyssa, In Cantica, homil. 8 (P.G., 44, 946BC); St. John Chrysostom, In Joannem, homil. 15, 1-2 (P.G., 59, 98).

^{28.} In Hex., 1 (P.G., 89, 684B).

BOOK REVIEWS

St. Anthony of Padua, Doctor of the Church Universal. By Very Rev. Raphael M. Huber. O.F.M. Conv. Milwaukee, Wis: Bruce Publishing Company, 1948. Pp. xiv-209. \$3.75.

The dearth of material on St. Anthony's theology in English was keenly felt in 1946, when the Paduan Wonderworker was elevated to the Doctorate of the Universal Church. The few extant devotional lives of the Saint gave English readers small reason to suspect Anthony as a great Teacher. It was precisely to remove this obscurity that Father Raphael Huber has produced his latest venture, St. Anthony of Padua. The writer declares in his introduction that he wrote this volume "for the purpose of providing a concise, yet co-ordinated study in English on St. Anthony's theology" (p. xii). That Father Huber was well fitted for this task is evident, not only because of his monumental achievements in the field of historical research, but also because the present work has grown from a series of lectures on the Doctor Evangelicus which he himself conducted during the summer-school session of 1946, at St. Bonaventure's College, Allegany, New York.

In the first chapter of his book, the author sets forth the three essential requisites for a Doctor of the Universal Church. How these requisites were fulfilled in Anthony of Padua is shown in subsequent pages. Testimonies of six popes, liturgy, and traditional Catholic art had placed Anthony among the Doctors long before Pope Pius XII's solemn and official extension of this honor to the Universal Church, Father Huber points out. A brief biographical sketch gives special emphasis to his eminent sanctity, a second requisite for a Doctor of the Church.

Profound learning is a third requisite. Although Anthony was not a systematic theologian, nearly all his sermons were colored by his theological and mystical expositions of Sacred Scripture. His scriptural allusions and allegorical interpretations show a profound knowledge of both the Old and New Testaments, The first lector of the Franciscan Order has exerted a greater influence over the Franciscan Masters than we are inclined to believe. Father Agostino Gemelli, O.F.M. (Antonio di Padova, Santo dei Miracoli. Roma: 1931, p. 27), writes: "St. Anthony is

rarely cited among the sources of the great Franciscan Masters. And yet it is he who draws the devotion to the Sacred Heart from the Gospel and the Fathers, and hands it to St. Bonaventure. It is he who hands the devotion to the Name of Jesus in the burning sun to Ubertino of Casale and St. Bernardine of Siena. It is he who leaves to Blessed Duns Scotus the devotion to Christ the King of Redemption. . Anthony suggested to Scotus, who perfected the idea (by demonstrating the Immaculate Conception) offered perhaps by Augustine, that Mary was filled with singular grace and preserved immune from all sin. Anthony also defended the assumption of Mary's body and soul into Heaven. This truth, once it is declared a dogma, will accrue to the honor of its most ancient defenders."

Anthony's authentic sermons have come to us mainly through the tireless efforts of Dr. Antonio Maria Locatelli and his priestly collaborators who have produced the famous critical edition. This treatise contains thirteen booklets numbering 929 pages in double columns. Citing chiefly from Dr. Locatelli's edition and from Father Diomede Scaramuzzi, O.F.M. (La Figura Intellectuale di San Antonio di Padova alla luce della critica. Roma: Tipografia Agostiniana, 1934), Father Huber has ably outlined the teachings of the Doctor Evangelicus in three tracts: Christology, Mariology, and Ecclesiology.

In a section on Anthony the preacher, Father Huber gives the reader a glimpse of what the Paduan Doctor was like as he spoke to audiences of 30,000 persons—his external appearance, his gifts of nature and grace, and the style of his sermons. The following chapter contains a critical inspection of Anthony's sermons, his method of writing and sources. Anthony used four pegs on which he hung the main thought of his Sunday sermons: the Gospel of the day, the Epistle, the Introit, and the history of the Old and New Testament as read in the first nocturne of the Divine Office. Noteworthy here is the Holy Father's Apostolic Letter, Exulta, (January 16, 1946) in which he called attention to pulpit orators that the sermons of the Doctor Evangelicus have been, and still are "a perennial font of most limpid water, that their author is looked upon as a Master and as a Doctor of the Church."

With regard to Anthony's miracles, Father Huber admits that many miracles ascribed to the Paduan Wonderworker during his lifetime were not recorded in the early legends. On this supposition, however, it does not follow that we may simply throw out all the miracles ascribed to him. Father Huber maintains that those miracles confirmed by papal declarations, constant oral tradition, and the Legenda Prima must be accepted as authentic.

Not of least value to the reader is Father Huber's two chapters: one on the works of Anthony in which the author labels the authentic, spurious, and doubtful writings of the saint and discusses the various editions of Anthony's sermons; the other on the authentic sources of his life, beginning with the Legenda Prima (1232) down to Pope Pius XII's Apostolic Letter of 1946. Another chapter of Father Huber's book evaluates the editions of Anthony's authentic works. The author also gives a critical survey of the more important Antonian publications that have appeared in different modern languages.

Of particular value to writers and students of Padua's great Feacher is Father Huber's extensive bibliography covering editions of Anthony's works, sources of life, biographies, selected studies and publications, periodical literature, articles in encyclopedias, and biographical collections. Here one will find the more available sources which can be used for a deeper study of our latest Doctor. Father Huber added an appendix containing three of Anthony's sermons in the original Latin on the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Assumption.

Father Huber's book is a preface or introduction to Anthony the theologian. It is not a detailed and comprehensive exposition of the Evangelical Doctor's theological opinions. It was not intended as such. Nevertheless, it is a masterpiece of scientific research and will ever remain a handy reference to Antoniana. It will prove especially helpful to writers and teachers. For in Father Huber's scholarly work they will find a neat outline of Antonian theology, the best in English, with plenty of references to available source material.

CHRISTIAN SCHEMBRI, O.F.M. CAP.

St. Anthony's Monastery, Marathon, Wisconsin. The Christology of Zeno of Verona. By Rev. Martin F. Stepanich, O.F.M., S.T.L. The Catholic University of America Studies in Sacred Theology. Second series, No. 9. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1948. Pp. 68.

Father Stepanich's dissertation is a worthwhile contribution to the studies of the Fathers. St. Zeno, though he is one of the minor Latin Fathers, nevertheless holds a place of importance among the Latin ancient Christian writers, because his *Tractatus* are the oldest specimens of sermons of the Latin Church, and because they are written in elegant style. Moreover, he is thought to have influenced the liturgy of the West. But most of all, his doctrine on the nature of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, though not quite as clearly voiced in some points as by the great opponents of the Arians, is nevertheless an improvement on his sources, Tertullian, Lactantius, and Novatian.

The author begins with an introduction that treats of the life of St. Zeno, of the authenticity and editions of the *Tractatus*, of the sources and style. The *Tractatus* are ninety-three sermons. The sixteen of the first book are chiefly on moral topics, the seventy-seven of the second book are doctrinal and exegetical. Most of them are short; some are mere fragments of sketches. Some are short talks given to candidates for baptism.

Father Stepanich's dissertation originally contained five chapters:

1) On the Irinity, 2) On the eternal divine coequality of the Son of God,

3) On the generation of the Son, 4) On the Incarnate Christ, 5) On soteriology. Only the third chapter is printed in full; the others are summarized at the end. Thus the third chapter begins rather abruptly. I should like to have seen the summary of the first two chapters printed before the third chapter. A conclusion to the whole book would be appreciated too.

The third chapter is by tar the most important section of the dissertation. In it Father Stepanich proceeds in scholarly fashion to exegetize the texts of St. Zeno and evaluate the solutions of other authors in regard to the seeming contradictions of Zeno's Christology. His method rightly includes a comparative study of Zeno's predecessors and contemporaries. Father's own solutions are quite satisfactory. He thinks that Zeno considered the Son as merely conceived from all eternity but born in

time through creation and the Incarnation. But I wonder whether it cannot be said that some of the Fathers looked upon birth more from the viewpoint of material births as an external manifestation. For Zeno, then, the manifestation of the Son through creation and the Incarnation would be a more complete birth. But that does not mean that he would deny that the Son was born in some fashion from the Father within the Trinity eternally. He was Son eternally; that obviously implies some kind of birth; a conception is something temporal, not eternal. At any rate Zeno had the correct idea, even though he might have hesitated to speak of the birth of the Son within the Trinity.

The expression "incarnate Christ" (pp. V and 62) does not seem too happy. The name "Christ" does not belong to the pre-existent Word. Though Christ as God pre-existed the Incarnation, there never was a non-incarnate Christ. "Christ" is peculiar to the God-Man as such.

In the copious footnotes the author betrays genuine scholarship and painstaking consultation of the best literature on the varied subjects that need to be treated in a study of this nature. We can only wish that the other four chapters had been printed in full. You would then want this book still more as part of your collection of patristic studies.

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L'Église Canadienne Glorifie S. Antoine de Padoue. Le Domair Evangelique. Edited by Rev. P. Ferdinand Coiteux, O.F.M. Montreal, Canada: Editions Franciscaines, 1947.

When on January 16, 1946 St. Anthony of Padua was declared a Doctor of the Church by the present gloriously reigning Pope Pius XII all nations of the world not only expressed their deep appreciation to the Holy Father, but also sought to further glorify the Saint on account of the new honors conferred upon him. Not least among these nations of the world was Canada. The impetus seems to have been given by His Excellency, the Most Rev. Ildefonso Antoniutti, Apostolic Delegate to Canada and Newfoundland, who in an audience accorded the Rev. Simon Archambault, O.F.M. on May 15, 1946 expressed a desire that there be also "une glorification de Saint Antoine Docteur par l'Église Canadienne".

The wish of his Excellency was admirably fulfilled. The learned representatives of the Catholic Church in Canada contributed their time and talent to immortalize the glorious event as well in ecclesiastical functions as in radio addresses. In the radio addresses over station CKAC on June 11, 12, and 13, 1946 the first two talks were given by Rev. P. Ferdinand Coiteux, Guardian of the Franciscan Convent at Rosemont; the third, by Msgr. Damase Laberge, Ex-Provincial of the Canadian Franciscans and present Prefect Apostolic in Peru. In the second triduum on June 14, 15 and 16, over station ACBF, the addresses were given by Msgr. Philippe Perrier, the Vicar General of Montreal as representative of his Excellency, the Archbishop; by the Very Rev. Pius Gaudreault, Provincial of the Canadian Dominicans; and by His Eminence, the late Archbishop of Quebec, Roderick Cardinal Villeneuve, O.M.I. (his last public address). All of these addresses on the various phases of the life of Saint Anthony are contained in this useful pamphlet, honored by a preface by his Eminence, the Wost Rev. James Charles Cardinal McGuigan, Archbishop of Toronto. The value of the booklet is enhanced by the inclusion (in French) of the Apostolic Letters of his Holiness, Pope Pius XII, Exulta, raising St. Anthony to the rank of a Doctor of the Church; by the French translation of the Encyclical Letters on St. Anthony by the late, Most Rev. Valentine Schaaf, O.F.M., Minister General of the Friars Minor; and by a learned treatise on the "Doctrinal Mission" of St. Anthony of Padua by the well-known author, the Rev. Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M. We owe the translation into French as also the publication of this useful booklet to the Rev. Ferdinand Coiteux, O.F.M. and to him a tribute of gratitude is justly due from all real lovers of Antoniana.

RAPHAEL M. HUBER, O.F.M. CONV.

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Faith, Hope, and Charity is a credit to the high standard of scholarship set by the two previous volumes that led the way in the Ancient

St. Augustine, Faith, Hope, and Charity (Enchiridion De Fide Spe Et Caritate). Translated and annotated by Rev. Louis A. Arand, S.S., S.T.D. No. 3 of Ancient Christian Writers. Westminister, Md.: Newman Bookshop, 1947. Pp. 165. \$2.50.

Christian Fathers series. Father Arand presents in this neat little book a smooth and intelligible translation of one of the many beautiful works of Augustine. A brief background furnished in the introduction along with the copious notes and references compiled in one section at the end of the translation as well as the excellent topical index make this work all the more valuable. Many of the comments and references to other works of Augustine give evidence of a thorough acquaintance with the doctrine of this luminary of Christianity.

Faith, Hope, and Charity was composed by St. Augustine originally for the benefit of a certain Laurentius, who wanted to have a handbook (enchiridion) which would "touch briefly on the principal points of the Christian faith." The author tried to fulfill the request, but at the end even he doubted whether he had actually accomplished his goal—of composing a handbook of Christian doctrine. While various basic points of Christian belief are presented in this work, it can hardly be said to be a complete summary of our faith. It treats such questions as the fall and redemption, the Blessed Trinity, the Providence of God, eschatology, the sources of sins, the remission of mortal and venial sins, the problem of evil, and the virtues. Some of these topics are examined quite in detail. The analysis of the problem of evil is particularly interesting. While this handbook does not present a complete summary of all our beliefs, it nevertheless considers truths that are perennially important.

As Father Arand points out in the introduction, Augustine places religion within the framework of faith, hope, and charity. The objects of these virtues, he says, are summarized in the Lord's Prayer and the Creed. This therefore suggests the manner in which Augustine unfolds the truths of our religion. The translator observes that there are many who are convinced that the success of this handbook of doctrine (based on the Creed) influenced St. Thomas to model his Compendium Theologiae on it.

The translation in general reads smoothly. However there are a few isolated instances which may not suit the taste of everyone. For example, the first sentence is paragraph 40 (page 48) stretches on for fourteen lines with a number of varied ideas. It might read more smoothly and be more readily understood by all if it were broken down a little more. The first sentence in paragraph 60 (page 62) could possibly be clarified by changing the construction of the first part. Apart from these and a few

other minor points, the work deserves great praise. It is a creditable contribution to the study of the Fathers.

This volume is highly recommended not only to those who are interested in the philosophy and theology of Augustine but also to those who are looking for an analysis of truths that have frequently become stumbling blocks in the lives of the uninstructed or the partially-instructed.

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Le Fou de Notre Dame: Le Père Maximilien Kolbe. By Maria Winowska. Paris, France: Editions du Cerf, 1948. Pp. 31.

The story of Father Maximilien Kolbe, O.F.M. Conv. resembles that of a modern knight thoroughly imbued with a supernatural affection for his "Lady Love" (Cf. Franciscan Herald and Forum XXVIII, No. 4 (April, 1949) p. 127). Practically without funds, amidst discouraging opposition and almost insurmountable obstacles he founded an organ "The Malitia of Mary" which by 1939 had reached the incredible circulation of a million copies a month in Europe and a correspondingly large circulation in Japan (Nagasaki). The priests and brothers at the friary and printery of Niepokalanov (City of the Immaculata) at one time reached the equally incredible number for modern times of seven hundred members. Father Kolbe had always desired to die a martyr's death. In 1941 he was arrested by the German Nazi invaders of Poland and on May 28 sent to Ausschwitz (Oswiecim). On July 30 a man escaped from camp. In punishment thereof and as a further determent, ten fellow-prisoners were sentenced to die by the infamous test-starvation bunker in the camp. One of the ten was the father of a family. Fr. Maximilien begged and obtained leave to take his place. By August 14 he was the only survivor. The fiends then finished him off with a carbolic injection! His wish had been fulfilled. He died a martyr of charity on the Eve of the Assumption, just in time to celebrate Mary's feast with his Lady Love in Heaven.

The booklet entitled "The Fool of Notre Dame"—because Father Kolbe so often attempted the seemingly impossible in Mary's honor—is

pleasingly written, although undocumented. At times, especially in the earlier part of the story one would welcome a more exact chronology; a few German expressions are misspelled; whereas on p. 29 we are told that the head of the "Lagerführer", Fritsch, resembled that of a "bouldogue". But for all that the booklet has already reached a wide circulation and this reviewer presages for it a still larger diffusion the greater the interest in Father Kolbe grows. His cause for beatification was opened at Padua on May 24, 1948, less than seven years after his death!

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Naturaleza, Historia, Dios. By Xavier Zubiri. Madrid, Spain: Editora Nacional, 1944. Pp. 563.

Although this book made its public appearance four years ago it well deserves that we should devote a few lines to it, particularly because at the time of its appearance it did not receive due attention.

Under the title of *Nature*, *History*, *God*, and in answer to a request of former students and friends, the author has grouped together in one volume the essays written within the last ten years and previously published, either wholly or in part, in various national and foreign magazines.

The book contains a brief introduction and three parts, the third of which gives its general title to the book. In the introduction the author calls our attention to the fact that the grouping of divers papers into three parts is somewhat arbitrary and is calculated to facilitate their reading. Here are the titles of the various essays: Part I (Reality, Science, Philosophy): Our Intellectual Situation; What is knowledge; Science and Reality; Aristotle's Idea of Philosophy; Philosophical knowledge and its History, Part II (Philosophy in its History): Historical Notes; Socrates and Greek Wisdom; Hegel and the Metaphysical Problem. Part III (Nature, History, God): The Idea of Nature: The New Physics; Human History: Greece and the Survival of the Philosophical Past; Concerning the Problem of God; The Supernatural Being: God and Deification in Saint Paul's Theology.

The book being a compilation of papers of different character, written on rather dissimilar occasions in the course of the years, one is not expected to find in it a systematic exposition of the author's philosophical thought, even supposing that the author had a system. I say "even supposing", for his definition of philosophy (p. 155) would seem to indicate that he has none. To a firm and systematic position Zubiri prefers, it seems, to keep his interest open to all systems worthy of consideration. And we should add that in this matter of having one's soul open to the most varied thoughts of others he is a model. His flexibility of spirit and his capacity to scrutinize from inside the thought of the most distant authors is superlative.

Another merit which the reader will immediately discover is that Zubiri masters all those sciences which are auxiliary to philosophy: history, natural sciences, philology, theology. He is not, therefore, of the number of those who believe that a popular, every-day knowledge of physical reality is sufficient for philosophizing.

As is the case with so many modern philosophers, Zubiri attaches a new meaning or shade of meaning to old philosophical terms; as an example, we may refer to the terms "existence" and "person". For this reason the author will be either criticized or praised according to whether the reader considers the method something short of intellectual dishonesty, or believes, on the contrary, that leaving our concepts "open" helps to catch all the better the innumerable aspects of reality.

We cannot undertake a detailed exposition of all excellent essays contained in the book. We shall turn our attention exclusively to the one entitled "Concerning the Problem of God" (pp. 423-469). In it Zubiri tries to break, so to say, the closed circle of Heidegger's philosophy, although without deviating from the latter's line of thought, in order to make room in it for the problem of God. Zubiri's effort is different from those undertaken in the same direction by R. Bultmann ("Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins und der Glaube", Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1930, fasc. V) and H. Reiner (Das Phänomen des Glaubens, Halle, 1934).

Zubiri starts by claiming that the traditional approach to the problem of God is based on the supposition that, if God exists, it must be

"besides" man and world. Then we have recourse either to a rational demonstration or to a blind sentiment, or again, we consider God's existence as an evident "fact". Something similar happened with regard to the problem of the world until the appearance of present-day philosophy (he means existentialism). Both idealism and realism (either critical or naïve) presupposed that the existence of world is a "fact" and a fact "added" to the existence of human subject. Actual philosophy has shown that world is not an additum to human subject, that human existence consists formally—in one of its dimensions, Zubiri points out,—in being in the world, "open" to the things. I'hings are a constitutivum formale of human being as such. Now, Zubiri reasons, besides this dimension towards outside (hacia fuera) it is possible to discover in the analysis of existence another dimension of a contrary direction, a dimension a tergo. Existence not only means to ex-sist, sistere extra causas; it means also something which must be made, achieved. And a force is required in order that it be made, for the ontological nothingness (nihilidad) of existence is radical. In other words, man not only finds himself among things which "are" and with which he "is" to make himself, but there "is" also that which makes that there be things and that existence make itself.

This making that there be existence is not a mere obligation of being, but something much more radical. We are obliged to exist because we are previously religated (from religare) to that which makes us exist. And since to exist is to exist in and with the world, that which religates the existence religates also the entire world. This dimension a tergo of human existence is, therefore, religation. It is a constitutive dimension of existence. That is to say, man does not have religation; he consists velis nolis in religation. That which religates, the fundamental root of existence, is what we all designate by the term God.

What precedes, Zubiri remarks, is not a causal demonstration nor anything similar, but an attempt to analyze ontologically one of our dimensions. The problem of God is not a problem which man may or may not state. It is a problem stated by the very fact of man being implanted in existence. Hence the problem concerning the "faculties" by which we reach God is meaningless. Man does not need to reach God. He consists in being coming from God, and, therefore, in being in God.

This Zubiri's effort regarding the problem of God is undoubtedly praiseworthy. There is nothing unorthodox in it. Whether it is a novelty in philosophy, something essentially different from a causal demonstration is open to criticism. It seems to us that his reasoning is not essentially different from the Scholastic argument of contingency and it certainly implies the principle of causality.

FELIX ALLUNTIS, O.F.M.

The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

The Nations in the Medieval Universities. By Pearl Kibree. Cambridge, Wass. Wedieval Academy of America, 1948. Pp. xi, 240.

This book is an enlightening presentation of the origin, history and functions of the nations in medieval universities. For the first time in English, it assembles the relevant material, arranged in good order and expressed in lucid and frequently graceful language. The author examines in considerable detail the status and function of the nations in the universities of Paris and Bologna; then proceeds to the deviations found in other universities. The procedure whereby each nation voted on the choice of an "intrant" or elector, and the method whereby the conclave of "intrants" in turn elected a rector is particularly interesting. These devices were used to prevent pre-election manipulation and fraud.

"As long as the universities retained their international character, the nations provided the units for the representation, according to their geographic origin, of students and masters from various parts of the European continent" (Pp. 185-6). Beginning with the sixteenth century, the nationalization of the universities caused the nations to lose much of their importance, though they still remained a feature of university organization until the eighteenth century. In the singular case of the University of Aberdeen, the proctors of the four nations still retain, in this century, the right of electing the rector.

Besides setting forth so conveniently the nature of this academic institution, the author has provided an admirable specimen of medieval

representative government, a type that is deplorably lacking in many instances today.

J.R. CRESSWELL

West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia.

A Philosophy of Submission; A Thomistic Study in Social Philosophy. By Rev. Henry V. Sattler, C.SS.R. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1948. Pp. xix-212.

A doctoral thesis which deals with its subject under the headings of: Acts and Habits of Submission, Limitations by excess or defect, and Reasons for Submission, to use the views developed for a critical analysis of some contemporary non-Scholastic conceptions and a discussion of the application to society, religious and secular, state and family, education, economics, and finally in regard to "international society". Six pages of bibliography and an index are added.

Submission is defined as the acceptance of ordination. The virtuous habits correlated to this acceptance are religion, piety, patriotism, observance, gratitude, and social justice. In its acts it gives support, honor, and service to the superiors, be they individuals or communities. Submission is necessitated by the finiteness and imperfection of man as a created being, by virtue of which the individual is in need of the community, the co-operation with others, the completion of his limitations. Submission springs from love, reverence, and careful meditation on the objective reality of individual and social dependencies. Thus, submission is an indispensable condition for a society to exist. Authority and planning, however great their importance, become effective only by the acceptance on the part of people. Submission as the recognition and acceptance of order on the part of the individual is an imperative need if order is to be restored in our times and in our world.

The author is aware of the incompleteness of his study which, however, is welcomed as a first approach on a broad basis. One might have wished that the sources of all social philosophy, and so also of the discussions concerning submission, had been referred to, the philosophies of Plato,

Aristotle, and the Stoics. But the author has refrained from historical inquiries. In one place he wanders off into the field of history to make Hegel responsible for the idea that discipline is instituted to break the will. But this idea is much older than Hegel and has been a tenet of pedagogics for centuries previous to Hegel's times.

Social philosophy which is desirous to rest securely on the basis of Thomistic principles will undoubtedly profit from this study.

RUDOLF ALLERS

Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

A Família. Sua Origem e Evolução. By C.F. Barbosa. Rio de Janeiro: Editoria Vozes, 1948. Pp. 320.

This volume by a professor of philosophy at the Collegio Estadual of Paraibo deals with the economic, juridical, and educational aspects of the family. Based chiefly on the papal teachings since rerum novarum, it gives a concise exposition of the problems, the present difficulties, the different theories on the family, from a Catholic standpoint. Because of the emphasis on practical and sociological questions the strictly philosophical questions are touched upon only incidentally. Reference is almost exclusively to the state of affairs in contemporary Brazil.

RUDOLF ALLERS

Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

The Scientific Cutlook. By Bertrand Rusell. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1948, Pp. x-269-Index.

This volume is a mechanical reproduction of the book which appeared in 1931. It is always a difficult matter to evaluate a work written some time ago; unless it has become a classic or the time of its writing is rather one long past, the differences between the standpoint of the author and the state of our actual knowledge make themselves felt in an un-

pleasant manner. Since 1931 many things have happened which may not have changed profoundly the "scientific outlook", but have taught us to view many things in another manner.

To illustrate the nature of scientific procedure, the author reports on the achievements of Galileo, Newton Darwin, and Pavlov. Our evaluation of the first three men probably is still what it was eighteen years ago; but it may well be that we are not any more as much impressed by Pavlov's work. To be sure, we recognize the amount of new facts he discovered; but we are rather more doubtful concerning the possibility of "explaining" mental facts in terms of "conditioned reflexes". What appeared as a solution then has become a questionable hypothesis today.

Man proceeds, we are told, by way of "trial and error", in his individual life and in the history of the race. Usually, we take account only of the progress made. But it might be interesting and, perhaps, enlightening, if one were to study the history of progress in terms of errors. One might learn how little actually the human mind profits by past experiences and how often it falls prey to the same errors it committed centuries ago.

In one respect, however, this book is as timely as it was. The author has, of course, an unbound admiration for science and its possibilities. But he realizes also, and more than many of his contemporaries, that science is not enough to guarantee a satisfactory existence; science "provides one of the ingredients which progress requires", but not a right conception of the ends of life, which the author calls "wisdom".

There is another point in which the study of this book proves interesting. It gives testimony to the deep disturbance of the scientific mode of thinking that resulted from the new developments in physics. Even though the "indeterminacy principle" is, of course, not mentioned, the reader realizes what it meant that the views of Newtonian physics—hitherto considered as the unshakeable basis of our knowledge of reality—became questionable. The reader thus, may come to think of the doubtfulness of all statements beginning: "We know now...".

Perhaps, the parts of the book which are most actual are not those dealing with scientific techniques but with their applications, especially to the fashioning of man's life. Mr. Russell foresees, or foresaw rather, quite a few of recent developments and he has been aware of many of the

dangers modern mentality entails, much more so than most of his contemporaries. One will hardly qualify Mr. Russell as a "reactionary", an enemy of progress or as favoring totalitarian ideas. The chapters on "The Individual and the Whole" and on "Scientific Government" are worthwhile reading. The author sees "a real danger lest the world should become subject" to the "cruel tyranny" of science. There are wise words in this book, words one does well to heed. Science is, to put Russell's ideas in words not his, fundamentally inhuman. "Disappointed as the lover of nature, the man of science is becoming its tyrant." "As soon as the failure of science considered as metaphysics is realized, the power conferred on science as a technique is only obtainable by something analogous to the worship of Satan, that is to say, by the renunciation of love."

It is refreshing to hear Mr. Russell condemn the disregard for tradition, the ignorance of the past, the lack of understanding on the part of those all too "progressive" minds "without tenderness towards what is traditional, without understanding of what they are destroying".

Why had the voice of a man like Russell, who surely was and is sufficiently esteemed by the modern mind, so little effect? Why were his warnings not considered? These are questions on which the thoughtful reader may well meditate when reading this book. To stimulate such reflections is an achievement. However little one may have in common with Mr. Russell, however much one has to disapprove of his philosophy, his is a mind and intellect worthy of consideration. Thus, one is grateful for the re-edition of this volume.

RUDOLF ALLERS

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A CONTROVERSY AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT CONCERNING THE DOCTRINE OF DUNS SCOTUS

It E Franciscan Theologians, at the opening session of the Council of Trent, outnumbered the other religious. In fact, of the one hundred and four theologians present, thirty-four were Franciscans, constituting one-third of the total number. Of this number, fifteen belonged to the Observants, while nineteen were Conventuals. If we take into

^{1.} Cfr. Concilium Tridentinum. Diariorum, Actorum, Epistolarum, Tractatuum Nova Collectio. Edidit Societas Goeresiana, Friburgi, 1901 ff. (Ilereafter cited as CT. The Roman number refers to the volume; the two numerals, separated by a comma, denote page and line.) CT, V, 1041 ff. The remaining seventy theologians are divided among the Orders as follows: nine Dominicans, fourteen Augustinians, fifteen Carmelites, nineteen Servites, two Jesuits, and eleven diocesan priests. Cfr. A. Walz, "Gli inizi Domenicani al Concilio," in Concilio di Trento 1 (1942-1943) 210-224; idem., "I Domenicani al Termine del primo periodo Tridentino e a Bologna," 368-376; idem, "I Domenicani alla VI Sessione," 2, (1947) 47-57; idem, "Elenco dei Padri Domenicani nel Concilio di Trento," Angelicum 22 (1945), 31-39; D. Gutierrez, "Los Augustinos en el Concilio di Trento," Ciudad de Dios 158, (1946), 385-499; Lucinio dell SS. Sacramento, "Los Carmelitas en Trento," Verdad y Vida 3, (1945), 174-192; S. Seiger, "Carmelitas in Concilio Tridentino," Analecta Ordinis Carmelitarum 12, (1944), 147-166; J. Brodrick, "The Jesuits at the Council of Trent," Month, 154, (1929), II 513-521; 155 (1930); I 97-108; P. Cherubelli, Il Contributo degli Ordini Religiosi al Concilio di Trento, Firenze, 1946.

^{2.} CT., V, 1041 ff. The names of the Observants are: Vicentius Lunellus, Richardus Cenomanus, Johannes Consilii, Alphonsus de Castro, Andreas de Vega, Hieronymus Lombardellus, Jacobus Maillettus, Thomas Hasart, Ludovicus Vitriarius, Ludovicus Carvaialus, Sylvester de Cremona, Baptista Castilliones, Clemens de Monilia, Melchior Flavus, Franciscus Salazar. The names of the Conventuals are: Franciscus a Pactis, Joannes Antonius Delphinus, Julius Magnanus, Johannes Jacobus Montefalchius, Sigismundus Phaedrius, Petrus Paulus Caporella de Potentia, Franciscus Visdomini, Antonius Frexius, Sebastianus a Castello, Bonaventura de Castro Franco, Laurentius Fulgineus, Johannes Benerius, Angelus Vigerius, Johannes Baptista Vastinus, Valerius Vicentinus, Hieronymus Girellus, Aloysius Pighisinus, Bernardinus Costacciarius, Philippus Brascus. Cfr. G. Pou y Marti, "I Frati Minori nel Primo Periodo del Concilio 1545-1547," in Concilio di Trento, 1 (1942-1943) 201-209; G. Odoardi, "I Francescani Minori Conventuali al Concilio di Trento," loc. cit., 298-311; B. Oromi, "Los Franciscanos Españoles en el Concilio de Trento," Verdad y Vida, 3 (1945), 3-45; 99-117; 275-324; 682-728; 4 (1946) 87-108; 301-318; Fr. Sarri, in

consideration some of the other sessions, the number is even higher. For example, in the session devoted to the decree on justification, considered universally to be one of the brilliant achievements of the Council, there were eight secular priests, seven Dominicans, four Carmelites, four Augustinians, two Jesuits, one Servite, and twenty-nine Franciscans. Not all of these religious, however, were entitled to a vote in the Council. There were four Franciscan Bishops, three of the Observant and one of the Conventual branch; in addition, the Generals of the Observants and the Conventuals had a seat and also a vote in the proceedings.

Although a large number of Franciscans attended the Council and took an active part in the proceedings, nevertheless, a doubt arises in regard to their doctrinal position. The solution of this doubt will serve to clarify many obscurities in the history of sacred theology and of the Franciscan Order itself. Did the Friars, present in such imposing numbers, act as one compact group? Are we justified in speaking of a united Franciscan School at the Council of Trent? And if the Franciscans were united, did they follow

[&]quot;Cherubelli, Il Contributo" 245-290; G.M. Palatucci, "Cherubelli, Il Contributo" 97-132. At the later sessions theologians of the Capuchin Order were also present. Cfr. P. da Casacalenda, "I Cappuzzini nel Concilio di Trento," Collectanea Franciscana 3 (1933) 396-409; Ilarino da Milano, "Cherubelli, Il Contributo" 207-243.

^{3.} Cfr. S. Merkle, "Die weltgeschichtliche Bedeutung des Trienter Konzils," in: Görresgesellschaft, Zweite Vereinsschrift 1936, Köln, 1936. S. 11.

^{4.} In determining the number of theologians we must not use the list printed in CT as the basis, V, 819. This list includes only those who were present at the solemn session, January 13, 1547, at which the decree on justification was published. Rather, one must check each session to determine the number of theologians who spoke in regard to the decree on justification.

^{5.} The names of the Bishops are: Ludovicus Chieregatus, Titular Archbishop of Antivari, Dionysius Zannettino, Bishop of Chiron, Name Grechetto, Antonius de la Cruce, Bishop of the Canary Islands, Cornelius Musso, Bishop of Bitonto (Conventual). The names of the two Generals of the Order: Johannes Calvius, General of the Observants, Bonaventura Pius Costacciaro, General of the Conventuals.

the doctrine of Saint Bonaventure or Duns Scotus? Finally, it is of interest to learn of the attitude of the non-Franciscan prelates to the doctrine of these two great medieval doctors. It is only by careful individual investigation that we can find the answers to these questions. We have selected a question which seems to us best suited to ascertain the attitude of these prelates in regard to Duns Scotus and theologians participating in the discussion on justification. It is a question extensively and hotly debated in the Council; one above all in which the true position of the Subtle Doctor was discussed, viz., the question of our certainty of grace.

I. The Course of the Controversy

A. The Origin of the Controversy:

The fundamental urge underlying Martin Luther's religious thinking and experience was his ardent longing for certainty

^{6.} Concerning the theological schools at the Council of Trent, see II. Lennerz, "Das Konzil von Trient und die Theologishchen Schulmeinungen," in: Scholastik (1929), 38-53; E. Stakemeier, "Die Theologischen Schulen auf dem Trienter Konzil," in Theol. Quartalschr. 117 (1936) 188-207; 322-350; 466-504; also, a shorter account by E. Stakemeier, Glaube und Rechtfertigung, Freiburg, 1937, 1-39.

^{7.} As to the controversy regarding the certainty of grace at the Council see J. Hefner, Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Trienter Rechtfertigungsdekretes, Paderborn, 1909, 297-328; H. Rueckert, Die Rechtfertigungslehre auf dem Tridentinischen Konzil, Bonn, 1925, 191-216; H. Hutmacher, "La Certitude de la Grâce au Concile de Trente," Nouv. Rev. Théol., 60 (1933), 213-226; A. Stakemeier, Das Konzil von Trient ueber die Heitsgewissheit, Heidelberg, 1947; J. Olazaran, "Voto Tridentino Inedito sulla Giustificazione de la Certezza della Grazia del Generale Carmelitano Nicolo Audet," Il Concilio di Trento 1, (1942-1943), 272-285; Idem, "Documenti Cattolici Antiprotestanti Precursori della Doctrina sulla Certezza della Grazia nel Decreto Tridentino sulla Giustificazione," Ioc. cit., 337-355; Idem, "La Contoversia Soto-Caterino-Vega sobre la Certeza de la Grazia", Estudios Eclesiasticos, 16 (1942), 145-183; Beltran de Heredia, "Controversia de Certitudine Gratiae entre Domingo de Soto y Ambrosio Caterino," Ciencia Tomista, 62 (1941), 133-162; M. Oltra-Hernandez, Die Gewissheit des Gnadenstandes bei Andreas de Vega, Duesseldorf. 1941.

concerning his salvation. "Wie kriege ich einen gnädigen Gott?" (How do I get a merciful God?) This is the formulation of the question that troubled him from his early youth and with which he busied himself throughout his entire life. He considered his decisive discovery to be this: Certainty of salvation is possible only through unconditional surrender to Faith, trustful and steadfast faith, that Christ died just for me and not merely for mankind in general. And for the sake of Christ, sin is not imputed to me. For Luther, then, justification by faith and the certainty of justification, are most intimately connected. Everyone who has been justified, moreover, has the obligation to believe that God has pardoned him. 8 If the Council of Trent intended to discuss Luther's doctrine on justification and, in contrast, present the Catholic truth, it could not, for this reason, pass by the doctrine of the certainty of grace. Surprisingly enough, however, the non-voting theologians who discussed for an entire week the problems connected with the doctrine of justification did not touch upon this point. Only two theologians, Andreas de Vega 10 and Antonius Frexius 11 mention it. Significantly enough, even at this time there is some opposition which, in the course of the further discussions, split the Councilespecially the Franciscan theologians, into two opposing parties. Vega, who enjoyed a vote in the Council but concerning which we have only an inaccurate account by Massarelli, secretary of the Council, opposes Luther's

^{8.} Cfr, A. Kurz, Die Heilsgewissheit bei Luther, Guetersloh, 1933; K. Holl, "Die Rechtfertigungslehre in Luthers Vorlesung ueber den Roemerbrief mit besonderer Ruecksicht auf die Frage der Heilsgewissheit," Holl, Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Kirchengeschichte, I. Tuebingen, 1932, 11-154; for an excellent summary of the opinions of Luther regarding the certainty of salvation, see A. Stakemeier, Das Konzil von Trient ueber die Heilsgewissheit, Heidelberg, 1947, 51 ff; Cfr. CT 635, note 2.

^{9.} Ct, V, 262-281; H. Lennerz, *De Congregationibus Theologorum in Concilio Tridentiao,* Gregorianum, 26, (1945) 7-21.

^{10.} CT, 275, 14 f.

^{11.} CT, V, 277, 42 f.

doctrine with the concise statement: No one can, of himself, without a special revelation of God, be certain of salvation. Frexius, however, confirms the fact that Saint Paul ascribes justification to faith, among other things, by pointing out that it is by faith precisely that we receive this assurance and feel justification. The full significance of these two contrary conceptions of the doctrine of justification probably did not dawn upon the others; for no other theologian expatiates on it. Then, too, this point like certain other matters. was not admitted into the summarium, which recapitulates the most important results of the deliberations of the theologians. 12 More surprising yet, the Fathers of the Council. in their votes, which in part are greatly protracted, make no mention of this question; for in the list of Protestant errors. prior to the beginning of the General convocation, which the presiding Papal legates gave to the Fathers of the Council for a thorough examination and judgment, among other things, is found the sentence: "The one justified is bound to believe that he is in grace, the sin is not imputed to him and that he is predestined." 13 Of the Fathers who expressed themselves on the problem of justification, only the Bishop of Bajados, Francis de Navarra, considers this question: he rejects every certainty of grace, except in the case of a special divine revelation. 14 From the notes of Seripando, General of the Augustinians, it is also clear that he considered this problem. He concedes the possibility of a certitude of grace, but limits it to a few favored souls. 15 In view of this scanty attention, it is surprising to find that the Fathers of the Council listed this question as the first

^{12.} CT, V, 279 ff.

^{13.} CT. V. 282, 24 f.

^{14.} CT, V, 324, 34 ff.

^{15.} CT, XII, 634, 31 ff. Later on Seripando takes an undecided position regarding this question; cf. Ct, V, 675, 10 ff, A. Stakemeier 41 ff, 153 ff.

formula on the decree of justification. Four Bishops 16 were commissioned with several eminent theologians as their aids. 17 On July 24, 18 they proposed, in canon 18, the Lutheran doctrine of the possibility of the certainty of grace (and at the same time the assurance of predestination) and its concomitant rejection: 19 "And let also that error be condemned which asserts that the justified not only surmise, but know for certain that they are predestined and that they live in the grace of God: also, the other error that holds that all the justified are obliged to believe such with a firm assurance. There is perhaps no assertation more daring and contrary to Christian humility." 20 The decree, thereupon, quotes several 'scriptural passages and, in conclusion, calls for confidence in God's mercy. In all probability, it can be safely asserted that the Franciscan, Andreas de Vega, contributed towards the final draft of this decree. 21 For, as we have said above,

^{16.} CT, V, 340, 10 ff; CT, X, 365, 15 ff. To the four deputies belong: the Archbishop of Armagh, Robert Vauchop, The Bishop of Accia, Benedictus de Nobili the Bishop of Bitonto, Cornelius Musso, O.F.M., Conv., and the Bishop of Belcastro, Jacobus Jaconelli.

^{17.} Probably Andreas de Vega, O.F.M., Dominicus Soto, O.P., Ambrosius Catharinus, O.P., cf. CT, X, 565, 15 ff.; B. Oromi, "Fr. Andreas de Vega, O.F.M., Theologus Concilii Tridentini," Arch. Franc. Hist., 36 (1943), 3 ff.

^{18.} CT, V, 384 ff.

^{19.} Concerning the doctrine of the Scholastics on the certainty of Grace, cfr. the excellent study of J. Auer, Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik mit besonderer Beruecksichtigung des Kardinals Matteo d'Aquasparta, Freiburg, 1942, 311 ff.

^{20.} CT, V, 390, 31 ff.

^{21.} Since the editor of the Acts of the Council, Stephen Ehses, had represented Andreas de Vega as the real author of the first sketch (Entwurf) of the decree (cfr. Röm. Quartalschr. 20 (1906) 1781; CT, V, 384 note), his authorship was regarded by all as an established fact; cfr. F. Huenermann, Wesen und Notwendigkeit der aktuellen Gnade nach dem Konzil von Trient, Paderborn, 1926, 64; Hefner, Die Entshehungsgeschichte des Trienter Rechfertigungsdekretes, Paderborn, 1909, 103; H. Jedin, Girolamo Seripando. Sein Leben und sein Denken im Geisteskampf des 16. Jahrhunderts, Wurzburg, 1937, I, 381; A. Stakemeier, 96. Ehses bases his assertion on the fact that the preliminary sketch has come down to us (now published in CT, XII, 637 ff.), and, as a comparison shows, has great similarity to the prima forma of the decree. In recent times,

he was the only theologian, who with great emphasis and exhortation, called the attention of the assembly to this point. 22 Such an outright condemnation in this form may have surprised some of the participants in the Council: for while approval is accorded the contents of the decree as a whole, an objection is raised merely against its clumsy form. 23 The objection is not raised against the condemnation in the assertion affirming the duty to believe in one's own justification; but to the impossibility of any kind of assurance in principle. To them, this seems to be extreme, It is possible, they say, for someone to know, with the certainty of faith, that he is in the state of grace. If this doctrine is included in the general condemnation, these theologians desire to consider the problem more thoroughly and be permitted to discuss it. 24 In the general session of July 30, some of the Fathers join in this protest 25 when the draft of the decree is read to the general assembly and the arguments of the theologians are presented. 26 According to Pratanus, in his diary of the Council. 27 a rather vehement discussion ensued on this day

however, the Spanish Franciscan-alas, too prematurely departed - B. Oromi has set up the thesis and also briefly given proofs that in the pretended tract of the Council of Vegas there is no question of a draft concerning the doctrine of justification but only the correction of the primary official schema of the decree, which Vega probably undertook having been commissioned by Cervini, the second President of the Council, and which is based on the discussions of the Fathers and Theologians. (Cf. Oromi, Fr. Andreas de Vega, O.F.M., "Theologus Concilii Tridentini," Arch. Franc. Hist., 36, (1943) 11 ff.). Despite this, one is probably permitted to adhere to Vega having had an essential share in the working out of the first sketch. I shall furnish elsewhere a more detailed proof.

^{22.} See note 10.

^{23.} CT, V, 392 ff.

^{24.} CT, V, 393, 37 ff.

^{25.} CT, V, 398, 30 ff.; CT, I, 98, 11 ff.; "Inter annotationes, quae res ipsas respicere videbantur, haec imprimis non aspernenda a quibusdam visa est, qua notabatur decretum, quasi per ipsum excludatur, ne quis certus esse possit se esse in gratia, contra Scoti et aliorum scholasticorum opinionem."

^{26.} Cfr. CT, X, 586, 24 ff.

^{27.} CT, II, 387, 15 ff.

concerning the problem of the assurance of grace which is said to have given occasion for serious discord between the first president of the Council, Cardinal Del Monte, and the imperial Council party, headed by Cardinals Pachecco of Jaen and Madruzzo of Trent. 28 According to Pratanus, during the discussion Cardinal Del Monte and his minority group favoring the affirmative position, interrupted the discussion (as was the customary procedure of Del Monte), and even went so far as to prevent an accurate tabulation of the votes, stating that the assembly was equally divided in its opinion. Against this unethical and dictatorial procedure, however, some of the prelates raised a voice of protest. Hence, there arose a vehement and uncontrolled verbal altercation between Cardinal Del Monte and the two imperial prelates, Cardinal Pachecco and Madruzzo. 29 However, this account of the proceedings is evidently incorrect, as the editor of the Acts. Stephen Ehses, justly emphasizes. 30 Nor is his account substantiated by Bishop Zannettino's letter, dated August 2. 1546, in which he reports this incident. 31 This is also the opinion of Bushbell, the editor of the Volume of Letters. 32 Rueckert and Stakemeier. 33 There was certainly a dissension between the first president of the Council and the imperially-minded prelates on this day. But the occasion for this dissension was not differences of opinion concerning the certainty of grace, but on principles relative to the government of the Council. For in the background, there were

^{28.} CT, I, 98 ff.

^{29. &}quot;In quaestionen autem proposita, utrum sc. quis cognoscat certitudine fidei se esse in gratia, videns primus praesidens suos sententiarum numero oppressum iri, suo more interrumpens, censurarum observationem dixit se nolle ea in re, et ambarum partium aequalia esse suffragia. Moleste hoc quidam ex praelatis tulere, volentes omnino censuris progredi. Tunc primus praesidens ... ". CT, II, 387, 15 ff.

^{30.} CT, V, 398 note 2.

^{31.} Edited in CT. X. 585 ff.

^{32.} Loc. cit., note 10.

^{33.} Rückert, op. cit., 199; Stakemeier, op. cit., 97.

widely divergent interests-papal and imperial council politics. 34 It is correct that Del Monte later on inclined more towards the affirmative side of the question concerning the certainty of grace, 35 while Cardinal Pachecco, leader of his group, decidedly denied the possibility of the certainty' of grace. 36 But at that juncture, this question had not yet aroused the attention of the two prelates. Rather, as we find in the bishop's letter quoted above, the Generals of the Conventuals and Servites and a few other theologians. brought up this problem of the certainty of grace and asked the assembled Fathers to consider it again in the light of the teaching of Scotus and the other Scholastics. However, it is interesting to read the informative report of Bishop Zannettino himself who-and this should be noted-was a Eranciscan of the Observance, After he had first accused the Cardinal of Trent and some other distinguished prelates of favoring Lutheranism, 37 he said: "Among these must be numbered also the General of the Minorites, Costacciaro, and the General of the Servites, who in union with their adherents among the theologians, objected that in the proposed formula of the decree, the doctrine of the possibility of the certainty of grace, is condemned. They are of the opinion that one, beyond the case of special revelation of God, could have the certainty of Faith as to the state of

^{34.} CT, I, 98 f; CT, V, 399 f. See Rueckert, op. cit., 40 ff.; Jedin, op. cit., 386 ff.

^{35.} Cfr. CT, V, 633, note 1.

^{36.} Cfr. CT, V, 492, 25 ff.; 642, 27 ff.; 727, 14 f.

^{37.} Zannettino, because of his Greek ancestry named Grechetto, Bishop of Chiron, does not appear in a favorable light at the Council. In his unenlightened zeal to care for the preservation of the purity of faith, he sensed heresy everywhere and was quickly at hand with baseless suspicions of men loyally churchminded, as is shown above all by his letters. (Cfr. CT, X, 539, 19 ff; 585 ff.; 587, note 2.; 629, note 1). Above all he became known for his dispute with Sanfelice, the bishop of La Cava. Cfr. CT, V, 354 ff. G. Bushbell, Reformation und Inquisition in Italien, Paderborn 1910, 36-60, passes a very unfavorable judgment on him. Cfr. also Stakemeier, op. cit., 77 ff.

grace. For this, they appeal to Scotus (Ox. IV dist. 14). In this sense, the two Generals mentioned, especially Costacciaro, discussed this at length in the previous session, without being contradicted by anyone. I know, however, that this is first against the opinion of the Subtle Doctor and. besides, that Martin Luther states in his Assertationes that we, by our trust in Christ, are certain of having obtained justification. I know, in addition, that if we admit this false opinion of the Lutherans, the entire decree on justification would collapse. This would be worse than the former error. since a minor error in principle turns into a gigantic error since a minor error in the principle turns into a great error in its consequences. Though I could hardly obtain permission to effort, I obtained it by calling attention to the fact that the General was permitted to speak against Catholic truth, but that I was not permitted to speak to safeguard the Truth. Is it perhaps due to the fact that I am a Greek? Finally, I achieved leave to make a brief reply. Consequently, I made my remarks to the point and emphasized, first of all, that Scotus in his first book of the Commentary on the Sentences, Dist. 17, says exactly the opposite. As Dist. 14, of the fourth book, to which Costacciaro and the Servite General appeal. I made the following remarks: In that passage, Scotus attributes to the Sacrament of Penance, because of the merits of Christ's Passion, an infallible efficacy and concludes that it is due on the part of God. For without doubt, in the Sacrament of Penance, the guilt of sin is remitted and grace is infused, if the penitent does not place an impediment, presupposing that he has not already made such (an act of) contrition, as in itself, blots out sin already before the real reception of the Sacrament. Scotus teaches such a certainty on the part of God based on faith; but we can doubt whether or not there is an impediment, because no one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love. Saint Paul says: "For I have nothing on my conscience, yet I am not thereby justified." (1 Cor. 4, 4), I have explained all these points to show how the Cardinal of Trent, together with aforementioned Generals

and many other members of the Council, defend the Lutheran position. It would seem that one must have the eyes of Argus, lest Catholic truth be betrayed; for if this point of doctrine is eliminated from the decree, it would redound to the detriment of Catholic Truth. I recall how the Bishop of Rochester, literary opponent of Luther, writes: It is by no means true that Scotus teaches what Luther asserts of him. ³⁸ And accordingly, I say with Gerson, whom some likewise quote in their own favor, that it is the evident mark of a reprobate, when he affirms for certain that he is justified, unless it be by a special revelation on the part of God. ³⁹

These remarks of Zannettino are highly informative. From these statements the following important points of information are deduced: The discussion proper concerning the problem of the certainty of grace, which later split the Council into two factions and consumed a considerable length of time, had its origin in a dispute concerning the doctrine of Duns Scotus. Primarily, two prelates of the Franciscan Order, one a Conventual and the other an Observant, differed in their interpretation of the doctrine of the great Doctor of their Order. Significantly, the Conventual Friar defended the

^{38.} The Bishop of Rochester, and later Cardinal St. John Fisher, in his book Assertionis Lutheranae Confutatio s. 1, 1524, refutes at length Luther's teaching on the certainty of grace. The passage, to which Zannettino here refers. is found ed. cit., 91-96. Fischer here defends his great countryman Duns Scotus against Luther, who had attacked the teaching of the Subtle Doctor regarding the doctrine on the Sacraments, above all the sentence: Sacramenta novae legis dant gratiam illis qui non ponunt obicem, i.e., "the Sacraments give grace to those who do not place an impediment." Fisher shows that Scotus does not understand non ponere obicem, in a purely negative conduct, as Luther falsely says of him, but of a positive disposition, which includes faith and a genuine contrition. He concludes his explanation with the words: Quo cuivis est dilucidum te de Scoto multa confinxisse mendacia. Probably Zannettino is alluding to these last words. (Ed. cit., 96). Cfr. V. Heynck, "Die Verteidigung der Sakramentenlehre des Duns Scotus durch den hl. John Fischer gegen die Anschuldigungen Luthers", Franz. Studien 24 (1937) 165-175; L. Siekaniec, "Cardinal Fisher and Duns Scotus", Franc. Studies 1 (1941) 45-48.

^{39.} CT, X, 586, 22-587, 20.

assertion holding the possibility of the certainty of grace; the Observant enthusiastically opposed this opinion. The question at issue is, above all, the explanation of the Scotistic doctrine on the Sacraments, especially that of non ponere obicem. Zannettino already indicated the solution based on principle which, in the further course of the controversy, other Scotists, opponents of the certainty of grace, made their own.

B. The Progress of the Controversy Until the October Discussion:

In consequence of the discussion between the Legates of the imperial Council party, as also of other political influences, another general convocation was not called until August 18th. In the meantime, the General of the Conventuals, Costacciaro, through the mediation of the Regens of the esteemed house of the Order of Padua, petitioned the great theologian Antonius Delphinus to work out an "expert opinion" concerning the certainty of grace and particularly, on the position of Scotus on this subject. 40 Again in

^{40.} Cfr. CT, V, 410, note 1. The expert opinion is reprinted: CT, XII, 651 ff. Concerning Delphinus, who is probably the most important Conventual Theologian who took part in the various sessions of the Council, cfr. F. Lauchert, Die Italienischen Literarischen Gegner Luthers, Freiburg, 1912, 487-536; S. Santoro, "La Giustificazione in G.A. Delphino, O.F.M. Conv. Teologo del Concilio di Trento", in Miscellanea Francisc. 41 (1941), 1-27. Delphino, who remained at Trent until July, 1546 (cfr. CT, V, 274, 21) was absent at this time for unknown reasons. He appears again at the Council only during the deliberations concerning the doctrine of the Sacraments. (Cfr. CT, 859, 12). The regent of the Paduan house of studies of the Order that time, who transmitted the wishes of the General of the Order was then the theologian of the Council, Fr. Visdomini (cfr. CT, V, 1042, note 2), a close friend of Delphinus, as is evident from his preface to Delphinus' work, De Potestate Ecclesiastica, (Venice, 1549): "Auctoris judicium, consilium magnifecit semper conc. Trident. quod nunc Bononiens. est: Fuimus una plerique nostrorum utrobique multis mensibus apud Reverendissimum Pium costacuarium sodalitii nostri moderatorem optimum et integerrimum. Communia fere officia. communia studia, communis

this session, Costacciaro defends the doctrine of the possibility of the certainty of grace as the opinion of Scotus. He establishes his proof on Scotus' teaching regarding the infallible efficacy of the Sacraments and, in particular, to the peculiarity of the Sacrament of Penance as the second plank after shipwreck. Furthermore, he exhorts the Fathers not to condemn the doctrine of such an eminent doctor. 41 The General of the Carmelites and Bishop Martellus of Fiesole agreed with the Franciscan General. 42 Before they condemned this doctrine it would have to be examined carefully. In his usual heated manner. Zannetino again took issue with his opponents. The legates, however, interceded and ordered him to be silent. When the time was opportune, they agreed to give him the opportunity to defend his position. 43 By now, the problem had aroused universal attention and the first President, at the adjournment of the session, requested the Fathers to consider it thoroughly, reflect on it, and make their decision. 44 Cardinal Pachecco, at this point, replied that the question had already been decided negatively

ardor animi in praestandis iis quae a nobis pro veritatis candore, pro ecclesiae Christianae ornamento poscebantur. Egimus omnes bona fide ac diligentia; nemo tamen isto aut sedulior, aut studiosior, aut commendatior unquam fuit." Ed. cit., fol. 2b; cfr. Lauchert, op. cit., 489, note 7.

^{41.} Generali Min. convent. placet decretum; quid autem sentiat super eo, alias dicet. Quo vero ad articulum de certitudine gratiae, dixit, nos posse habere certitudinem gratiae, ex Scoto et ex definitione sacramentorum, cum sit efficax et certum signum. Item poenitentia non esset secunda tabula, si per eam nos non essemus certi de gratia. Admonuitque patres, ne tantus doctor subtilis damnetur. CT, V, 404, 41.

^{42.} CT, V, 504, 50; 406, 16. See, too, the expert opinion which the General of the Carmelites, in the middle of August, sent to the legates, reprinted in CT, XII, 646-651.

^{43. &}quot;Iterumque a nonnullis, et inprimis a generali Conventualium revocata est quaestio de certitudine gratiae, quam is ex Scoto multis argumentis probavit. Cum tamen Chironensis adversus illum dicere vellet, admonitu legatorum tacuit, qui alias suo loco de hac ipsa quaestione disserendum esse dixerunt." CT, I, 101, 3 sqq.

^{44.} CT, V, 405, 2 sq.

in principle by Pope Innocent III, as is evident from the Decretal, Cap. 16, Accepimus, X, lib. V, tit. 37.45 The reference to this Decretal, however, was a mistake, as the General of the Carmelites justly determined in a letter he wrote to the legates on this same day. 46 In this decree, the Pope objects to the frivolously interchanging of internal and external forum, of which an incriminated bishop, had been guilty. by designating a sworn statement of his innocence; for he had, in the meantime, confessed his fault and had been absolved. The two general convocations of August 17th and 28th, the only ones that were convened at this time, were almost exclusively taken up with the problem of the certainty of grace. 47 Some Fathers defended the formula of the proposed decree; others were not ready to submit and demanded further discussion. Again, others proposed to condemn only the general doctrine of the Lutherans concerning the duty of the certainty of faith regarding one's own justification. They preferred to leave the theological dispute 48 undecided. Only the two generals, the Conventual and the Observant, and the Bishop of Worchester, Bishop R. Pate, defended unequivocally the possibility of the certainty of grace. 49 According to the report of Severolus, in his diary of the Council, matters again came to a duel of speech, on August

^{45.} CT, V, 505, 5.

^{46.} CT, V, 405 nota 2.

^{47.} CT, V, 408 sqq; 418 sq.

^{48.} On August 17th, of the thirty-four Fathers, who declared their opinion, six favored the negative in formulating the decree (cfr. CT, V, 408, 16; 408, 35; 409, 2 (413, 14); 409, 13; 409, 47; 412, 27); two Fathers demanded additional deliberation, (cfr. CT, V, 409, 16; 409, 22); five Fathers wishes merely a condemnation of the Lutheran concept, cfr. CT, V, 408, 28; 409, 28; 409, 42; 409, 25; 412, 13. In the session of August 28th, of the forty-two Fathers, seventeen still spoke in favor of the article on the certainty of grace, and expressed their desire that it be further discussed and then decided. The majority, however, (twenty-one) approved the proposal of the President, viz., to condemn only the assertion of the Lutherans; four preferred to leave the matter to the President's discretion. Cfr. CT, V, 419, 36 ff.

^{49.} CT, V, 410, 1 sq.; 410, 5 f; 419. 18 f.

17th, between the General of the Conventuals and the Bishop of Chiron. Zannettino presented his side of the question and with the same decisiveness, Costacciaro, presented the Subtle Doctor as the protagonist of the certainty of grace. Long explanations followed and, in point, would have continued without end if the first president of the convocation had not put an end to them. ⁵⁰

The major role that the Scotistic opinion played in the early discussions on grace, is known to us through an address, delivered by an unknown theologian on the 28th of August. The report reads: "Propositum fuit per Reverendissimos Dominos Praesidentes an decretum rite et aeque bene confici possit absque laesione alicuius doctoris et praecipue sine offensione doctoris subtilis, Joannis Bachonis Anglici et aliorum doctrinam eorum insectantium." 51 In the reply. the prelate points out that in the proposed formula of the decree, which in principle condemned every possibility of the certainty of grace, is contrary to the doctrine of the Subtle Doctor. In the Fourth Book of his Commentary on the Sentences, dist. 17, q. un, a. 1, Scotus defends the opposite opinion. Anyone who studies the text will see this immediately. Moreover, the canon as formulated is opposed to the doctrine of the great English Scholastic, John Baconthorp. It is also opposed, in the final analysis, to the doctrine of

^{50. &}quot;Fuit in eadem congregatione iterum ab episcopo Chironensi et generali S. Francisci Conventualium suscitata quaestio de certitudine gratiae, quorum alter, videlicei generalis, se omnino ex Scoto certitudinem gratiae per fidem probare contendebat, alter vero id ex Scoto probari penitus negabat. Multaque super ea re ab utroque dicta sunt, pluraque dicta adhuc fuissent, nisi card. de Monte illis silentium imposuisset." CT, I, 101, 28 f.

^{51.} This vote of an unknown author is not yet contained in the collection of the Concilium Tridentinum, since it was only discovered in 1934 together with other votes, which primarily concern the certainty of grace, in the Archives of the Gregoriana in Rome, Codex 614. Cfr. the report by H. Lennerz, Gregorianum, 15 (1934) 577 ff. I am indebted to Fr. Julius Reinhold, O.F.M., a member of the Scotus Commission at S. Antonio in Rome, who obtained this information for me. The text quoted is found in Codex 614, fol. 41^v, cfr. also the text which Delphinus sent to the General of his Order in August, CT, XII, 651, 24 ff.

many Fathers, e.g., Sts. Augustine, Hilary, Bernard. Moreover, it is opposed to the doctrine of justification as contained in the Pauline Epistles. Justly, indeed, the doctrine concerning the certainty of predestination is condemned as well as the obligation of believing in one's own justification. In fact, the latter opinion has been condemned by Scotus himself in the Fourth Book, dist. 9, q. un., as an error. ⁵²

It is evident from the Acts and the Diaries of Massarelli and Severolus, that the first president, Cardinal Del Monte, proposed to the Council the possibility of condemning the erroneous doctrine of the so-called reformers concerning the certainty of grace and also of solving the theological controversy. ⁵³ If the error alone was the subject only under consideration, the matter could have been finished within a short time; but if the Council intended to discuss the latter controversy, then the Theologians and Fathers would have to be heard. He proposed that the formula be expressed in such terms that the theological discussion could be avoided. In fact, the second president of the Council, Cervini, agreed

^{52. &}quot;Respondeo optime hoc fieri posse non tamen relinquendo particulam illam in illo canone, ubi dicitur, ut ille error cadat quo dicitur certo sciri non modo conjici a justificatis, quod sint in Dei gratia. Ista enim particula laedit Scotum in 4 dist. 17 q. un. a 1 circa finem, ut clarissime et evidentissime ex eius textu potest intuentibus patere. Laedit etiam Joannem Baconem Anglicum in 3 d. 30 q. un. per totum. Laedit etiam Augustinum 13 de Trinitate c.p., ubi habet, quod homo fidem suam tenet firmissima scientia et certissima eamque in se videt clamatque conscientia, quia rerum absentium fides est praesens et rerum quae non videntur videtur fides. Et quando datur occasio, probabo, quod laedit Bernardum, Hilarium et D. Paulum multis in locis, sicut optime quidam Rev. Dominus adduxit. Altera vero particula illius canonis de certitudine iustificatorum, an sint praedestinati intelligendo de finali praedestinatione, neminem sententia mea laedere potest, cum nullus certe scire possit, an finaliter moriturus sit in gratia; ad istum sensum Ecclesiastes 9 cap. locutus est, dum dixit: nemo scit, an odio, an amore dignus sit. Tertia vero particula eiusdem canonis etiam aliquem doctorem non offendit, ubi dicitur iustificatos teneri omnes, ut id firmitei et certo credant. Scotus enim in 4 dist. 9 hunc abiicit errorem inquiens non oportere communicantem scire se esse in charitate." Loc. cit., fol. 41".

^{53.} CT, V, 418, 4 ff.; CT, I, 102, 5 ff.; 446, 26 ff.; 517, 14 ff.; cfr. CT, X, 629 nota.

with him. He admonished the Council to consider only the question of orthodoxy and to avoid, insofar as it was possible, any long drawn out theological controversy. However, Cardinal Pachecco opposed this suggestion and demanded that the theological controversy be discussed on the floor of the Council so that the matter would be settled. 54 The Cardinal's motive was not entirely prompted by an interest in the theological controversy, but rather to prolong the formation of the decree which, it seems, had some bearing upon the interests of the imperial council politics. 55 The remaining Fathers were divided in their opinion: some maintained that the matter should be settled as proposed by the President of the Council, viz., to formulate the decree condemning the heretical teaching and to leave to the Schools of Theology the discussion of the theoretical problem. Others agreed with Cardinal Pachecco and demanded the discussion of the problem concerning the certainty of grace. Two Fathers considered the question settled and hence, little reason to discuss it further. The Bishop of Feltre believed that this did not belong in the final decree on justification. 56 A vote was taken, and it showed at once that a clear majority consisting of twenty-one votes, favored the formation of the decree as proposed by the President of the Council. Four left the matter entirely to the discretion of the legates. There were seventeen votes in favor of the discussion. 57 The secretary of the Council, Massarelli, concludes the report of the session with these words: "It was resolved to leave the question undecided and to condemn merely the assertions of the Lutherans." 58

The entire form and contents of the decree, proposed by

^{54.} CT, V, 418, 13; CT, 1, 102, 14 ff.

^{55.} Cfr. the Report of Severolus, CT, I, 102, 17.

^{56.} CT, V, 419, 3; 419, 17; 418, 27.

^{57.} CT, V, 419, 36.

^{58.} CT, V, 419, 44.

the Legates on September twenty-first, has its origin in the work of the Augustinian General, Seripando. ⁵⁹ The decree is carefully worded-avoiding even the intimation of the disputed question. Therefore, the question concerning the certitude of grace is left open to speculation. Whereas, the Lutheran doctrine asserting the necessary coincidence of justification by faith and of the certainty of justification, is rejected. It is by no means true that anyone is justified, it states, who boasts, in vain confidence in an assurance by Faith and the certitude and forgiveness of sin. In the respective canons, the duty of believing with certainty that one's sins have been pardoned and predestination and in all perseverance is condemned as heretical. ⁶⁰

In spite of the determination, on August 28th, to reject only the heretical Lutheran doctrine, the dispute is again brought up in the September session of the Council. This was done by the opponents of the certainty of grace who, it would seem, were still dissatisfied with the wording of the decree. They demand a clear rejection of every possibility of the certainty of grace. In the gathering, only a few theologians favored the discussion. The Franciscan, Andreas de Vega, the Jesuit, Salmeron, and the Dominican, Caspar de Regibus, and the French Friar, John de Consiliis-otherwise an opponent of the certainty of grace-approved the August 28th resolution. 61 The Conventuals, Montcalvius and Julius Magnanus, by appealing to the Scotistic teaching of the sufficiency of the "non ponere obicem", most emphatically upheld the contrary opinion. 62 In the general convocation during the first two weeks of October, the Fathers for the most part do not discuss the subject. The remaining Fathers expressly defended the wording of the decree and were unwilling to

^{59.} Cfr. Jedin, Girolamo Seripando, 1, 384 ff.

^{60.} CT, V, 424, 12 sqq.; 427, 8 sqq.

^{61.} CT, V, 431, 33 (438, 28); 438, 5; 434, 2 (436, 11); 432, 30.

^{62.} CT, V, 432, 15; 432, 2.

discuss the theological question. Even those who advocated the certainty of grace are contented to leave intact the decree as formed in the previous session. 63 But at this time, the newly consecrated Dominican Bishop, Ambrosius Catharinus, appears for the first time. Later on, this prelate was to become the most zealous advocate and defender of the certainty of grace. 64 We also have the three Benedictine Abbots, having one vote, who strongly advocated the opinion favoring the certainty of grace. In their appeal to the doctrine on the Sacraments, there is evidence-although not exclusively-that they favored the Scotistic doctrine. 65 The General of the Conventuals, Costacciaro, who, in a most exhausting exposition, takes sides regarding the proposed decree, and condemns those who endeavored to change the September decree and reject every certainty of grace on the principles of Faith. He defended his opinion as the true view of Scotus and emphatically denies that this opinion is almost identical with the Lutheran doctrine. There is, he maintains, an essential and fundamental difference between the doctrine of Scotus and Luther, in their proof of the certainty of grace. Luther denied, most emphatically, the supposition or the starting point of the Doctor Subtilis. And, moreover, he expressly opposed and condemned the great Franciscan teacher. 66 If, he states, Scotus taught this certainty, based on the principles of Faith, as is evident from the many Sco-

^{63.} CT, V, 442, 30; 443, 15 sqq.; 447, 44 ff.; 461, 19; 471, 32 ff.

^{64.} CT, 471, 32 ff.; for Catharinus' activity at the Council see: J. Schweizer, Ambrosius Catharinus Politus, (Munster, 1910), especially pp. 139-208. Catharinus particularly opposes the Franciscan Bishop, Antonius de la Cruce, who had expressed an opinion contrary to the possibility of a certainty of grace. Cfr. CT, I, 105, 8 ff.

^{65.} CT, V, 474. 1 ff.: 477 ff.

^{66.} Cfr. ad rem, V. Heynck, "Die Verteidigung der Sakramentenlehre des Duns Scotus durch den hl. John Fisher gegen die Anschuldigungen Luthers", in: Franz. Studien, 24 (1937) 165 - 175.

tistic passages muted, yet, it is impossible to place his view in the same level with that of the heretics. The latter that only of vair unfinence and exclude everything else which is no esserily required. If so tus teaches, he states, a containty of grace, he as ribes it to the Faith, to the dispositions are eding as to the time, in the power of the enus operation and the reception of the Sacraments. Scotus demands that anyone all wishes to obtain a certainty of his being in the stutus gentiae must tisteese himself by doing what is to his power and, nursules, receive with a good conscience Is me firtured the Narraments either in reality or in desire. In conclusion, estar haro stresses that he does not assert the nullgation but only the possibility of a certainty of grace by virtie of faith. Therefore, it is not necessary to change the wording of the herree, because it clearly conderns the Lutheran error without retriment to the opinions of Catholic the negrans. The General accused "quamplurimi patres" who were saxious to change the necree as worden. However, according to the acts of the Council, only a few Fathers demanded this change in the decree. The most noteworthy, ci course, was Carinal Pachecco and Bisnop Salazar of Lanciano. There were only three other fathers who belonged to them. 68

C. The October Debate and the Final Agreement

In view of the fact that in the General Convocation of August 28th, the majority resolved to condemn only the Lutheran doctrine concerning the certainty of grace, and to omit any decree on the various opinions existing among

^{67.} CT, V, 484, 3 ff.

^{68.} Cfr. CT, V, 492, 25 ff.; 462, 5 ff.; 443, 8; 471, 5 ff; 485, 27.

Catholic Theologians, it is surprising to find that the first President, Del Monte, again, on October twelfth, reopened the discussion. He declared that the problems concerning imputed justice and the certainty of grace were on the agenda of the Council. And he strongly exhorted the theologians and the Fathers to examine thoroughly this matter. 69 The reason for this dicision was not to examine new reasons that had been adduced pertinent to the question, as the Legates in their letter to Cardinal Chamberlain Ascanio Sforza admit. but to gain time. 70 The second president, Cardinal Cervini, stated that the discussion regarding this problem was unnecessary, since all could be content with the condemnation of the Lutheran errors. But since so many Fathers desired a further discussion and probable solution, of the problem, a discussion might go on in the customary manner. 71 On October fifteenth, the Legates proposed to the theologians, besides the question of the double justice—this proposition: "Utrum aliquis possit esse certus de sua adepta gratia secundum praesentem iustitiam et quo genere certitudinis." 72 Thirty-seven theologians, among them sixteen Franciscans, spoke in the various sessions-prolonged as they were from October fifteenth to the twenty-sixth. 73 Their votes are preserved for us or, at least, we have access to other sources which indicate without doubt their views on this subject. Not all of the theologians showed interest in both questions. Thus, the expert opinion of the Jesuit, Jacob Leinez, on the first question concerning the double justice in the new

^{69.} CT, V, 497, 3; I, 108, 8 ff.; 448, 16 ff.; 579, 6 fa

^{70.} CT, X, 684, 13 ff.; cfr. Jedin, Seripando, I, 396.

^{71.} CT, V, 497, 13 ff.

^{72.} CT, V, 522, 17 fa

^{73.} CT, V, 523 - 633. The Franciscan Theologians are: Observants: Lunellus, Cenomanus, Consilii, Lombardellus, Vitriarius, Vega, Carvaial, Salazar; Conventuals: Visdomini, Moncalvius, Bernardinus Costacciaro, Brascus de Fanetia, Clemens Thomasinus, Sebastianus de Castello, Laurentius Fulgineus, Julius Magnanus.

edition of the Acts fills seventeen and a half pages, in quarto, while he expresses his opinion on the certainty of grace in a few lines, 74 Others, as Montecalvius and Cenomanus, on the contrary, have paid more attention to the second problem. 75 These detailed explanations of the theologians are interesting, not only because of the treatment of the subject under discussion, but also because of the opportunity afforded us in examining their theological views. Above all, they afford us the opportunity of examining their position towards Scotus and their knowledge of his theology. On this occasion, the problems concerning grace and the Sacraments were discussed. Of the thirty-seven theologians present, twenty decided in favor of the possibility of certitude and fifteen denied such certitude. Two did not express any opinion. 76 Among the Franciscans, eight Conventual Friars and four Observants favored the opinion. 77 Four Observants, among them being the Parisian Doctors Cenomanus and Consilii, and the Spaniard Andreas de Vega, opposed it. 78 As far as we can gather from the writings of Alfons

^{74.} CT, V, 612-629.

^{75.} CT, V, 534 - 535; 537 - 540.

^{76.} See the list as set up by Massarelli. CT, V, 632 f. Massarelli includes, indeed, the diocesan priest Andreas de Navarra among the representatives on the certainty of grace. But as is plain from his vote, he decidedly denies the possibility of the certainty of grace. Cfr. CT, V, 559, 14 ff.

^{77.} For the names of the Conventuals see note 73. Regarding Visdomini's vote, the volume of the Acts contains only the first part which treats of the question concerning a twofold justice (CT, V, 530-534); the second part on the certainty of Faith is missing. But it is plain that Visdomini upheld, with his Conventual brethren, the possibility of a certainty of grace. This is deduced from the remarks of Johannes Consilii. He begins the discussion of the second question with the remark that on the preceding day four theologians affirmed the possibility of the certainty of grace. (Cfr. CT, V, 543, 28). Cenomanus is manifestly an opponent of the certainty of grace. (Cfr. CT, V, 543, 28). Accordingly, the remaining four, and this includes Visdomini, must be adherents to this opinion. The four Observants, who sided with the Conventuals, are: Lunellus (CT, V, 525 f.), Lombardellus (CT, V, 555), Vitriarius (CT, V, 570 ff.), Carvaial(CT, V, 632).

^{78.} Cfr. CT. V, 537 ff.; 543 ff.; 599; 575 f. (Salazar).

de Castro, the Observant, he must be included among the opponents of this opinion although, for some reason, he did not attend the session. 79 As expected, the Dominicans without exception, rejected the teaching concerning the possibility of the certainty of grace. 80 Among the Augustinians, two voted in the negative; one only in favor of the opinion. A fourth, refrained from voting. Three Carmelites, a Servite and Jesuit father voted in favor of the opinion; while another Jesuit refrained from voting. 81 Of the diocesan priests, two favored the resolution while four voted against it. 82 In this session, the question whether Scotus should be considered a representative or opponent of the doctrine of the certainty of grace, is not longer discussed. Only seven of the theologians present expressly mention him; 83 in regard to the doctrine of the Sacraments, some approve the teaching of Scotus while others reject it. Their principal concern was to analyze and collect the various proofs from Sacred Scripture and Tradition. 84

The three Roman Court theologians, the Bishop Pantusa of Lettere, the Dominican Bartholomaeus de Spina, and the Augustinian Johannes Jacobus Barba, to whom the legates had turned over these questions for their expert opinion, reject it. 85 While Barba uses his influence to influence the

^{79.} Cfr. his work: Adversus Omnes Haereses, (Paris. 1571), especially p. 547.

^{80.} Cfr. CT, V, 546; 551 ff.; 597; 599 f.

^{81.} Cfr. CT, V, 564; 581; 599; 611; 529 f.; 564; 631; 586 f.; 629; 546.

^{82.} CT, V, 567 sq.; 607; 549; 559 f.; 576; 602.

^{83.} They are the Franciscans: Lunellus (CT, V, 526, 22); Moncalvius (534, 20); Consilii (542, 32); Vitriarius (571, 26); moreover, the Servite, Mazochius (XII, 692, 19); the Augustinian Gregorius Perfectus (V, 581, 13), the diocesan priest, Andreas Navarra (560, 4).

^{84.} The Franciscan theologians, too, not only refer to Scotus, but they attempt to prove their thesis from Sacred Scripture and Tradition. Cfr., for example, CT, XII, 652 f. But in our study we have deliberately omitted these proofs from Scripture.

^{85.} CT, X, 719; cfr. Stakemeier, Das Konzil von Trient über die Heilsgewissheit, 138. The expert opinion of the three court theologians is reprinted in CT, XII, 685-690.

assembly in favor of this doctrine of the certainty of grace, Bishop Pantusa stands firmly on the negative side. The latter's judgment, however, is calm and reticent. 86 Bartholmaeus de Spina, the Magister Sacri Palatii, defends, enthusiastically and vehemently, the doctrine of the negative opinion. For the most part, he finds the affirmative opinion incomprehensible and improper, ilad not Saint Thomas already decided this question in the negative? The Scotistic opinionis not in accord with the teaching of the Church. 87 Some of the Bishops present at the Council petitioned the eminent and learned Franciscan Conventual, Jacobinus Malafossa, professor of Metaphysics at the University of Padua and professor of Sacred Theology at St. Anthony's Convent, for his opinion. 88 The Augustinian, Gregorius Perfectus of Padua, had also attempted after the session of October twenty-first, to determine the opinion of this outstanding Franciscan. 89 At any rate, his opinion did not come to the

^{86.} CT, XII, 687, 23 ff.; 689, 24 ff.

^{87.} CT, XII, 686, 14.

^{88.} Thus Malafossa himself reports in his Commentary on Scotus "Quoniam Scotus, ut vides, valde expresse tenet, quod certitudinaliter non possumus cognoscere nos esse in charitate, et ut ista difficultas clarius elucescat, est hic habenda quaestio, quam de tali materia edidi tempore Concilii Tridentini videlicet 1546 rogatus a multis Episcopis in eodem Concilio existentibus, quae est in tali verborum forma. Cfr. Rev. Doctoris Jacobini Malafossii Pedemontani Bargii Minoritae conventualis theologi praestantissimi super primum Sententiarum Doctoris subtilis theologorum principis Joannis Scoti exactissima enarratio absolutissimaque expositio, Patavii 1560; cfr. fol. 220 B.

^{89.} We read in Gregorius of Padua: "De hac enim materia patres Dominicani et Galli Minoritae cum Hispanis copiose dixerunt, quos laudo; haec via etiam communis est neque praenominati solum id a Scoto teneri dicunt (Thus the probable reading in Cod. 614 of the *Gregoriana* and not "debent" instead of "dicunt", as Ehses writes in his edition of the Acts), sed et quidam doctor eiusdem ordinis et maximae in gymnasio Patavino, ubi quatuor et viginti annos et forte plures metaphysicam profitetur, auctoritatis idem asserit. Sicut per literas cuiusdam patris, qui meo nomine de hac re ipsum interrogavit, certior factus sum." CT, V, 581, 11 ff. The last remark is found only in Cod. 117; cfr. loc. cit., nota: d.). In a note, the editor Ehses, remarks ad rem, that by this professor of Metaphysics at the University of Padua, no one else could be meant than a certain Franciscan, Burgius or Burges; he did not leave any writings.

attention of the council until late in this debate. Costacciaro in his votum of November twenty-sixth, probably refers to it. 90

Malafossa's expert opinion has a very important part in these discussions concerning the certainty of grace since, up until this time, it was believed that the Scotistic doctrine upheld the certainty itself. By diligent research, this eminent doctor decided in the negative. Evidently, neither Hefner, Rueckert, Huthmacher and Stakemeier — nor for that matter the editor of the Acts of the Council, Ehses, made use of it. There is however reference to it in the Acts of the Council. This is important since the Conventuals entertained the opposite opinion to their confrere. Scotus, according to Malafossa, decidedly favored the negative opinion: "Scotus enim subtilissimus omnium doctorum apertissime est huius

However, this Jacobus Burgius is none other than Malafossa who, because of his native city in Piedmont, was frequently so named, as appears also from the title of his work. In the Foreword to his work, dated 1560, he reports that he had been Lector of Theology for forty-two years in the Convent of St. Anthony in Padua and just as long as professor of Metaphysics at the University of Padua. In the epilogue we read: "Hic finis est, Candide Lector, Commentariorum in Primum Librum Joannis Duns Scoti super Primo sententiarum quorum Auctor est praestantissimus Artium, Sacraeque Theologiae Doctor: Reveren. Pater frater Jacobinus Malafossius de Bargiis Ordinis minorum Pedemontanus, qui annos XLII in Gymnasio Patavino libros Metaphysicorum Illustrissimi Dominii Venetorum stipendio frequenti semper auditorio publice professus est et annos XXV in sacro Conventu Divi Antonii de Padua fuit Regens et in eodem in numerum Patrum nemine penitus dissentiente Virtutis et Probitatis ergo fuit accitus. Provincialemque Praefecturam integrum Triennium in Provincia sua Genua magna sua laude gessit." Loc. cit., 305, F.

^{90.} Malafossa has reprinted it in his expert opinion, ed. cit. 220, B-222 C. One may perhaps be permitted to consider it as an allusion to this expert opinion, when Costacciaro in his vote of Nov. 26th, writes: "Nec valent ea quae adducta sunt contra me a quodam theologo in congregatione theologorum, sicut nec valent adducta a quodam ex nostratibus in quadam sua quaestione ex principiis eiusdem Scoti." Cod. 614, fol. 171°. By this "quodam ex nostratibus" certainly a Conventual is meant, not an Observant. Now, all the Conventuals present at the Council were advocates of the certainty of grace. Therefore, the question can only be about Malafossa, who, in fact, calls his expert opinion a "quaestio" and therein "ex principiis Scoti" opposes the certainty of grace.

^{91.} See note 89.

mentis." ⁹² This eminent Scholar is well-aware that a fellow Conventual ardently advocated the affirmative opinion as Scotus'; he does not wish to offend his confrere in any way, but he is evidently mistaken about the Scotistic doctrine. Nor is this to be wondered at since this same theologian, when faced with objections raised by an Augustinian, openly admitted that in many points his Order did not make the doctrine of Scotus, its own. Therefore, it is not surprising that this Conventual should defend a doctrine that is plainly non-Scotistic and even goes so far as to ascribe it to Scotus. This doctrine cannot in any sense be attributed to Scotus since he explicitly teaches the contrary. ⁹³ In another passage, Malafossa again refers to this doctrine and with satisfaction

^{92.} Ed. cit., 220 K.

^{93.} Scotus enim subtilissimus omnium doctorum apertissime est huius mentis, et quoniam audio quendam Reverendum Patrem ordinis minorum conventualium, qui coram sacro concilio dixit Scotum tenere, quod quis potest se cognoscere certitudinaliter esse in gratia, salva reverentia illius boni patris, numquam Scotus tuit huius mentis, et ita ille bonus frater multum deviavit ab opinione Scoti et in maximo fuit errore in via Scoti, nec miror de tali fratre, quoniam etiam alias dixit in loco publico, quod in multis religio nostra non tenet Scotum et hoc dixit convictus quodam argumento fratris heremitani, quod solvere nescivit; non miremur ergo, si saepe a veritate scotica declinet imponendo Scoto, quae numquam dixit, immo oppositum apertissime tenet." Loc. cit. The Franciscan referred to here by Malafossa cannot be exactly determined. Until the great debate of October, the General of the Conventuals, Costacciaro, defended unequivocally the opinion which upheld the possibility of the certainty of grace. However, it cannot be supposed that Malafossa refers to his highest superior in such a light manner. He may refer to Delphinus, who likewise being a lector in Padua, had worked out for the General of his Order an expert opinion concerning the opinion of Scotus in regard to this question, wherein he defends the opinion opposed by Malafossa, as has already been mentioned. (Cfr. CT. XII, 655-658; also, cfr. note 40). Otherwise, in the field of theology, Delphinus, especially in regard to Scotus, takes a free attitude, although, in general, he may be considered a Scotist. (Cfr. particularly his work: De Salutari Omnium Rerum Progressu, Camerini, 1553); on the contrary, Costacciaro must be accounted a strict Scotist. Possibly, there might be question here of Moncalvius or Julius Magnanus, who in the convocation of September 27th, likewise entered the group upholding the possibility of the certainty of grace. Since their votes have not come down to us, we do not know exactly how far they upheld or referred to Scotus. Cfr. note 62.

is pleased that the Council in its solemn decision adhered to his negative opinion: "non obstante quod in contrarium esset major pars fratrum nostrorum ibidem existentium, qui tamen theologos esse dicebant." 94

Once more, it was due principally to political reasons that the President of the Convocation of October twentyninth, proposed to the assembled Fathers that they limit themselves to rejecting only the erroneous views of the Lutherans. It was hoped that this solution would put an end to the disputes that were continually coming up in the Council, thus causing disunion and dissatisfaction. 95 The majority of the Fathers present agreed to this solution as the most practical at the moment; despite this, however, they felt that every theologian should be permitted to attend the discussion in regard to the new formula of the decree and, if necessary, be free to express his opinion. 96 And the new decree offered this opportunity. In this chapter, the former wording of the decree had remained intact; at the end of the decree, however, a new sentence had been added which caused some offense. It read as follows: "Nescit enim homo communiter, num divino amore dignus sit." 97 The expression "communiter" is ambiguous: if it is understood in the sense of "general", or, "in the majority of cases", then it would seem that the affirmative opinion had been approved since it asserts for some cases only a certainty of the state of grace. If, however, it is translated as "amid ordinary circumstances", or, "according to a general law", then, as

^{94. &}quot;Utrum quis certe possit se cognoscere esse in charitate? Respondet Scotus, quod non ... Sed vide omnino meam quaestionem longam de hac materia, quam edidi tempore Concilii Tridentini, cuius sententia et opinio a dicto sacro Concilio solemniter fuit approbata non obstante, quod in contrarium esset maior pars fratrum nostrorum ibidem existentium, qui tamen theologos se esse dicebant." Loc. cit., 4 L

^{95.} CT, V, 633, 19 ff.; cfr. Rückert, op. cit., 57 ff.; Jedin, Seripando, I 409 f.

^{96.} CT, V, 633, 24.

^{97.} CT, V., 637, 20.

an exception, only the certainty of a special revelation is conceded. Consequently, the opponents of the tertainty of grace urged a clearer expression and demanded that instead of the expression "communiter", the expression "communi lege" be inserted. But the other party insisted on the inclusion of the expression "communiter". Others, relatively few, take the mediating position and contend that all should be satisfied with the condemnation of the false heretical doctrine. 98 The deliberations only caused prolonged disputes which plainly showed that union would never be attained. The opponents to the certainty of grace formed a minority in the Council, but a very powerful minority. Among them were some outstanding Bishops, renowned for their theological knowledge. Cardinal Pachetto, undoubtedly, was the leader of this minority. 99 The protagonists of the certainty of grace, whose chief representatives were the three Generals of the Orders of the Conventuals, Observants and the Carmelites, the Benedictine Abbots, the Bishops of Minori and Salpe, could also boast as numbering among their adherents both Presidents of the Council. 100 It was clear, too, that at the deliberations, the Franciscans were divided. While both Generals of the Order spoke in favor of the possibility of the certainty of grace, the two Franciscan Bishops, Antonius de Cruce, Bishop of the Canary Islands, and Cornelius Musso, Bishop of Bitonto, took the opposite side, 101 The third Fran-

^{98.} Twenty-one Fathers were against the possibility of any certainty of grace; seventeen expressed themselves as in favor of it; eight desired to condemn the Lutheran teaching only; sixteen approved the wording of the draft in the decree; eight expressed themselves obscurely or undecidedly. Cfr. CT, V, 682, 22 ff., where Massarelli summarizes the result of the discussions.

^{99.} Cfr. CT, V, 642, 26 ff.; 643, 22; Stakemeier, Das Konzil von Trient über die Heilsgewissheit, 164 ff.

^{100.} CT, V, 633, nota 1; CT, XII, 703, nota 2; also, Schweizer, Ambrosius Catharinus, 160, note 6.

^{101.} CT, V, 661, 9 sqq. (General of the Observants); 548, 25 sqq. (General of the Conventuals); 654, 37 sqq. (Ant. de la Cruce); 548, 25 ff. (Musso); 644, 17 f. (Zannettino).

ciscan Bishop, Zannettino, of Chiron, a decided opponent of every certainty of grace, on this occasion, did not express his approval of either side and simply approved the decree. Worthy of special mention, is the Dominican Bishop of Minori. Ambrose Catharinus, who, in contrast to the attitude of his confreres, used his influence most decidedly for the affirmative view. In the General Convocation of November twentysecond, this prelate, in a speech lasting two hours, tried to convince the Fathers of the correctness of his view and to refute the objections of his opponents. 102 He was also one of the few who, after the Council had been dismissed, continued the discussion in several polemic writings. 103 (atharinus does not adhere to the doctrine of Scotus: rather, he wishes, according to his own words, to leave the controversy concerning Scotus to the Scotists. 104 Only in his last writing, which he published and transmitted to the Council reconvened in 1551, he mentions other scholastics including Duns Scotus. 105 In the general convocation of November of the same year, very little was mentioned concerning the doctrine of Scotus on this point. 106 The General of the Conventuals, however, did not intend to forsake his position without some

^{102.} CT. V. 656, 13 ff.

^{103.} Cfr. Schweizer, Ambrosius Catharinus, 188 ff.; Stakemeier, "Das Konzil von Trient über die Heilsgewissheit," 189 ff.; Beltrán de Heredia, "Controversia de Certitudine Gratiae entre Domingo de Soto y Ambrosio Caterino," in: Ciencia Tomista, 62 (1941). 133 ff. J. Olazarán, "La Controversia Soto-Caterino-Vega sobre la Certeza de la Gracia," in: Estudios Eclesiasticos, 16 (1942), 145 ff.

^{104.} Cfr. Schweizer, op. cit., 104.

^{105.} Ibid., p. 221.

^{106.} Yet, this question plays a certain part as is shown in the remarks of the Benedictine Abbot, Isidorus Clarius, in his Council treatise which he composed at the end of November, 1546. He notes: "Restat altera quaestio, num certo scire possit se iustificantem illam gratiam tenere, quove id certitudinis genere. In qua disputatione mirum est, quanta cententione theologi hi nostri contrariis inter se atque ex diametro (quod aiunt) oppositis sententiis decertaverint et cum scripturae sacrae tum aliorum scriptorum et veterum et recentiorum auctoritates ad se traxerint, ut recte quidam ex patribus dixerit sibi nondum exploratum esse, quam in partem Scotus, cui plurimum theologi innitebantur, visus fuerit inclinare." CT, XII, 718, 44 ff.

defense. 107 In the convocation of November twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth, he maintained, rather vehemently, that his interpretation of the teaching of Scotus was the true one. In the beginning of his eloquent speech, he insisted that in his former address he stressed only the true doctrine of the Subtle Doctor; not his own thoughts on the subject. And therefore the Council should weigh the matter carefully before they consider discarding the doctrine of such an eminent Scholastic. Moreover, the General insisted that he did not intend to retract anything that he had said and that, since his speech in the last assembly, no proof had been offered to disprove his contention. If such arguments were offered. he would gladly consider them and refute them one by one. Finally, he proposed questions for their examination and consideration and offers further proof against the objections that had been raised to prove that Scotus was an adversary of every certainty of grace. We will consider more in detail his informative exposition in the second part of our study.

In the general convocation of December seventeenth, another serious conflict arose concerning this problem. The dispute took place between the President of the Council, Del Monte, and the leader of the Imperial Council party, Cardinal Pachecco.

The President proposed that the Council discard the

^{107.} CT, V, 662. Here, it is true, only an excerpt is offered. The complete votum is preserved in Cod. 614 of the Archives of the Gregoriana. Cfr. note 51. We use this as the basis of our presentation. True, the votum in the manuscript has only been anonymously handed down. But if we compare it with the extensive index of contents, which Massarelli offers (loc. cit.), and consider other circumstances, there can be no doubt that here we have before us the votum of Costacciaro, dated November 26th. Lennerz, "Voten auf dem Konzil von Trient über die Rechtfertigung," (Gregorianum, 15 (1934) 577 ff.), in describing the manuscript (loc. cit. 587), first of all, thinks of the General of the Conventuals as the author; finally, however, dares not to make a decision. He correctly states that it cannot be the explanations given by Costacciaro on the 13th and 17th of August, or in the general convocation of October 8th. It is surprising, however, that he does not consider the possibility of the votum of November 26th. To be sure, the mention of "Lusitanus" offers a certain difficulty. We shall, on another occasion, give a detailed proof for the authorship of Costacciaro.

problem concerning the certainty of grace so that the decree of justification would be completed. In this case, he maintained, an agreement would have been reached. The discussions had clearly shown that the present discussion had nothing to do with justification understood in the proper sense. But Cardinal Pachecco was not satisfied with this proposal of peace. He maintained, with great vehemence, that a clear decision to this important doctrine should be given at once. Otherwise, all the labor of the past months would have been in vain and preachers would still disseminate the doctrine in favor of the certainty of grace. Certainly, after such deliberate consideration of this problem, a definite dogmatic decision could easily be achieved. Del Monte replied to this statement with great poignancy. It would not be wise, he said, under the pretext of further deliberation, to delay the publication of the decree. Nor could the Council simply condemn those who maintained that the certainty of grace was possible, since this doctrine was defended by eminent Catholic teachers. If necessary, this doctrine could be discussed later on. The Council voted in favor of the proposal of the President, twenty-three to sixteen. 108 The thirteenth of January was assigned for the solemn sixth session in which the decree of justification was to be published. 109 A few days before this date an agreement was reached. In order to accelerate the discussions, a change had already been made in December to form a limited committee in which only the more learned and outstanding would take part. 110 This convocatio praelatorum theologorum on January the ninth occupied itself once more with the famous

^{108.} CT, V, 727 f.

^{109.} CT, V, 252, 33 f.

^{110.} Cfr. CT, V, 704, 15 ff. To this commission belonged the Archbishops of Sassari, Aix and Armagh, the Bishops of Accia, Chiron, Motula, Bosa, Oporto, Fano, Castellamare, Verona, Lanciano, Bitonto, Belcastro, Bertinoro, Salpa, Canary Islands, Minori; moreover, the Generals of the Dominicans, Franciscans (Observants and Conventuals), Augustinians, Carmelites and Servites.

controversy. This convocation sought a solution by which the erroneous doctrine concerning the certainty of faith could be condemned without reflecting on those who held the affirmative opinion. Recourse was first had to the distinction repeatedly mentioned in former deliberations concerning the fides Catholica seu infusa and the fides acquisita, or the fides universalis and the fides particularis, excluding the Catholic Faith or infused faith, and the universal faith. Nevertheless, this somewhat misleading expression was dropped again. Finally, both sides agreed upon the formula: "No one can be certain of his pardon, certitudine fidei, cui non potest subesse falsum." With great joy and gratitude toward God for at last having found a solution for this difficult question, the Fathers adjourned. 111

II. The Debated Questions of Scotistic Theology

This hotly debated question which had occupied the attention of all the theologians and actually split the Council of Trent into two camps, and only found its final solution in the publication of the decree on justification in adopting a mediatory formula, had its origin in the interpretation of the genuine meaning of Duns Scotus on this point. It was, in the final analysis, the Scotistic-minded prelates and theologians who in their interpretation of the doctrine of the Subtle Doctor, defended the possibility of the certainty of grace. Among those present at the session were the Generals of the two Franciscan families, the Observants and the Con-

^{111.} CT, V, 772, 10 ff.: "Tandem cum Dei laude et gratia omnes concordarunt, quod exprimeretur in capite et in canone, quod nemo possit esse certus certitudine fidei, cui non potest subesse falsum, se esse in gratia Dei, et ita cum magno gaudio omnes recesserunt hora 19." Loc. cit., 773, 3 ff; cfr. CT, 1, 600, 5 ff.

ventuals, including the former general of the Observants, Lunellus. However, there were also eminent Franciscan theologians on the other side of the picture who, with equal authority, maintained that the doctrine of Scotus favored their opinion. Significantly, the Observants only, with the important exception of the Conventual theologian and scholar, Malafossa, were in this group. Also, the two doctors of the University of Paris, Richard Cenomanus and Johannes Consilii, as well as the two great Spaniards, Alfons de Castro and Andreas de Vega, 112 and other eminent prelates and theologians favored the negative opinion. The Bishop Jannettino of Chiron, too, who in the initial debates of the General Convocation vehemently opposed the General of the Conventuals, and his interpretation of Scotus, belonged to this branch of the Franciscan Order.

Alfons de Castro, according to whom the representatives of the affirmative opinion were not precisely eminent theologians, 113 concludes his remarks with these words con-

^{112.} Concerning Alfons de Castro, see Santiago Castillo Hernández, Alfonso de Castro y el problema de las leges penales, (Salamanca, 1941); D. Saval, "Fray Alfonso de Castro," in Arch. Ibero-Americano, 38 (1935) 240-255; i). Beaufort, "Alphonsus de Castro .. voor Hugo de Groote", in: Coll. Franciscana Neerlandica, s'llertogenbosch, 1927, tom. 1, 205-218; "Sancho, Domingo de Soto y Alfonso de Castro," in Ciencia Tomista, 22 (1920) 144-160; F. Asensio, "Alfonso de Castro y los decretos tridentinos sobre la S. Escritura", in: Estudios Eclesiasticos 20 (1946) 63-103. More recent literature includes: V. Heynck, "Die Stellung des Konzilstheologen Andreas de Vega, O.F.M., zur Furchtreue, in: Franz. Studien, 25 (1938) 301-330; idem., "Die Stellung des Konzilstheologen Andreas de Vega, O.F.M. zu Duns Scotus," ibid., 27 (1940) 88-103; 129-148; idem., "Untersuchungen über die Reuelehre der Tridentinischen Zeit," I. "Der Konzilstheologe Andreas de Vega, O.F.M. über das Motiv der vollkommenen Reue," ibid., 29 (1942) 25-44; M. Oltra Hernández, Die Gewissheit des Gnadenstandes bei Andreas de Vega, O.F.M., Düsseldorf, 1941; B. Oromi, "Fr. Andreas de Vega, O.F.M., Theologus Concilii Tridentini, in Arch. Franc. Hist. 36 (1943) 3-31; A. de Villalmonte, "Andreas de Vega y la proceso de la justificacion segun el Concilio Tridentino," in Revista Española de Teologia 6 (1946) 249-275; S. Sagues, "Un libro pretridentino de Andreas de Vega sobre la justificacion, in: Estudios Eclesiasticos 20 (1946) 175 ff.

^{113.} Cfr. Alphonsus de Castro, Adversus omnes haereses, Paris 1571, lib. 7 pag. 535 C.

cerning Scotus' doctrine: "Manet ergo Scotus pro nostra et Catholica sententia de incertitudine gratiae et non pro contraria in qua alii invitum et retinentem trahere conabantur." 114 Vega, in his commentary to the decree of justification, reports, not without a certain indignation, that some of those "qui ipsius (sc. Scoti) doctrinam profitentur et ipsius professione et intelligentia gloriantur", did not refrain in the presence of the entire Council of Trent, to claim that Scotus supported the affirmative opinion. 115 Malafossa expresses himself in a similar manner. 116

In more recent times, the two scholars of the Tridentine doctrine of justification, Hefner and Rueckert, in considering this question of the genuine meaning of Scotus, come likewise to the same conclusion. Hefner concedes that de Castro and Vega were correct in their interpretation of Scotus, nevertheless, he views the entire situation as "a fateful error" and a "misunderstanding of the prelates and theologians, misled by the authority of Biel who, indeed, could have appealed to some misapprehensible texts of Scotus." Rueckert, rejecting these conclusions of Hefner, takes the side of the opposition and claims that their interpretation of the Franciscan Doctor was the correct one. 117 Most recently Stakemeier, too, substantially agrees with him. 118

The question naturally arises: What did Duns Scotus teach concerning this mooted question? And to which texts did the Fathers and the Doctors at the Council refer to support their opinions? We know their opinions through the Council treatises of Delphinus and Malafossa, the learned speeches

^{114.} Loc. cit., 545 B.

^{115.} Andreas de Vega, De Iustificatione Doctrina Universa, (Aschaffenburg 1621), 9, 14 (262) - lib. 9 cap. 14 p. 262.

^{116.} Malafossa, Super Primum Sententiarum Doctoris Subtilis, (Padua 1560), (For exact title see Note 88) fol. 4 L; 220 L.

^{117.} Cfr. Hefner, Entstehungsgeschichte, 301 f.; Rückert, Rechtfertigunsglehre, 197 ff. especially 197, note I.

^{118.} Stakemeier, Das Konzil von Trient über die Heilsgewissheit, 36 ff.

of Costacciaro, the General of the Conventuals, and the eloquent discussions of the Observants, Alfons de Castro and Andreas de Vega. The main point in this controversy, as is already evident from what we have said in the first part of our study, consists in the correct interpretation of Scotus' doctrine concerning the Sacraments, especially the Sacrament of Penance. There is, finally, the difficult Scotistic doctrine of the *fides infusa* and the *fides acquisita*.

A. The Teaching of Scotus Concerning Justification in the Sacrament of Penance

With greater emphasis than his predecessors, Scotus stressed the efficacy, ex opere operato, of the Sacraments of the New Testament. The sinner, he insists, is not justified by reason of his dispositions but by reason of the fact that he does not place an obex (obicem non ponit) at the time of the reception of the Sacrament. 120 The Sacrament,

^{119.} The Treatise on the Council is reprinted: CT, XII, 651-658; for the expert opinion, see Malafossa in his Commentary on Scotus, Padua 1560, 220 B-222 C (cf. note 88); the vote of Costacciaro is preserved only in manuscript in Cod. 614 of the Archives of the Gregoriana (cf. note 106). The discourses of Castro and Vega are found in their works quoted in Ann. (notes 111 and 113. Castro: 519-555; esp. 447; Vega lib. 9 De Incertitudine Gratiae, 227-356; esp. cap. 15 De Testimoniis Scoti Pro Incertitudine Gratiae, 264-268). The votes of the remaining theologians are found CT, V, 523 ff. However, they are less fruitful for our question. We need, therefore, merely adduce them for closer illustrating. Also, the otherwise very interesting "Summa Sententiarum theologorum extra concilium in eorum congregationibus super certitudinem gratiae pro parte affirmativa", which is contained in Codex 614 of the Archives of the Gregoriana, brings little new material for our question. A photostat of the manuscript, my confrere P. Julius Reinhold, a member of the Commission for editing the Works of Duns Scotus, procured for me through the mediation of Professor Lennerz, S.J. For this my hearty thanks in this place.

^{120.} See our presentation of the Scotistic doctrine on contrition in: Franz. Studien, 28 (1941), 1-22, esp. 18 ff. True, the Scholastics, prior to Scotus knew of an efficacy of grace of the New Testament Sacraments ex opere operato; but regarding the Sacrament of Penance there exists lack of clearness. Even Thomas Aquinas, who with all clearness teaches the sin-destroying force of priestly absolution, does not represent today's concept. According to him, the priestly absolution effects an elevation of the disposition, if the penitent approaches con-

then, unfolds its justifying power solely from the Passion of Christ. From several passages, it would seem that Scotus understood this "non ponere obicem" in a purely negative sense. According to the Subtle Doctor, the recipient would receive the justifying power of the Sacrament if he did not place an obex, interiorly or exteriorly, at the time of the actual reception. This would be the case even though no act of contrition preceded. William of Ockham understood Scotus in this sense. At the dawn of the Middle Ages, the influential Gabriel Biel took pains to spread this concept. In his teaching on Pennance, Biel devoted a detailed treatise to this pretended teaching of Scotus and even a lengthier refutation. But the Pre-Tridentine Scotists never defended such a concept. It did, however, find adherents with such

fession with imperfect contrition, so that also the sacramental justification is not accomplished without contrition, in the strict sense, Scotus, however, lays stress on this that in sacramental justification the priestly absolution directly effects the blotting out of sin, grace, accordingly, is not imparted by reason of the disposition; the penitent need only, as in the remaining Sacraments, place no obstacle to the sacramental efficacy. For justification, therefore, in the Sacrament of Penance, an imperfect contrition, which does not by itself bring about justification, is sufficient. The sacrament does not effect an elevation of this imperfect contrition to the contrition proper, Cfr. on this point H. Dondaine, O.P., L'Attrition Suffisante, (Paris 1943). He very pointedly lays stress on this difference between the concept of St. Thomas and that of Duns Scotus. Regarding the doctrine of Scotus about Penance, see also R. Seeberg, Die Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus, (Leipzig, 1900), 397 ff.; N. Krautwig, Die Grundlagen der Busslehre des J. Duns Scotus. J. Klein, "Zur Busslehre des sel. Johannes Duns Scotus," Franz. Studien, 27 (1940) 104 ff.; 191 ff.; P. Minges, "Die angeblich laxe Reuelehre des Duns Scotus" Zeitschrift fuer Katholische Theologie, 25 (1901) 231 ff.

^{121.} Cfr. Minges, op. cit., "Die Lax Klingenden Obex Texte", Krautwig, op. cit., 156 f.

^{122.} Cfr. C. Feckes, Die Rechtfertigungslehre des Gabriel Biel, (Muenster 1925), 108.

^{123.} G. Biel, Collectorium in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum, (Tuebingen 1501), in 4, d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, note 2; cf. Feckes, op. cit., 65 ff.

^{124.} Cfr. V. Heynck, "Zur Lehre der Unvollkommenen Reue in der Skotistenschule des ausgehenden 15. Jahrhunderts," Franz. Studien, 24 (1937) 18-58; "Die Reuelehre des Scotusschuelers Johannes de Bassolis", in Franz. Studien, 28 (1941) 1-36.

theologians such as the Nominalist Jacob Almain 125 and the Dominican Silvester Prierias 126-the well-known opponent of Luther. And what is most surprising of all, the Spanish reviver of Thomism, Francis of Vitoria, adopted it wholeheartedly. 127 In all probability, this notion had its origin in Biel, if Luther, too, has so understood Scotus and directed his serious accusations against him. He speaks here of a "somnium scoticum", or a horrendissima haeresis." 128 The Franciscan teacher found, however, in his countryman, St. John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester and Cardinal, a warm defender who convincingly refuted the serious attacks of Luther. 129 It was also Biel who connected the necessity of the "non ponere obicem" at the reception of the Sacrament with the question concerning the possibility of the certainty of grace. 130 It is true that the English Carmelite, John Baconthorp, had already anticipated him. 131 But it was to Biel's authority, according to Audetus, the Carmelite General, and

^{125.} Cfr. Feckes, op. cit., 137; J. Morinus, "De Contritione et Attritione," (Paris 1703), 65. It is unintelligible how Dondaine (L'Attritione Suffisante," 19, 4) can count Almain among the Scotists and quote him as a proof for the pre-Tridentine Scotists having interpreted the non ponere obicem in the negative sense.

^{126.} Cfr. Morinus, loc. cit.

^{127.} Cfr. Franciscus de Victoria, Relectiones Tredecim, (Ingolstadt 1580), 21 ff.; cfr., J. Goettler, Der hl. Thomas von Aquin und die Vortridentinischen Thomisten ueber die Wirkungen des Bussakramentes, (Freiburg 1904), 260 ff.

^{128.} Cfr. V. Heynck, "Die Verteidigung der Sakramentslehre des Duns Scotus durch den hl. John Fisher gegen die Anschuldigungen Luthers," Franz. Studien, 24 (1937), 165-175.

^{129.} Cfr. our treatise quoted in the preceding note.

^{130.} Cfr. Biel, 4, d. 27, q. un., dub. 5.

^{131.} Johannes Baco, 3, d. 30, q. un.: "Utrum habens caritatem certitudinaliter potest se scire esse in caritate." Cfr. D. Soto, De Natura et Gratia, (Antwerp 1550), lib. iii, cap. 13, p. 235. Several adherents of the certainty of grace at the Council of Trent appealed to John Baconthorp. See also Schweizer, Ambrosius Catharinus, 193. As to Baconthorp, cfr. Xiberta, "De Magistro Joannes Baconthorp", Anal. Ord. Carm., 6, (1927), 3-128; Chrysogne du S. Sacrément, "Maître Jean Baconthorp, les sources, la doctrine, les disciples", Rev. Néo. Scol. Phil 34 (1932) 341-365.

Alfons de Castro, that the advocates of the certainty of grace claimed Scotus for their side. ¹³² In fact, Costacciaro and Delphinus, the two most eminent in this group, interpreted Scotus' "non ponere obicem" in the same merely negative sense of Biel.

Delphinus was convinced that Scotus had already completed the application of the certitude of grace, as a glance into his doctrine of penance proves. The Doctor Subtilis knows of two roads to justification which he explains in detail. 133 One road is doubtful; the other certain and beyond doubt. The first, consists in a bonus motus interior, namely, in the detestation of sin for God's sake which, as a meritum de congruo, brings about the remission of the guilt of sin. This procedure is doubtful and not safe since, according to the clear doctrine of Scotus, (Ox. IV, dist. 14, q. 2a), 134 not

^{132.} Cfr. Audetus, CT, XII, 651, 2; de Castro, Adversus Omnes Haereses, 547; cfr. likewise the judgment on Catharinus in Schweizer, Ambrosius Catharinus, 199, note 5; Vega, De lustificatione, 9, 15 (265); Costacciaro, The Vote of Nov. 26 (Cod. 614. fol. 173"). We have no reason to doubt these explicit testimonies of participants in the Council, as Stakemeier (Das Konzil von Trient über die Heilsgewissheite, p. 37 f.) Surely, the Franciscan Theologians knew Scotus through their own studies; but there remains the fact that, above all, it was Biel who had interpreted the Scotistic non ponere obicem in a negative sense an interpretation foreign to the pre-Tridentine Scotistic school. He likewise brought the Doctor Subtilis' teaching on the Sacraments and of the non ponere obicem in connection with the question of the possibility of a certainty of grace. (Cfr. note 122). One need only to compare the doctrine as treated by other theologians in the High Scholastic School, cfr. the excellent study of J. Auer. Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik, (Freiburg 1942), 311 ff. to realize that the Council theologians were influenced by Biel. The latter already posits the question: "Sed diceres: Homo potest scire de seipso quod facit id quod in se est, et per consequens ex principio fidei (quod certissimum est, scilicet quod Deus dat gratiam facienti quod in se est) certitudinaliter nosse se habere gratiam, licet non evidenter. Item quis potest scire se non ponere obicem per propositum peccandi mortaliter et accipere sacramentum absolutionis, quod confert gratiam ex opere operato." In 2, d. 27, q. un. Q. The position of the question and the manner of consideration, which is still strange to the teachers of High Scholasticism, however, plays a great role at the Council and appears especially in the votum of Costacciaro as a main argument.

^{133.} CT, XII, 556 f.

^{134.} Scotus, Opera omnia, Ed., Vivès, Paris, 1891 ff, tom. 18, 74.

every act of contrition, even though it may fulfill all moral conditions, suffices for the meritum de congruo, but only that which because of its determined intensity and duration is known to God alone. Hence, it necessarily follows that no one can have certainty concerning this fact. Moreover, one cannot even entertain a probable supposition that he has sufficiently prepared himself for justification, although he may have repented of his sins. In brief, no one can presuppose that his contrition really attains the requisite degree of intensity and has lasted for the requisite time. Sacred Scripture does not clarify this point for us.

However, the second way to justification is absolutely certain. This is accomplished by means of the Sacrament which infallibily effects the remission of sin ex opere operato and, consequently, the infusion of sanctifying grace. This procedure is safe since each one can sufficiently determine for himself whether the conditions for the valid reception of the Sacrament are present; namely, whether he has the will to receive the Sacrament. The sinner can have the certainty, at the time of the reception of the Sacrament, that he has not sinned and that he has the intention of not sinning in the future. And such a sinner who approaches Sacramental confession with such a disposition may be sure that he will receive sanctifying grace. Hence, beyond doubt, Scotus holds that we can without any doubt, be certain of our justification. In fact, Scotus shows by this twofold comparison that the only method is the second way if we wish to have certainty in becoming partakers in sanctifying grace. Delphinus quotes in detail Scotus' explanation, (Ox. IV, dist. 17, q. 1), 135 where the Subtle Doctor strives to give a new reason for necessity of confession. Briefly, Scotus' arguments may be stated thusly: He who has lost the grace and the love of God, is obliged to do all in his power to regain them and this by reason of the most important commandment in Christianity: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God ... and of the other: Thou

^{135.} Loc. cit., tom. 18, 510 f.

shalt love thyself." As an effective means of regaining lost sanctifying grace, Christ has instituted, as is plain from John 20, 23, the Sacrament of Penance and has delegated to the minister of the same a juridical power. Hence, the sinner himself is obliged to make use of this means and to receive the Sacrament of Penance. This, however, includes the obligation to confess one's sins to the priest. The duty of confession, therefore, follows, based on the words of institution narrated by Saint John and of the commandments of the love of God and of self-love, also contained in Sacred Scripture. 136

To the objection: The argument is not conclusive, because the Sacrament is not the only means whereby this is achieved. There is also perfect contrition. Scotus replies: No other way for obtaining grace is as easy and sure as the reception of the Sacrament of Penance; for here nothing else is required except that the penitent does not place an obstacle non ponere obicem. This is much less than to have attrition, which per modum meriti de congruo, merits justification. Besides, one may have a greater certainty of not placing an obex than he would have in the manner of meritum de congruo after he has made an act of attrition. Someone may know with probability that he has not sinned actually, whether it be an interior or exterior sin, and, moreover, having the right intention, viz., to receive what the Church wishes to administer in this Sacrament. But he cannot have an equally certain knowledge in this regard that his attrition suffices as meritum de congruo. If, however, one knows of an easier way to obtain grace and has this means within his power to obtain it, and promises greater security, then it would seem that he is obliged to use this means. Now, as has already been proved, the reception of the Sacrament of Penance is a means of regaining grace which is in the grasp of man and

^{136.} Cfr. on this point V. Heynck, "Die Begründung der Beichtpflicht nach Duns Scotus", Franz. Studien, 28, (1941), 65-90; esp. 80 ff.

also offers greater security. The duty of receiving the Sacrament follows accordingly. Thus, Scotus concludes his argumentation, from the words of the institution according to Saint John, which pledges to us the efficacy of the Sacrament of Penance and from the Commandment of the love of God and self. In other passages, Scotus develops this concept similarly and clearly states that the second way of justification, i.e., the reception of the Sacrament is the sure means for the acquisition of grace. Delphinus briefly alludes to these texts. ¹⁸⁷

In his detailed vote of November 26, Costacciaro, General of the Conventuals, refers to these same texts of Scotus. 138 His exposition is of special interest to us due to the fact that, in this vote, he takes into account the objections raised by some Fathers and theologians in the great discussion on the certainty of grace. Someone had denied that it was possible to be certain that one is in the state of grace through the Sacrament of Penance, since no one could be sure that his contrition for sin was perfect; he had maintained, however, that perfect contrition is also necessary for forgiveness of sins in the Sacrament of Penance. In his reply, Costacciaro very decidedly questions the correctness of this latter statement, and in support of his position refers to the great theologians, especially Scotus. Scotus, he explains, 139 knows two kinds of justification: justification through an inner disposition, or attrition, and justification through the reception of Baptism and Penance. In the first case, it is true, a "displicentia graduata et intensa" is required; in the second, viz. in the reception of Baptism and Penance, the only requisite is to place no obstacle

^{137.} Delphinus, CT, XII, 656, refers to Ox. IV, d. 14, q. 4, a. 3 (18, 157 ff.); d. 18, q. un. (18, 649 ff.); d. 1, q. 5 (16, 166).

^{138.} CT, 662; Massarelli here offers an excerpt only. In our expositions we rely on the complete vote of Costacciaro, contained in Cod. 614 of the Archives of the Gregoriana; cfr. note 106.

^{139.} Cod. 614, fol. 164 v - 165 r.

(non ponere obicem) and to intend to receive what the Church intends concerning these Sacraments. If more is required, then it need not be a perfect contrition of certain intensity; it is sufficient to have an imperfect contrition, moderate and weak, for in this case, the power of the Sacrament working ex opere operato is a contributing factor. If in this case an intensive detestation for sin were required as well, then it would be hard to understand the significance of the Sacrament of Penance, since such a contrition on its own and without the mediation of the Sacrament, effects the remission of the guilt of sin and the acquisition of grace. On this contrition depends the meritum de congruo in regard to grace. In such a case, it would not be easy to receive the Sacrament, nor could one be sure of having received it. This is expressly maintained by Scotus (Ox. IV, dist. 17). 140

The two Scotists, John de Bassolis and Peter Tartaretus teach, in conjunction with their master, that attrition as justifying contrition needs to be very intense, for the reason that this type of justification is difficult, just as it is difficult to know whether one has acquired such contrition. On the other hand, they teach that, if it is true that contrition is necessary for the reception of Penance, then the contrition need not be of special intensity; a contrition of lesser intensity will suffice. This is later perfected in the reception of the Sacrament. ¹⁴¹ The correctness of this doctrine, Costacciaro continues, is confirmed by experience. Confessors do not ask penitents whether they have elicited perfect contrition for their sins, whether they detest this or that sin

^{140.} Cfr. Scotus Ox. IV, d. 17, q. un., n. 14 (18, 510 f.); cfr. Heynck, op. cit., 81 f.

^{141.} Cfr. V. Heynck, "Die Reuelehre des Scotusschülers Johannes de Bassolis", Franz. Studien, 28 (1941) 1-26; see esp. 32 ff. Concerning Petrus Tartaretus, cfr. E. Wegerich, "Bio-bibliographische Notizen ueber Franziskanerlehrer des 15. Jahrhunderts," Franz. Studien, 29 (1942), 187 ff. Petrus Tartaretus was not a Franciscan: he did, however, in 1506, give lectures on Scotus and explained the Oxoniense. Concerning his doctrine on contrition, cfr. his Commentary on Ox. IV, d. 14, q. 4 (Venice 1607), 244 f.

intensively; for they are not obliged to ask such questions, nor are penitents in a position to answer such questions with certitude. When, however, the confessor asks them whether their sins displease them, or whether they are repentant at all, then penitents can and must submit to it. 142

Further in his discussions, Costacciaro finds occasion to explain the expression "non ponere obicem." In the general assembly, one of the Fathers doubted whether Scotus had really taught that we can know with certitude when we receive the sacraments of Baptism and Penance, that we have done everything in our power (quantum in nobis est). Furthermore, this particular Father asked for proof of the statement. In reply, Costacciaro first referred to Scotus' teaching on the two types of justification and the different degree of certitude they give. Next he tried to present the desired proof, and established this thesis: He who has been justified in Baptism or Penance can know with certitude that he has done what is in his power (quantum in se est), 143 for, as far as sacramental justification is concerned, the expression "quantum in se est" has only one meaning in this

^{142.} St. John Fisher, too, writing against Luther, points out that the priest in hearing confessions, shall inquire only whether there is true contrition, but not whether the contrition is worthy and sufficient. Episcopi Roffensis Assertionis Lutheranae Confutatio, see 1, 1524, a. 14 p. 246 f.; cfr. Heynck, Franz. Studien, 25 (1938), 125 ff.

^{143. &}quot;Sed quia quidam Pater Reverendus Dominus meus elapsis diebus dixerat Scotum numquam probasse propositionem minorem, quae erat nos certo scire fecisse quantum in nobis est; item dixit, quod desiderabat audire probationem; item argumentabatur contra illam minorem, ideo adducam prius Scoti probationem deinde probabo illam propositionem etiam ex doctrina eius, postremo solvam duplici solutione argumentum suum. Probatio Scoti in textu talis est: Potest iustificatus scire se tunc non peccare actualiter peccato interiori vel exteriori et intendere recipere quod Ecclesia intendit in illo sacramento conferre, non sic potest scire se habere attritionem sufficientem quasi meritum de congruo ad iustificationem. Et infra sequitur: Sed ista via suscipiendi sacramentum poenitentiae est magis possibilis homini et certior ad primam gratiam recuperandam. Ecce ergo probatio minoris ex Scoto. Probo etiam minorem, quam desiderabat ille Reverendus Pater, quae etiam a quibusdam theologis et patribus negata fuit, quod talis erat: Sed iustificatus in casu baptismi et poenitentiae potest certo scire se fecisse quantum in se erat." Fol. 166" – 166".

case, "non ponere obicem." This means "to sin neither by interior or exterior act," Anyone can experience this in himself and can have certitude about it. Someone may object that "facere quantum in se est" also includes removal of obstacles to grace, i.e., the stain of sin and the habitual guilt remaining after sin. Such an opinion, however, must be entirely rejected for to remove such an obstacle is not the task of the recipient of the Sacrament but of God Himself, since it is the work of God to eradicate the guilt of a sinner. as Scotus explains in the twenty-sixth Distinction of Book II. A third meaning of "facere quantum in se est" is possible. This includes a positive requirement, viz., to elicit contrition for one's sins, to resolve to change one's life, and to intend to receive which the Church intends to give in administering the Sacraments. Should one maintain that a penitent can never have complete certitude about this, then such an assertion has to be entirely rejected. After this, the General proceeds to a detailed proof of his exposition which we shall not explain here. It is based mainly on the fact that we know the inner acts of our consciousness in an intuitive way. If this is denied, then the possibility of an examination of conscience ought to be denied, and the possibility of confession of our sins as well. As a result, the Sacrament of Penance would be destroyed, as well as examination of conscience before Holy Communion, an examination expressly required by Saint Paul. 144

Costacciaro's opponent had adduced, as a basis for his objections, the argument that it is impossible to know whether one has done all in his power because "facere quantum in se est" is a virtuous action. Such an act must fulfill all ethical conditions required for it, yet no one can be sure that he has fulfilled all these conditions. Therefore, to know that everything in his power had been done is impossible. Costacciaro first denies the truth of the major premiss. It is not

^{144.} Fol. 166 v.

true in the case of justification through a Sacrament, although it may be true of justification by perfect attrition. This type is indeed really difficult, but not impossible. However, in justification through the Sacraments no disposition is required which fulfills all ethical conditions in a perfect way, and which is meritorius, for in the case of the Sacraments the power of the Sacrament makes up for what is lacking in disposition. Even if we admit the major premiss, the minor must still be denied, namely, that we cannot be certain of ourselves that we have fulfilled all the ethical requirements for our action. Here we shall pass over the prolonged exposition as given by Costacciaro. 145

Someone else had asserted that "facere quantum in se est" includes a love of God surpassing everything; for this reason, it cannot be known with certainty. This objection is not valid either, the General explains, ¹⁴⁶ for love of God is either the foundation for a meritum de condigno or only a meritum de congruo. In the first instance, love of God cannot belong to the "facere quantum in se est", for then grace would be already present before grace is given. In the second instance, it is quite possible for the love of God to be known intuitively if possible "ex puris naturalibus", as Scotus

^{145. &}quot;Ad argumentum autem illius Rev. Domini respondeo. Cum dicebat: nemo scit se fecisse quantum in se est, et probabat hoc modo, quoniam facere quantum in se est virtus; ergo debet esse circumstantionata circumstantiis moralibus; sed nullus potest scire, quando habet istas circumstantias morales; ergo nec scire poterit se fecisse quantum in se est. Respondeo, quod falsum est assumptum loquendo de hoc, quod est facere quantum in se est respectu gratiae acquirendae via susceptionis sacramentorum, licet sit forte verum loquendo respectu gratiae acquirendae via attritionis, quae difficilis est, non tamen impossibilis. Ad primam enim viam non requiruntur circumstantiae ex integro et perfecte morales et minus meritoriae; virtus enim sacramentorum supplet defectum et illarum carentiam. Et satis est, ut baptizandus et absolvendus faciat quantum in se est, ut supra dictum est. Respondeo, ctiam concessa maiori sua assumpta, quod minor est falsa, quod nos non possumus scire circumstantias ipsas morales." Fol. 167°°.

^{146.} Fol. 168 r.

apparently holds (Ox. III, dist. 27, q. 1). 147 If you declare that along with the actual reception of the Sacrament one has to know the intention of the minister and the validity of his ordination in order to be sure that he really has received the Sacrament, then we have to reject your opinion, for this does not belong to the "facere quantum in se est" as far as the recipient of the Sacrament is concerned. On the contrary, such a knowledge is not necessary at all. For, even if the minister were a heretic, a Jew or a Turk, even if he were no priest at all and lacking all actual and virtual intention, it matters not, as long as the recipient of the Sacrament intends to receive that which the Church intends in administering the Sacraments; all that matters is that the recipient does everything in his power, and that he believes that the minister has validly administered the Sacrament, In such a case, he has received grace and will be truly saved. 148

The last objection to be raised is likewise not valid. It starts with the fact that grace is a gift of God and hence entirely dependent on the Will of God, but nobody knows with certitude what depends on the Will of God. Furthermore, all our dispositions and preparations dispose us only so far towards grace as it pleases the Will of God to accept them.

^{147.} Ed. Vivès tom. 15, 368 n. 14, 15. Anent the question whether Scotus knows and teaches an actual grace, cfr. P. Minges, Die Gnadenlehre des Duns Scotus auf ihren angeblichen Pelagianismus und Semipelagianismus geprüft, (Münster 1906); N. Krautwig, Die Grundlagen der Busslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus, (Freiburg 1938), 107 ff.; J. Klein, in: Franz. Studien, 8 (1921) 260 ff; 19 (1932) 256 ff.; 27 (1940) 191 ff.; V. Heynck, in: Franz. Studien, 27 (1940) 129 ff.; J. Auer, Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik, (Freiburg 1942), 254 ff.; R. CH., Dhont, Le problème de la préparation à la grâce. Débuts de l'Ecole franciscaine, (Paris 1946), 283 ff.

^{148. &}quot;Nec valet, quod requiri dicunt cognitionem intentionis ministri vel ordinis sacerdotalis eius, quia istud non pertinet ad hoc, quod est 'facere quantum in se est' ex parte suscipientis, immo nec est necessaria cognitio ista, quia esto, quod minister fuerit haereticus, iudaeus, turca nec sacerdos nec habuerit intentionem actualem nec virtualem, adhuc si suscipiens intendat recipere, quod intendit Ecclesia et fecerit quantum in se est, credideritque ministrum rite dispensasse sacramentum, habet gratiam et vere salvatur." Fol. 168.

Again, a merit is only a merit because it has been accepted by the Will of God. Who, then, knows the Will of God, who has been His counselor? Costacciaro admits without reserve the plausibility of this objection. It is true, he replies, that grace is a gift of God, and that our works have value only so far as the Will of God accepts them. Merit is only a merit because it is accepted as merit by God; even the Passion of Christ is meritorious only because it has been accepted as such by the Divine Will. Now, even though we do not know by any natural reasons or in any natural way when the Will of God has accepted the good works of a man who has done all in his power, nevertheless we can know about it in virtue of the divine ordination and the covenant which God has made with us that He will give his grace to everyone who has done what is in his power. This ordination of God is infallible, since God is faithful to Himself and never denies Himself to those who place themselves in the right disposition, according to the words of the Apocalypse, III, 20: "If someone...opens the door to me, I will come to him and will supper with him," and according to Psalm LXXX, 11: "Open thy mouth wide and I will fill it." 149

^{149. &}quot;Nec valet, quod dicunt gratiam esse donum Dei et quod reservatur divinae voluntati, quam nemo certitudinaliter cognoscit; et quod dispositiones et praeparationes nostrae disponunt tantum ad gratiam, prout placet divinae voluntati eas acceptare; et quod meritum ideo meritum quia acceptatum a divina voluntate; sed quis novit eam aut quis consiliarius eius fuit? Respondeo, quod verum est gratiam Dei donum esse et opera nostra tantum valere quantum acceptantur a divina voluntate et meritum ideo meritum quia acceptatum, imo passio Christi ideo meritoria quia acceptata a divina votuntate. Et licet per naturalem rationem et secundum causas naturaliter moventes non possit sciri, quando divina voluntas acceptabit opera alicuius facientis quantum in se est, poterit tamen sciri hoc ex divina pactione seu ordinatione, quam pepigit nobiscum, ut facientibus quantum est in nobis semper dabit gratiam, quae ordinatio infallibilis est, quia fidelis Deus in omnibus verbis suis et numquam deest disponentibus se iuxta illud Apoc. 3, 20 "Si quis aperuit, intrabo et cenabo cum illo" et Ps. 80, 11 "Dilata os tuum et implebo illud". Fol. 168 . - Costacciaro here probably refers to the explanations of the secular priest, Petrus Sarra, who, by pointing out the divine acceptation, contested the possibility of the certainty of grace. (Cfr. CT, 549, 12 ff.) Also, Malafossa 220 K. Already

These explanations of the General of the Conventuals, which we have purposely dealt with at great length, give us an interesting picture of the theological opinions of this outstanding Scotist. It is noteworthy that he, just as Delphinus, understands the "non ponere obicem" as a purely negative attitude. We do not know with certainty whether the other Scotists who defended the certitude of grace at the Council shared this opinion, since some of them speak of the sufficiency of the "non ponere obicem" without explaining it. Others whose votes have come down to us in brief excerpts only, do not touch upon this point. 150

in the Medieval Franciscan School, with Rupella, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Matthew of Aguasparta, Richard a Mediavilla, Alexander of Alessandria, for the negative attitude concerning the question of the certainty of grace, the first reason always mentioned is the divine acceptance which is hidden from us; while John Pecham and Petrus de Trabibus do not approve of this method of proof. (fr. Auer, op. cit., 313-320, Costacciaro had already presented the acceptance theory in the same pointed wording in his vote on October 7th. (Cfr. C7, v. 482, 7 ff). We meet with other eminent Scotist during that period who held the same opinion. Thus, Lychetus, in his Commentary on Scotus, Oz. d. 17, q. 3 (Vives, Tom. 10, 78 ff.), Antonius Trombetta in his Quaestio "Numquid adultus non baptizatus salvari possit secundum Scoti doctrinam." Also Antonii Trombetae Urbinatis Episcopi necnon theologi ac metaphysici acutissimi quaestio profunda de efficacia primi principii ad mentem Aristotelis adjecta subtili quaestione: Numquid adultus non baptizatus....optime discussa.' (Venice 1513, fol. 11th). John Vigerius, Lectura resolutissima super primo libro sententiarum Doctoris Subtilis Jo. Duns Scoti, (Venice 1527, fol. 146); Malafossa, op. cit., 19, K; G.II.J.K.; likewise, the expositions of the theologian of the Council, Andreas de Navarra on the acceptance of meritorious acts (CT, v, 556 f.). For the teaching of Scotus on acceptance, cfr. R. Seeberg, Die Theologie des Joannes Duns Scotus, (Leipzig 1900); P. Minges, "Der Wert der guten Werke nach Duns Scotus", Theol. Quartalschrift, (1907), 76-93; Idem., "Beitrag zur Lehre des Duns Scotus über das Werk Christi," ibid., 241-249; also, "Beitrag zur Lehre des Duns Scotus über die Person Jesu Christi", ibid., 384-424; Th. Fetten, Johannes Duns Scotus über das Werk des Erlösers, (Bonn 1913); P. Vignaux, Justification et Prédestination au XIV Siècle, (Paris 1934), 9-41.

^{150.} Thus Philippus Brascus (CT, V, 554, 25); Vitriarius (571, 30 f.); cfr. also Navarra (560, 5 f.), Miranda 552, 19 f. For the correctness of his interpretation of Scotus and the just claim on the basis of his concept regarding the efficacy of the Sacraments, to assert a real certainty of the state of grace, Costacciaro, among others, refers to Mauritius de Portu (O'Fihely), "qui Paduae tot annos publicam theologiam professus est et tempestate nostra summus Scotistarum." Regarding this famous Scotist (Conventual) who, as Archbishop

This explanation of the Scotistic "non ponere obicem" has been sharply rejected by Franciscan theologians who were opposed to the certitude of grace, especially Andreas de Vega and Alfonso de Castro. Vega has devoted long discussions to the refutation of this thesis. He speaks of a "falsissima et merito damnanda sententia," and tries to prove by an abundance of texts from Scotus that Scotus demands true contrition for the reception of Baptism and Penance. Yet, according to Scotus, this need not be so intense that of its own it justifies as meritum de congruo; nevertheless it must be a genuine religious contrition. 151 Alfonso de Castro expresses himself in similar fashion. 152 On this point, we agree with them absolutely. In fact, Scotus demands genuine and real contrition for the reception of Penance, and demands it with such expressive words that there can be hardly a doubt about his true opinion. The texts

of Tuam, Ireland, died on the journey thither in 1513, see A.G. Little, The Grey Friars in Oxford, (Oxford 1892), 267 f., D'Alton, M. O'Fihely, Catholic Encycl., 1911, tom. 11, 221; F. Longpré, Dict. Theol. Cath., tom. 10, 404-405. It is a matter of regret that Costacciaro does not mention the place where Mauritius defends this concept. Possibly he refers only to an oral expression; for the writings of Mauritius treat almost exclusively of philosophical problems only. For the most part, his investigation, De Rerum Contingentia et Divina Praedestinatione, might be in question. Another eminent Scotist of this time, Antonius Trombetta, O.F.M. Conv., likewise professor at the University of Padua, defends the thesis: "Decens fuit, ut Deus institueret sacramentum baptismi tamquam signum sensibile, ut quisquis fidelis haberet viam, per quam posset cognoscere certitudinaliter se justificari a peccato originali et mereri propriam gratiam." Regarding the "non ponere obicem", no explanations are found with him; cfr. Antonii Trumbetae, "Quaestio, numquid adultus non baptizatus salvari possit secundum Scoti doctrinam" (Venice 1513), 11°; cfr. note 149.

^{151.} De lustificatione, 9, 15 (264 ff.) For the manner of quoting see note 115); cfr. likewise, V. Heynck, "Die Stellung des Konzilstheologen Andreas de Vega, O.F.M. zu Duns Scotus," in Franz. Studien, 27 (1940) 141 ff.

^{152.} Adversus Omnes Haereses, lib. 7, p. 448. It is remarkable that Malafossa is aware of the explanation of "non ponere obicem" in Scotus in the negative sense, through the representatives of the certainty of grace and even mentions the passage in Scotus which these quote in their own favor, but in his rejoinder does not repel the false interpretation. He only opposes the fact whether one who has placed an obstacle to the efficacy of the sacrament, could not obtain a strict certainty, but only a probable opinion. Cfr. ed. cit., 220 D; 221 L.

which contain references to the obez are only apparently in contradiction with this opinion. They must be understood in the light of the problems which were discussed at that time. The expression "It is sufficient for justification through the Sacrament of Penance not to place an obex" is always used by Scotus when he intends to emphasize the efficacy of the Sacrament of Penance to remove sins ex opere operato, and this in an objective way. This was a doctrine by no means generally accepted at the time. For this reason he emphasizes that the subjective disposition of the sinner does not effect justification, but the Sacrament does. All that is required of him who receives this Sacrament, as any other, is that he place no obstacle in the way of its action. Seen in this light this doctrine is well-founded, and, in a certain sense, has a traditional negative formulation which includes a positive requisite, as Vega justly remarks. 153 For, if someone goes to Confession without true contrition, then he places an obex. This has been stated by Scotus in several passages of his writings. 154

Costacciaro, in his exposition, points out that the Subtle Doctor in many passages does not consider a purely negative attitude sufficient for the Sacrament of Penance, and that Scotus demands a real detestation for sin and the resolution of amendment, Delphinus also refers to this same idea 155 as Gabriel Biel, in indicating this obscure point in Scotus' teaching, had done before him. 156 However, they were not aware that here we do not have a contradiction or an obscurity, but only a different formulation of the same idea which varies according as the question is formulated. Botl

^{153.} De lustificatione, 9, 15 (266).

^{154.} Cfr. our presentation of the Scotistic teaching on Contrition, Franz. Stud., 28 (1941), 19 ff.

^{155.} CT, XII, 657, 9 ff.

^{136.} In 4, d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, note 2. Cfr. Feckes, Die Rechtfertigungslehre des Gabriel Biel, (Muenster 1925), 67.

Costacciaro and Delphinus believe that it is immaterial for their argument in favor of the certainty of grace, whether one understands "non ponere obicem" in a purely negative sense or whether one includes in it a positive disposition as well. They maintain that Scotus demands not a perfect contrition for justification through Penance, i.e., a contrition which justifies of itself, but only a contrition which is not very intensive, but rather weak and, at most, not particularly specified. For such contrition certitude is possible. However, the adversaries of the certitude of grace are not willing to even grant them this. Many of them, especially the Franciscans, are ready to grant the major premiss, viz., that the Sacrament of Penance imparts grace to those who go to Confession with true, though not perfect and justifying contrition, and with the resolution to amend their lives. 157 Some of them, it is true, call attention to the fact that there is no agreement among theologians about the disposition required for Penance, and they stress this point emphatically. 158 The minor premiss,

^{157.} Thus, Zannettino (CT, X, 587, 1 ff.); Cenomanus (CT, V, 538, 4 ff.): Pantusa (CT, XII, 689, 33 ff.). Cfr. also loc. cit., 693, 9 ff.; Alphonsus de Castro, Adversus Omnes Haereses, 552; Malafossa, op. cit., 222 B.

^{158.} Navarra: "Sed dato, quod ita sit, quod non ponat obicem, secundum illum doctorem non constat sibi de ministri intentione, et ita an receperit verum sacramentum, sine quo in tali casu non potest iustificari; et quando recepisset sacramentum a ministro, non est de fide, quod sacramentum poenitentiae conferat primam gratiam et in tali casu iustificet, cum multi doctores teneant contrarium et forte probabilius. Si ergo non est de fide, quod conferat primam gratiam, quomodo igitur ex illo deducitur tamquam de fide, quod recipiens illud sit in gratia," CT, V, 560, 5 ff; Miranda: "Quod aperte demonstratur: quoniam secunda praemissa assumpta non potest esse certa per fidem catholicam, sed tantum ex humanis testimoniis potest esse probabilis aut opinata, quoniam nondum convenit inter theologos, qualis et quanta dispositio requiratur, ut digne accedamus ad sacramenta." CT, V, 552, 16 ff.; Caspar de Regibus: "Antecedens probatur, quia talis iurat, hubuisse sufficientem dispositionem ad hoc, quod per sacramentum iustificetur, et quod suscipit verum sacramentum. Sed cum controversum sit, qualis et quanta requiratur ad hoc dispositio, et cum veritas sacramenti a potestate et intentione ministri pendeat, quae illi constare non potest, sequitur manifeste, tale iuramentum esse temerarium." CT, V, 598, 2 f. Fonseca von Castellamare: "Cum nullus homo scire posset, se fecisse id quod tenebatur, cum apud doctores sit maxima controversia et nemo cum alio concordat, quid sit illud, ad quod homo tenetur, ut habeat gratiam." CT, V, 646, 40; cfr. also Vega. De Iustif., 9, 41 (331); Dom. Soto, De Natura et Gratia, III, 13 (335).

which states that one can have indubitable certitude about the valid reception of the Sacrament, they contest. The only certitude possible in this case is a more or less probable conviction, at most a moral certitude. In particular, the penitent can never be sure of the right intention of the confessor, an intention necessary for the realization of the Sacrament, according to the decision of the Council of Florence. 159

We have already seen how Costacciaro tries to dispose of this last objection. He believes that, when a sinner does what is in his power, viz., when he receives the Sacrament of Penance with true though not justifying contrition, he receives forgiveness of his sins, even if the priest absolves without the right intention or if a bogus priest makes a pretense at absolution. In such cases, God supplies what is lacking. This surprising thesis is more or less expressly held by Delphinus, Lunellus, Brascus, and Vitrarius. 160 Some of them, quoting Scotus as their authority, maintain that he teaches (Bk. IV, dist. 5, q. 1), that it is unjust for someone to suffer from the guilt of another, or to be punished for another's malice, even if he is in no way guilty. 161 The opponents of the doctrine of the certitude of grace, however, reject this thesis as untenable. 162 Among the Franciscans, the main adversary is the French friar of the Observance, Richard Cenomanus. 163 Reference to Scotus as an authority in this case is not accepted. In the text which they quote, Scotus merely intends to say that the validity of Baptism, or any Sacrament, does not depend on the moral disposition and the state of grace of the minister, and that, therefore,

^{159.} Cfr. Vega, De Iustif., 9, 17 (271 f.); 9, 41 (331 f.); de Castro, Adversus Omnes Ilaereses 545; Soto, De Natura et Gratia, 335; Navarra (CT, V, 560, 5 ff.); Cenomanus (CT, V, 538, 5); see also CT, XII, 697, 27.

^{160.} CT, XII, 653, 19 ff.; CT, V, 526, 20 ff.; 554, 24 f.; 571, 32 f.

^{161.} Scotus, ed. cit., 16, 504.

^{162.} See the authors quoted in note 157.

^{163.} CT, V, 535, 5.

even a heretic can validly administer Baptism, provided he has the intention to do what the Church intends and observes the regulations for the matter and form of the Sacraments. Scotus expressly maintains the absolute necessity of a right inner intention.

B. Express statements of Scotus on the possibility of a certitude of grace

The Franciscan theologians who, at the Council of Trent, declared Scotus was an opponent of any kind of certitude of grace, were able to substantiate their arguments with several unequivocal texts of Scotus. It is true that Scotus did not deal with this problem ex professo, as the other great Scholastics had done before him, 164 yet from various passages we are able to ascertain what his true teaching was. Particularly conclusive seems to be a text (Ox. I. dist. 17, g. 3). to which Zannetino, Malafossa, Vega and de Castro chiefly refer. 165 There Scotus explains that a man who is conscious of having elicited an act of love of God, is not able to conclude thereby that he is in possession of the infused virtue of charity. He can conclude this neither from the substance of the act nor from its intensity, the pleasure and the ease with which he elicits the act, nor can he conclude it from the moral goodness of the act. Were such a conclusion admissible, then someone could know that he is in the state of charity if he possesses it. 166 There is another text in

^{164.} Cfr. note 19.

^{165.} Zannettino, CT, X, 586, 39; Malafossa, 220 M; Vega, De lustificatione, 9, 15 (262); de Castro, Adversus Omnes Haereses, 547.

^{166. &}quot;Quantum ad primum articulum potest dici, quod ex nullo actu, quem experimur, nec ex substantia actus, nec ex intensione actus, nec ex delectatione sive facilitate in operando, neque ex bonitate sive rectitudine morali actus

Scotus which, as Malafossa and Vega point out. 167 apparently militates against the former. It seems that Scotus teaches the contrary (Ox. III, dist. 24, q. 1), 168 viz., that it is possible to know the habitus of charity from the acts performed. However, we must take into consideration that, in this text, Scotus is criticizing Henry of Ghent who, along with the lumen gloriae and the lumen fidei, postulates a light which is between these two, a "medium lumen". Scotus uses the following argument: Caritas can be revealed in an inner act by which a man feels himself drawn to God, and in an exterior act by which he shows his concern for the person beloved, just as a science is revealed on the interior by understanding, and on the exterior by correct teaching. Those who possess the lumen medium do not teach better, according to these theologians, nor do they assent more firmly to the truths of faith through this light any more than do the simple faithful. Often the contrary is true. According to this text it seems that Scotus teaches that the existence of infused virtue can be known from its act, and that one who is conscious of his acts can be sure of having it. Vega discusses this text and its interpretation at great length. His reasons for a different interpretation can be reduced to this: Scotus here is not speaking of a strict certitude (as he does in Book I, dist. 17), but only of a conjecturalis vel probabilis cognitio. Besides, it is doubtful if Scotus is speaking of the habitus of charity at all. 169

The opponents to the certitude of grace also refer to Scotus' teaching on the infused virtues (Ox. III, dist. 23-27).

possumus concludere aliquem talem habitum supernaturalem inesse, quia quocumque istorum dato, posset aliquis habens charitatem, cognoscere certitudinaliter se esse in charitate, ex hoc scilicet quod actum illum sibi experietur inesse, vel actum sic intensum sibi inesse, vel sic delectabiliter vel faciliter inesse vel rectae rationi consonum esse." Ox. I, d. 17; q. 3, n. 21 (10, 81).

^{167.} Malafossa 221 A; Vega, loc. cit., 267 f.

^{168.} Ed. cit., 15, 42 f., n. 12.

^{169.} Loc. cit., cfr. Heynck in: Franz. Studien, 27 (1940), 139 f.

Here the Doctor Subtilis declares that it is not possible to prove the presence of the infused virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity by natural reasons since we cannot conclude from the acts of faith, hope, and charity which we perceive in ourselves, that they are caused by a supernatural habitus, for such acts can also be elicited by the purely natural powers of the soul. 170 Scotus declares the opinion false (Ox. III, dist. 27, q. 1) which states that a man can know that he possesses supernatural charity, and he infers from this that a love of God without a supernatural habitus must be possible; for, if such a love were only supernaturally possible, then everyone who feels himself stimulated to a love of God would have certitude about the presence of charity in himself. This, however, is impossible. 171 Scotus adduces a reason of congruity. (Ox. IV, dist. 5, q. 1) for the fact that a priest in the state of mortal sin can validly administer Baptism, for, if the moral goodness of the minister were required for the validity of Baptism, then this Sacrament would hardly be to the benefit of the one about to be baptized, but rather to his disadvantage. It is difficult to be certain of one's own moral goodness; how much more difficult is it to be certain of another's. 172

One text (Ox. IV, dist. 9, q. 1) has special force in the opinion of the opponents to the certitude of grace. Almost all of them refer to it. 173 In this passage Scotus discusses

^{170.} Cfr. Scotus, Ox. III, d. 23, q. un. (15, 22, n. 14; 15, 26, n. 17); cfr. 26, q. un. (15, 348n. 25); d. 27, q. un. (15, 373, n. 19); cfr. Ox. IV, d. 4, q. 2 (16, 391, n. 4); d. 6, q. 9 (16, 603, n. 13); cfr. Malafossa, 221 AB; Vega, loc. cit., 264, 268; de Castro, op. cit., 547; Vitriarius, CT, V, 572, 25 f.

^{171. &}quot;Additur quaedam persuasio theologica, quia si nullus potest habere actum virtutis perfectum diligendi Deum super omnia ex puris naturalibus, igitur qui inveniret se pronum ad talem actum, posset scire se esse in charitate, quia sine charitate non est talis pronitas. Consequens est falsum; ergo." Ox. Ill, d. 27, q. un. (15, 368, n. 14).

^{172.} Ed. cit., 16, 503, n. 5; cfr. Vega, loc. cit., 265; de Castro, loc. cit., 547.

^{173.} Vega, op. cit., 268; de Castro, loc. cit., Consilii, CT, V, 546, 6.

the problem whether a man who is in the state of mortal sin and receives Holy Communion always sins mortally, At this point he also declares that no man who is a pilgrim here on earth has certitude about his state of grace, and he quotes the text of Holy Scripture in confirmation: Nescit homo utrum odio an amore dignus sit (Eccl. 9, 1). This same text provided the main scriptural proof for the opponents to the certitude of grace at the Council. From this text Scotus infers that such a certitude is by no means necessary for the reception of the Holy Eucharist. Rather, it is sufficient that the penitent diligently examine his conscience as might be done in a court of law, and that he repent and confess his sins, even if some sins remain hidden and forgotten, He who dies after such a confession and contrition will be saved. Certainly, no more diligent examination is required for the reception of Holy Communion than is needed for a good death. Were this not so, then each one receiving Holy Communion would expose himself to the danger of sinning, and Holy Communion would not be a Sacrament for man here on earth, since here on earth no one can have such certitude. 174

All these texts quoted from Scotus by the opponents of the certitude of grace show clearly that Scotus did not think differently than the other great theologians of his time, especially St. Thomas. Costacciaro and his adherents do not deny this by any means. They concede everything which Scotus teaches in these passages, because "he merely rejects a natural, experiential, and evident certitude as regards the state of grace. He does not, however, reject a certitude of faith. This is just what we maintain." Costacciaro tries to prove this by discussing in detail each one of the texts quoted from Scotus. 175 The Observant Franciscan, Vitriarius,

^{174.} Ox., IV, d. 9, q. un. (17, 131, n. 2).

^{175.} Nec valent ea, quae adducta sunt contra me a quodam theologo in congregatione theologorum, sicut nec valent adducta a quodam ex nostratibus in quadam sua quaestione ex principiis eiusdem Scoti; quae argumenta miror

who has very clear expositions on this subject and gives an extensive explanation of the notion of the certitude of faith, ¹⁷⁶ declares: "All the authorities quoted from Holy Scripture, the Fathers, and theologians against our thesis, prove only this that, of ourselves and on the basis of our

quomodo ab illis adducta fuerint, cum fuerint omnia multo ante clarissime a me soluta in congregatione universali ante Illustrissimum et Reverendissimum Dominum meum D. Praesidentem a Monte. Expedisset magis adducere validas replicas contra meas solutiones, sed eas certe nondum vidi. Non enim valent, quod dicunt et afferunt ex Scoto in primo sent. d. 17 de actu, quem certitudinaliter non experimur, quoniam cognitio ista et certitudo gratiae, quam ibi Scotus negat, est experimentalis et evidentiae, quam nec assero nec probo, nec ibi loquitur Scotus de fidei certitudine. Nec valet, quod adducunt ex tertio d. 27 de fide infusa, quae non potest nobis inesse nisi ex creditis et non demonstrative, quoniam ut clare patet loquitur ibi de cognitione naturali ac per demonstrationem, ut supra dictum est, nec loquitur de certitudine per principium fidei, imo eam, quae est per principium fidei, videtur stabilire et statuere, cum dicat nisi ex creditis, ut patet in principio corporis quaestionis. Nec valet, quod adducunt in tertio d. 27, a. 3, in persuasione illa theologica, qua probatur hominem ex naturalibus puris posse Deum diligere super omnia, de pronitate illa ad diligendum sic Deum super omnia, ubi negat hominem scire se esse in charitate, quoniam ut bene loquitur D. Lychetus, expositor egregius, loquitur Scotus naturaliter et non negat cognitionem et certitudinem charitatis per principium fidei. Nec valet, quod adducunt ... Cod. 614, fol. 171 - 173 . Similarly, Delphinus expresses himself (CT, XII, 657, 26 ff.); cfr. too note 191. In the same manner they also solve a difficulty which results from Scotus, Quodlibet., q. 14, a. 1 (26, 12, n. 8).

176. Vitriarius, besides evident certainty, of which there is no question here, still maintains a triple one: a certainty of experience, which can establish a merely moral or probable certainty, a certainty of revelation, which results from a special revelation on the part of God, and finally a certainty of faith, which he explains in this manner: "Et per certitudinem fidei intelligo notitiam certam habitam ex Scripturis et dictis Sanctorum, ab Ecclesia et a Conciliis Spiritu Sancto congregatis; quae enim novi per Scripturam, sunt mihi certa certitudine fidei, qua credo Scripturis et dictis Sanctorum. Scriptura dicit et Ecclesia tenet, sacramenta conferre gratiam digne suscipienti et disposito, et hoc est tantum creditum, quia hoc habetur ex revelatis scripturis, licet mihi non sit revelatum, et hoc dico, ut appareat distinctio inter conclusionem de certitudine fidei et illam, quae est per revelationem. Ex una ergo parte habemus sacramenta necessaria ad salutem et dispositionem ad illa digne suscipienda; ex alia parte superest probare, quae sit ista dispositio et utrum possim esse certus de illa.º CT, V. 570, 26 ff. This is followed by a proof from Scripture and Tradition, that in preparation for Baptism nothing else is required than faith, contrition for sin and the will to receive the Sacrament. In conclusion, he appeals to Scotus and his teaching of the sufficiency of "non ponere obicem." Ibid., 570, ff.

works, we do not have such a certitude. I am not opposed to this opinion since Scotus in Book I, dist. 17, and in other places, upholds this opinion. This refutes the main proof of the Spaniard who went to such great trouble to weaken and refute our thesis, for he has only proved that it is impossible to obtain such certitude by our acts. This, I too hold, along with Scotus, However, he has not succeeded in weakening the reasons and authorities which we have adduced for our contention that we can be sure with the certitude of faith that sanctifying grace is in us. Yet, this must not be understood in the sense that it is an article of faith, but only that one can have such a knowledge which has the same certitude of faith as that with which I believe in the Holy Scripture, in the opinions of the Fathers, and in the Church and the Sacraments." 177 For this reason, Costacciaro does not hesitate to believe that he can claim the authority of the great scholastics, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Thomas Aguinas, and Richard of Middleton in favor of his opinion. 178

In his answer, Vega points out that Scotus, in the texts quoted, not only intends to exclude evident certitude but all genuine certitude; therefore all certitude of faith. Otherwise his entire line of argument would be void and superfluous at many points. Vego tries to prove this by a detailed exposition of the texts, ¹⁷⁹ and uses the argument of a learned Scotist (probably Malafossa) to do so. ¹⁸⁰ The argument is as follows: When Scotus denies that it is possible to prove the possession of a supernatural habitus, especially of grace and charity, by natural reasons, then he rejects in general any certitude of faith about the state of grace; for, not only that

^{177.} CT, V, 572, 22 ff. The "Spaniard", to whom Vitriarius here refers, is probably the Dominican Bartholomaeus Miranda, Cfr. CT, V, 552, 14 ff.

^{178.} Cod. 614. fol. 163^V.

^{179.} De lustificatione, 265; cfr. Heynck, Franz. Studien, 27 (1940) 137 ff.

^{180.} Cfr. Malafossa, 221 D.E.

proof is to be considered natural which presupposes only naturally knowable facts, but also that which is based on premisses, one of which is known naturally, the other through faith. Proofs of this latter type would necessarily be the basis for obtaining certitude of faith. In order to support his argument, Vega adds the following consideration: Scotus not only argues against philosophers, but theologians as well, when he tries to prove that it is impossible to conclude the possession of infused virtues from the existence of certain psychic acts or from their specific quality. However, it seems certain that none of the theologians criticized by Scotus, has maintained that the existence of an infused virtue can be proved by purely natural reasons. ¹⁸¹

C. Scotus' teaching on the certitude of faith

The controversy on the certitude of grace ultimately came down to the problem of how the certitudo fidei which was accorded to the conviction of being in the state of grace, or denied from it, was to be understood and explained. This question was the occasion for debating the problem of faith in general and the certitude which faith can give. For this reason we encounter remarkable expositions concerning the difficult doctrine of faith according to Scotus. Scotus gives a detailed account of the relationship between fides

^{181.} De lustif., 265; cfr. Heynck, op. cit., 138.

^{182.} Concerning the teaching of Scotus on Faith, cfr. P. Minges, Das Verhältnis zwischen Glauben und Wissen, Philosophie und Theologie nach Duns Scotus, (Paderborn 1908); J. Espenberger, Grund und Gewissheit des übernaturlichen Glaubens in der Lehre der Hochscholastik und Spätscholastik, (Paderborn 1915); J. Klein, "Der Glaube nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus," in: Franz. Studien, 12 (1925) 184-212; A. Lang, Die Wege der Glaubensbegründung bei den Scholastikern des 14. Jahrhunderts, (Münster 1930), 73 ff.; H. Klug, "Die Lehre des hl. Bonaventura über die Aufgabe der eingegossenen Tugend des Glaubens und ihre Darlegung in den Sentenzenkommentaren des sel. Joh. Duns Scotus," in: Franz. Studien, 24 (1937) 105-121.

acquisita and fides infusa in the III Book of his Commentary on the Sentences and examines the necessity and operation of the supernatural habitus of faith. 183 To him, every natural faith in a testimony is fides acquisita; therefore, the firm acceptance of statements or facts on the testimony of a person whom I know is trustworthy. The more trustworthy this witness, the stronger my faith. This is especially true when a community, and especially the Church which detests every lie and which alone is founded on truth, proposes something to me concerning the doctrine of faith and morals. For the Church has her authority from God, and therefore, in the end, God Himself guarantees the truth of these statements. Hence, natural faith which has been acquired by our own power, concerns also the mysteries of revelation, which are presented to us by the Church and which I accept on her testimony. 184 Why, then, is there necessary an infused habitus of faith? What task has it to fulfill, which cannot be fulfilled by the acquired faith? Scotus has worked extremely hard on the solution of this problem. He maintains as a principle the necessity of positing that an infused habitus cannot be proved by natural reasons; we are only bound to posit it on the basis of the sources of faith. In order to determine in detail the task or function of the fides infusa he proposes two solutions - they are as to their essential the solutions of St. Thomas and of St. Bonaventure 185-which both, however, do not quite satisfy him, though he apparently is inclined more to the latter. The remarks which he makes criticizing the solution of St. Thomas have, as it seems, for the first time clearly opened and formulated the problem of the ultimate resolutio fidei; as we know, it is that problem with which the theological speculation since his time has been occupied and which has lead to every new attempts

^{183.} Ox. III, d. 23-25 (15, 5-319); furthermore, Quodlibet., q. 14, (26, 8-14).

^{184.} Cfr. especially Espenberger, op. cit., 55.

^{185.} Cfr. Klein, op. cit., 200 ff.; Klug, op. cit., 105 ff.; Lang, op. cit., 78.

toward a solution, especially since the time of the Council of Trent. 186 In summarizing, Scotus says that the infused faith must first raise and strengthen the human power of cognition and perfect it in actu primo, just as caritas perfects the will; secondly, it exercises an influence upon the act of faith by gradually intensifying it and giving a greater firmness and infallible certitude to the assent of faith. 187 It is noteworthy that the "voluntarist" Scotus in his theory about faith accords a less decisive role to the will than, for instance, St. Thomas Aguinas. 188 For this reason, it is not correct to label as Scotistic the partly extreme and wrongly voluntaristic theory of faith advanced at the Council by the Abbot Lucian and the Servite, Laurentius Mazochius; 189 yet, this has often been done in recent articles. 190 These two theologians do not invoke the authority of Scotus in support of their teachings by any means. At the Council the two Conventuals, Delphinus and Costacciaro, discussed in detail the opinion of Scotus concerning faith.

Delphinus defends his master against the charge that he did not assign to faith an absolute certitude which is beyond any doubt. In order to prove his point he quotes some texts of Scotus from the III Book of the Commentary on the Sentences. They show that the Doctor Subtilis not only posits a fides acquisita, the existence of which can be proved by natural reasons, but also a fides infusa on the basis of revelation, and that he assigns to this fides infusa

^{186.} Lang 78; F. Schlagenhaufen, "Die Glaubensgewissheit und ihre Begründung in der Neuscholastik," in: Zeitschr. J. kath. Theol., 56 (1932) 313-374; 530-595.

^{187.} Ox., III, d. 23, q. un. (15, 22 ff., n. 14-18); cfr. Quodlibet; q. 14 (26, 10 ff., n. 6, 7, 8); cfr. Espenberger, op. cit., 57 ff.

^{188.} Cfr. Klein, op. cit., 184 ff.; Lang, op. cit., 79 f.

^{189.} Cfr. CT, V, 477, 1-478, 52 (Lucianus); CT, V, 586, 44-590, 19; XII, 690 ff. (Laurentius Mazocchius);

^{190.} Rückert, Die Rechtfertigungslehre auf dem tridentinischen Konzil, 202 ff.; Schlagenhaufen, in: Zeitschr. f. kath. Theol., 56 (1932) 337 ff.

the task not only of giving a greater intensity to the act of faith but also a greater certitude. Our author continues: When Scotus says in two instances that faith does not exclude any doubt, but only "a victorious doubt which inclines to the opposite", this merely indicates that faith is still exposed to temptations which intend to shake its firmness. 191 Delphinus discusses in detail the main difficulty resulting from Ox. III, dist. 23, q. 1. In this text, Scotus hesitates to assign to the fides infusa the task of giving a greater certitude to the act of faith than the fides acquisita is able to do. lie leaves it to his readers to solve for themselves the reasons which have been adduced against it. 102 With good reason, Delphinus, quotes from the Quodlibet, q. 14, where Scotus expressly ascribes this greater certitude to the fides infusa. Since, as Scotus explains there, the fides acquisita is based upon an authority which in turn can err and can lead others into error, it cannot cause a certitude which is beyond any doubt; it is different with the fides infusa, which comes from an authority, viz. God, Who does not err and cannot deceive others. Again, the infusa has infallible certitude (certitudo infallibilitatis) since it never can accede to something that is false. For, the infused faith is efficient through the power of the Divine Light in which it participates, and in consequence it accedes only to what is in accordance with this Divine Light, Insofar, therefore, as the act of faith is based on this infused faith it cannot lead into error. 193 Delphinus believes that in the light of these

^{191.} Delphinus quotes: Ox. III, d. 23, q. un. (15, 22 ff., n. 14, 15); d. 24, q. un. (15, 44 f., n. 13, 48, n. 17); Quodlibet., q. 14 (26, 8 ff., n. 5); Ox. I, prol. q. 1, ad 3 arg. princ. (6, 34, n. 14). The reference to this passage is hardly valid.

^{192.} In Scotus we read: "Dico tune, quod fides infusa est propter actum primum et propter perfectionem gradus actus secundi, quem gradum non posset habere intellectus cum fide acquisita solum, et si propter aliquam certitudinem maiorem velitis dicere, salvatis argumentum factum, quod non." Ox. III, d. 23, q. un. (15, 34, n. 16).

^{193.} Cfr. Quadlibet., q. 14, (26, 11, n. 7); cfr. for this, Espenberger, op. cit., 57 ff., who also calls attention to other passages in Scotus similar to this.

expositions it is easy to solve the argument left unanswered by Scotus in the Oxoniense. This he discusses in detail. 194 Scotus' great commentator before the Council of Trent, Lychetus, had interpreted the Doctor Subtilis in this positive sense. 195 However, many of Scotus' immediate disciples, above all, John de Bassolis, had put more emphasis on ideas which seem to tend towards skepticism. According to John de Bassolis, fides infusa does not contribute anything to the essence and to the certitude of an act of faith; it only serves as a decoration to adorn and perfect the human mind. 196 With Delphinus, so it seems, we encounter the opposite tendency, viz., to strengthen importance of the fides infusa. For this reason his explanations deserve our attention. However, they do not contribute much towards understanding the certitude of faith so hotly discussed at the Council. 197

^{194.} CT. XII. 655. 38 ff.

^{195.} Cfr. concerning this the Commentary of Lychetus on: Ox, III, d. 23, q. un. (reprinted in the edition of Scotus, 15, 23ff.).

^{196.} Cfr. Lang, op. cit., 87 f.

^{197.} In his expositions, Delphinus is mainly concerned in offering proof that Scotus ascribes to Faith a certainty that is above every doubt, From this certainty which is proper to the articles of faith he distinguishes the certainty which we can have concerning our pardon; this, too, is a certainty of faith, however of a different kind. He warns lest in disputations one confuse the two certainties; for Scotus in some passages speaks of the first and in others of the second, and at times of both. Some fail to take notice of this and simply talk at random whatever comes to their minds. CT, XII, 655, 53 ff. If we inspect more closely wherein, according to Delphinus, the two certainties differ, we find that he emphasizes only one -, the following difference: the certainty of the articles of faith is beyond any doubt and without any fear; the certainty of pardon indeed also without any doubt but not without any fear, namely, not without the fear of losing the state of grace: "Illud etiam sciendum est, utramque certitudinem sine dubitatione esse, non tamen absque timore: quippe certitudo credibilium est absque dubitatione et absque timore; qui enim credit, ut exempli gratia dicam, Trinitatem divinarum personarum, nemini timet; porro certitudo gratiae sine dubitatione quidem est, non tamen sine timore, ut supra exeruimus. Qui enim credit se habere gratiam gratum facientem, debet timere sibi, ne illam videlicet amittat." CT, XII, 655, 58 ff. In his later post-Tridentine work, "De salutari omnium rerum progressu," he explains the difference: Concerning the state of grace a firm certainty only "ex parte subjecti" is possible, to which reality

Our judgment will be different concerning the vote presented by Costacciaro. 198 One of the main arguments of the opponents of the certitude of faith was the following: It is not possible to believe with the same absolute certitude in our justification, as we believe in the articles of faith, for instance, that God is triune. Otherwise we should be ready to die for the conviction of our own justification, as we are obliged to uphold the truths of the articles of faith at the risk of our lives. 199 Costacciaro first gives a detailed discussion of this difficulty 200 and then continues: If my opponents had paid better attention to what I have explained so often, all doubts would have vanished. For it is necessary to distinguish a twofold faith, the fides infusa and the fides acquisita. They are different in several respects. The fides infusa is immediately given by God. It is true, man can prepare himself by natural means to the reception of this

need not always conform, while to the truths of Faith belongs a subjective and an objective certainty. Cfr. S. Santoro, "La giustificazione in Giovanni Antonio belfino, O.F.M., Conv., Telogo del Concilio di Trento", Misc. Francisc., 40 (1940) 26. – In the exposition of the Scotistic doctrine on the certainty of grace, Delphinus wants to prove above all that, according to Scotus, for reason of the reception of the Sacraments one can gain a real certainty of one's own pardon, which, therefore, is greater than the merely conjectural one of the Thomist, which relies on other marks than on the reception of the sacraments: "Puto iam exploratum habere omnes opinionem Scoti, quod possit via sacramenti quis certus esse gratiam gratificantem se habere, neque ista coniecturalis tantum certitudo est, quippe quod illa ex aliis colligitur signis quam ex sacramento, ut probe noverunt omnes theologi." CT, XII, 657, 13 ff.

^{198.} Cod. 614, fol. 169° ff.

^{169.} Cfr. CT, V, 686, 44 ff. (Bishop Fonseca); 652, 30 ff. (Bishop Salazar); 604, 35 ff., (John de Utino); 598, 14 ff. (Navarra).

^{200. *}Et quoniam difficile quamplurimis patribus excogitata videtur quaestio, quando possibile sit ex principio fidei gratiae adeptae certitudinem a iustificato haberi, propterea quia videatur eis maximum sequi inconveniens imo multa inconvenientia, videlicet quod crederet iustificatus sic certus eodem gradu certitudinis hoc complexum credibile, quod est se habere gratiam, quo gradu crederet complexum hoc credibile: 'Deus est trinus et unus' et alia ad essentiam fidei pertinentia. Et sic inde sequeretur alterum, quod ille mori teneretur pro hoc sicut pro illo credibili, quae sunt maxime absurda. Respondetur, quod si bene advertissent ad ea, quae ego multoties dixeram, iam omnia dubia evacuissent. Dico ergo fidem duplicem esse ...* Cod. 614, fol. 169**.

faith; but it is impossible that it can be acquired by his natural power. 201 Since this faith is based on the Divine Light, it never can accede to something false, but always can to something true. 202 It cannot be known by experience for nobody can know by experience whether he elicits an act of faith in virtue of infused faith. 203 The fides infusa alone is not sufficient to posit an act of faith; in proof of this, we could point to the case of a child who was baptized but brought up in a wilderness without any training in the Christian faith, and who on reaching manhood, does not consider the articles of faith true, though he has received in baptism the infused virtue of faith. The reason why he does not believe is, because the object of the fides infusa is not truths evident in themselves. 204 Furthermore, there is only one infused faith which concerns all truths that in any way can be the object of the acceptance by faith, whether they be articles of faith in the proper sense, which therefore belong to the depositum fidei of the Church, or whether they concern other truths as mathematical and physical truths, which were revealed to a person; for this faith considers the objects of faith not in themselves, but only in so far as they are revealed by God. Hence, the fact that they are revealed is the bond which unites all these objects. With the same habitual faith by which we believe that God in his revelation is true, we also believe everything revealed by God to be true. In this manner faith does not get its certitude from the object which is believed, but from the trustworthiness and veracity of the witness, viz., God, who warrants it. Thus we easily understand why faith is full of mysteries and obscurities; for the faithful does not consider the articles of faith to be true, because they are evident to

^{201.} Cfr. Scotus, Quodlibet, q. 14 (26, 9, n. 5).

^{202.} Cfr. Scotus, loc. cit., (26, 11, n. 7).

^{203.} Cfr. Scotus, loc. cit., (26, 12, n. 12).

^{204.} Cfr. Scotus, loc. cit., (26, 10 f., n. 6).

him, but because he assents to the veracity of the revealing God who has given this habitus of faith. For this reason, in the life to come the enigmatical and obscure cognition will pass into clear vision. ²⁰⁵ In this sense it can be said that the statement that the justified person knows with certitude that he is in the state of grace, can be known on the basis of infused faith which inclines to everything that is true, no matter whether the truth belongs to the totality of the christian truths of faith, or whether it does not belong to it, though, of course, the degree of inclination will be different in those cases. ²⁰⁶

The definition of the fides acquisitamust be different. This faith can be acquired by natural means, for example, when listening to a sermon. I assent to the preacher because he is a true witness. Such an assent is in a certain case even firm and with certitude, namely, in the case where the preacher or teacher is a person who cannot err and cannot lead others into error, because of the infallibility of his intellect and the honesty of his will; such is the case with God and with Christ. For, God cannot only cause in us an act of faith through revelation and through infusion of the habitus of faith, but also through an immediate "motio"; such an act of faith is not a habitus of infused faith, but a fides acquisita, as Scotus remarks, 207 Still, there is another case where such an infallibly acquired faith is possible, namely, when my faith is based on the authority of the Church. For the Church is an infallible teacher guided by the Holy Ghost. Hence, in matters of faith she cannot err and cannot lead others into error. She testifies to me that Holy Scripture

^{205.} Cfr. Scotus, Ox., d. 23, q. un. (15, 10, n. 6).

^{206.} Et secundum istum modum dicitur posse sciri hoc credibile videlicet iustificatum certo scire se habere gratiam ex principio fidei infusae inclinantis in omne verum credibile tam ad illud, quod est de substantia fidei, quam ad alia extra fidei catholicae naturam, sed non eodem gradu inclinet ad hoc et ad illa. Cod. 614, fol. 170°.

^{207.} Cfr. Scotus, Quodlibet., q. 14 (26, 11, n. 7).

is the word of God. Therefore, it is on her authority that I believe that the Gospel of St. John is genuine, whilst I reject the so-called Gospel of Nicodemus and the Nazarenes, though, perhaps, they may be true in themselves. For, I do not believe in the words of the Holy Gospels because of the truth of their statements, but because of the veracity of the Church which testifies it. Hence, when I read the Holy Scripture approved by the Holy Catholic Church and when I believe in its content, then I have again an infallibly acquired faith. ²⁰⁸ It is not that the fides acquisita inclines to something false; it is not correct to say that something false can be the basis of this faith, though often this is possible, as Scotus thinks. ²⁰⁹ Rather, the fides acquisita inclines to something true, as the two torementioned cases show, namely, when the acquired faith is reduceable to an

^{208. &}quot;Altera fides est acquisita, quae per causas naturales acquiri potest et ex concionantis vel praedicantis verbo auditu apprehenditur, cui praedicanti tamquam veraci testi etiam assentitur et praestatur assensus firmus et certus et sic certus, quod non potest falsificari in eo casu, quando praedicator ille seu instructor est talis, quod nec se nec alios fallere potest aut propter intellectus indefectibilitatem voluntatisque inobliquitatem, qualis est Christus seu Deus ipse, qui non tantum per revelationem aut infusionem, sed etiam per immediatam motionem causare potest fidem ipsam in nobis, et tunc fides non erit infusa, sed acquisita, ut inquit Scotus. Et etiam in alio casu, quando quis legit Scripturam sacram ab Ecclesia sacrosancta catholica approbatam, cui credit et firmum praestat assensum propter veracitatem testis veracis, quae est Ecclesia, sic a Spiritu Sancto dictata et regulata, ut minime in his quae sunt fidei fallere possit quempiam aut ipsam falli; non enim credo quod Scriptura dicit propter veracitatem credibilis, sed dumtaxat propter veracitatem ipsius Ecclesiae testificantis illud esse verum, ut supra dicebam de fide infusa; nam non credo Evangelio Nicodemi et Nazareorum, esto quod vera sint, quia non credo testimonio illorum, nec crederem Evangelio Johannis, nisi quia Ecclesiae Catholicae credo asserenti Evangelium illud esse Johannis et verum. Nec est verum semper fidem acquisitam inclinare in falsum, nec verum ei semper posse subesse falsum, sed frequenter (ut inquit Scotus) ei subest, verum ipsaque inclinat in verum, ut patet in duobus casibus, i.e., Dei moventis et Ecclesiae instruentis. Ideo decipiebantur illi Reverendi Patres, dum dicebant certitudinem gratiae in iustificato posse talsificari, si per fidem acquisitam habebatur, imo non est maior certitudo per infusam quam per acquisitam." Cod. 614, fol. 170 rv; cfr. Scotus, Ox., d. 23, q. un. (15, 7, n. 4).

^{209.} Cfr. Scotus, Quodlibet., q. 14 (26, 11, n. 7).

impulse given by God, or to the information given by the Church. Therefore, those fathers of the Council are in error who think that a certitude of being in the state of grace is never infallible on the basis of a fides acquisita. The opposite is true. For the certitude caused by the fides infusa is in these cases not stronger than that caused by the fides acquisita. 210

Another characteristic feature of the fides acquisita is that it is always accessible to experience. Furthermore, it atone suffices to elicit an act of faith, as is evident in the case of the Jewish boy who has been brought up in a christian environment and has had christian training. This boy, when grown up will believe as the other Christians of his environment do, but nevertheless, since he is not baptized, he does not possess an infused faith, but possesses only an acquired faith. ²¹¹

From this he concludes that when a justified person, who has been instructed by the Church, reads in Holy Scripture the many texts about the divine convenant and the divine promises, namely, that God will give his grace to those who prepare themselves and do what is in their power, as can be found in the books of Isaias, Jeremeias, Ezechiel and in the Gospel of St. Matthew, then this person very often can, on the basis of the authority of the Church, believe in these statements through an acquired faith; and in this case his assent of faith is firm, certain, infallible and true. Thus, a justified person knows in this case that he is in the state of grace in the light of the *fides acquisita* which excludes doubt, in as much as a doubt must be excluded from an act of faith. ²¹²

^{210.} Cod. 614, fol. 170 cfr. note 208.

^{211.} Cfr. Scotus, Quodlibet., q. 14 (26, 12, n. 8); Ox., III, d. 23, q. un. (15, 7, n. 7).

^{212.} Cum ergo iustificatus ab Ecclesia instructus legat multas auctoritates divini foederis ac promissionis de gratia praestanda ac donanda disponenti se

With regard to these expositions of the General of the Conventuals, it is first noteworthy that all the distinctive marks enumerated by him can be substantiated by texts or Scotus, and are even sometimes given in the exact words of Scotus. Nevertheless, Costacciaro does not give a faithful account of the doctrine of the Doctor Subtilis, First. the General adheres to a theory about infused faith, the correctness of which his master gravely doubted, and which he, therefore, would like to abandon in favor of a different conception of faith, though this second opinion doesn't completely satisfy him either. 213 Furthermore, whilst Scotus puts much emphasis on the fallibility of acquired faith, Costacciaro, on the contrary, stresses very much the possibility that acquired faith can also be infallible and it can therefore be found a firm infallible conviction. This, it is true, is not denied by Scotus on principle, though he does not attach as much importance to the cases mentioned above as Costacciaro does.

Most noteworthy, however, in the exposition of Costacciaro, is the application of his theory of faith to the debated problem concerning the certitude of being in the state of grace "ex principio fidei". The speculative justification advanced by Costacciaro and his followers for the opinion about the certitude of faith, ultimately culminates in the following argument: Everyone who does what he is obliged to do will receive sanctifying grace; for, there is general agreement upon the well-known theological axiom: Facientibus, quantum in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam". Nor is it

et quantum in se est facienti, ut patet in Isaia, in Hieremia, in Ezechiele et in Evangelio Matthaei, saepissime poterit fide acquisita certo credere auctoritatibus illis testimonio Ecclesiae, et assensus talis erit firmus, certus, indeceptibilis, ita quod propositio ista superior cognita sit ab ipso iustificato lumine fidei acquisitae, quod lumen omnem dubietatem excludit, ut dubietas ex fide excludi requiritur." Cod. 614, fol. 170 f.

^{213.} Cfr. Ox., III, d. 23, q. un. (15, 10 ff.) nn. 6-13); Klein, in: Franz. Studien, 12 (1925) 200 ff.; Lang, Die Wege der Glaubensbegründung, 78 ff.

possible to be certain by intallible inner experience, that one has fulfilled all these conditions, especially when receiving the sacrament of penance. 214 For that certitude, and this is something really surprising, Costacciaro does not claim a fides infusa, as one should expect and as, as it seems, the opponents of the certitude of faith at the Council presupposed in their counter arguments, 215 but a fides acquisita. It is true that this fides acquisita is of such a nature that it possesses infallibility just as the fides infusa, and therefore can be the basis of an equally strong and objective certitude. It is necessary to stress this characteristic feature of the certitude of the fides acquisita, for recent studies of this controversy made by Rueckert, Stakemeier and Schlagenhaufen 216 are misleading. They point out that characteristic of the Conventual General's position was his contention that he only maintained a fides acquisita, which though generally in accord with objective truth, nevertheless could be erroneous, and hence his contention that he posited for the certitude of the state of grace a faith which is not infallible. These authors were lead astray by the abstract from the Votum presented by Massarelli, who especially on this point is not clear. 217 Our exposition based on the detailed Votum has shown that the opposite is true. The general of the Order em-

^{214.} Cfr. Costacciaro, Cod. 614, fol. 166^{v} and 168^{v} ; Vinzenz de Leone, CT, V, 529, 32; Consilii, CT, V, 543, 46; Miranda, CT, V, 552, 5; Navarra, CT, V, 559, 43 ff.; Audetus: CT, XII, 649, 40; above all, does Vega extensively discuss this argument. He proposes the various solutions, that in the Council were offered by various parties, and partly rejects them, in order thereafter to propose in detail his own reply and to give his reasons for it. Cfr. De justif., 9, 17 (269 ff.); 9, 39 (313 ff.); 9, 41 (329 ff.).

^{215.} Zannettino CT, X, 587, 1 ff.; Soto, De Natura et Gratia, 3, 13 (335); cfr. Stakemeier, op. cit., 99, 130.

^{216.} Rückert, op. cit., 209 f.; Stakemeier, op. cit., 150 ff.; Schlagenhaufen, op. cit., 341.

^{217.} Cfr. CT, V, 662, 35 ff. Costacciaro certainly affirms that the acquired faith can err; but precisely in this case, in the certainty of faith concerning the state of grace it is not erroneous. This is likewise clear from the excerpt in Massarelli, if one examines more closely.

phatically stresses the infallibility of this acquired faith:

quae propositio cognita est lumine fidei acquisitae, cui tamen non potest subesse falsum, cum fides ipsa habeatur ab universitate Ecclesiae sacrosanctae, quae non potest fallere nec falli. Ideo eidem propositioni sine haesitatione potest per principium fidei assensus praestari. 218

The objection: "If the conviction of the truth of the major premiss is based on texts of Holy Scripture, then there is a cognition or certitude through revelation", is rejected by the General maintaining that this is not correct; for in this case the cognition through revelation and the cognition from the principle of faith have to be clearly distinguished. it is true that the truths of Holy Scripture were revealed to some people but not to all; to many they are known only from hearing. 219

Whilst the major premiss has certitude from acquired faith, it is possible that the minor premiss, namely the knowledge to be sufficiently disposed, can be established with an infallible certitude that is based on evidence. These statements of the General of the Order might appear surprising to us. Nowadays we are rather inclined, as, indeed, many of the opponents of the certitude of grace at the Council were, to attribute a high moral certitude to the minor premiss or even a certitude on the basis of human belief; but to the major premiss we would attribute a certitude of the fides infusa, and then we would attribute to the conclusion, namely to the conviction of being in the state of grace, only the degree of certitude that belongs to the minor premiss, which is only a

^{218.} Cod. 614, fol. 168 v.

^{219.} Loc. cit., fol. 169^r. Vitriarius, too, distinguishes between the certainty of revelation and of faith. This latter he explains in the same manner as Costacciaro, indeed, without expressing himself more in detail, whether, according to him, there is question of a fides acquisita or fides infusa. CT, V, 570, 25 ff.; cfr. note 176.

moral certitude. 220 However, Costacciaro's argumentation is different, and it is the same which had been already advanced by the Conventual Philippus Brascus in the congregation of the theologians. The latter writes: 211 It is the teaching of the Philosopher that the conclusion always follows the less evident and less known premiss. In the case of the knowledge of my state of grace, we have two premisses, of which the one is known by experience, the other by faith; therefore the conclusion is only known by faith. Costacciaro's reasoning is similar. According to the rules of Logic, he writes, 222 it follows that the conclusion follows the weaker part of the premisses. Since the cognition through faith is without evidence, the cognition through inner experience, on the other hand, with evidence, the non-evident premiss must be considered the weaker part; therefore the conclusion has only certitude of faith. An objection could be made here. We can only infer that the conclusion is not evident. However, we have here to deal with the kind of certitude. Insofar as certitude is concerned, the major premiss is the stronger part, and therefore, the conclusion can have

^{220.} Cfr. Miranda, CT, V, 553, 18 ff.; Vega, De Justificatione, 9, 41 (531); Soto, De Natura et Gratia, 3, 13 (335).

^{221. &}quot;Quo vero genere certitudinis? Dico quod certitudine fidei. Nam sententia est philosophorum, quod quando notitia est alicuius rationis fit ex duabus praemissis, quarum una est notior et evidentior altera, conclusio sequitur minus evidens; at notitia, quam ego scio me accepissi gratiam, fit ex duabus praemissis, quarum una est nota per experientiam, altera vero per fidem. Conclusio igitur erit nota per fidem." CT, V, 554, 28 ff.

^{222. &}quot;Ex ambabus ergo propositionibus, quarum altera lumine fidei cognita est, altera vero lumine naturali, non sequitur conclusio alia nisi lumine fidei cognita iuxta canones physicorum, logicorum et theologorum: quod ex una contingenti particulari negativa identica de iure positivo, altera vero affirmativa naturali necessaria de lege naturae formali sequitur conclusio particularis contingens identica de lege positiva propter ea, quia conclusio insequitur debiliorem partem, ne maior veritas colligatur in conclusione, quam fuerit seminata in praemissis. Sed cum notitia fidei sit sine evidentia, notitia vero experimentalis sit cum evidentia, erit debilior pars, quae sine evidentia quam ea, quae cum evidentia, ideo sequitur certitudo fidei in conclusione." Cod. 614, fol. 169°. The same explanations are found verbatim also in the Summa Sententiarum, loc. cit., fol. 178°.

only the certitude of the minor premiss. Costacciaro takes this objection into consideration. He declares that if someone should object that the cognition from faith is superior to the purely natural cognition as far as certitude is concerned, since the former is based on the veracity and infallibility of him who reveals this to us and teaches us about it, then we have to answer. Even if faith is more certain, it is still not more evident. When we have knowledge in the strict sense we deal with a cognition which necessitates assent on the part of the intellect. Hence every doubt is excluded. Faith does not act in the same manner. Faith does not exclude every doubt but only such a doubt which is invincible and which inclines us to the opposite. For this reason, the cognition which we have by faith is weaker than that which comes from knowing. 223

We may gather from these expositions that the notion of faith, and questions concerning the certitude which it gives and the ultimate basis for this subjective and objective certitude, were not yet clarified in many points. Schlagenhaufen in his much quoted study "Die Glaubensgewissheit und ihre Begründung in der Neuscholastik" has shown how widespread the lack of clarity on these questions was in the whole theology of this time. 224 lle is right, we believe, in his opinion that the fides acquisita of Costacciaro cannot be simply identified with a purely natural human faith, just as the fides acquisita of Scotus cannot be identified with it. For this reason, Schlagenhaufen speaks of an acquired supernatural faith. His opinion, however, that the General

^{223. &}quot;Respondeo, quod licet fides sit certior, non tamen est evidentior. Scientia enim habet rationem cogentem intellectum ut excludit dubitationem; fides vero non sic: quia non excludit omnem dubitationem, sed eam tantum vincentem et trahentem in oppositum credibilis, ideo notitia fidei sapit naturam debiliorem quam scientiae." Loc. cit., fol. 171°. Very extensively does Vega discuss this question: De iustif. 9, 39 (320 ff.).

^{224.} Schlagenhaufen, Zeitschrift, f. kath. Theol., 56 (1932), 312 ff. esp. 336: "Verschiedene Ansatze auf dem Konzil v. Trient."

of the Order did not consider this faith to be infallible, is untenable as our own expositions have shown. 225

III. Summary and Evaluation

The great controversy concerning the possibility of a certitude of grace, which kept the Council of Trent busy for a long time, merits our special interest from the point of view of the history of the Order. There is hardly any other question, where the opinions of the two great medieval schools, the Thomistic and the Scotistic, were in opposition to such an extent. It is true, the front lines were not so clearly determined, because both parties claimed for themselves the authority of St. Thomas and of Duns Scotus. However, in general, the affirmative answer was usually considered to be the Scotistic doctrine, whilst, on the other hand, many considered the negative answer as the only one for which the authority of St. Thomas could be invoked. Hence, recent scholars speak only of a thomistic and scotistic opinion and the thomistic and scotistic parties. It is a remarkable fact that at the Council the scotistic group is numerically superior to the thomistic one. Amongst both the theologians and the prelates, they have the majority. Not only the Franciscans, but also members of other orders: Benedictines, Carmelites, Servites, Augustinians, Jesuits, and even one Dominican-Ambrosius Catharinus-are of the Scotistic opinion. Likewise the two presidents of the Council favor this doctrine. The head of the Scotistic group is the general of the Conventuals, Bonaventura Costacciaro.

During the course of the controversy, the fore-mentioned Dominican bishop, Catharinus, sides with him. The real backbone of the Thomistic party was the very energetic leader of the imperial party of the Council, Cardinal Pachecco, and also the General of the Dominicans and the Dominicans.

^{225.} Ibid., 341 ff.

can theologians. However, the fact should not be overlooked that by no means do all the adherents of the certitude of grace base themselves on the authority of Scotus; and since they do not take their position from Scotus, they cannot without reserve be numerated with the Scotistic party.

The real discussion concerning the doctrine of Scotus about the certitude of faith took place within the group of the Franciscan theologians present at the Council. And this is the most interesting result of our study concerning the history of Scotism, namely, that the Franciscan theologians present at the Council were of such different opinions in their interpretation of the master and that they were even of opposite opinion in such an important problem of Scotistic theology. The General of the Conventuals, all theologians of the Conventuals present at the Council, the General of the Observants and four of the present theologians of the Observants energetically maintain that Scotus favored the affirmative answer: on the other hand the two bishops coming from the Order of the Observants, Zannettino and Antonius de la Cruce, and the five present theologians of the Observants, Vega, de Castro and others, deny with equal determination the right to understand Scotus in this sense. The unanimous agreement of the Conventuals on this point is surprising and very remarkable. It is true, Malafossa was an exception. However, he was not present at the Council. We might mention in passing that he occupied the Scotistic chair at the University of Padua.

When we now ask at the end, which of these two groups has understood and interpreted Scotus correctly, we must decide in favor of the Observants Vega, De Castro and the others. The Doctor Subtilis did not think differently concerning the possibility of the certitude of grace from the theologians of his time, especially from St. Thomas Aquinas. This is clearly shown by the many texts advanced by the great theologians of the Observants. The attempt of the Conventuals to deduce a kind of certitude of faith from the

principles of Scotistic theology cannot convince. We certainly do justice to Scotus and to his strong emphasis on the infallible efficacy of the sacraments to give grace, if we declare that a high moral certitude of a person's justification is possible, and if we maintain that this is the opinion of Scotus. However, another point should not be overlooked. At the beginning of the Council, the idea of the possibility of certitude of faith on the basis of an infallible efficacy of the sacraments was completely outside of the horizon of many of the members of the Council, especially of the thomistic group. It is without any doubt to the merit of the Conventuals, especially of their General, that they called the attention to the fact that there must be possible a higher certitude of one's own justification than only a conjectural one, "per conjecturas" which alone was being admitted by the Thomists. The Conventuals really started the debate with their objection; and during this debate it became clear, that the difficult problem of the certitude of salvation posited by Luther, could not be solved with that simple scholastic formula, as found in St. Thomas, and that a completely sufficient answer could not be given by it. They also rightly sense that the clear elaboration of the doctrine of the infallible objective efficacy of the New Testament sacraments, especially of the sacrament of penance, and of the dispositions required to it, is a characteristic property of the Scotistic theology, and they are convinced, therefore, that they have to defend their master and his theology. wherever this doctrine of his is misunderstood and in peril.

The controversy concerning the certitude of faith at the Council is of special importance for the History of Scotism. From it we gain much interesting information about the various views of famous Scotists as regards certain problems of Scotistic theology which even nowadays are not yet fully clarified, namely, problems concerning the doctrine of faith, of charity, of grace and justification, and the doctrine on the sacraments, especially on the sacrament of penance and the disposition required for it. All these problems are being

discussed in part or in detail. We are surprised that Biel's interpretation of the Scotistic "non ponere obicem" in a purely negative sense, which caused Luther to level the worst accusations against Duns Scotus and which has brought many heavy reproaches upon the great Franciscan Doctor from Catholics and non-catholics, was taken over by such prominent Scotists of the time of the Council of Trent, namely, by the General of the Conventuals, Costacciaro, and the rector of the Order's house of studies at Padua, Antonius Delphinus. It is especially surprising if we take into account, that this interpretation is not to be found in other members of the Scotistic school before the Council of Trent. It is true that both theologians also know the other interpretation of the Scotistic doctrine of attrition, according to which the worthy reception of the sacrament of penance requires a true though not justifying contrition, and it seems that personally they give preference to this opinion.

There is still another fact which can be derived by considering the various votes of the Franciscan theologians and by comparing them with each other. The Conventuals show a better acquaintance with the doctrine of Duns Scotus. They take into account the opinions of the great Franciscan Doctor in their votes much more than the Observants do, even if their interpretation of Scotus is not always convincing and correct. It seems safe to state that the tradition of the Order exercizes a stronger influence on the Conventuals. The Italian Franciscan Conventuals—Conventuals of other nations were not at the Council—had famous schools of the Order in Padua and Bologna, where the study of Scotus had always been flourishing, ²²⁶ whilst on the contrary, the Spanish Observants, especially Vega and DeCastro, had a much freer

^{226.} It would be worthwhile to investigate the flourishing study of Scotus at the University of Padua at that time. Here let us recall the most eminent Scotists, Antonius Trombetta, Mauritius de Portu, and Johannes Vigerius.

attitude towards the Doctor Subtilis. 227

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227. Cfr. V. Heynck, "Die Stellung des Konzilstheologen Andreas de Vega O.F.M.," in: Franz. Studien, 27 (1940) 88-103; 129-148.

THE PRIMACY OF TRUTH

ATS MAY die of curiosity but men live by it. It is not unusual to hear a man say he would prefer death to the mindless existence of the insane, for human life is by definition a rational existence. The urge to experience is an urge to knowledge. From the days of Thales there has been a concerted and scientifically organized quest for truth, beauty and goodness but without truth we should be forever ignorant of goodness and beauty. To satisfy their need of truth men prosecute physical research and buy newspapers, build theories and break confidences, stock libraries and circumnavigate the globe.

Truth is not a luxury but a necessity, and one of which we cannot be deprived. Unlike some other of life's necessities truth is always available in an unending supply which cannot be depleted for it is as endless as being. We have only to open with the key of our senses that sample of the universe which is called environment to find at our hand a teeming storehouse of truth.

Our minds need truth as avidly as our bodies need food. Almost everyone can recall some incident from childhood when his young spirit, craving straightforward answers, was rasped by the rank injustice in the artful dodges of teachers and other adults. Almost everyone can remember evenings of tireless debate which continued in his own thoughts into the lonely hours of the morning.

No normal person accepts life altogether uncritically. We are questioning beings who experience an insistent need to crack the surface of things, to unravel the twisted skein of appearances. The question mark is an eloquent symbol of man's attitude toward the neighbor beside him, the universe around him, and the God above him.

Think of all the questioning apparatus of the physicists, splitting molecules into atoms and smashing atoms into

electrons, resolving the material universe into its least common denominators; the questionings of psychologists, some of them striving to reduce the questioning mind itself to a cipher; of the philosophers with questioning distinctions probing, like so many scalpels, a slow patient progress to the core of truth. Humanity is marshalled in queues which are really spiritual breadlines, and the bread they are seeking is the bread of truth.

There are men who tell us that we shall never find the truth we seek, that our search for it is a diverting, delightful, amusing-and futile-occupation. And there are men who tell us that there is no truth, or that what we have always called truth is merely the practical and pleasant attainment of our desires. If there is really no such thing as truth then there is no such thing as goodness and all the ideals of our civilization are evanescent bubbles inflated with the unsubstantial stuff of our own foolish pride.

To say that truth is always a subjective thing which must remain a matter of personal appeal and choice is to deny it altogether. Choice is more unpredictable than the weather. Voltaire thought Shakespeare a savage, and Carlyle called Voltaire a madman. The Bureaus of Standards and of Weights are Measures and institutions erected to refute these theorists.

Every normal mind knows that truth is an absolute and that all the enduringly beautiful and good things of life are rooted in it. Goodness and beauty are its fruit and flower. There are persons who so deeply appreciate truth that they strive for it constantly, and they are called philosophers. There are persons who so dearly appreciate beauty that they seek it instinctively, and they are called artists. There are persons who so cordially appreciate goodness that they pursue it insistently, and they are called saints.

We know with Lord Byron that the tree of knowledge is not the tree of life, but we know too that we must eat of the tree of knowledge or die. The choice has altered since Adam's time. Today God comes to us through knowledge of His effects. We shall know the truth, He told us, and the truth will make us free.

What is truth? The meaning of truth is a prime concern of philosophy. The exploration of truth is the philosopher's only function for philosophy is systematic thought about ultimates. It is not enough to ask whether the statements of any philosophy are true. We must answer the more ultimate question: what is truth itself?

To think is to answer truly the questions we ask ourselves. Thinking is the permanent duty of every man since life without reflection would be subhuman. Intellectual anemia undermines happiness, the health of reason. In every ordered life action follows thought, practice follows theory; the will must follow the intellect because, in all reality, goodness follows truth. Truth and goodness are facets of the one reality upon which the mind feeds. That is why there is no such thing as an irrelevant truth.

All human action is born of a nostalgia for the Absolute. Whenever I choose anything I elect it because I judge it preferable to something else. It seems better to me than its rival. Now, if there is no good there is no better, and if there is no best there is neither a good nor a better. If there is no absolute perfection how can anything be called more or less perfect? Things are better or worse only insofar as they approximate or recede from something that is best. If there were no absolute perfection nothing would be comparable to anything else for each would possess a degree-less perfection. Without the absolute there is no yardstick for judgment, no common denominator of agreement.

You would not say that New York is nearer or farther unless you had a point of reference in mind. It is only nearer or farther in reference to somewhere else. In like manner, everything is good or better than something else only with reference to a fixed point of absolute perfection.

Truth is the fixed point of all our statements in the communication of mind with mind that is called language. But we can think and speak only of what is and hence truth is being. Whether we say with Hilary that "the true is being manifesting and declaring itself", or with Aquinas that "truth is the agreement of thing with intellect", or with Augustine that "truth is being," we are speaking the same thought. truth is what the intellect sees in being.

As a unified state must have definite frontiers a unified mind must have definite frontiers of thought. The boundaries of truth edge the domain of our thinking but they do not limit it, for their edge is the fringe of nothingness since truth is coterminous with being.

Ontological truth is the truth of things, logical truth the truth of thought, and moral truth the truth of communication. In this assimilation of being through logical truth we see the difference between the mysterious and the absurd, between what is beyond reason and what is beneath it. Where the light is too great or too little the eye does not see clearly. Where the truth is too great or too little the intellect does not know clearly. Now if you bear in mind the relationship between truth and being, the fact that truth is a partial aspect of being, that it is being seen in reference to an intellect, you will easily understand that the truth of anything you read or hear, no matter how commonplace or trivial, depends upon the existence of God.

The sentence: "This is a typewriter" would be meaningless and incomprehensible if God did not exist. It would be even less than that; it would be the nothing of speech which could never have been uttered. For see how each of these three kinds of truth and being depends upon the one preceding it. Moral truth, the truth of communication, depends upon Logical truth, the truth of thought, for words are merely reflections of thoughts. Logical truth, the truth of thought, depends upon ontological truth, the truth of things, for thoughts are merely reflections of things.

And the truth of things, their intelligibility, their meaning, their obvious purpose, is derived from their makers. When you understand the function of a telephone your mind reflects the purpose which Alexander Graham Bell put into that conglomeration of wires, batteries and bells. When you understand the plot of a play you are intellectually grasping the meaning which the playwright placed into that composition of words, phrases and sentences. Words are the way we understand the thoughts of others, just as thoughts are the way we understand the things outside us.

As the realization of an architect's idea, a skyscraper has ontological truth. No one would argue that it is an uncaused thing which simply happened. And what is true of a skyscraper is true of a mountain or a rose. In digesting the ontological truth of these things, our minds rethink the creative thoughts of God.

If it is true to say that you are what you eat, it is also true to say that you are what you know. The mind is nourished by the truth of being as the body is nourished by food. Being is one bread by which man lives. And as the reality of every created being is derived from the uncreated being, so the truth and goodness of created things is derived from the truth and goodness of uncreated being. Since goodness and truth are merely aspects of being, in all our knowing we are enlightened by the truth which is God, and in all that we desire we are fascinated by his goodness.

There is no need of a metaphysical sodium pentathol to serve as an ontological truth-serum for there can be no such thing as ontological untruth. Since truth is being, and since ontological being is the shadow of God, to suppose ontological untruth is to suppose that God does not exist. And if God does not exist, if there is no creator, whence is creation? Did the universe make itself? If it did, then books can make authors, children generate their parents, and all of thought is recreant to reality.

There are two orders of existence, two ways in which things have being: the real order and the mental order. All knowledge is a matter of putting the real order into the mental order or of getting the outside-one's-head to become the inside-one's-head, of having the mind conform to reality.

Now, this very conformity is what we mean by truth. If I say that Albany is the capital of New York State I am speaking the truth. What I have thought and said about Albany is something in my mental order conforming with something in the real order. Albany is the capital of New York State in the real order of things, and if in my own private mental order I assert that Syracuse is its capital there is no conformity between my mental order and the real order and consequently there is no truth to my statement.

Truth is always just such a conformity. Truth is the honest acceptance and statement of reality. The unfortunate creature in the psychopathic ward who identifies himself with Napoleon is suffering delusions. There is no conformity between his mental order and the Napoleon of the real order. What he thinks and tells about himself is not truth but a lie.

As all beings are derived from the First Being so all truths are derived from the First Truth. Being is truth, truth is being. It is because of the Unity of the First Being that truth is one. That is why facts cannot contradict each other and why consistency is a virtue. The transcendent unity of the First Being is the reason why philosophy can give us a unitary conception of the world and why it is impossible for the laws of any science to conflict with the laws of any other science. There is only one eternal truth for there is only one Eternal Being.

There is a fixed and final standard of unity, truth and goodness. It is the fixed and final being. Truth makes knowledge in the same way that causes make effects. Truth and goodness are convertible with that being which causes transmit and communicate. Actual being is the root of all causality and absolute being is the root of all actual being.

Human inventiveness is largely plagiarism. Since the intellect functions only after the senses have done their work, and since the effects of nature historically preceded the effects of man, every artifice of man is originally in some manner a copy of the work done by nature's Author. This imitation is obvious in the fine and useful arts for they are forthright and undisguised replicas of nature. It is less obvious in the tools and instruments which man has made, but closer scrutiny will prove that most of these have been directly copied from human anatomy. The semaphore is an artificial policeman with extended arms, hammers are fists, saws are teeth and towers are giants. To call the human body a machine should be a violation of the patent laws. It would be more sensible to mistake a machine for a human body. The invention of the wheel would come spontaneously to anyone observing a boy turning somersaults or rolling snowballs downhill.

Things are embodied ideas. To learn things is to strip off the body and appropriate the idea, the truth. To make things is to clothe an idea in the apparel of matter.

Just as the relation of artificial things to the intellect of their artificer is essential and necessary, so the relation of natural things to the divine intellect is essential and necessary. The reason for this is that both natural and artificial things are effects and hence their being and truth follow their causes. A telephone, for example, is intelligible to me only because prior to its existence it was intelligible to the mind of Alexander Graham Bell. If he had not known it before it was, I could never know it. The truth of the telephone has taken this journey:

Bell's intellect
Causality
Telephone
My knowledge of the telephone

Now, what is said of men with regard to artificial things, is true of God with regard to natural things. It is only by discovering in the telephone the truth which was previously in the mind of its maker, that I can have knowledge of this artificial thing. And it is only by discovering in physics or chemistry the truth which was previously in the mind of their Maker, that I can have knowledge of these natural things.

It is the glory of science that all of its assertions will survive the acid test of experiment. Philosophy has its own laboratory where men daily put its theories to the test of action, and it is called Ethics. Ethics is lived philosophy, the arena in which truth becomes goodness. Ethics is the workroom where the will executes the plan of reason. The ethical is therefore the true and the reasonable, and for that reason the practical and the best. There are no moral aims which the intellect cannot sanction for the very good reason that truth and goodness are one in the matrix of being. The will has no worthy actions which are unworthy of the intellect, and the intellect has no higher dignity than when it contemplates the truth that will engage the will in action. The duties which it imposes, the course which it prescribes are commands issuing from the captain on the bridge, the neglect of which may cause shipwreck. That is why morality is truth and why immorality is a synonym for unreason.

Loyalty to truth is the highest and simplest form of realism since truth is only reality in contact with mind. To say that you believe something because it is true is a profession of rationalism in the best meaning of that abused word. It is a rationalism that is outmoded in modern philosophy where almost anything but truth is accepted as a motive for credibility. The pragmatist believes only what has practical consequences. The utilitarian believes only what is useful. The instrumentalist believes what is helpful. Where the scholastic appeals to reason the others appeal to the emotions, the senses, the pocket-book or the myth of progress.

Apostasy from truth is the sin of Lucifer in which the

intellect utters its awful Non serviam. There is no measuring the effects of this sin. Without truth we have no rational ground for believing or doing anything. Probability is no incentive to action unless we know that something is probably true. Without truth we can never be sure of anything. With our destiny in doubt, our nature problematical, nobility is nonsense, all is disputable and fatalism inevitable. Then the solution to the riddle of existence, dependent upon our endocrine glands, will be either an unsubstantiated optimism or cynicism and despair. We will see the world as a grand illusion where the cruel joke is on us. But that would be an impossible joke, humorless and pointless.

Indeed, it would be impossible. That is why it cannot be true. For however unsavory and unappealing, truth is real. However fascinating, the lie is unreal. Truth is substance, the lie is shadow. Truth is permanent, the lie is transient. Truth is fertile, the lie is barren.

Nations as well as human beings must be founded upon truth if their character is to endure. When the founding fathers of our republic spoke in the Declaration of Independence of the inalienable rights with which men are endowed by their Creator they held "these truths to be self-evident." They did not hold them as tentative and provisional assertions or as opinions, but as truths. They held these rights as incontrovertible not because they were pleasant, or useful, but because they were true.

Today in our justifiable demand for academic freedom anyone suspected of deriving his convictions from something other than evidence falls beneath our contempt. Freedom of inquiry is no longer a right to be fought for. The right to use objective methods of seeking the truth is recognized everywhere outside totalitarian countries. This is as it should be. But it is a great concentration on means to the neglect of ends, for what will it avail us to insist upon objective methods of seeking the truth if meanwhile we deny that there is any objective truth to be sought?

It is a common academic assumption that while certain statements may be true within a fixed framework nothing is finally, absolutely and altogether true. The wooly-minded who are impressed by such assertions seem not to realize that if nothing is true nothing is false. If this theory breaks out into common social practice human society will be debased to a level below that of the animals and the City of Man will become a jungle.

If, as the pragmatists are fond of saying, the true is the emotionally satisfying or the ethically inspiring, then what, may we ask, is falsity? Would the truth of a journalist's report of painful death be more emotionally satisfying than the lie which denied it? Is not the legend of Santa Claus ethically inspiring to thousands of children for weeks before Christmas? And yet the report of disaster may be true while the message of joy is false.

Truth and falsity are not concerned with psychological reactions but with objective reality. Facts are not to be persuaded by coaxing or by tears. They exist in a realm beyond fear or favor.

The crude pantheism of Emerson's Brahma wherein the slayer is identified with the slain, shadow with sunlight, nearness with distance, the doubter with the doubt, shame with fame, is an effrontery to any normal intelligence. And yet, this mingling of all things with their contraries and contradictories must happen if truth is relative. If this were so the universe would be unintelligible and the cosmos chaos.

The existence of absolute truth is an absolute being alone explains the intelligibility of the universe, the orderly processes of nature and of thought, the uniformity of nature and the universal reign of law. We assume that nature will always act in the same way because it follows a plan. Before its execution this plan existed in the mind of the being who formulated it and whom we call God. Things now exist because He exists. Things can be known because He first knew them. Things are desired because He made them desirable.

There are means because He is the end. There is purpose in the universe because there is purpose in His mind. There is time because of His eternity. There is space because of His immensity. His Being is the unique and ultimate explanation of the unity, truth and goodness of all that is.

The rationality of God is therefore the ultimate groundwork of all knowledge. It explains the rationality of the sciences. Human knowledge no more makes intelligibility than Columbus made America. The mind of man can only discover what is already there. The law of right and wrong is immutable because it is the law of reason. It is not the law of man's reason but of God's. This and all other natural law is therefore part of the integrated and coherent pattern of the universe which is uniform with the unity of God.

We have been considering what are called "absolutes". The person who accepts the existence of these absolutes is called an absolutist. There is many an academic circle in this country where to call a man an absolutist would be to court the academic equivalent of fisticuffs.

The man who resents the appelation likes to refer to himself as a relativist. He proclaims in wearing this dubious title, that he does not believe that anything is absolutely true or absolutely false, absolutely good or absolutely bad, but that everything is relatively true or relatively false, relatively good or relatively bad. "There's nothing either good or bad, true or false, but thinking makes it so," chants the relativist in solemn tones of absolute assurance.

And yet, isn't it curious that the relativist does not hold his relativism relatively but absolutely? Even the relativist is absolutely sure of his position.

For fairness' sake let us assume with the relativists that ethics and morality are purely personal questions, matters of individual preference and social custom. Or let us say, with the Communists, that morality is a by-product of the methods of production in any given period of history, or

with some reigning favorites in academic circles, that there is no absolute objective norm of truth, no way of objectively deciding who or what is right and who or what is wrong.

What are the practical consequences of such an assumption? Probably nothing very drastic if a mere handful of persons think that way. It would matter very little to the United States Navy if a few of its ships were sailing about without compass or rudder, but it would matter greatly if they all were. You may, however, be sure that the Board of Administration at Annapolis would never countenance any of its professors teaching the cadets a new theory of navigational relativism.

Moral relativism, however, is all the vogue. It has been in style for the past four hundred years. The late Oliver W. Holmes Jr., the celebrated Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, was capable of writing that: "when the Germans in the late war disregarded what we call the rules of the game, I don't see that there was anything to be said except: we don't like it and shall kill you if we can. So when it comes to the development of a corpus juris the ultimate question is what do the dominant forces of the community want and do they want it hard enough to disregard whatever inhibitions may stand in the way?" "Our system of morality," wrote Holmes, "is a body of imperfect social generalizations expressed in terms of emotion."

Suppose a man is what Holmes calls him: "a cosmic ganglion, a momentary intersection of what humanly speaking we call streams of energy, such as give white light at one point and the power of making syllogisms at another". Suppose man is this subject of spectroscopy. Then why all the sanctimonious nonsense about the dignity of man, the inviolability of human rights and the sanctity of law? If Holmes is right then all these high-minded ideas are the intellectual provender of fools, and any man who walks past an open and unguarded safe-deposit vault without helping himself to its contents is a prince of fools.

The explosive power of an atomic bomb is weak and ineffectual when compared to the devastating potential of such ideas as these. If they ever become generally accepted by our countrymen this nation cannot long survive. If a man with the courage of his convictions were to accept them society would not tolerate his existence. "A dog will fight for his bone", said Holmes, knowing that varieties of human dogs relish varieties of bones.

It requires but a small expenditure of cerebral effort to sound with the plummet of philosophy the shallow depths of this nonsense of relativism. A relation exists between two or more things. If a father is related to a son, a son is also related to a father. If a two-legged man has one short leg he also has one long leg. In other words, if everything was indescriminately short or long, true or false, good or bad, nothing would be any of these things.

Heraclitus centuries ago started a lot of thinkers off on the wrong foot in this doctrine. "All is flux," said Heraclitus. Perhaps it was on a rainy day when all sensible Athenians were indoors that he first made this vacuous utterance, for certainly if there had been a man in the street he would have put his finger on the absurdity directly. "Look here, Heraclitus", he would have remonstrated, "you're spouting thoughtless words. For if all is flux, if all is in motion, then, so far as anyone could tell, nothing is in motion. If all is in motion then all is at rest. For how in Zeus' name can you determine motion except by something which is standing still?"

Suppose you and I were sitting in the seats of two trains on parallel tracks conversing with each other through the window in sign language. Suppose in the midst of our absorbing conversation, both our trains started in the same direction at the same moment, accelerating equally and remaining at the same speed for, let us say, a distance of five miles. We would have no way of knowing that our journeys had begun, and to the best of our knowledge, both

trains would still be standing in the terminal.

If Truth exists nowhere there should be no laws against perjury. If Truth exists nowhere it is foolish to trust dictionaries, encyclopedias, traffic-policemen who give directions, men who measure with scales, fathers who give their sons advice, teachers who instruct from text-books or clergymen who preach sermons.

Anyone who knows a hawk from a handsaw knows that this way madness lies. We know that we ourselves are trustworthy and that our own trust in standards has, for the most part, gone unbetrayed, Truth is a universal human need which will not go unfulfilled. The mind needs facts rather than falsities as much as the stomach needs food rather than poison.

The charter for American liberty, as found in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, states that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights. Would it be equally true to say that some men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, or that no men are endowed with these rights, or that it is the State which makes this endowment?

Of necessity the truth is one and indivisible because truth is being and apart from being there is nothing. That is why there can be any number of false answers to a mathematical problem, but only one true answer. Indeed, it would be better to say that there can be only one answer, for the others are not answers at all since in their presence the problem remains unsolved.

No scholastic philosopher would be guilty of agreeing with Sir Thomas Browne that many "impossible falsities do not withstanding include wholesome moralities, and such as expiate the trespass of their absurdities". There is nothing either wholesome or moral about falsity and no power on earth can expiate absurdity in Sir Thomas' sense. Absurdity is falsity clothed in the cap and bells of a clown.

Truth is the paramount concern of human discourse for

truth is reality. "Let truth prevail though the heavens fall!" said St. Jerome. Ontological truth will always prevail, of course, but human beings often have their willful and erring way with logical truth and whenever they do havoc is wrought. With Margaret Fuller we must resolve to accept the universe and with equal prudence resolve to preserve honesty in our report of it.

Plato abhorred "the lie in the soul" with a cold white passion for he knew it as the assassin of being. Truth is the great emancipator because it is the great disciplinarian and there is no liberation except through discipline. You cannot draw melody from slacked strings. You cannot drive an automobile without submitting your whims to the discipline of machinery. You cannot write a sentence without submitting your thought to the discipline of language. Slovenly and otiose practice have never made perfection because art and work are synonymous terms.

"You shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free". You are free to count if you know the truth of arithmetic. You are free to build beautifully if you know the truth of architecture. You are a free man to the extent that you are unfettered by the chains of ignorance. It is truth which makes the liberal arts liberal, as the lie makes minds slaves of propaganda.

The consideration of the absoluteness of truth leads to profound questions of ethics, morality, and law in general. If there is no absoluteness about truth, then there is no such thing as right or wrong, and we should even refrain from calling Hamlet right when he says, "There's nothing either right or wrong but thinking makes it so". Indeed, it is only because of the existence of these divine constants which men call goodness, truth and beauty that there can be anything good, true or beautiful in the total effort of living.

EXISTENTIAL IMPORT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF DUNS SCOTUS

1

PROLEGOMENA

1. The Norm of Wisdom

HE PHILOSOPHIA Perennis is, humanly speaking, the norm of wisdom. Any system of thought that typifies it, must therefore answer the fundamental ontological needs of integral humanism.

Infortunately, in order to assure with greater efficiency the sovereignty of reason, too many philosophers have confined philosophy to the realm of abstractions, thus debarring themselves from the thrills of vital human experience. The mind has been drilled to ideological acrobatics, where true wisdom might have been contacted. "The greatest reproach one may cast upon most traditional philosophies", says Gustave Thibon, "is the fact that they keep aloft concrete reality, aloft the individual of flesh and soul, which lives, which struggles and which suffers hic et nunc". 1

Not so Duns Scotus. The existential import of his philosophical works is on the scale of man. This means, as we shall see, that it fulfills the exigencies of the individual by adjusting him to his true situation and meaning in this world and beyond. Of course, Duns Scotus posits a philosophy; that is to say: an objective-scientific system or method, in which Aristotle's influence is clearly noticeable. Nevertheless his whole work, as it is permeated by an Augustinian influx and inspired by that other existential, *Il Poverello*, focuses on being as the clue to all existential values. Under-

^{1.} Gustave Thibon, "L'Existentialisme de Gabriel Marcel," in *L'Existentialisme Revue de Philosophie*, (Paris, 1947, 2^e édition), p. 144.

stood in this sense, his philosophy proves to be "a way of life," as Helmut Kuhn would put it, based as it is upon "ontological affirmation." Thus, Duns Scotus favors the concrete individual singular, because it alone is true being: "Solum verum ens"; he goes in quest of real transcendency, since alone it discloses ontological communion of beings with the Infinite Being; he finally exalts free will because it can most perfectly join the destinies of that "God-loving-being" man is, to the Being Who is God-loving man, because He is Love.

2. Some Notions About Existence, Existential, Existentialism

A. Existence

Existence, like experience its derivative, cannot properly be defined. It is aphasic. "To treat of existence", Kierkegaard exclaims, "is to abolish it!" As we live existence, feel it, re-create it, it steals away. At the most, one may attempt to describe it. But considering it is the propeller of our substratum through concrete individuation, we do detect the present moment of its unceasing rythmical throb. De ente actualiter existente, it is Duns Scotus who asserts this, tale enim est verum solum ens. 4

According to Duns Scotus, from the metaphysical point of view, to exist is to be posited outside of nothing and exterior to one's causes, by a free creative act of the First Cause. Existence, therefore, is no appendage to some pre-existing essence; it has the full value of a being's intrinsic time or duration. Duns Scotus conceives this duration or intrinsic time as "the intrinsic identity of every something" with its duration, so that there are as many facts of intrinsic time

^{2.} Helmut Kuhn, "Existentialism and Metaphysics," in The Review of Metaphysics, December, 1947, vol. I, n. 2, p. 53.

^{3. &}quot;Individuum est verissime ens et num...". Duns Scotus, Quaest. Metaph., I, 7, q. 13, n. 17, tom. 7, 417b. See also Minges, Duns Scoti Doctrina Philosophica et Theologica, (Ad Claras Aquas, 1930), tom. I, p. 91.

^{4.} Scotus, loc. cit.; Minges, ibid.

or existence as there are existing individual beings. In other words, each existent exists solely by its own existence, because the nature of the facts of existing or being, is determined by the nature of the existents themselves". "Quia nonnisi res existens vere est ens, reapse autem non quidditates rerum, non universalia genera et species, etc.... existunt nonnisi individuum seu singulare ens verum, ens verissimum, maxime ens."

On psychological grounds, Duns Scotus conceives existence as life; implying the self-subsistent vital force of rational free conscious being that exerts its autocreation or personal display. Vivere viventibus est esse. Due to his metaphysical thesis on person, Duns Scotus can assert this on psychological grounds, of every human individual as such; that is to say, whether or not this individual assumes his own personality or is assumed by another person. Consequently, every human individual whosoever, whether assumed or not, is a man in the full sense of the term, and this implies free exercise of his human activities.

This notion of existence as intrinsic time might be considered tantamount to Bergson's views on the same. In both cases the existent's duration is intrinsically personal and incommunicable. Psychologically speaking, Bergson's idea of duration or intrinsic time is the moi interieur of conscience, that is to say a substance, not a static substance, but the indivisible action of a substance, analogous to the scholastic notion of act. Bergson compares it to the tension of a high strung bow at the moment the arrow is being shot; it is the persistence of existence, sufficient, so he says, to safeguard our substantial unity. 8

^{5.} Deodat de Basly, Scotus Docens, (Le Havre, 1934), ch. XI, p. 23.

^{6.} Minges, op. cit., tom. I, ch. 3, p. 15.

^{7.} Duns Scotus, Oxonien. I, 3, dist. 6, q. 7 tom. 14, 305ss. Also see Minges, op. cit., tom. II, p. 345, ch. 3.

^{8.} Chevalier, "Bergson," Nouvelle Edition Revue et Augmentée, (Paris, 1926), ch. IV, V, VII (see note p. 276).

As is evident, Bergson and Duns Scotus are not in contradistinction to each other when defining existence as the intrinsic time or duration of individual beings. At any rate, Duns Scotus' notion (on both metaphysical and psychological grounds) retain the solidity of full complete substantiality: "Imo individuum est verissime ens et unum... Individua sunt maxime substantiae, quia sunt primae substantiae."

Duns Scotus' conception about existence bears also some analogy with the existentialist description. His theme is voluntaristic and optional in the sense that it implies a self-actualization, which although marred by finitude, is nevertheless the highest achievement of man. Karl Jaspers corroborates the statement when speaking of human individuals, he says that "existence is the highest sense of the word; not the biological individual as expressed by vital care, but the free individual as defined by his concern to be." 10

From the psychological ground upon which they evolve, the existentialists describe existence as a projection; a creation of self by self; a jeopardy; an option; the engagement of a free person. "Existence", says Jaspers, "is the irreducible singular subject that comes in touch with himself instead of visualizing an exterior world; it is he who discovers within him a unique and perhaps inexhaustible source of possibilities. It is displayed as a being that I am not by nature, but that I make or create through successive decisions taken upon myself." 11

The similarity between Duns Scotus' notion and the existentialists', consists in identity of existence with the individual and with optional dynamism; whereas the divergence lies in their respective views on being; for in Duns Scotus' system,

^{9.} Duns Scotus, Report. 1, 7, dist. 36, q. 4, n. 14, tom. 22, 452a. Also see Minges, op. cit., tom. I, p. 91.

^{10.} Mikel Dufrenne et Paul Ricoeur, "Karl Jaspers et la Philosophie de l'Existence," in Editions du Seuil, (Paris, 1947), ch. I, 7, p. 22.

^{11.} Ibid., p. 111.

concrete being is substantial reality, while existentialists conceive it as pure relativity. By the very fact that so many existentialists discard the value attributed to substance and to the speculative activities of thought, merely acknowledging the dynamism of lawless freedom, their idea of self-creation, when it is not chaotic, remains forcibly incomplete.

An affinity, nevertheless, can be detected between the conceptions of the *Doctor Subtilis* and the descriptions of the existentialists; he, as they, on the ground of contingency, restores existence in its full individual and optional worth.

Thus, like the little star that twinkles in the heavens of a dark night, existence, human existence, in and out in time and space, flickers its sparks of life away. Or, like the ebb and the inflow of the restless sea tide, it introverts and extroverts its moves.

B. Existential

A distinguo must here guard us, in order that we do not confuse "existential" with "existentialism". Just as subjectivity by no means signifies subjectivism, so existential is not synonymous with existentialism.

The existential, I might say, stands for the sum of ontological personalist values, so graded, as to grant primacy to the concrete individual over the universal abstract of genus and species; to the object; to life over purely speculative thought or objectivation; to undetermined free will over determined intellect; to transcendence over immanence; to the real over the ideal; to love over reason, etc. And since primacy does not exclude its subordinates, the existential appears rightly as the only means of reconciling what Helmut Kuhn terms the "animal passionale" with the traditional animal rationale.

^{12.} Helmut Kuhn, "Existentialism and Metaphysics," in The Review of Metaphysics, December, 1947, vol. I, n. 2, p. 51.

Consequently, an existential philosophy bases its speculations on real existant individual being, while at the same time keeping balance with the essential order that validates science. Being personalistic, such a philosophy shall evidently prove the counterpart of abstract Idealism of the hegelian type, or of that exaggerated realism of which Plato remains the symbol, and according to which sense objects being but a "partial and incomplete manifestation of ideas", are merely projected movable shadows on the cavern wall. It nevertheless maintains intellectual objective values, because these, as well as option, surge from the personal ego to complement the existing subject in his thirst for the meaningful reality of truth. Camus himself seems to have confessed this exigency when he wrote: "That which is absurd is this irrational and distraught desire for clearness. the call of which resounds within the very depths of man." 13 Consequently, man's reason alone, as well as mere optional futurity, is helpless to answer the needs of our legitimate cravings. Paul Ortegat rightly thinks that "the spontaneous vision of man is realistic..., the world exists, I exist, God exists. They exist, and because they are being or beings, they are more than relations; they are self-subsistent, independently of the thought that thinks them and of the will that wills them. They are...." 14

C. Existentialism

I have already mentioned existentialism. This reputed school of thought has become the favorite subject for discussion among college and university amateur philosophers and also among so many fashionable "society" women who enjoy to chatter clatter at a bridge or cocktail party. Roger Trois-Fontaines defines it as: "A passionate return of the individual and his freedom, in order to disengage in the ob-

^{13.} Carnus, "Le Mythe de Sisyphe," p. 37. See also Roger Trois-Fontaines, "Existentialisme et Pensée Chrétienne," (Paris, 1948, 2^e édition), ch. I, p. 40.

^{14.} Ortegat, S.J., "Intuition et Religion," (Paris, 1947, IIIe partie), p. 211.

servative of its proceedings the meaning or signification of his being". 15 It is a philosophy, therefore, trying this tragico-comical experience of renouncing philosophy in terms of philosophy, and this, in order to save philosophy. This modern Janus bears two opposite faces: two doors opening on the threshold of wisdom: Christian existentialism, based upon ontological affirmation, represented by Kierkegaard, Marcel and others, and Atheistic existentialism founded on nihilistic meontology, of which Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and Camus among hosts of others, are representatives. On the whole, despite its many aspects, existentialism remains the "retour au coeur" of which St. Augustine is, perhaps, the strongest exponent:

Sero Te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova, Sero te amavi.....¹⁶

It professes, therefore, to be a reaction against the undue essentialism of intellectualism. "By dint of knowledge", writes Kierkegaard, "we have forgotten what it is to exist". 17 Heidegger also warns us against impersonal existence; he calls it *inauthentic*. 18 The existentialist movement, claiming as it does to be humanistic, produces the individual man versus specified man; human experience and facts versus logical speculation; optional freedom versus the passivity of fatum; "loved love" versus objectivation, etc. Jaspers affirms the following principle which Sartre also upholds: "Man is an existence that posits its essence". 19 This principle, however, bears a dual signification. Understood in the atheistic sense,

^{15.} Trois-Fontaines, "Existentialisme et Pensée Chrétienne," vers une définition. (Paris, 1948, 2^e édition), ch. I, p. 44.

^{16.} Saint Augustine, "Confessions," (Edition Vives, Paris, 1871), ch. XXVII.

^{17.} Regis Jolivet, "L'Existentialisme de Kierkegaard," in L'Existentialisme, Revue de Philosophie, (Paris, 1947, 2^e édition), p. 128.

^{18.} Trois-Fontaines, "Existentialisme et Pensée Chrétienne," Heidegger, (Paris, 1948), ch. I. p. 25.

^{19.} Trois-Fontaines, "Existentialisme et Pensée Chrétienne," Jaspers, (Paris, 1948), ch. 1, p. 28. See also J.P. Sartre, "L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme," (Paris, 1946), p. 12 et sq.

it means radical atheism by which man, devoid of a creator, creates himself into a hopeless nothingness; whereas from the Christian existential point of view, the same principle simply testifies to the fact that the individual, living his intrinsic duration, is existence, by privilege of which this individual becomes the maker of his own free choice and actions, justifying Helmut Kuhn's assertion that "man is a son of his time in the radical sense that his thoughts and beliefs, his response to the world and his action upon it, are fruits of the historical moment." 20

Existentialism is as well the reproach of honest thinkers of all categories, looking full in the face those among philosophers who cool-headedly juggle with "quids", and scornfully overlook contingent facts or deep emotions as a-philosophical and therefore unscientific, forgetting they are indispensable to life. Thus, we then understand how in the estimation of every sincere existentialist, "a live dog is worth more than a dead king," as Gilson remarks, and that the concept of one hundred dollars, although the same, possible or real, is much more valuable and much more appreciated in pocket money, to the man concerned, than as a metaphysical quiddity. ²¹

Rightly nauseated by the rattle of deadbone philosophical concepts, the existentialists, with a vengeance, turn to the concrete, and with perhaps a reminiscence of Ezekiel's vision, hope to restore philosophy to life again, by adding flesh on these bones, and by breathing a fresh spirit into them. Possibly so, the Christian existentialists shall succeed, but the atheists we presume, shall only serve to add dead bones upon dead bones. Indeed, a concrete puzzle instead of a mystery is what the world appears to Sartre, when, in his regal concrete style, he describes the "En-soi" as that "massive fullness crammed with self; a lifeless datum de-

^{20.} Helmut Kunn, op. cit., pp. 45 and 46.

^{21.} Gilson, "lère Conférence sur l'Existence et la Philosophie," (Université de Montreal). Resumé dans Le Devoir, (Mardi, 30 Avril, 1946).

spoiled of intelligibility - (see analysis of the small pea... and of the root). The kill-joy is the "Pour-soi" of conscious man, because it introduces a gap of nothingness (une faille de néant), a sort of decompression or perpetual desintegration of being, (un decollement de l'être). 22 His idea of freedom proves the paradox of a strange fatality, since man rivetted to his liberty is irretrievably compelled to desperate responsibility, without no other issue than the tragic doom of despair. Sartre appears as one who, confronted by human finitude, prefers giving it away to the God of Wisdom.

On religious grounds, existentialism does not lack relevancy. Faith is foremost; not the abstract faith of a catechism formula, but a living faith. Kierkegaard writes sublimely on the faith of Abraham, while Gabriel Marcel warns us that: "To believe, in the strong sense of the word-not to presume that-always consists in believing in a thou, that is to say in a personal or suprapersonal reality, capable of being addressed to and, as it were, placed beyond all judgment bearing upon any sort of objective datum." "God is God", he adds, "in so far as lle remains the Thou absolute. As soon as we speak of God, that is to say, as soon as we transform Him into He, we do no more speak of God. God cannot be reached safely in colloquy, or more exactly, in invocation and prayer." ²³

So it is, that existentialism in its terrible revenge of the hic et nunc concrete individual values, takes a bold leap, a free soaring out of the cave of shadows.

3. Existential Philosophy Offers a Solution

From the aforesaid, one can sufficiently measure the great divide between reason and existence, to foresee, owing to

^{22.} Pedro Descogs, I, "L'Athéisme de J.P. Sartre," II, "J.P. Sartre et le Problème de Dieu."

^{23.} D. Dubarle, "L'Ontológie Phénoménologique de J.P. Sartre," in "L'Existentialisme," Revue de Philosophie, (Paris, 1946, 2^e édition, 1947).

their apparent parallelism, the difficulty of the task alloted to philosophy in trying to bridge them. On the one hand, the philosophical boundaries are closed to the whole concrete existents, because unintelligible; on the other hand, there is refusal to "capsulate the universe" by objectivation into this neat catalogue of inauthentic existence.

If this be the case, how shall communication be effected in order to permit exchanges? How bridge the gulf of the chacun chez-soi? It does seem that neither essentialism nor existentialism fully answers the needs of the human person endowed with both intellect and free-will. Man therefore expects that philosophy, taking this fact into account shall comply with it. "The thou and the ego, the subject-object or the object-subject are the conditions", as Paul Ortegat says, "of every love and of every knowledge of things as well as of men." 25

As we know, rationalism is and has been the mischief maker of the antagonism between thought and will, which ended in their arbitrarily splitting apart. For instance, when it formulated the principle concerning the illegitimacy of passing from the logical to the real order, rationalism did but divulge the unconscious idealism it pretended to disown. We need but refer to the position taken on the matter by noted theologians, such as Romeyer, concerning the ontological arguments of St. Anselm, and of Leibniz, which were discussed at the St. Thomas Roman Pontifical Academy in 1936-1937, ²⁶ to be convinced of the sophistication of the rationalistic principle.

On the contrary, existential philosophy ever retains its intensive personalistic unity of life and thought. "To give up

^{24.} Trois-Fontaines, "La Notion de Présence chez Gabriel Marcel," in Existentialisme Chrétien: Gabriel Marcel, (Paris, 1947), p. 265.

^{25.} Jeanne Delhomme, "Témoiguage et Dialectique," in Existentialisme Chrétien: Gabriel Marcel, (Paris, 1947).

^{26.} Ortegat, S.J., op. cit., p. 222.

thought", wrote Jaspers, "is to give up existence; I cannot be existence unless I think existence." ²⁷ Let us remember that! Being also aware of St. Augustine, Father of both scholasticism and existentialism, who, in perfect balance with the rational and the passionate nature of man, is as Cayre remarks, "at the very opposite of the pure thinker who can conceive truth yet not live it, or of the active man who can live without troubling himself over principles; on either side he feels deeply concerned; the spirit and the will are really binding." ²⁸

With this in view, we now turn to the solution offered by existential philosophy. Firstly, existential philosophy must restore to its intelligibility the whole concrete world of individuals and phenomena; it must acknowledge man's responsive intellectual power to understand it unaltered, that is to say, reeking with existential value, mysterious though it be. For, wrote Gabriel Marcel, "that which exists and that which counts is this individual, it is the real individual that I am." 29 Such an attainment must rest upon an intrinsic criterium which, radically infallible, can assure certitude. Secondly, existential philosophy must also be capable of perceiving the ontological mystery of real transcendental metaphysical being qua being, and reach it, not as a vacuity, but as the highest intelligible existential fact or raison d'être, capable of revealing the "ontological communion," that binds the universe and the Infinite Absolute.

Marcel had foreseen the importance of the individual as a clue to transcendental being, when he wrote: "The more we shall be willing to acknowledge individual being as such, the more we shall be guided and, as it were, make our way

^{27.} Léonard M. Puech, O.F.M., "Une Preuve oubliée de l'Existence de Dieu," in Nos Cahiers, (September, 1939), pp. 269, 270, 271-tom. IV.

^{28.} Mikel Dufrenne et Paul Ricoeur, op. cit., II partie, ch. I, p. 112.

^{29.} F. Cayré, "La Philosophie de Saint Augustin et l'Existentialisme," in "L'Existentialisme," Revue de Philosophie, (Paris, 1947, 2^e édition), p. 19.

towards comprehension of being qua being." ³⁰ Finally, existential philosophy must revert to that which is the first and last word of existence in the human individual: free will, because it is existence of man in the act of weaving itself to a destiny of hatred... or of love.

So the road is now clear for philosophy. She laughs away her fears, raising her beacon to a world aghast. Had not Kierkegaard himself requested her courteous help in his attempt to restore existential values which, according to him, should nevertheless do away with her? She laughs away her fears, because in the last word, it is in her power to utter: "Thou sayest: I must not philosophize; but this I say: Thou must philosophize to demonstrate that that thou must not. Therefore, somehow or other, thou must philosophize."

H

EXISTENTIAL POSITION OF DUNS SCOTUS

1. The Outset

To posit existence, being, and freedom, is in equal measure, to posit the existential problem. Precisely, Duns Scotus has done this by means of three solution-keys; intuition, univocity and aseity, bearing straight upon the threefold primacy of existence, being, and freedom.

Duns Scotus posits the creative act at the outset of all finitude. This implies passage from nothingness to being: "Creare est aliquid de nihilo producere in effectu." All finite beings thereby exert the polarity of attraction to the

^{30.} Gabriel Marcel, Jeanne Delhomme, "Le Mystère Ontologique l'Ontologia Concrète," (Paris, 1947), pp. 120-121.

^{31.} Scotus, Oxonien. 1, 2, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 3; tom., 11, 49a. See also Minges, tom. II, p. 259.

magnet of infinitude. Who started them, expressed in men by the distraught desire for infinite truth, beauty and love, is termed happiness; and a drawback inherent to the shortcomings of finitude and its tendency to nothingness, which, among men, generates fear, anxiety, pain and death. Indeed, the clue to the whole existential tragedy lies in this polarity of non-absolute beings causing their individual oscillation which Duns Scotus calls intrinsic time, and which is nothing else than individual substance limited to its ever renewed actual and factual finite present, attracted by the infinite.

The creative act also implies contingency: "Deus causat omnia quae sunt ad extra contingenter," 32 in which no susceptive is presupposed: "In creatione nihil susceptivum praesupponitur. 33 Creatio est productio totius creati in esse, non praesupposita aliqua parte eius." 34 One could not more pertinently do away with platonician essences to safeguard the creative act. Thus, according to Duns Scotus, the ex nihilo of creation must be interpreted in its strictest sense, because any medium whatsoever is intrinsically repugnant to the term a quo of creation. Thence, Duns Scotus formulates the following stern principle: "Inter ens actu et nihil non est medium," 35 and explains it thus: Any given proportion between actual being and nothingness is null and void, because nothingness is deficient to measure. Consequently, the term ad quem of the creative act must be an existential being; nothing less, nothing more. Hence, no real distinction can arbitrarily split essence and existence; they are really identical in every existential created being. Duns Scotus calls the real distinction a suitable fiction: "Nescio enim istam fictionem

^{32.} Scotus, Oxonien. I, 2, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 5, tom. 11, 54. See also Minges, tom. II, p. 261.

^{33.} Scotus, Oxonien. I, 1, dist. 17, q. 3, n. 34, tom. 10, 97a. See also Minges, tom. II, p. 260.

^{34.} Scotus, Oxonien. I, 2, dist. 1, q. 4, n. 30, tom. 11, 180b. See also Minges, tom. II, p. 260.

^{35.} Scotus, Oxonien. I, 4, dist. 1, q. 1, nn. 11-13, tom. 16, 375. See also Minges, tom. I, p. 9.

quod esse est quid superveniens essentiae," ³⁶ and, with a bit of mischief he adds: "Ens aliquod quod sit extra causam suam quin habeat esse proprium, non capio." ³⁷

In point of fact, Duns Scotus traces the creative act to its origin by firmly asserting that "the essences of things cannot be and are not "prioritatae naturae" previous to the idea God has of them." 38 The "ratio cognoscendi" in God, he teaches, is the Divine Intellect normally productive of each individual singular, according to a proper knowledge the Divine Intellect has of each. For, as Boehner writes: "Ile does not use one and the same knowledge for all things to be produced. Consequently, He forms each singular thing according to a proper knowledge; ergo singula propriis rationibus format." 39 The ideas of things are not, therefore, preexistent essences as say the Platonists; they are merely known ideas as such: "Idea est cognitum ut cognitum." 40

Let it here be said that Duns Scotus' theory on divine ideas, rightly understood and interpreted, by no means confirms the unfounded and unjustified statement made by Maritain in his recent article: "L'Existentialisme de Saint-Thomas", 41 in which he insinuates that Duns Scotus is a "libertiste" to the extent that, if God had wanted, He could

^{36.} Scotus, Oxonien. 4, dist. 11, q. 3, n. 46; XVIII, 429a.

^{37.} Scotus, Oxonien. 4, dist. 43, q. 1, n. 7. See also Debasly, "Scotus Docens," ch. X, p. 23.

^{38.} Scotus, Oxonien. I, l, dist. 36, n. 4 and 6, tom. 10, 567b, 575a. Intellectus divinus, ut intellectus praecise, producit in Deo rationes ideales. Intellectus divinus producit illa intelligibilia in esse intelligibili.

^{39.} Boehner, The History of the Franciscan School, Part III, Duns Scotus, (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1945-46), p. 100.

^{40.} Scotus, Reportata I, 2, dist. 12, q. 2, n. 10, tom. 23, 18b. "Idea est objectum cognitum ut cognitum." "Immo ipsum objectum cognitum est idea." See also Boehner, p. 100.

^{41.} Maritain, "L'Existentialisme de Saint Thomas," in *Esistenzialismo*, (Casa Editrice, Marietti, 1947), Acta Pont. Academiae Romanae S. Thomae Aq., Nova Series, vol. XIII.

have made mountains without valleys and the circle a square. If Monsieur Maritain would take the trouble to go through Duns Scotus' works, instead of being satisfied with exhibiting a vieux cliché, he might be able to give to the public a correct estimate of Duns Scotus' genuine thought which is as follows: "Cognitio idearum a parte Dei est mere naturalis et necessario, quia omnis cognitio praecedens ibi actum voluntatis est mere naturalis et per essentiam, ut ipsa est ratio mere naturalis intelligendi." ⁴² The intellect being naturally prior to the will, as Duns Scotus teaches that the divine ideas are also natural and necessary, and not dependent on the will of God.

From Duns Scotus' doctrine on creation, we can surmise how keenly aware the *Doctor Subtilis* was of the superiority of individual singularity: *hic*, *haec*, *hoc*, in regard to its genus and species. By sweeping clean platonic essences, he posits the initial step for a real individuation, which principle is nothing else than the *ultima realitas entis*; and creation itself finds here its full justification.

The existential import of these views on divine Ideas and Creation is evidenced when one applies them to practical effect. Indeed, there is all the difference in the world between the case of Janet, William, and Richard convinced of the fact that God is really concerned about their ego because He knows each, inside out, from all eternity, and the case of Aristotle of old, who pretended that God is unconcerned about singular individuals since He cannot and does not know them. It is also evidenced from the Christian point of view of both philosophy and theology, as both envolve an existential meaning. Let us suppose, for instance, that things have already their esse independently from their existence, what happens? Duns Scotus answers: "In such a case, since it would not be possible either to give them or take away from

^{42.} Scotus, Oxonien. I, 1, dist. 38, n. 5, tom. 10, 605b. See also Minges, tom. II, p. 115.

them the esse, creation ex nihilo is impossible: "Quia alioquin nihil creari potest; creatio impossibilis est." 43 There might be a commutation to another mode of existence, but no creation proper.

But one may ask: If this be the case, how shall we cope with the problem of differentiation concerning beings in which essence and existence are identified? Duns Scotus might give this ready answer: Finite beings differ as much by existence, since existence is identified with the essence by which they differ. For, as Belemond remarks, we need not ask ourselves "whether there is in a given object, a horse, for instance, a distinction of entity to entity, of reality A to B, between that which makes the horse a non nihilum and that which makes it a horse. By suppressing the essence of this horse from its existence or vice versa, there remains nothing else but a bell'nulla". 44 "Since blindness cannot be said to be constitutive of sight, Duns Scotus will say, then no esse of the mere possibles constitute real existence". "Possibilitas alicuius rei non plus exprimit quam caecitas in oculo, cum etiam oculus caecus secundum naturam suam possit et debeat videre, etsi reapse non videt." 45

Wolter's pronouncement was therefore correct. To ask whether the philosophy of Duns Scotus is essential or existential, is a pseudo-problem. It is based on a false opposition. 46

^{43.} Belmond, "Essence et Existence," in Etudes Franciscaines, 1911, XXV-98-100. See also, "La Distinction réelle entre essence et Existence. Sa valeur apologétique" in Etudes Franciscaines, 1912, XXVIII, 537, 556.

^{44.} Scotus, Oxonien. I, 2, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 7, tom. 17. 63a. See also Minges, tom. I, p. 16.

^{45.} Scotus, Oxonien. 1, 1, dist. 30, q. 2, n. 15, tom. 10, 461a. Cfr. dist. 36, n. 6-11, tom. 10, 575ss. See also Minges, tom. I, p. 14.

^{46.} Allan B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Functions in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. (The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1946, Part II), ch. IV, p. 66.

2. INTUITION

A. Primacy of the Singular

The key to individual concrete value is intuition. But intellective intuition of the individual in the concrete is possible only in so far as the individual concrete is intelligible; and it is intelligible in as much as it is a perfection: "ens in actu perfectum." Moreover, if it is an ens in actu perfectum, its worth cannot be based on the negative term: undivided; rather it is based on the positive term of singleness. Let us suppose that the concrete individual is considered as a mere undivided something, it can then well comply with prime matter as its principle of individuation. But the consequence will be that if prime matter be tantamount to nothingness (prope nihil), it must then be unintelligible and, therefore, the concrete individual as such, that is to say, abstraction made of its form or essence, must also be unintelligible.

Now, we have seen that the creative act terminates in individuals and not in a genus. Hence, according to Duns Scotus, the primacy of the singular over the universal, which cannot arise except from that Absolute Singular: God. "Deus est unus unitate singularitatis ibi enim commune est singulare et individuum quia ipsa natura divina de se est haec." "48 In God there is no universal; it is therefore impossible for men, as for anyone, to make universal assertions about Him. The creative act is thus the operation of the Singular producing singulars. For this reason, Gabriel Marcel is justified in saying ad mentem Scoti: "That which exists and that which counts, is this individual, it is the real individual that I am." 49 Duns Scotus teaches nothing else.

^{47.} Scotus, De Anima, n. 4, 629b. See also Minges, tom. 1, p. 249.

^{48.} Scotus, Oxonien. I, 2, dist. 3, q. 1, n. 9, tom. 12, 55a. See also Minges, tom. II, p. 100.

^{49.} Jeanne Delhomme, "Témoignage et Dialectique," in Existentialisme Chrétien: Gabriel Marcel, (Paris, 1947), La Réflexion Primaire, pp. 120-127.

It follows that the singulars are intelligible. This is a tremendous affirmation, which both essentialists and existentialist deny; the former in the name of science, understood in the rigorous aristotelian sense, the latter by distrust of reason.

Nevertheless, the clue to the harmonious whole of existence and thought and to their reciprocal value lies chiefly in this intelligibility of singulars.

And since the singulars, as has been previously stated are a positive perfection, ens in actu, denoting singleness of complete being, created by the Singular, God, their primacy over the universal must be conceded. By this primacy is meant the ineffable character of concrete individual beings, as complete, perfect, intelligible, and positively single. It is therefore an ineffable intelligibility that reason cannot parcel out as it does the universal: an intelligibility so ineffable that only intellective intuition can intelligently grasp it.

B. Intuitive Cognition

By intuition, we may grasp the ineffable singulars, first guide post to transcendendal being, leading to the Infinite Being of God. For this reason, intuitive cognition is of greatest existential import in philosophy.

Often labelled Bergsonian intuitionism, intuition is affixed to the modern trend of thought and to phenomenology. In point of fact "there is much in common", Sebastian Day pertinently remarks, "between [these modern systems] and the traditional Franciscan psychology." ⁵⁰ Intuition is sometimes referred to as anti-intellectualism, but this so-called anti-intellectual intuition is a myth that does not stand serious investigation. The fact is that Bergson may be credited for having given

^{50.} Sebastian Day, Intuitive Cognition, A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics.* (The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1947), part II, ch. II, pp. 124-125.

the death-blow to rationalism and its narrow intellectualism. by promoting the cause of this cognitive act he positively calls supra-intellectual, which he defines as follows: "On appelle intuition cette espece de sympathie intellectuelle par laquelle on se transporte a l'intérieur d'un objet pour coıncider avec ce qu'il a d'unique et par conséquent d'inexprimable." 51 The great French master implies here that intuition is not "intelligence"; for the latter, according to him, is but the discursive reasoning faculty of our mind, whereas intuition is that supra-intellectual simple apprehension to which is attached some elements of penetrative sympathy, allowing coincidence with the unexpressible singleness of the known object. Bergson's distinction between intuition and intelligence, is evidently in the line of Pascal's thought, who wrote: "Le coeur a des raisons que la raison ne connait pas". However, Bergson's theory on intuition was to him as the double-edged sword dividing the spirit from the flesh, by serving as a weapon against materialist positivism and as an incitement to spiritual loftiness.

Much, however, as we may be gratified to Bergson and to his followers, who in turn owe much to Ockham for this great contribution to philosophy, it is Duns Scotus, nevertheless, who, among scholastics and moderns, is the first authority on this matter; for he was, as Sebastian Day tells us, "apparently the first scholastic to give a systematic and rational explanation of this phase of our psychic activity." 52

May I venture here to express my surprise that Monsieur Maritain did not choose Duns Scotus or Ockham in reference to this question. For had he done so, he surely would have avoided the unscholastic blunder of trying the square circle termed: abstractive intuition. ⁵³

^{51.} Chevalier, "Bergson," Appendices I, "L'Intellectualisme de Bergson," in Nouvelle Edition Revue et Augmentée, (Paris, 1926), p. 304.

^{52.} Day, op. cit., ch. II, p. 125.

^{53.} Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics. (Sheed and Ward, 1940), p. 43.

The Doctor Subtilis teaches ex-professo that intuition, i.e., intellectual intuitive cognition, is an act of the intellect on the level of simple apprehension, extending to both material and immaterial things, according to which we know immediately and directly, without any species, the guiddity of the thing known, and this, under the aspect of its existence and of its presence, by the fact that we grasp the existential notes of the object known." 54 Duns Scotus then lays stress on the fact that characterizes this cognitive mode: It is not its contradistinction to discursive knowledge, since according to him abstractive cognition stands also on simple apprehension level; and yet is not intuitive. No, intuitive cognition is characterized by its apprehension of the individual singular sicut est in se which means as existent and as present in its own ineffable singleness, "Voco cognitionem intuitiva, non prout intuitiva distinguitur contra discursivam, quia sic aliqua abstractiva esset intuitiva, sed simpliciter intuitiva eo modo quo dicimur intueri rem, sicut est in se". 55 Elsewhere he is more explicit: "Ista inquam intellectio potest proprie dici intuitiva, quia ipsa est intuitio rei ut existentis et praesentis."56

Let us peruse these important statements, and firstly, let us disengage the Scotist from the Bergsonian notion.

Both Bergson and Duns Scotus refer to a simple, immediate and direct operation of the intellect; but whereas Bergson seems to oppose it to discursive intelligence, by stressing the simplicity of this insight and its sympathetic penetration, thus almost implying existential concern which existentialists term "presence", and which, of course, is bound to entail

^{54.} Scotus, Quaest. Quadl. XXV. pp. 243-244. Ed. Vives. See also Day, op. cit., p. 50.

^{55.} Scotus, Oxonien. II, dist. 3, q. 9, n. 6, XII, 212b. See also Day, op. cit., p. 72.

^{56.} Scotus, Quaest. Quadl. XXV, pp. 243-244. Ed. Vivès. See also Day, op. cit., p. 50.

sympathy for the object known, Duns Scotus, on the other hand, does not commit himself that far. He ascertains in scholastic terms that we know the intelligibility of this or the individual under the aspect of its existence and of its presence. Nothing is said about existential sympathy leading to this concern for the so-called "presence."

To begin with, Duns Scotus explicitly teaches that our human intellect, absolutely speaking, is able to know the singular per se, in its haecceity, i.e., in its singularity as such; because, as we have previously seen, the singular, being an entity, is intelligible - since intelligibility follows entity and since the individual is constituted such by the ultimate degree of actuality and unity: 57 ultima realitas entis, as its principle of individuation. Singulars as such in their ultimate degree of reality are therefore knowable per se and adequately, by the human intellect; although pro statu isto, our intellect does not penetrate the substance of these singulars qua singularis. For instance, I cannot make out the haecceity of two flies observed with the naked eye. Yet, this limitation due to the defectus naturae, does not affect the adequate natural power of our intelligence, empowered per se as much as that of angels to know all knowables, plus the individuals' haecceity as such. However, "as regards our intellect in its present state," writes Boehner, "we are not able to know the ultimate degree of actuality of a singularity." 58 What we do know is, together with the intelligible quiddity, the existence and the presence of this singular individual.

This happy coalescence between the contingent fact of individual existence and presence with the quiddity, in the processus of intuitive cognition, we owe to the principle of real identity of essence and existence by which are blended together, so to speak, the generic, the specific, the individual

^{57.} Boehner, op. cit., Part III, "Duns Scotus." -A-II, 2, pp. 39.

^{58.} Boehner, op. cit., p. 40.

and its existential notes. Thus, intuitive cognition uithout rupture, grasps the ineffable individual singular, owing to the fact that in it essence and existence are really identical.

This intuition, being direct and immediate, needs no representation, i.e., no species, but contacts the object itself. Simultaneously to my sense cognition, and with prerequisite conditions for a perfect sensation, I apprehend that in front of me is Jimmy Z. And because this Jimmy Z exists and is actually present to me, not duplicative but single, he is bound to be of some interest to me from the very start; even though, as the case may be, this self same singular, because of sensorial defect, is sometimes forcibly reduced to a notion more or less confused, such as that thing, over there Neither indifferent nor impersonal, intuition has but a step to take in order to promote the sympathetic "presence" to this other ego, the thou, whom I shall perceive as thou exist; thou art present to me, rather than a mere predicate or a thought-object. No dry objectivation process runs chance here of dispelling the coincidence which intuitive cognition, prima facie and of itself, arises; because let us remember, intuitive cognition is too contactual, too existential in its ir mediate and direct grasping of the individual singular in concreto.

In defense of intellectual intuition, Duns Scotus interprets the axiom: Intellectus est universalium; sensus singularium, by a distinguo. "The sense," he says, "perceives this intelligible perfection we call singular, and perceives it in its material sensitive note, while on the other hand, the Universal is proper to intellectual cognition. But, as a matter of fact, the singular as ens in actu perfectum is complete and more perfect than the universal. In this case, the human intellect which is more empowered and more perfect than the sense, must know the singular, that ens in actu perfectum, since the sense, its inferior, knows it. The singular is empowered to become "presence" as well as "objectivation"; in balance, therefore, with the thou and the he. On the contrary, the universal expresses nothing else than the quod quid est, or

that which is common in things. Moreover, this common element abstracted from the singular, (in the good Aristotelian fashion) is but partially known. Thus, my concept man gives but an incomplete and diminished cognition of the individual Jimmy Z, seated across the room. Now to consequences: for, if it is true that I pledge myself only in regard to a person, it is equally true that this concept, man-will not pledge me to Jimmy Z. It merely furnishes casual registration references, allowing me to classify this object into the category of reasonable animals. Some amount of intellectual curiousity may accompany this act, but hardly any real existential concern for the same.

To epitomize: the ratio formalis motiva of intuitive cognition is nothing else but the res in propria existentia, 59 blending, as it were, all the requirements exacted by that unexpressable, ineffable thing, hie, haee, hoe, we call such and such... or... so and so.

C. Introspection

Let us now examine what subject intuitive cognition first apprehends.

Archimedes had dared this bold defiance: "Give me a point of support and I will move the earth!" Duns Scotus might have challenged instead: "Let me be assured of a substantial center empowered with intelligence and free-will and I shall infallibly attain the universe!" This center is found through introspection.

Duns Scotus, like St. Augustine, teaches: "Intellectus potest percipere actum meum intuitive... quodam sensu id est perceptione interiori experimur." 60 Therefore, my first intel-

^{59.} Scotus, Quodlibeta, q. 13, p. 522b. See also Day, op. cit., p. 67.

^{60.} Scotus, Oxonien. IV, dist. 43, q. 2, n. 11, XX, 40b. See also Day, op. cit., p. 127.

lectual cognition is the intuition of my immaterial singular acts. Verily, I reach within me the rock of my first and intrinsic certitude by this intellectual perception which is as infallible as it is immediate. It goes without saying that prostatu isto we do not intuit the substance of our soul sub propria et quidditativa conceptu. This cognitive mode may be had by abstraction proceeding from general concepts derived from empirical data. But the immanent acts of the soul are, nevertheless, immediately perceived by intellectual intuition. According to this, I know myself knowing and willing, thus justifying the "non minus mens se novit quam est" pronounced by St. Augustine, With respect to this, Sebastian Day points out the value and scope of this psychological approach in contrast to the diametrically opposed a priori metaphysical theory, and draws our attention to the modern zest of the approach, reconciliable, he says, with that which is best in Bergsonian intuitionism. 61 Longpré also signalizes this point in his article: "Psychologie Scotiste et Psychologie Moderne."

The principle: Omnis Cognitio incipiat a sensu is therefore true only in as much as it is confirmed by the basic criterion of introspection. My subsequent extrinsic perceptions and the knowledge derived from them must rest on this intrinsic center, remaining in constant relation to it when "exploring" the world outside; similar to a beast's tentacles that move in and out according to its needs. For I cannot have certainty unless there is a link between the exterior and my intrinsic self. Hence, to deny the certitude of introspection is to postulate universal doubt. "Praeterea si non haberemus de aliquo cognitionem intuitivam, non sciremus de actibus nostris si insunt nobis vel non certitudinaliter de actibus dico intrinsecis." 62 How could the intellect have the sense for its cause, when it is superior to the sense and is the

^{61.} Day, op. cit., pp. 124-129.

^{62.} Scotus, "Oxon.," dist. 49, q. 8, XXI, 306b. See also Day, op. cit., p. 124.

arbiter concerning the truth of falsity of sense perceptions? Let us suppose a motorist speeding eighty miles an hour along a country road. Of course he sees the whole scenery: trees, fields, fences, telegraph posts running in the opposite direction, while a farmer at stand still by the road side, views these same objects in a static condition. But is the scenery really moving or not? Can the sense make out the truth about reality when it perceives contradictorily through the motorist and the peasant's eyes? The intellects of both can alone perceive the illusion of sense perception caused by physical laws. One can say as much, for that matter, about all optical illusions as well as of all sensorial or imaginative deceptions whatsoever.

This initial intuition, alone, does reach beyond all relativity, with intrinsic certitude, the truth of reality as well as the reality of truth.

Interpreting St. Augustine, Gilson writes: "This cognitive mode is of all the most evident, because in order that it be false, he, who experiences it, would have to err, and that in order to err, one must be." 63 It is therefore not in our power to think or not to think ourselves; this seizure of self by self precedes reflection and will. It is the first act, the initial shock of our existential experience. And it is in reference to this first act, that common sense is granted to the existentialists when they proclaim: "Man first exists, and then, is subject of a definition." If any should suspect Cartesianism here, let him be reassured: A good measure of Augustinism lies buried under this stratum of philosophical ground. There can be no question whatsoever of subjectivating the real objective after the manner of Kant or of Berkeley. The question is simply to start human cognition from introspection. So that it does not matter much if the Cogito, ergo sum be interpreted in the sense of the esse est percipi for those who

^{63.} Gilson, Introduction à l'Etude de Saint Augustin. (Paris, 1929), ch. II, pp. 44 to 52.

favor idealism, or if it be transposed for convenience of the absurdists into this minor tone: Gogito, non ergo sum. The thing that really matters is that we can modulate it according to Augustine and Scotus: "Si fallor, sum." For this latter interpretation alone is my existential guarantee to all else. In fact, the radical meaning of the Gogito goes far beyond that of objectivated thought; in reality, it strikes the initial start or very first activity of the subject, the first existential operation of man's ego.

We can make this concrete by recalling the casual fact that happens on awakening after a good snooze. From the unconsciousness of sleep I am suddenly awakened by the alarm clock. What happens? Automatically, I sit up in bed, and before any reflex, I invest myself, so to speak, rekindling by this initial shock the spark of consciousness of my ego.

Introspection, indeed, cannot be dispensed with. If a man were deprived of it, says Duns Scotus, he would not be human. To convince his auditors of this necessity, he fancies a poor chap floating in space, whose limbs and body would be so scattered about, as to come in no relation whatsoever to the body as a whole; and this, to the extent that he could perceive nothing through his body members. Still, says Duns Scotus, notwithstanding these impediments, our poor chap floating in space would still hold on to the firm certitude of his existence, prior to the existential judgment: I exist. 64

No wonder then, that the worst human experience comes to us in face of death, when we feel overpowered by that progressive dissolution or disintegration or our ego, causing agony. In his *Dream of Gerontius*, Newman analyses this fatal experience with as much comprehension as literary pathos:

This emptying out of each constituent And natural force by which I come to be.

^{64.} Deodat DeBasly, Capitalia opera Duns Scoti. (Le Havre, 1908), Liber Primus, 9, p. 21.

As though my very being had given way,
As though I was no more a substance now,
And could fall back on aught to be my stay.
But must needs decay.

And drop from out this universal frame, Into that shapeless, scopeless, blank abyss, That utter nothingness of which I came, This is it that has come to pass in me.

O horror! this it is, my dearest, this...65

Introspection is, therefore, "the central pillar upholding within me all my other certitudes and beliefs." Indeed, the evidence with which I know myself thinking and willing, and know myself thinking myself and willing myself, is certainly prior to knowing my intellect and my will power, and I believe only in so far as I know myself willing to believe. Gefore Duns Scotus, St. Augustine had written: Quid enim, tam intime scitur, seque ipsum esse sentit, quam id quo etiam caetera sentiuntur, id est ipse animus? Gefore Duns Scotus, St. Augustine had written:

To summarize, let us revert to Vital Du Four's interpretation of the fact concerning the apparition of our risen Lord to Thomas; it is very clever and to the point. When the Lord said to Thomas: "Put in thy finger hither, and see my hands and bring hither thy hand into my side and be not faithless, but believing." (Jn. XX, 27), Duns Scotus tells us, that Thomas could not have believed on just seeing and touching the wounds, unless to these immediate sense perceptions

^{65.} John Henry Newman, "The Dream of Gerontius," from Verses on Various Occasions, (Longmans and Green, London, 1912), pp. 226, 227.

^{66.} Deodat DeBasly, "Scotus Docens," La Philosophie, V. L'Expérimentation Interne et Directe, (Le Havre, 1934), pp. 11, 12, 13.

^{67.} Saint Augustine, "Quid enim tam intime seitur," etc. De Trinitate, (Ed. Vivès, Paris, 1871).

corresponded the equally immediate intellectual intuition, alone capable of generating knowledge which, in this case, roused supernatural faith. "...Cognitio ista non super singulare ut est in imaginatione, sed etiam ut est actu existens extra." 68

3. Univocity

Univocity of being, qua being, is the key to real transcendency, because, it is the only means, philosophically speaking, by which existential ontological communion can be effected between finitude and infinitude. Otherwise, the gap of this unfathomable abyss cannot be filled, since finitude and infinitude are the two terms, as Duns Scotus reckons, denoting a real distinction between God and the universe.

The Subtle Doctor's great concern underlying this metaphysical research was based upon his concept of the infinite being of God. Longpré describes him as "Le metaphysicien aux antennes les plus hautes et les plus sensibles." For indeed, if Scotus resorts to the univocity of being in his metaphysics (being the first of the Scholastics to do so), it is because he was directed by the true Faith and firmly believes that this Infinite Being is the kgo sum qui sum of the burning bush; the A and the Ω of all things; also, the Christ Who, in the presence of the Pharisees, sternly declared: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, before Abraham was, I am!"

Unhesitatingly, therefore, like a shooting arrow, Duns Scotus makes straight for being, that existential Cause and End of existences; nay, that true and total Being, the Infinite.

Duns Scotus the philosopher knows, however, that what he believes, he has yet to learn; so he shall strive to know it:

^{68.} Vital DuFour, De Rerum Principio, n. 325, 514. See also Minges, t. I, p. 247.

Domine, Deus noster, Moysi servo Tuo, de Tuo Nomine filiis Israel proponendo, a Te Doctore veracissimo sciscitanti, sciens quid de Te posset concipere intellectus mortalium, Nomen tuum benedictum reserans, respondisti: Ego sum qui sum. (Exod. 3) Tu es verum esse, Tu es totum esse; hoc credo, hoc, si mihi esset possibile, scire vellem. Adjuva me, Domine, inquirentem ad quantam cognitionem de vero esse, quod Tu es, possit pertingere ratio nostra naturalis, ab ente, quod de Te praedicasti inchoando. **69

Let us retain: "Thou art therefore the true Being, Thou art total Being; that, I believe, and it is that also, if possible, that I do want to know." But how? "Help me, Lord, to find what knowledge of this true Being Thou art, my intellect can attain, beginning with the being which Thou hast attributed to Thyself."

As is quite evident, such a sublime invocation which is also an evocation, denotes Duns Scotus' genuine existential concern for a personal God, in contradistinction to the God of abstractions couched in clever definitive terms. In this mystical dyadic, "1" relation to "Thou", Duns Scotus not only contacts his God, but he swings open the gates of the transcendental realm of being for all philosophers.

The *Doctor Subtilis* was fully aware, haunted as he was by metaphysical being, of the importance that intuitive cognition of the individual singular is as a guide post on the road to transcendental being; for he knew from his contemplation of the *Ego sum qui sum*, that existence is the clue to being. In order, therefore, to have a *quidditative concept* of being adequate to reality, one must first intuit the existence and presence of that *solum verum ens*, the individual singular. Whosoever knows intuitively an existent individual, knows real being in its *esse*, finite though it is. Duns Scotus there-

^{69.} Scotus, De Primo Rerum Omnium Principio, R.P. Garcia, O.F.M., (Ad Claras Aquas, 1910), ch. I, 1, p. 627.

fore defines being, qua being, as Ens cui non repugnat esse, and, as Wolter carefully points out, the term "to be" (esse) is to be understood in the sense of actual existence. Hence, metaphysics is the science of being taken in the nominative sense of "a being" or "the immediate subject of existence, that is, the existible." To Being, qua being, consequently lies beyond and above all categories and their modalities, in the stratosphere of pure transcendency, that holy of holies of philosophy.

We must now examine how, in the field of metaphysics, Duns Scotus bridges finitude with infinitude. Indeed, he is fully conscious that this abyssus abyssum invocat of Scripture is also the problem of philosophy, and that it can be solved. But how?

If Augustinian illumination must be dispensed with, there remains no other issue than univocity of the logical and of the quidditative concept of being qua being. Analogy cannot do it. The mediaeval Doctors, namely St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure who used it, could succeed only because they implied the univocity they denied.* Analogy arises only after we have some proper knowledge of what God is, whereas univocity is a condition for knowing God at all. Before we can speak of analogies between God and his creatures we must know first whether God exists or not. So that there was no sophistication in Hamlet's: "To be or not to be, that is the question." A very existential concern it was! And a very wise one indeed!

By analogy, I pronounce a concept to be simpliciter different, yet secundum quid similar; different by nature, but rela-

^{70.} Scotus, Oxonien. 4, dist. 8, q. 7, n. 2; XVII, 7b. See also Allan B. Wolter, op. cit., part III, ch. IV, pp. 68, 69, 70.

^{*} St. Bonaventure, being a promoter of Augustinian illumination was nevertheless somewhat justified by not adopting the Univocity of the logical and of the quidditative concept of being qua being, which in his own system would have proved useless.

tively the same. For instance: ens finitum; ens infinitum. These two concepts are relatively similar because they denote in both cases an ultimate basis-being; but they absolutely differ by their modalities of being, since their respective quiddities or natures are different, aliis et aliis. Let us schematize this as follows:

2:4::6:12

or

Infinitum Finitum

Ens Ens

Duns Scotus proves here that the *ens* is considered subsistent and therefore prior to its modalities, and that consequently the one term *ens* is in reality equivocal, because there are really two different concepts instead of one. "You cannot say," he explains, "infinitum is *ens* but only in the mode of infinity, and every creature is *ens*, but only in the mode of finiteness, because admitting this, the opponents implicitly admit a third concept of *ens*, which is common to both." 71

Duns Scotus proves this from the axiom: "Every intellect which is certain about one concept and in doubt about diverse concepts, has the concept of which it is certain as a different one from the concept about which it is in doubt." 72

If we now apply this axiom to the above example, we find certainty concerning this fact: God and creatures, infinitum and finitum are beings, about which beings I am predicating. But as to whether these beings about which I have the quidditative concept of being, are finite or infinite, I may be in doubt. Therefore, the concept of being predicated about a thing is different from the concept: ens finitum or infinitum.

^{71.} Boehner, The History of the Franciscan School, part III, Scotus, -B-II, 2, The Univocity of Being, (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1945-46), p. 65.

^{72.} Boehner, The History of the Franciscan School, p. 64.

Hence, this concept is neither the one nor the other by itself, but it is included in either one; much as the middle term in a syllogism is included in both extremes. Consequently, the concept of being is univocal. This must be conceded in view of the principle of contradiction, which state: that no concept can be at once certain and doubtful. The state: that no concept can be at once certain and doubtful. Unit as, 2:4::6:12 is a correct estimate, insofar as 2 unites their respective proportions, so, the total: 4:26, and the other total 6:12:18, allows no identical proportion to all. I am also sure that God, man, atom, electron, horse, moon, daffodil, George, are beings, as my concept of being applies to each and all univocally; whereas the same concept conceived with quidditative modalities cannot relate these beings together, but rather, it dispels them.

The result derived from the mere analogy must then be agnosticism of the Infinite Being, leading to absurdism, as well as to the impossibility of real transcendency. So, if I do away with univocity of being, qua being, my concept of a real created stone is analogous to the idea of a stone, in God. I would then be justified in predicating: God is stone, as I predicate: God is wise. 74 With this, metaphysics comes in to be less than a figurehead in the scientific area; it is dead.

One cannot help marvelling that Duns Scotus was *subtle* enough to join us to God by the thin thread of this quidditative univocal concept of being.

Owing to this very tiny, feeble, flickering light, we may affirm: The finites that we are, and the Infinite God is, have this in common: they are. Such is the philosopher's strong, invicible hope. Peguy might have admired it and called it: "Cette toute petite fille... Espérance!" While Sartre, instead of considering the root irreducible and absurd, had he contemplated it in this proper transcendent metaphysical setting,

^{73.} Boehner, "The History of the Franciscan School," op. cit., p. 64.

^{74.} Scotus, Oxonien. I, 7, dist. 3, q. 2, t. 9, 8 ss., n. 10, 205. See also Minges, t. I, p. 28.

might have rather admired and loved "our sister root" after the gentle manner of Francis of Assisi.

4. Aseity

The indispensable complement of every existing man is freedom. Duns Scotus agrees with Gabriel Marcel and the existentialists in acknowledging the "autocreation of the spirit".

On psychological grounds, we remember, Duns Scotus conceives existence as a *life* or re-creation. Now this simply means that to be free is the highest dignity in man; that, according to which he is truly a *lord*. Free-will, therefore, has primacy over the intellect: "Intellectus et voluntas sunt nobilissimae protentiae animae et maxime voluntas. Voluntas est nobilissima perfectio." 75

This prerogative implies, first basic unity of the soul with its faculties, and second, perfect integrity of the human individual as such, both metaphysically and psychologically speaking. Basic unity of the soul, that is to say its consubstantiality of essence and powers, is such that I can say: I will in as much as I know myself willing and I know in as much as I want to know, and will myself to it. This favors the Vult quia vult of our relative aseity. The soul is thereby a simple force whose powers are really identical to it; for although these acts of knowing and of willing are different by nature, they are nevertheless complementary to each other. The soulight and flame spring from fire, so intelligence and will proceed from the soul; and just as

^{75.} Scotus, Reportata I, 2, dist. 25, nn. 3-7, t. 23, 118a, 126a. See also Minges, t. I, p. 286.

^{76.} Scotus, Oxonien. II, dist. 16, q. 4. Dico igitur quod potest sustineri, quod essentia animae indistincta re et ratione, est principium plurium actionum sine diversitate reali potentiarum ita quod sint vel partes animae, vel accidentia eius vel respectus. See also Boehner, op. cit., (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1945-46), part III, Scotus, pp. 111-112.

light and flame are fire, so, intellect and will are the knowing and the willing soul. It is this basic unity that guarantees our human beatitude (if we deserve it); because, owing to this basic unity, we shall not be happy in heaven per accidens, but substantially so. Indeed, "it is nobler for the substance of the soul itself to attain its end of love immediately and directly in beatific vision and possession, than to attain it indirectly by means of accidental faculties. The imago Dei of our soul shall therefore be substantially enraptured in beatitude. Primacy of free-will finds its psychological expansion in the integrity of human individual as such, maintained equally in metaphysical and psychological orders. Metaphysically speaking, there is no difference between a human individual and a person, save the positive fact for a person (which nevertheless adds nothing to the individual as such) of being self-possessor, self-owner, sui-iuris. 77 "Dico quod singularitas praecedit rationem suppositi." 78 There is a significative well-known existential reason for this, which Duns Scotus formulates thus: "Existentiae sunt individuorum." 79

In the psychological order, the consequence derived from these existential views is loaded with existential resources for choosing freely. In fact: existence being what it is, a life, a re-creation, any human individual, whatever, assumed or not, enjoys the full and free exercise of his acts, in the psychological sense, and in this order. Of course, this implies thorough capability of performing meritorious and demeritorious acts, because they are performed with entire freedom of action.

^{77.} Scotus, Oxonien. 1, 3, dist. 5, q. 2, n. 4, n. 926, t. 14, 228a. Ad personalitatem requiritur ultima solitudo sive negatio dependentiae actualis et aptitudinalis ad personam alterius naturae. See also Minges, t. II, p. 221.

^{78.} Scotus, Oxonien. 3 dist. 1, q. 3, n. 3. See also DeBasly, "Scotus Docens," p. 254, ch. LXXVI.

^{79.} DeBasly, Scotus Docens, ch. LXXVI, p. 253.

Although it is not within the scope of this article to apply the splendid Christological results derived from this existential resource, I must however call attention to the fact that owing to it, Jesus Christ, perfect man assumed by the Word of God, finds here, at once, His justification and apotheosis.

"Voluntas est nobilissima perfectio." 80 Both human faculties: intellect and will, really identical with the soul, stand equal in dignity in regard to the indispensable part they play in man's immaterial substance: the soul. Suppress the intellect, you ipso facto, at once, suppress intuition, abstraction, memory, objectivation, etc., which are indispensable to this existential complexum that we are. So that we would no longer be specifically nor individually human. On the other hand, if man be deprived of his free will, intelligent though he is, he would be necessarily determined by his acts, and consequently not imputable, because irresponsible. These two powers are so binding that Duns Scotus defines the will: "Appetitus cum ratione liber". 81 Hence, these three prerogatives: 1-appetition of the will; 2-natural priority of the intellect; 3-freedom.

Owing to this subordination in unity of substance, there can be no will power without previous cognition, conformably to the axiom: Nil volitum quin praecognitum. The more so as primacy of the will does not mean priority, but lies in the fact that the will is free. Neither does the appetition of the will prove its excellency; for animals share appetition with man. One need not attribute primacy to the intellect on the ground that the intellect enlightens the will, since this fact merely provides a motive to the will. Primacy is due to will power only because will power is self-determined

^{30.} Scotus, "Reportata" I, 2, dist. 25, nn. 3, 17, t. 23, 118a, 126a. See also Minges: t. I, p. 286.

^{81.} Scotus, "Reportata" I, 3, dist. 17, q. 2, n. 3, t. 23, 376a. See also Oxonien. 1, 3, dist. 33, n. 9, t. 15, 446b. Voluntas est proprie appetitus rationalis.

ab intrinseco, and this, freely. The intellect, on the other hand, is necessarily determined by its object. This autocreation called freedom, therefore, and nothing else, is the reason for which will power excels in dignity. And by the fact that the singular is superior to the universal, good, which is the object of the will, is not inferior to the object of the intellect, being; for, let us never forget that the concrete singular and not the abstract universal is the most valuable, because the most perfect.

Freedom is then the essential mode of the will, its condition sine qua non. Each willful act of mine is a self-determination, to such extent that St. Augustine was right in saying: Nothing is so much within the power of the will as the will itself." Consequently, an remains free to refer or not his act to an end; from thence proceed indifferent acts. The will, it is true, depends on the intellect in order to receive a sufficient and necessary motive enticing natural appetition towards or against its own proper good. This is fortunate, so long as it is a ward-off for the will. In point of fact, considering the intellect thus conditions the will, there can be, no question of an arbitrary will, a sort of unruly enfant de Bohème. Morals are thereby safeguarded.

The will is both a natural appetite and a power of free choice. To this double element corresponds two kinds of love which Duns Scotus terms: Affectio commodi and Affectio amicitiae. 83

In as much as it is a natural appetition, the will inclines irresistibly towards the things which are or at least appear good. But this inclination is prior to free choice. As a matter of fact, the will in its freedom can act contrary to its natural

^{82.} St. Augustine, "Retract.," I Libr. c. 22. Nihil est tam in potestate nostra quam ipsa voluntas.

^{83.} Belmond, Le rôle de la volonté dans la Philosophie de Duns Scotus, (Etudes Franciscaines, 1911), XXV, 449-467, 561-583.

tendency, to the point of flat contradiction. And this can be done outside the realm of will power, so to speak; that is to say during and upon the very acts of sensation or of intellection. One may, for instance, refuse to give practical consent to the first principles per se notae, self-evident to the intellect though they are; as do Marxists in dialectic-materialism, and absurdists in absurdism. Again, one may chastise the flesh when a prey to carnal temptations, as did a host of saints. Although it is not within our own power to remain unaffected by that which we see, hear, or feel; it is, nevertheless, always in our own power to will it or not. Definitely, therefore, Belemond is justified in proclaiming that even "knowledge itself is what the will makes it to be." This comes to admitting that in the main, "will power is the whole of man." 84

The affectio commodi, which lies within the scope of natural appetition, is, like all appetites, necessary, but not free. When this sort of love aims selfishly at its proper interest, it is self-centered egotism, cold or passionate, as the case may be.

The affectio amicitiae, which is love of compliance and benevolence, corresponds to the will as free. Owing to this kind of love, says Boehner, the ego has a taste for the intrinsic value of others: the bona honesta and their rights. Thereby, the limits and fetters of egocentric moves are broken asunder, because this superior kind of love goes to that which is valuable in itself, without any selfish pleasurable or utilitarian end in view. It is at once objective and subjective love. Here, free will triumphs, since it is capable of loving values for what they really are and of submitting to the rule of justice as well as to the value of other persons

^{84.} Scotus, Reportata I, 2, dist. 42, q. 4, n. 17, t. 23, 222b. Ipsius voluntatis duo sunt actus, scilicet actus concupiscentiae, et actus complacentiae. Oxonien. I, 2, dist. 21, q. 2, n. 2, t. 13, 139b. Est autem velle duplex, aut est velle aliquid amore amicitiae, qui est propter se vel propter amatum, vel amore commodi, qui est propter aliud. See also Minges: t. I, p. 361 et sq.

and of God. "We are therefore free", marks Boehner, "because we can be altruistic in true love." 85

This "freedom in action", or affectio amicitiae, is suggestive enough of this noble existential pledged-fidelity that constitutes union with others. It suggests that "presence" capable of overlapping the boundaries of my egocentric person. Roger Trois-Fontaines, commenting on Gabriel Marcel seems to understand it thus when he writes: "By viewing the thing closely, we realize that if my love can act influentially on the being that I love, it is only in as much as this love of mine be not desire; by desire I am inclined to subordinate the loved one to my own ends; in fact I convert it into an object. Perhaps, then, only disinterested love is susceptible of affecting the thou."

In short, freedom is the pivot of the will, the raison d'etre of its primacy over the intellect, and consequently the dominant characteristic in man. Free will alone could cause us to fall; with the help of grace free will shall renabilitate us. Means, secondary purposes, principal end, all these pertain to free-will, which plays first fiddle in the human orchestra of life. So dignifying is it, that some do not hesitate to call it relative aseity. The term is adequate to the existential Vult qui vult of autocreation that free will denotes, and by which Duns Scotus resumes its prerogatives.

^{85.} Boehner, "Scotus," part III, II-E-II, p. 116. The History of the Franciscan School.

^{86.} Trois Fontaines, "Existentialisme Chrétien: Gabriel Marcel." La Notion de Prisence chez Gabriel Marcel, (Paris, 1947), p. 254.

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Conclusion

In bringing this treatise to a close, a synthetic bird's eye view on the whole aspect of these existential resources, might help disengage their main characteristics, and thus suggest a final appreciation.

If Duns Scotus resorts to identity of essence and existence in singular beings, positing thereby their existential intelligibility, it is because, negatively speaking, essences do not give us the clue to real existence; positively speaking, because, according to the principle: nil volitum quin praecognitum, only intelligible known existing subjects can promote interest and love, i.e., be lovable, loving, and loved. Then also, if Duns Scotus pronounces the metaphysical concept of being qua being univocal to the ens finitum and Ens Infinitum, it is because the philosopher must point the needle of his compass to the north of this univocal concept of being in order to acquire knowledge of Infinite Being and render possible through this common denominator, the ontological communion binding all beings to the Being. Indeed, otherwise, there can be no scale of supra-modal existential am, art, is, are, to link all values together: the Absolute Infinite Value, finite values of the universe and human values. Beyond the diversities of modalities, Duns Scotus reveals to us here, on the level of real transcendency, the first kiss of love between Creator and creatures. "In eo vivimus et movemur et sumus." Finally, if Duns Scotus exalts free autocreation of man's will, it is because love, the act of free will is the noblest and most powerful achievement in man, as it is in spirits, and free will itself his highest prerogative; since none else can effect the ontological communion of our individual and collective destiny.

It does seem that Duns Scotus' philosophical thought gives the deathblow to both rationalism and idealism, by binding together what they break asunder, because his phi-

losophy is an existential philosophy of life commanded by love. The abyssus abyssum invocat of Holy Writ can well apply to characterize it. In his theory on the creative act ex nihilo, Duns Scotus strongly marks out that nothingness of which we came. The existence of the finite beings, that is to say their intrinsic duration tells plainly of contingency in need of, in call for infinitude. Among human beings, we find the substantial soul united to body, striving at completing itself by adding to itself the wealth acquired by its intellectual existential apprehension of existing and present actual beings; this, prior to the judgment of existence, that is to say, previous to pure objectivation. Hence, our intuitive cognition is the existential fruit still attached to the tree of real existing beings, therefore not yet fallen to the ground of objectivation. Then also, the abyss of finite beings is not so much viewed as a limited act, as it is considered as an act unlimitedly striving at and craving for infinitude. Intuition and autocreation serve as the basis for this full achievement by selfness and otherness, until one's life be accomplished as a momentous existential history.

If this be so, perhaps we are justified in pronouncing the philosophy of Duns Scotus, because of its existential import, as one of the most magnificent and timely contributions of mediaeval scholasticism to the *Philosophia Perennis*.

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BOOK REVIEWS

A Study of Psalm 72 (71). By Rev. Roland E. Murphy, O. Carm. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1948. Pp. vii-140-Index.

A Study of Psalm 72 (71) by the Rev. Roland E. Murphy, O. Carm., is a doctoral thesis submitted to the Catholic University in 1948. The author and his work meets the challenge to the Messianic interpretation of Psalm 72 (71) as expounded in the theory of Hofstil, that is court style as advocated by Hermann Gunkel, Hugo Gressmann and other modern Biblical scholars. After reviewing the theory of Hofstil, the author in his dissertation rejects this theory as inadequate. The author rejects the reasons given by the Modernists against the Wessianic interpretation and shows that the Psalm is Messianic in character in accordance with the Messignic themes of the Prophets justice and peace, eternal life, national prosperity, worldwide dominion. Aided by the versions, the author gives us a critical translation of the Hebrew Text and in his commentary explains any textual changes while giving the general meaning of each verse. Finally, he gives us an historical survey of the Messianic interpretation according to Christian and Jewish understanding of the Psalm as well as modern lines of interpretation of the same.

Chapter I. After studying the title of the Psalm: "Lishlomoh" the author concludes that it is not clear who is the author. Textual criticism shows that the title is critically uncertain. To date the Psalm, the furthest back we can go is David because it was to David the promise was made that the throne of his kingdom would be established forever (2 Samuel 7:13). The latest period to which we could refer the Psalm would be before the exile roughly between 900 to 600 B.C. or the period just after the exile. Hence, the author feels confident in locating the Psalm between the Prophet Isaias and the Restoration roughly 700 to 500 B.C.

In discussing the literary form, the author is of the opinion that the Psalmist does not distinguish between the Jussive and Future tenses. In the final analysis these forms merge. Hence, the literary form of Psalm 72 is properly speaking prophecy; it begins with a request and merges into prophecy.

Chapter II. In verse one of the Psalm the author prefers the singular judgment to the plural of the Massoretic text following the versions. In this he is in agreement with the Latin interpretation of the professors of the Biblical Institute. In either case, whether singular or plural, there is no substantial difference in the meaning. In verse three he omits the preposition through justice and is supported in this by the present Latin translation of the Biblical Institute. There are no other variations in his translations of the text in the first strophe verses one to four.

The second strophe runs from verses five to seven. He amends verse five to read "and may be live on". In this too, our author is supported by the Biblical Institute translation, but there is place of a wish, the future tense is used "and be shall live on". In verse seven, the Massoretic text reads, "the just man", but our author corrects the text in the abstract form justice based on three Hebrew manuscripts, the Septuagint, Syriac, Arabic and St. Jerome. Here too be is in agreement with the Biblical Institute translation. The parallelism peace would demand the abstract righteousness.

The third strophe is from verses eight to eleven. One word in this strophe causes difficulty: siyyim. It has several meanings ship, desert dweller, crier. The older versions rendered it people of the desert. Our author, with other scholars amongst them the professors of the Biblical Institute amends it to read: sarim, adversaries, or saraw, his adversaries.

The fourth strophe is from verses twelve to fourteen and our author makes no emendations in the text.

The fifth strophe is from verses fifteen to seventeen. Verses fifteen to sixteen, as the author says, are very difficult. The primary difficulty is who is the subject, the king or the poor. The author's translation takes the king as the subject of the first verb and reads the passive kal in the second. The idea, being long live the king to receive Sheba's gold. In verse sixteen, there is predicted an abundance of grain, corn and a multitude of men if the text is not corrupt. Our author would characterize the bundance not so much with an abundance of people, but rather as a continuation of the figure of an abundance of grain. That is, the material abundance which will characterize the reign of the Messianic king. In verse seventeen, the Septuagint and Arabic add the word blessed. Our author adopts this too as does the translation of the professors of the

Biblical Institute. Our author translates may his name "be established" from a reading of the Targum, namely, yikkon, "to be established." The Septuagint has diamenei, St. Jerome, perserverabit. In this emendation, our author agrees likewise with the Biblical Institute translation from the Hebrew.

The sixth strophe, verses eighteen to twenty is the doxology. Verses eighteen to nineteen are not part of the original poem. They serve to mark the end of the second book of psalms. Verse twenty is the note of an ancient reductor.

Chapter III. Psalm 72 in Court Style. Because the poets of the courts of ancient Sumaria, Syria, Babylonia and Egypt had a proper and stereotyped way of addressing their kings in court style on special occasions, therefore, modern opponents of the Messianic interpretation of Psalm 72 would have us believe that we have here in Psalm 72 the same literary mode. All kings were supposed to be high-minded and just and to protect the poor and the lowly. The most famous testament to the virtue of justice in a ruler is to be found in the immortal Code of Hammurabi where he calls himself, "Ilammurabi the king of righteousness whom shamash has endowed with justice, Am I". Egypt, likewise, was not behind Mesopotamia, as our author says, in this matter. The Pharaohs attributed eternal life to the king. Frequent titles of the Pharaohs are: "Living forever", "Living like Re forever". Nabuchadnezzar called himself "Farmer of Babylon - he who waters the fields", hence, the one providing irrigation of the land. The kings of the ancient Near East assumed such sweeping titles as "King of the Four Regions of the World" thus claiming world dominion.

Psalm 72 an Example of Court Style in Israel according to the Critics. The critics of the court style theory pretend to find in this Psalm all the marks of the foreign royal court styles. They say there is the same pious tone, exaggeration and foreign phrases. The Psalm according to them can not be Messianic because it refers to a contemporary king. The psalmist just as the court poets extols the usual themes of justice, eternal life, world rule. Verse eight, especially say these critics, is a stock phrase of the Fertile Creseent. Israel wanted to be like other nations for example, her desire to have a king (confer 1 Samuel 9:5). Patriotism, according to these critics, led them to expect a "Weltkoenig", world monarch.

Examination of these arguments by the author. In refutation of the arguments of the Critical School of *llofstil* or court style, our author rightly stresses the fact that there is not one text or section of the Old Testament which contains a complete description of the Messias and his coming.

The term, Son of the King, in verse two can just as easily be applied to the future Wessias as to the contemporary ruler. Actually, would not the Messias, a descendent of King David be the son of a king par excellence? The prayer expressed in verse fifteen did not hinder the Septuagint translators from considering the Psalm Messianic. Parallelism of foreign texts with statements in the Bible does not prove foreign origin. In fact, the Messianism of Israel and its worldwide influence is based on the belief in one God, monotheism and, hence, could not borrow from the cult of many gods. Furthermore, the classification royal psalm is a very weak classification. Our author studies briefly Psalms Eighteen, Twenty, Twenty-one, Sixty-one, One hundred and one and One hundred and forty-four, verses one to eleven. He concludes that the royal psalms cannot be lumped together in the name of Hofstil court style. Our Psalm 72 is essentially different in tone from several of the royal psalms. Psalm Two, Seventy-two and One hundred and ten are Messianic in the literal sense.

From the standpoint of history, too, a period long enough to create a so-called court style is wanting. The combined rule of David and Solomon totals about seventy-five years, hence, no temporal world rule. Another argument against the application of *Hofstil* to Hebrew literature is to be found in the nature of kingship in Israel. God is their real king and the earthly king who is chosen is answerable both to God Himself and to the people, a concept foreign to the pagan world of that time.

Chapter IV. The Messianic Background of Psalm 72. The key, then, to the interpretation of Psalm 72 is to be found especially in the Messianic ideal of the Prophets. When David proposed to build a temple to the Lord and this was approved by the Prophet Nathan without consulting the Lord, God let it be known through Nathan that David's son would build the temple, a man of peace, but to David he gave the promise of a perpetual dynasty. "He shall build a house to My name and I will establish a throne of his kingdom forever" - ad-olam. This promise and its fulfillment is repeated in the major and minor prophets through all the vissisitudes of

the House of Israel (confer Amos 9:11, Osee 3:5). According to Micheas 5:1 to 2, the Ruler is to come from Bethlehem. The relationship of Psalm 72 to this promise made to David is not as clear as in the passages of the Prophets, but the description of the future king who is to be the Messias fits in with the king of Psalm 72. The attributes of the king as described in the Prophets correspond to the attributes of peace and justice, world dominion, everlasting life, which belong to the king in Psalm 72. Verses eight to eleven of our Psalm emphasize a world empire. Even as the Prophets emphasize material prosperity in the time of the Messias, so likewise, this material abundance is emphasized in our Psalm verse sixteen. The blessing promised to Abraham is alluded to in verse seventeen. Our author translates the hithpael of barak here in the reflexive sense rather than in the passive, and rightly so. The universality inherent in the words of the verse could apply only to the promised Messias, and not to an ordinary Israelite monarch. The Psalmist seems familiar with Chapters nine, eleven and thirty-two of Isaias which emphasize the peaceful role of the Messias. Our author concludes that Psalm 72 is directly or literally Messianic in the strict sense.

Chapter V. Traditional and Modern Interpretations. 1. Christian tradition. Tertullian (160 to 240) refers the homage paid by the kings of Arabia and Saba to Christ in his work entitled Adversus Marcionem. He thus sets the standard for subsequent Christian writings. Saint Augustine (354 to 430) in his De Civitate Dei affirms that the contents of the Psalm do not fit Solomon, but Christ. St. Jerome (347 to 419) follows St. Augustine in his understanding of Psalm 72 while writing on the Prophet Daniel. St. Jerome thinks that Solomon, the subject of the Psalm is a type of Christ. This is the typical sense. In other words, Solomon the literal meaning is the type of the Messias. In the East, St. Justin (165) seems to be the first to have made an apologetic use of Psalm 72 and against his opponent he argues the Psalm cannot refer to Solomon. Origen (254) interprets the Psalm uniformly of Christ. Outside of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Christian tradition and interpretation of Psalm 72 is Messianic.

2. Jewish Tradition. The Jewish Tradition like the Christian has preserved the Messianic understanding of Psalm 72. The Targum has as follows: "O God, give the decree of thy judgment to the King Messias, and thy justice to the son of David the king." The famed Jewish com-

mentators Kimchi and Rashi interpret the Psalm Messianically.

3. Modern Trends. The modern interpretations may be divided into non-Messianic and Messianic. In the nineteenth century the theory of a Maccabean Psalter became popular. These would apply Psalm 72 to the Hellenistic period and the Ptolemies. Gunkel would not apply the Psalm to any particular king except that he would place it on the accession of some king to his throne or on the king's anniversary. Some scholars just found in the poem an ideal figure, either the nation itself or the king without much effect.

At the beginning of modern criticism two famous conservative Protestant scholars, Rosenmueller and Hengstenberg held for the traditional Messianic interpretation of Psalm 72. Others were influenced by the speculation on the Psalter referred to above. English scholars such as A.F. Kirkpatrick, S.R. Driver and A.B. Davidson have viewed the Psalm as Messianic.

By far the great majority of modern Catholics accept Psalm 72 as Messianic. Some view the Psalm as typically Messianic; others like our author, as in the direct literal sense. Our author feels that this gives coherence to the Psalm. Following up his rejection of the theory of Hofstil, our author rightly criticizes two Catholic scholars, L. Durr and N. Peters, who try vainly to work Gunkel's Hofstil into their interpretation of Psalm 72. They would attribute the Psalm to a reigning king looked upon as the Messias and merely as a matter of court style. Historically, as our author states, this is inconceivable.

This study of our author shows conclusively that the Messianic interpretation never died down and is as strong as ever. To conclude with the author, "It might be remarked that Messianism as Etienne Gilson has observed about philosophy, buries its own undertakers".

MARK KENNEDY, O.F.M.

Siena College, Loudonville, New York. Les Lieux-Saints. By Bernardin Collin, O.F.M.* Paris, France: Les Éditions Internationales, 1948. Pp. 240, 600 francs.

The custody of the holy shrines of Palestine which witnessed the birth, life, death and resurrection of Our Saviour has always been a sacred duty dear to the heart of Our Holy Mother Church. From the early days of Christianity to the present day She has kept vigil over these holy places. Down through the centuries Her children have gone in pilgrimage from the four corners of the earth to kneel in prayer at these holy shrines. Bethlehem, Nazareth, Capernaum, Jerusalem are names which every catholic child learns at its mother's knee. Little wonder therefore if recent events in Palestine have been followed with more than ordinary interest and with no little anxiety by Catholics the world over for the future fate of the Holy Places of Palestine will depend on a large measure on the successful settlement of that very disturbed Holy Land.

Père Collin's book on the Holy Places is, therefore, very timely and very welcome. In it he traces the history of the Holy Places from the capture of Jerusalem by Titus 70 A.D. down to the present day. The reader will find in these pages a resume of world history; Kingdoms and Powers which have long ceased to exist flash across the screen to be followed by others which still retain a place in world history. Political intrigue, bribery, and corruption of Officials, falsification of documents the only thing missing is an iron curtain and the story is up-to-date. This story is also a miniature Church History - the early Roman persecutions, the rise of Mahomed and the Moslem religion - the persecutions and destruction which followed in their wake; the reign of the Turk in Palestine and the Middle East; the Crusades, the liberation of the Holy Land, the Latin Kingdom; the Schism which separated Greece and much of the East from Rome and the Successor of St. Peter; the seven glorious centuries of Franciscan guardianship of the Holy Places - pages of Church history often dyed red in the blood of Martvrs.

These are the scenes of profane and sacred history which Père Collin unfolds before the readers eyes, scenes depicted with a masterly touch

^{*} We are pleased to announce to our readers that Fr. Bernardin Collin, O.F.M., was appointed auxiliary bishop of Port Said, Egypt.

and documented with the scientific historian's meticulous care. But the Author's scope is not to give us a synopsis of ancient and modern history but rather to place the question of the Holy Places in its historical setting.

The kernel of the question is this: The Schismatic Greek Monks in Palestine and the Moslems have usurped rights over many of the sacred Shrines, rights which never were theirs; the Catholic Church has strenuously and continuously objected to this usurpation. Objections, however, are of little avail in a land where might seems to be right. Hopes ran high when the Turks were driven out of Palestine in the first World War that the question would then be settled and justice done. The question was proposed in a calm scholarly documented statement to the Treaty-Makers of Versailles by the Franciscan Custody of the Holy Land, Some months later the Greek Schismatics followed suit, loudly proclaiming that they, and they only, had the exclusive ownership of the Sacred Places but ending up with a fervent wish that Catholics and Schismatics could share the Sacred Places in fraternal charity. One is tempted to call to mind the "Judgement of Solomon" the false Mother was very willing to divide the baby! But unfortunately Versailles was not exactly over-thronged with Solomons and the question was left unsolved. Great Britain during her twenty-six years as Mandatory Power in charge of Palestine had recourse to the principle of the "Status quo ante," i.e., leave things as she found them and thus the question is still awaiting a solution.

Today, the question of the Holy Places comes to be front-page news once more. Palestine is being divided into two kingdoms- not the first time in its chequered history—and Jerusalem is to be an Independent International City. The Governor of Jerusalem shall have the right and the duty to protect the Holy Places not only in Jerusalem but in the Jewish and Arab States as well. Any questions that may arise concerning ownership, rights, etc., between the different religious confessions or communities are to be solved by applying the old panacea the "Status Quo". This is but side-stepping a moral obligation and sanctioning an injustice as Père Collin says. The solution suggested by the Author seems the only equitable one: Let the United Nations Organization appoint a Commission of historico-judicial Experts to study the rights of the

different Christian and other Communities in the various Shrines and having ascertained the facts, let justice be done. Then this new "Status Quo" can be enforced and the Holy Places which witnessed the earthly sojourn of the Prince of Peace amongst us will be once more the abodes of fraternal peace and charity among those who reverence His sacred memory.

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Problemas do Catolicismo Contemporáneo. By Mesquita Pimentel. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Vozes, 1948. Pp. 333.

This volume unites several essays published by the author since 1943 in the periodical lozes de Petropolis. Animated by the fervent desire to see the basic tenets of the Faith untouched and fully recognized, as well as made the principles of attitude and action, Mr. Pimentel sometimes becomes rather agressive and, perhaps, even a little unjust, his emphasis on charity notwithstanding. It is, of course, everyone's right to judge according to his lights, and his duty to speak according to his conscience; but it would seem that before condemning altogether men who, after all, have been admired by people not less anxious to preserve the true spirit of Catholicism, some consideration might be given for the reasons why these others failed to see all the dangerous errors the author discovers in the "four evangelists of a new Christianity" who are false prophets: Maritain, Bloy, Peguy, and Bernanos. His standpoint had been attacked, and in one article he answers his critic. The titles: The Catholic in today's world, Confusionism, Collaborating with evil (already reporting in a not wholly unfavorable manner on books not strictly Catholic is such a collaboration), Catholic mentality, Literature and Catholicism, False prophets, The centennary of L. Bloy, The four evangelists, Catholicism and politics, Catholic conformism (highly critical of the ideas, e.g. of W. Parsons), Morals and art, Ethics and Aesthetics, Union in truth and charity. These essays are interesting, more perhaps as the testimony of a sincere if rather extremistic mind, than because of their philosophical content. To judge the attitude of the author one would have to take

account of the particular situation in Brazil and the repercussions the "false prophets" may have caused there. It may be that Mr. Pimentel views his problems too much from the angle of local events.

RUDOLF ALLERS

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The Didache, The Epistle of Barnabas, The Epistles and the Martyrdom of St. Polycarp, The Fragments of Papias, The Epistle to Diognetus. Translated and Annotated by Rev. James A. Kleist, S.J. No. 6 of Ancient Christian Writers. Westminister, Md.: Newman Book shop, 1948. Pp. 235. \$2.75.

Father James Kleist makes another valuable contribution to the study of the Ancient Christian Writers in this the sixth number of the series. This volume should prove as popular as his first (The Epistles of St. Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius of Antioch). Here we have some of the most ancient Christian documents bearing witness to the life and discipline of the Church in the first and second centuries.

The first work, The Didache or The Teaching of the Tuelve Apostles, according to its longer title, is usually considered as the oldest Christian non-canonical piece of literature. The original author is unknown. The date of its composition is placed towards the end of the first century. This work is valued so highly because it gives us a glimpse of the primitive Christian community. It sketches the primitive instruction for converts, offers a brief description of the liturgy of the time, outlines the early Church organization together with some disciplinary regulations, and concludes with a final instruction on the Parousia. The Didache has been described by various authors as the oldest ritual-ordo of Christianity. Perhaps it would be more exact to describe it as a summary of moral, individual and social obligations of the early Christians. It could have served as a "Vade Mecum" for the faithful and as an ordo for the Church officials.

The Epistle of Bamabas is a letter of instructions intended for recent converts from paganism. The purpose of the instructions was to shield the neo-converts from the Judaizers and to strengthen them in their faith.

To achieve his end the author uses every means at his disposal to show that the New Law established by Christ has supplanted the Old Law. The second part of the letter is an exhortation to Christian life, parallel to the section in *The Didache* which deals with the "Two Ways: The Way of Life and the Way of Death." In early Christianity the companion of Paul was regarded as the author of this letter. Now it is shown from the context that the author was not the companion of Paul.

Polycarp's Epistle to the Philippians, written during the first half of the second century is an answer to a letter that had been addressed to him by the Philippians. Polycarp utilized the occasion by giving a moral exhortation. He urged the Philippians to keep their faith pure, and especially to steer clear of avarice "which is the root of all evils." Polycarp uses scriptural quotations freely, particularly from the Epistles of Paul, the venerable Apostle of Philippi.

Polycarp, who was martyred about the middle of the second century, was held in high esteem by the early Christians. One of the main reasons was that he had been a disciple "of those who had known the Lord." Tertullian confirms that statement when he says that Polycarp was made a bishop of the Apostle John. Because of this distinction "numerous disciples gathered around him to hear from his lips the last living echo of Apostolic teaching." When this venerable Bishop of Smyrna was put to death for his faith during the Roman persecutions, the faithful of Philomelium (expressing the feeling of all the faithful) requested an account of his martyrdom. Marcion, an eye-witness, answered the request. He presented not only to the particular community at Philomelium but to the world at large a vivid description of how this "most wonderful man" won the martyr's crown. This account by Marcion is a gem of Christian Martyrology, and bears testimony to the glory of other early martyrs.

Papias, Bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia at the beginning of the second century, wrote an Explanation of the Oracles of the Lord in five books. This work was an interpretation, not only of the oracles of the Lord but also of the narrative of our Lord's actions. Oral tradition with its "marvellous stories" formed a part of Papias' sources. Whatever remains of the original work it has come down in quotations from subsequent writers, particularly Irenaeus and Eusebius. The collection of these quotations forms The Fragments of Papias.

The Epistle to Diognetus is an anonymous letter to an unidentified person by the name of Diognetus. The author answers three questions put to him by Diognetus: 1) Why do Christians separate themselves from the pagans and Jews? 2) How do Christians live among themselves? 3) Why did Christianity come into existence at so late a date in the history of the world? Whether the questions and questioner are real or imaginary, the author presents an excellent apology for Christianity. In speaking of the excellence of the Christian life, he says "what the soul is in the body, that the Christians are in the world." According to the translator, "Mysticism has always flourished in the Church and of her ample literature this letter is the first extra-canonical attempt to show its necessity." (p. 130)

These six ancient Christian writings, translated, analyzed and explained by Father Kleist, present a view of Christianity as it existed immediately after the age of the Apostles. It is interesting to see also in these works explicit references to basic Catholic truths, which are sometimes challenged as medieval innovations. The introductions to the individual writings by the translator, in addition to the scholarly comments in the notes, bring out the importance of these ancient documents. They serve as irrefutable historical confirmation of the indefectibility of the Catholic Church.

FIRMIN M. SCHMIDT, O.F.M. CAP.

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L'Avènement de Jesus dans l'Âme. Traduction et Adaptation de Sermons sur les Mystères de l'Enfance, par S. Antoine de Padoue, Doct. Evangélique. Edited by Rev. r'. Ferdinand Coiteux, O.F.M. Preface de S.E. Mgr. l'Archèvèque de Montreal. Two volumes. Montreal, Canada: Editions Franciscaines, 1948. Vol. I (one star) pp. 255; Vol. II (two stars) pp. 275.

These two booklets represent radio sermons given over the Canadian Address Systems between May 6, 1947 and September 21, 1948 on the Mysteries of the Infancy of Christ as expounded by St. Anthony of Padua, and adapted by the Rev. Ferdinand Coiteux, O.F.M. of Rosemont, Canada.

The first series comprises thirty addresses, divided into three categories, pertaining to the Conception of Christ; to His Infancy; and to His Circumcision; the second series comprises twenty-one addresses divided into three other categories: the Epiphany, the Massacre of the Innocents; and the Presentation of Christ in the Temple. The first volume has a few introductory pages including a preface by his Excellency, the Most Rev. Joseph Charbonneau, Archbishop of Montreal; the second, with a preface by the Very Rev. Théodoric Paré, O.F.M., Definitor General, consisting of an epilogue on the "Anthonian Theory of Perfection"; and a Prayer of St. Anthony inviting Jesus to take up His abode in the souls of men. Both booklets are real treasures of Anthonian doctrine and present a veritable font of material for sermons, discourses and conferences.

RAPHAEL M. HUBER, O.F.M. CONV.

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Evangelista del Pacifico: Fray Junipero Serra, Padre y Fundador de la Alta California. Textual Reproduction of the Relacion historica de la vida y apostolicas tareas del Ven. Padre Fray Junipero Serra y de las Misiones que fundo en la California Septentrional y nuevos establecimientos de Monterrey. By R.P. Fray Francisco Palou (first published in Mexico, 1787). Madrid: Consejo Superior de Misiones, 1944. Pp. xxviii-317.

Although this new edition of the well-known work of Palou has been a long time in reaching us, its importance is such that it merits a review, however tardy. It was most fitting that this life of the Apostle of California should be the first volume in the collection "Espana Misionera". It contains more than the biography of Serra alone. It is also a history of the wonderful epoch of the missions that brought the dawn of Christianity to the State of California, where great cities now flourish on the sites of the old missions.

Today, when our country takes the lead in world affairs as the champion of the principles of Western culture vivified by the Gospel, the historical facts of the work of those saintly missionaries shine forth with renewed brilliance, for it was they who infused into the life of this young country that spiritual inspiration that will make it triumphant.

Although the work is written with truly Franciscan simplicity - for Fr. Palou tells us in his Prologue that he originally intended it only "as an edifying letter, or simple report which I was making to my holy Province of Mallorca of the virtues and apostolic labors of the abovementioned Venerable Father, so that the chronicler might polish and perfect it," - it is nevertheless of great historical value, because the author was the disciple, friend and companion of Serra during many years in Mallorca, Mexico and California, and his most important collaborator on the missions of which he writes. Therefore this work is justly considered to be the principle source of all the later studies and biographies of Serra.

It was written before the glorious future of California could be foreseen but in its veracity, abundance and simple beauty it has all the qualities of a literary masterpiece that have made it a fundamental work in the history and literature of California. It not only gives us a biography of Serra, but also describes the beginnings and development of the missions, the customs of the natives, the geography of the country, its climate and capacity for the introduction of new fruits as the material basis of a prosperous civilized life.

This work of Palou was first published in Mexico in 1787, only three years after the death of Serra. A second edition was published in Mexico in 1852 by Nicolas García de San Vicente, who appended to it the posthumous work of Padre Francisco Xavier Clavijero, S.J., Ilistoria de la Antigua o Baja California. A good English translation was published by the Rev. J. Adam in San Francisco in 1883. But this volume of the Collection "Espana Misionera" is the most complete edition of Palóu's work.

The value of the book is increased by its maps and plates. There is a reproduction of an oil painting of the martyrdom of Fray Luis Jaume and facsimiles of the baptismal record of Serra and one of his letters.

The elegant Prologue was written by the noted Mallorcan author, Lorenzo Riber. With poetic inspiration, Sr. Riber carries out Palóu's wish that a chronicler of his Province add to his own simple words some elaboration of the interesting points in the life of the holy missionary.

It seems a shame that by some *lapsus calami* (for there is no other explanation) Sr. Riber calls Alta California a "peninsula".

In these days when the work is going forward on the Cause of Beatification of Junípero Serra, it is very opportune to have in this book a reproduction of the copper-engraving of Serra, taken from the original edition of 1787, where his fame of sanctity is already mentioned in a caption placed on the picture by the engraver. It reads as follows:

"True portrait of the Venerable Padre Fray Junípero Serra, son of the Holy Province of Our Father Saint Francis of the Island of Mallorca, Doctor and former Professor of Theology, Commissary of the Holy Office, Missionary of the Apostolic College of San Fernando of Mexico, Founder and President of the Missions of Northern California. He died with great fame of sanctity in the Mission of San Carlos at the Port of New Monterrey on the 28th of August, 1784, at the age of 70 years, 9 months, 4 days, having spent half of his life in the work of Apostolic Missionary."

LÁZARO LAMADRID, O.F.M.

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The Holy Bible: The Book of Genesis. Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1948. Pp. vi-130. \$1.00.

It is now slightly over a year since the Confraternity translation of Genesis has appeared. The cordial reception which this translation from the original has received augurs well for the remainder of the Old Testament.

Presented in a pleasing, easy-to-read format, the translation is outstanding not less for its simple, yet worthy, style, than for its pains-

taking accuracy of rendition. This accuracy of translation, and a judicial use of prudent textual criticism, have combined to make this text a most trustworthy rendition of the words and thoughts of the inspired author. Pace Msgr. Knox, accuracy implies literalness, not a literalness that consists in a slavish word for word translation in the original sentence construction, but a literalness that consists in blending the genius of the English language with an exact translation of the original Hebrew. This is the ideal which the translator and editors set for themselves. That they have achieved it in a remarkable degree cannot be denied. They have, for instance, almost universally avoided the pitfall of interpretative translation. Thus they have translated generic terms generically, instead of yielding to the temptation of narrowing their meaning to fit a particular interpretation. And, while they have not retained many of the Hebrew idioms, the flavor of the original has not been lost. At times, of course, where the specific meaning of a word or phrase is disputed, they have been forced to adopt one translation, usually indicating alternatives in a note. In general, however, there can be no dispute as to the literal accuracy of the translation.

As for the utility of this volume, the reviewer can testify that its classroom use has shown its practicality. No longer is there need to first correct the Vulgate text and then proceed to a positive explanation, unnecessarily burdening the student's mind. The clarity of the translation has considerably reduced the necessity of further explanation, in many instances. The general reader will find the same advantages. Those who were repelled, not only by the format, but also by the language of the Challoner edition must search elsewhere for excuses for not reading Holy Writ.

All this is not to say that the work is without flaw. Others have pointed out instances which, to them, left room for improvement. I should like to select two points for criticism. In the translation of the Protoevangelium (3:15) it is difficult to understand the reason for the "deliberate compromise" with the older version in the rendition: "You shall lie in wait for his heel". At best this phrase is ambiguous in English. A translation "wound" or "injure" would not give rise to the oft encountered misunderstanding of "lie in wait for" as "cover" or "lie in fear of being crushed". The second criticism regards a case of general editorial

policy. Although one can respect and appreciate the desire of the editors to adhere to the principles of St. Jerome in transliterating proper names. it is difficult to agree with the perpetuation, in many instances, of the deficiencies of Latin phonetics, or the use of a consonant whose pronunciation is different in modern English from the Latin pronunciation of St. Jerome. In these instances principles are not in question. Had he had the means at his command, St. Jerome would certainly have transliterated more accurately. The reviewer has in mind particularly the transliteration of the llebrew shin, gof and kaf. These sounds can be represented in English by a consonant more closely approximating the pronunciation of the original. In particular, the rendition of qof by "C" and kaf by "Ch" lead to an entirely erroneous pronunciation in many cases. The English "C" often has the pronunciation of "S". Thus in Gen. 15:19 (to select at random) we read "Cinites"; the ordinary English pronunciation of which would be "Sinites". "Ch" is most frequently pronounced as in "chair". not as in "echo", which the transliteration often presupposes. This sort of transliteration could lead to the almost absurd rendering of the name of Saul's father as "Cis", the English pronunciation of which is "Sis". St. Jerome at least approximated the correct pronunciation, since for him the "C" was pronounced "K". We can correctly render it "Kish". Why not do so? Hence the reviewer would respectfully suggest to the editorial board that in editing the other books of the Old Testament they attempt a more correct transliteration of proper names where this does not conflict with the principles of St. Jerome.

The footnotes, while brief and to the point, have been excellently done. They convey the maximum of necessary information in a minimum of space. And the critical notes which have been wisely relegated to the rear of the volume, are a model of conciseness and scholarship.

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A Filosofia do Communismo. By Agnelo Rossi. Rio de Janeiro; Editora Vozes, 1947. Pp. 127.

A brief summary of the history and doctrine of communism, in its

original Marxian form and its later developments, with a critical analysis of Dialectical and Historical Materialism, of the economic conceptions and the attitude in regard to religion. Three appendixes deal with: Philosophy and Communism, Religion in Soviet Russia, Communism in Brazil. Obviously written for the general reader, this slender volume summarizes ably the problems and states impressively the objections against communism. The short bibliography lists only publications in Portuguese.

RUDOLF ALLERS

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The National Catholic Almanac. Compiled by the Franciscan Clerics of Holy Name College, Washington, D.C. Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1949. Pp. 832. \$1.50.

The National Catholic Almanac compiled by the Franciscan clerics of Holy Name College, Washington, D.C. has become a fixture among Catholic publications in the United States. Any book that is published yearly for forty-three years must have undoubted merits. If you have ever consulted the Almanac you will know that the sentence on the cover "A Complete Catholic Library in One Volume" is not hyperbole.

For both Catholic and non-Catholic citizens there is a wealth of information on topics of current and enduring interest, e.g., Church doctrine, practice, history and organization; religious orders; missions; recent developments in the field of religion; government matters and statistics; scientific information; sports records; general statistics; information on books and periodicals, etc. There is an especially well-written and concise digest of the events—secular and religious—of the past year.

Perhaps among the most distinctive features of the Almanac are the short historical sketches on subjects such as "The Church In Latin America". This reviewer happens to know, through personal contact with former editors of the Almanac how much painstaking work goes into these historical articles in an effort to keep them concisely correct.

There is a section called "Catholic Ready Reference," however, which

could stand a closer scrutiny in future editions. In this section, short definitions of words like "Abbess" "Alma Mater" "Beatitudes" "Tonsure" etc. are given. Some of these definitions are marvels of conciseness and correctness. But a few of them are a trifle ambiguous. For instance, "General Absolution" is called "a blessing of the Church to which a plenary indulgence is attached." In the next sentence, the text continues: "It also is given without confession of sin...to soldiers on the battle-field" (p. 206). Evidently these are not one and the same thing, although one could obtain that impression from the Almanac. On p. 213 under "Burial" the list of those to whom ecclesiastical burial is denied should have been qualified by the inclusion of the restrictive phrase contained in No. 1240 of Canon Law, sc., "unless they (apostates, schismatics, etc.) have given some signs of repentance before death".

I hope the editors will take these criticisms in the spirit in which they are given. It is precisely because this "Ready Reference" is such an important and well-written section that even more care and attention should be given to each definition so that exactness and completeness will be evident to all the readers.

May the Almanac keep up and even surpass the high standards set by this 1949 edition!

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La Filosofia de la ley segun Domingo de Soto. By Alfonso Zahar Vergara. Mexìco: Editorial Jus, 1946. Pp. 173.

The first two chapters of this small volume describe the intellectual and spiritual situation in Spain at the time of the Council of Trent, the leading personalities, especially of Francisco de Vittoria, Melchor Cano, and Juan de Mariana, and briefly, the life of de Soto. The other three chapters summarize de Soto's legal philosophy as laid down in his work De justitia et jure. The treatise follows closely the doctrine of St.

Thomas. The author summarizes de Soto's presentation under the three headings: the general notion of law, the eternal and the natural law, the human law. The Thomistic teachings are faithfully reported and the way de Soto used them is indicated. The author finds a happy formula to characterize the difference of the modern and the scholastic approach: when the schoolmen refer to justice, they think of a virtue, when the moderns do, they think of a value. As a conscientious pupil of Aquinas, de Soto stresses reason as the basis of law and its observation. As a contemporary of Mariana, he is much concerned with the problem of just government and its distinction from tyranny: when the legislator makes laws in view of his particular good he becomes a tyrant. A bibliography of seventeen items and an index are added.

RUDOLF ALLERS

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- Dragulis, Rev. S.J. Life of the Blessed Virgin Mary Mother of God.

 A Series of Mystery Plays. II Madonna of Nazareth. Stockbridge,
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SOME NOTES ON A RECENT INTERPRETATION OF WILLIAM OF OCKHAM'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Ĭ

In 1926 M. Georges de Lagarde published a work, Récherches sur l'esprit politique de la Réforme, which attracted considerable attention both for the thoroughness of its scholarship and the brilliance of its style. The author made no attempt to hide his main object; it was to question the traditional "liberal" assumption that the 16th century Reformers were the protagonists of the autonomy of the individual as against the hierarchical and corporatist conceptions of the Catholic Middle Ages.. M. de Lagarde argues convincingly that the real effect of the Reformation was to replace the Church as mistress of the situation, not by the individual, but by the State, which was now provided with its own imprescriptable religious sanction.

The researches necessary in the preparation of his book had convinced M. de Lagrade that the origins of "l'état laique", which he saw as the real power behind the Reformation upheaval, could not be explained by a study of the 16th century alone. The roots of the movement towards laicisation were to be traced back to the 13th and 14th centuries; it was there that would be found "la naissance de l'esprit laïque". So began the extensive researches into later medieval thought and action which have been embodied in M. de Lagarde's still uncompleted work, La Naissance de l'esprit laïque au déclin du Moyen Âge. 1

It is as a part (the most important part) of his study of this huge problem that M. de Lagarde has embarked on the only full-scale examination of Ockham's political thought so far to be undertaken. The historical public has cause to be grateful for the presentation in so readable a form of the issues raised by (it has to be confessed) one of the most unreadable of thinkers. In ability to present a complex theme with the clarity and acumen so characteristic of French scholarship M. de Lagrade has lost none of his cunning; no discerning reader can fail to

^{1.} Vol. I (Bilan du XIII'ème siècle) and II (Marsile de Padoue), 1934; Vol. III (Secteur Social de la Scolastique) and IV (Ockham et Son Temps), 1942; Vol. V (Ockham; Bases du Départ) and VI (Ockham; La Morale et le Droit), 1946.

be impressed with the resulting synthesis. Oddly enough, it is perhaps this very impressiveness which gives rise to our first doubts of the validity of M. de Lagarde's interpretation. Can so complex a system of thought as that of the English Franciscan be patient of quite so clear - an explanation, however competent? How far are we justified in believing that M. de Lagarde's synthesis was Ockham's own? These are the important questions which we wish to discuss here.

Ockham and Marsiglio have been cast by M. de Lagarde for the roles of principal initiators of the modern secular State, and in this work it is Ockham who, contrary to the usual opinion, plays the larger part. This is because, says Lagarde, Ockham's intellect is better able to make use of the tendencies in fourteenth-century ecclesiastical and secular society which might promote the triumph of the radical individualism which was the logical social complement to his philosophy. Despite his surface moderation, the English Franciscan is the more dangerous man, for he is

beaucoup plus séducteur. Il enveloppe si bien toutes choses de sa dialectique savante que l'on se sent d'avance vaincu par un savoir aussi étendu, par une subtilité aussi dissolvante...Et les institutions mêmes qu'Ockham prétend respecter sont plus ébranlés par son obséquieuse insolence que par les coups de béliers francs d'un Marsile de Padoue.³

The chief vehicle of Ockham's undermining process is the régime of "corps" or "estates", "qui est la véritable réalité politique du XIV e siecle".4

This statement immediately raises doubts in our mind. Why should it be assumed that the regime of "estates" was so adapted for the spread of individualism and the downfall of the conception of a united Church and society? The medieval Papacy itself cannot have seen the alleged danger, for in its struggle with the secular power, it was constantly invoking the principle of the separateness and autonomy of the clerical "estate". This fact does not, of course, prove that M. de Lagarde is wrong in seeing the regime of "estates" as the dissolving factor in the medieval political synthesis; but it seems

^{2.} Naissance, iii, 4-5.

^{3.} G. de Lagarde, 'Marsile de Padoue et Guillaume d'Ockham', Revue des Sciences Religieuses, XVII. 454.

^{4.} Naissance, iii, 6.

hard that Ockham should be blamed for espousing a cause which had met with approval in the citadel of orthodoxy itself.⁵

The further question then presents itself; how far is it true to say that Ockham's philosophy, as he taught it at Oxford, must needs have had so destructive an impact in the social and political field? We are far from minimizing the revolutionary character of Ockham's philosophical findings. 6 Yet it seems to be true that this philosophy was never condemned in medieval times by the highest authority of the Church. It is true that the Inceptor himself saw fifty-one of his alleged propositions condemned by a commission of theologians at Avignon, but this condemnation was never officially ratified by the magisterial authority of the Papacy itself. The Bull of excommunication directed by John XXII against Ockham was not a result of Ockham's philosophical errors, but of his opposition to the Pope in matters of ecclesiastical discipline. During the remainder of the Middle Ages, Nominalism continued to be one of the Church's most flourishing philosophical schools, despite sporadic attempts to suppress it. Nor was the post-Tridentine Church noticeably hostile to it. Luke Wadding, the indefatigable Franciscan annalist, takes pains to show that Ockham's philosophy is not heretical and that his polemical anti-Papal works alone are to be condemned. Even in the case of the latter. says Wadding, so orthodox an authority as Cardinal Bellarmine

^{5.} The history of the relations of the Lombard Communes with the Papacy might be cited as an example. From the eleventh century onwards these cities received support from the Papacy in their efforts to free themselves from dependence, not only on the Empire, but on their local feudal Archbishops, who were generally obedient tools of Imperial policy (e.g. Gregory VII's opponent, Aribert of Milan). In the 13th century a new situation arises. The Imperial menace is past and the Communes themselves show signs of encroaching on ecclesiastical authority. So once more the Papacy comes forward as defenders of the clerical 'estate' against its previous ally, the secular Commune. M. de Lagarde himself gives examples of the second stage. (Naissance, i, 217-220).

^{6.} Although recent writings by members of the Franciscan Order and others make it clear that here too a case may be made for Ockham as a reforming conservative. Vide especially E.A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham (1935); R. Guelluy, La Philosophie et la Théologie chez Guellaume d'Ockham (1947) and the various articles of Fr. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M.

^{7.} Annales Minorum (1733), viii, 14.

^{8.} These had in fact been placed on the Index of Prohibited Books in the sixteenth century.

was unwilling to pass much censure on Ockham's views on the relation between Papacy and Empire. It was not until the Neo-Thomist revival that Ockham was definitely cast as villain of the Catholic philosophical scene. It is only in writers influenced by the Neo-Thomist interpretation that we meet with the idea that Ockham's polemical position was a necessary result of his philosophy. Previous ages seem to have considered it no absurdity to make an important distinction between the two aspects of Ockham's intellectual activity.

It is, in fact, a distinction which Ockham himself would have accepted. In his Oxford philosophical works he makes clear again and again that the difference between philosophy and theology is radical and total. Whether this was a disaster is not for the historian qua historian, to decide; what he may legitimately point out is that the mental dualism inherent in Ockham's attitude would lead him, not to apply the destructive results of his philosophical reasoning to the faith of the Church as it stood revealed, but to fall back on a method of interpretation based on tradition. He seems to intimate in an oftenquoted passage of the Dialogus that such is, in fact, his policy. 10 So we must expect Scripture and the Fathers, not Nominalist logic, to be his basis when dealing with theology. This point cannot be emphasised too strongly when Ockham's "political" treatises are in question; for these writings are theological through and through. Ockham approaches politics by way of ecclesiology; revelation, not reason, has the last word in this sphere.

The dispute of the Franciscan Conventual party with the Papacy over the interpretation of the Order's Rule was the impetus which led Ockham to examine the nature of authority within the Church. In his *Epistola ad Fratres Minores* (sent in the nature of an *apologia* to the Chapter-General at Perugia in 1334), Ockham states that it was not until 1328 that he was induced to take an active interest in the controversy on evangelical poverty. There is one curious indication, however, that his philosophical enunciations at Oxford had become, as

^{9.} Annales Minorum, loc. cit.

^{10.} II, v; (Goldast, Monarchia (1614), ii, 415-416)..

^{11.} Epistola ad Fratres Minores, Ed. K. Brampton (1927), 1.

early as 1322, a part of the perennial struggle between the secular clergy and the friars. The Oxford Chancellor, Jean Lutterell, a secular master, was Ockham's first real opponent and it was through his instrumentality that Ockham was finally summoned to Avignon for examination in 1324. But, before he could achieve this, Lutterell had to endure a considerable amount of opposition from the English royal court. In a letter of August 12, 1322. Edward II forbade Lutterell to leave the realm to present his plea before the Pope on the grounds that his action would bring discredit on the University and Kingdom. It was not until 1323 that Lutterell appears to have surmounted this opposition. The long delay seems to suggest that interests with a powerful footing at Court were working against Lutterell. Who more likely than the friars? Edward's partiality towards them has already been pointed out by Hastings Rashdall 12 and it was shared by his consort, Queen Isabella, two of whose confessors were chosen from the London convent of the Franciscan Order. 13 Edward and Isabella, so much at loggerheads in other respects, seem to have been at one in their generosity to this Franciscan house and after death mortal remains of both (Isabella's body and Edward's heart) were to rest here. 14 It is perhaps significant that the London Greyfriars possessed a famous tradition of learning and was later to have Ockhamist affiliations. 15 So well connected a religious house would not be averse to using its influence to stay proceedings against one of its Oxford brethren, especially when the adversary was Lutterell, who was definitely "persona non grata" with the Mendicant Orders since his prominent part in the dispute between the University and the Dominicans during the previous

^{12.} Mediaeval Universities, iii, 67 and 74. (Revised edition by Powicke and Emden, 1936).

^{13.} John Lamborn and John Vye. (Kingsford, C. L., The Grey Friars of London (1915), 75 and 79.)

^{14.} Martin, A.R., Franciscan Architecture in England (1937), 197.

^{15.} Adam Wodham, or Godham, one of Ockham's pupils during the famous lectures on the Sentences, and an early defender of Ockhamism at Oxford (1332), resided and probably taught at London in the middle of the century. (Kingsford, op. cit., 22). Leland records that the library of the convent contained MSS. of several of Ockham's philosophical works (Collectanea, IV, 49-51). His list is reprinted in Kingsford, op. cit., 234.

decade. 16

We have the possibility, then, that Ockham's 'philosophie pure' may have been a factor in Franciscan relations with other sections of the Church even before he took official cognisance of the controversy on Evangelical Poverty, But it is only when we turn to consider that controversy itself that we emerge from the region of surmise. The connections between the Franciscans and the Papacy had been, during the 13th century, very close and cordial. Ever since Innocent III had perceived the possibilities of the new venture the Pope had been protector of the Order and the Holy See had acted as direct or indirect dispenser of the temporal goods necessary ad sustentationem vitae. In the course of the century a legal theory 17 grew up which aimed at securing for the Franciscans the permanent provision of the necessities of life while the theoretical ideal of poverty for which the Order stood was retained. This theory distinguished between the usus iuris of temporalities used by the Order and their usus facti. The Pope possessed the former and delegated the latter to the Friars; this reasoning was given official Papal approval in Nicholas IV's Bull, Exit qui seminat. 18

The settlement thus achieved was open to attack from two sides. On the one hand the "Spiritual" section of the Order contended that the carefully-worded distinctions were a mere cloak to cover the abandonment of St. Francis's own insistence on absolute mendicant poverty; on the other the secular clergy

^{16.} Dictionary of National Biography (1893); xxxiv, 296. Lutterell had in fact been to Avignon in 1318 in connection with this dispute. It is interesting to recall that both Dominicans and Franciscans were persuaded with reluctance to conform their methods of theological teaching with that of the University. Originally neither Order lectured on the Sentences; the Franciscans wished to substitute the direct study of Scripture. Here Ockham's attitude is very true to type, although by his time his Order had bowed to the yoke of the Lombard. In making a reductio ad absurdum of the philosophical systems of his predecessors, Ockham perhaps incarnated the Franciscan revenge. Like Al Ghazali, whose argument against causality he followed by accident or design and whose books were left to the library of the Oxford convent by Grosseteste (Tornay, S.C., Ockham: Studies and Selections (1938), 69), Ockham used philosophy to 'destroy' the philosophers, and so vindicate what he considered to be the outraged claims of Divine revelation.

^{17.} Formulated chiefly by St. Bonaventura (Apologia Pauperum) and Peckham (Tractatus de Paupertate).

^{18.} C. Eubel, Bullarium Franciscanum, iii, 404-416.

and the other religious Orders, resentful of the tone of spiritual superiority often adopted by Franciscan apologists, pointed out the discrepancies often to be observed between Franciscan theory and Franciscan practice. Educated laymen seem also to have been aware that the Order was in danger of losing the substance of its ideal while striving to preserve the letter. In a Canzone on voluntary poverty (Molti son quei che lodan povertade) Giotto the painter anticipates the later conviction of John XXII "that the renunciation of property had little to do with perfection", 19 as well as indulging in some satire at the expense of the Conventual position. His experience as decorator of the Order's mother church at Assisi would enable Giotto to speak with some insight.

It is not surprising that John XXII, whose sympathies were strongly with the Thomist and Aristotelean view of society and property, should finally have clashed with the Conventuals as well as with the Spirituals (whom all parties were agreed in suppressing). In December 1322, he promulgated the famous Ad Conditorem Canonum, 20 which completely reversed the decision of Exit qui seminat. The very existence of the usus facti as a valid conception was denied and the Papacy divested itself of any responsibility for the ownership of the Order's temporalities; in future the Order itself would be their owner. This was followed a year later by an attack on the alleged doctrinal basis of the Franciscan position; in November, 1323, the decretal Cum inter nonnullos 21 declared the statement that Christ and His Apostles possessed nothing to be heretical.

Michael of Cesena, the General of the Order, and other prominent Franciscans were finally driven to open rebellion. It seems that Michael was responsible for interesting Ockham in the problem, ²² during the enforced confinement of both, together with the acrid Franciscan controversialist, Bonagratia of Bergamo, at Avignon. Perhaps Michael was (as the Popesuspected) in touch secretly with the anti-Papal Emperor Louis of Bayaria, who had in the previous year (1327) invaded Italy,

^{19.} D.L. Donie, The Nature and the Effect of the Heresy of the Fraticelli (1932), 178.

^{20.} Bullarium Franciscanum, v, 233-236.

^{21.} Ibid., v, 256.

^{22.} Epistola ad Fratres Minores. Op. cit., 1.

entered Rome and set up an Antipope, Peter of Corvara, himself a Franciscan Conventual. The trio of prisoners decided to throw in its lot with the forces actively in opposition to Avignon and, after Michael had drawn up a document (which the others signed), accusing John of heresy, they made their escape by sea to Italy (May 26, 1328) and joined the Emperor at Pisa. Henceforth Ockham's future was bound up with the political fortunes of Louis, whose Court had already become a refuge for religious and political dissidents.²³

On arrival at Pisa, Michael issued a series of formal appeals to the Church. These follow a traditionalist line, being based on the alleged inability of the Pope to change the character of the Rule. This brought forth a rejoinder from John - the Bull Quia Vir Reprobus (1329), the most detailed of his pronouncements during the controversy. It is this document which is controverted point by point in Ockham's Opus Nonaginta Dierum. The property of the point o

The Coventuals were in a very real sense committed to seeking a passage between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand they must emphasize the absolute character of the Papal proprietorship of the temporalities of the Order. But in this exaltation of Papal privilege, they ran the risk of undermining their own position; for John might retort that, if he was in fact absolute master of Franciscan goods, he might justifiably use his prerogative of ownership to surrender his property into the hands of those who were actually using it. Ockham realized that a middle way to escape both horns of this dilemma must

^{23.} Marsiglio of Padua and Jean of Jandun had been there since 1324.

^{24.} B.F., v. 408-425.

^{25.} Ibid., v, 408 ff.

^{26.} All references to O.N.D. are to the Manchester University Press edition of Ockham's Opera Politica (edited by J.G. Sikes). The first volume of this (covering Octo Quaestiones, some minor treatises and the first part of Opus Nonaginta Dierum) appeared in 1940. The second volume (dealing with the remainder of Opus Nonaginta Dierum) is unpublished at the time of writing, but I have been enabled to use the pagination of its proofs by the kindness of Dr. E.F. Jacob. It seemed to me far preferable to quote from a modern critical edition (even if still unpublished) than to use Goldast's very imperfect version. Editions quoted for the other two treatises used in this study are: - For the Octo Quaestiones: Sikes, op. cit., i. For the Breviloquium: Baudry's edition, (Paris, 1937). (A more recent edition has been produced by R. Scholz, (Leipzig, 1943), but we have been unable to make extensive use of this.)

be found.

His logical subtlety was equal to the task and significantly enough he begins with exhaustive definition of all terms in question. 27 Usus facti, usus iuris, consuetudo, dominium and potestas are passed under review and every shade of meaning, obvious as well as abstract, is pointed out. The central argument becomes apparent in the definitions of ius utendi and potestas licita. 28 lus utendi is defined as "a legitimate power of using some exterior thing, of which [power] a person may not be deprived without his own fault and without reasonable cause; if he is so deprived, he has the right to take legal action against the person who deprives him". This ius utendi is to be distinguished from a gratia, by which "is often conceded to a person a legitimate power of using something of which he may however be deprived at the will of the conceder without any fault of his own or any cause, because he who concedes [a power] may revoke the power conceded". Ockham maintains that the Franciscan use of temporal goods is a gratia and not a isu, and the distinction owes much to contemporary charter forms. But what he is most concerned to emphasize is that such a distinction is in accord with the Church's own ancient distinction between magistracy and ownership, the concept expressed in Roman Civil Law as dominium and potestas. 29

This distinction, however, is to be given a new twist by Ockham which is to take him far beyond the position of other Michaelist controversialists. Michael himself, whether appealing over John XXII's head to Sancta Romana Ecclesia or in later desperation to a General Council, could never shake himself free from the traditional Franciscan conception of the Church as a hierarchy, a conception systematized in the philosophy of St. Bonaventura and which had originated from the lips of St. Francis himself. All that Michael wished to do was to prevent John XXII from overstressing the Papal position in the hierarchy of authority, particularly by his infringement of what Michael regarded as the unalterable Franciscan Rule – itself

^{27.} Opus Nonaginta Dierum, c. 2. (Sikes, Opera Politica, i, 301-313).

^{28.} Ibid., 304.

^{29.} Ibid., 308.

^{30.} St. Francis's letter to all the faithful. A.G. Little, Franciscan Papers, Lists and Documents, 12.

here elevated to the status of participation in the chain of authority.

Ockham approached the problem from a different angle and here we must concede some ground to those who advocate a philosophical starting-point for his political theory. Although we deny that Orkham was consciously formulating a 'political philosophy' as such, it must be admitted that his metaphysical and ethical theories may have prejudiced him against acceptance of the principle of hierarchy as hitherto conceived. Furthermore, Ockham perceived that for the purposes of controversy alone. the depate must be shifted to new ground. If the principle of hierarchy were accepted in its usual form, it was impossible to avoid the logic of John's claim to override the provisions of a Rule which owed its very validity to Papal approval. What was needed was a new basic principle which would make the Michaelist plea for the irrevocable character of the Rule as incontrovertible as the hierarchical principle had made John's argument for the Rule's revision. The principle of contract was brought forward by Ockham as the needed element.

Earlier medieval thinking had indeed included factors favourable to a contractual view of authority. Scriptural and Germanic 'covenant' conceptions had mingled with deductions from the lex regia provisions of Roman Law and Stoic and Christian ideas of the natural equality of men to build up a mental attitude in which the individual would be considered as prior to the community. 31 Ockham would thus be able to represent his new move as a mere reassertion of obscured elements in earlier tradition and in a sense he was right. His re-discovery would enable the Franciscans to hold John to the provisions of the thriteenth-century Rule; for that Rule is now not (as the Michaelists would have it) an impersonal member of the hierarchy of ecclesiastical order or (as John would have it) a mere document granted de gratia by the supreme hierarchical authority and revocable at any moment by that same authority. Ockham conceives the Rule rather as a charter, granted indeed by a superior authority but, once granted, obtaining the status of a "franchise" or "liberty", revocable only by the consent of both parties.

^{31.} E.g., St. Augustine: 'What is a city but a multitude of men drawn together in a certain bond of agreement?' (Epistle cxxxviii, 2, 10).

In an important chapter 32 Ockham is led by the necessity of emphasizing against John the distinction between permission to use temporalities (licentia utendi) and the right of using them (ius utendi) to define natural and positive law and their respective spheres. John's attempt to place the Michaelists in the dilemma of using their goods inste or iniuste 33 is countered by a careful distinction between the ius fori (positive law) and the ius poli (natural law). The ius fori owes its force to the fact that "it is framed in a explicit manner from a human or Divine compact or decree." Whence also the ius fori can be called the law of custom in the wider employment of the word "custom". 34 Ockham cites no less an authority than Gratian ("The law of custom originated after the natural law at the time when men gathered together and began to dwell in the same places") 35 and concludes "that law is established by a human compact or ordinance".

A further corollary is that laws thus made by common consent may not be violated "at anyone's pleasure". For this too Patristic support if found in St. Augustine 36 and St. Isidore 37 although there is the qualifying reflection that "in some cases such a law may be set aside by the authority of the superior".

The application of all this to the Franciscan case is soon made clear. If "laws humanly instituted are not to be broken at will" it follows that "a licence which by positive law can be revoked at will by the conceder is not to be regarded as a part of positive law", (i.e. it is outside the legal sphere altogether). The licentia utendi granted by previous Popes to the Franciscan Order may be revoked at any moment and does not therefore constitute a legal title as asserted by John. What it does constitute, if Ockham's reasoning may be stated paradoxically, is a legal title to possess no legal standing. But this strange licentia derives not from the isu fori (for otherwise John as "superior" might be able to convert a licentia granted by

^{32.} O.N.D., c. lxv.; op. cit., ii, 569.

^{33.} Quia Vir Reprobus. B.F. v, 433-434.

^{34.} O.N.D., c. lxv.; op. cit., ii, 569.

^{35.} Decreti Prima Pars, dist. vii, c. 3. Friedberg, Corpus Iuris Canonici, (Leipzig, 1879-1881), i, 11.

^{36.} Ibid., dist. viii, c. 2; op. cit., i, 13.

^{37.} Ibid., dist. i, c. 2; op. cit., i, 1.

his predecessors into a ius granted by himself) but from the ius poli, which Ockham now proceeds to define. His description is worth quoting in full: "The ius poli may be called natural equity since without any human ordinance or even any purely positive Divine ordinance it is conformable to right reason (rationi rectae), either in the purely natural form of right reason or in the deductions of right reason from those things which are divinely revealed to us (divinitus revelata). Therefore this ius is sometimes called the natural law, because all natural law belongs to the ius poli. Sometimes it is called Divine law, because there are many things conformable to right reason in its deductions from Divine revelation which are not [however] conformable with the purely natural form of right reason. For example it is conformable with the deductions of right reason from the dogmas [of our Faith] that those who preach the Gospel, at any rate if they have not the means of procuring the necessities of life, should be supported from the temporalities of those to whom they preach (de bonis horum quibus praedicant), " 38

The definition bases the claims of the ius poli not on any reflected gleam of the eternal law (to which Ockham had in his philosophical works denied existence in any Realist sense such as envisaged by e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas), but on the two sharply-distinguished elements of ratio recta and Divine revelation. It is not stated here that the latter is primarily to be identified with Scripture but we know from other references in Ockham's works that such was the case. 39 Ratio recta pure naturali makes evident that every man has a right to the means of sustaining life; natural law divinitus revelata makes plain that those vowing themselves to poverty for the sake of the Gospel have a right to avail themselves of bonis horum quibus praedicant. That such "evangelical poverty" was the only way of conforming fully to the precepts of the Gospel was, of course, the major contention of the Michaelist group, and Ockham is merely following his predecessors in consecrating long and weary pages to Scriptural "proofs" of this point.

So the case against John XXII is laboriously built up. The

^{38.} O.N.D., c. lxv; op. cit., ii, 570.

^{39.} The identification had been anticipated in Gratian's famous definition: "The law of nature is that which is contained in the Mosaic Law and the Gospel ... (Decreti Prima Pars, dist. i; op. cit., i, 1).

Rule and Gospel alike are cited to prove that the Franciscan Order is wholly outside the scope of the ius fori. John, on the other hand, is very much within it as the temporal owner of the Order's property, allowing the Franciscans only a licentia utendi. But can he not make use of this position to enforce his will on the Order? Can be not face it with the dilemma of either the withdrawal of the licentia utendi and consequent risk of starvation or the transference to the Order itself of the Order itself of the ownership hitherto vested in the Roman See? Ockham's answer is in both cases a categorical "No". John may withdraw the licentia utendi by the ius fori but not by the ius poli, which assures to all the right of using temporal goods ad sustentationem vitue and thus overrides the ius fori; on the other hand, the Scriptural precepts of the ius poli forbid the Order to assume the ius utendi itself. Thus the existing state of affairs possesses the sanction, not only of Exit qui seminat but also of the natural law.

This bold contention is probably the clue to the obscurities of Cap. CXXIII of the Opus Nonaginta Dierum, where Ockham insists on the necessity of the clavis scientiae as a check on arbitrary Papal decisions in the field of faith and morals. It seems likely that this clavis scientiae is the authority of Scripture, which is necessary to make any decision of the clavis potentiae (i.e. Papal magisterial action) effective. Here Ockham in making his first incursion on to ground which will be explored exhaustively in the Dialogus. But in the present context his object is primarily controversial. He wished to show that John's pronouncement in Quia Quorundam 40 on the reversible character of some Papal decisions can only be understood as a rejection of Nicholas III's previous decision on Franciscan matters, and attempts to safeguard John from this charge by stressing the qualifying character of the phrase per clavem scientiae are treated as sophisms. 41 It is only incidentally that the larger question of the ultimate grounds of Papal authority is broached. Ockham's thought on this point is still largely orthodox and based on the traditional distinction between magistracy and proprietorship; unrestricted Papal dominium by means of the clavis potentiae is to be exercised only in matters de se indifferentia, i.e. ad hoc disciplinary de-

^{40.} B.F., v. 279.

^{41.} O.N.D., c. exxiii; op. cit., ii, 821.

cisions.

In Opus Nonaginta Dierum, discussion of problems of secular authority is only embryonic; the exigencies of controversy prevent any systematic treatment. Thus the question whether property belonged to Man in his pre-fallen state leads to the denial of a direct Divine origin of political authority. The Divine dominamini of Genesis I did not confer on Adam a proprietorial dominium as that word is understood sub specie mundi lapsi, but rather a strange natural faculty of effortless mastery of environment, decharacterized aptly by M. de Lagarde as "magnétisme adamite." The Opus Nonaginta Dierum never really comes to grips with the question of the basis of political authority, but its emphasis on the possession of private property as a characteristic of post-fallen society is reminiscent of Locke's later refinements on Man's alleged original "state of nature." 45

A characteristic element of Ockham's ethical theory had been his statement of the existence of so-called "indifferent" acts, i.e. actions which were carried out neither in disobedience nor obedience to the Divine Will and were therefore morally neutral. We now gather that political authority falls within the sphere of these "indifferent" acts. Thus positive law is firmly separated from ethics; it is obvious that this separation cuts the ground from under the feet of those who, like Giles of Rome, and (later) Wycliffe would base the legitimacy of a ruler's dominium on his possession of grace. This is made clear by Ockham's discussion of the Egidean trump-card St.

^{42. &}quot;...the dominion (dominium) over all temporal things given to our first parents was a power (potestas) of ruling and governing temporal things without their violent resistance, so that they could not bring violence or harm to Man." (O.N.D., c. xiv; op. cit., ii, 430).

^{43.} Lagarde, op. cit., vi, 179, note 31.

^{44.} O.N.D., c. xiv, xxvi-xxviii, lxxxviii; op. cit., ii, passim.

^{45.} Cf. Locke, Of Civil Government, ii, c. 9, section 131.

^{46.} St. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, had contended that every act was prompted by Reason, rightly or wrongly informed, acting towards a good or bad end. In the last analysis, therefore, there are no purely 'indifferent' acts; even the slightest action may be pronounced good or bad according to the goodness or badness of its ultimate end.

^{47.} De Civili Dominio, i, c. 1-6.

Augustine's dictum, Cuncta iustorum sunt. 48 Ockham holds that the Egidean thesis unjustifiably assimilates the ius fori to the ius poli: "But the ius poli is none other than an authority conformable to right reason without a compact; the ius fori is an authority deriving from a compact and is sometimes conformable to right reason and sometimes in discordance with it. Now no one possesses a thing in a morally good manner unless he possesses it according to right reason and thus he who possesses a thing in a morally good manner possesses it leither by the ius poli or by the ius fori, and he who possesses it by the ius poli possesses it well. It follows from this that the words cited i.e. cuncta justorum sunt are not to be understood as applying to the ius fori, because many things are possessed according to the ius fori which are not possessed in a morally good manner, and many things are possessed in a morally good manner which are not possessed according to the ius fori."49 This argument is somewhat unsatisfactory as it evades the real issue posed by "political Augustinianism", i.e. what should true dominium be in a society based on Christian values? Ockham does not touch on this at all, but contents himself with stating what de facto dominium is. The treatment of the problem is hardly what we have a right to expect from a philosopher of Ockham's calibre; it furnished a further proof of the discontinuity between Ockham's philosophical and political thinking.

The immediate exigencies of the controversy lead Ockham to a tentative examination of the economic relations between Church and State. This main concern is to emphasize the superiority of the Franciscan ideal and to meet criticism based on the right of temporal ownership possessed by the secular clergy. In reply Ockham insists on the element of trusteeship inherent in ecclesiastical emoluments, and even hints, without pressing the point, that ideally the secular clergy also should conform to the rule of evangelical poverty. The theory of lay administration of ecclesiastical temporalities mentioned here with approval by Ockham bears resemblance to that already

^{48.} O.N.D., c. lxv; op. cit., ii, 574-575.

^{49.} O.N.D., c. lxv; op. cit., ii, 574-575.

^{50.} Ibid., e. lxxvi; op. cit., ii, 610.

^{51.} Ibid., c. lxxvi; op. cit., ii, 610-612.

enunciated by Marsiglio 52 but the parallelism must not be exaggerated. Ockham's support is ringed with qualifications; Marsiglio will admit of no doubts in the matter. Ockham's espousal of the idea is based on the proviso that the secular arm is efficient enough to bear such responsibilities; for Marsiglio the omnicompetence of secular authority allows no such restriction - efficient or inefficient, moral or immoral, the State has an undisputed right to administer the goods of the Church. Both thinkers owe much to Exist qui seminat; but, whereas Ockham is content to confine its rulings to the Order for which it was explicitly drafted, Marsiglio would make its principles obligatory on all ecclesiastics without exception.

This last difference is symptomatic of the whole tone of the Opus Nonaginta Dierum. Throughout the work, long as it is, Ockham is never far from the controversy for which the treatise was written. It is this topical Leitmotif which prevents him from treating the problems of authority as comprehensively as in later works. But the real interest of the Opus Nonaginta Dierum lies in the fact that it enables us to see at their origin the pivots around which the whole later thought of Ockham moves.

It is at this point that we must indicate our attitude towards the *Dialogus*. We frankly admit that we intend to make no use of this baffling treatise in the present study. The problems inherent in the *Dialogus* with its "impersonal" treatment of every question discussed, demand a quite special discussion which would swell our study to unmanageable proportions; moreover, it is still unfortunately true that we still possess no convincing key to their solution. ⁵³ It is true that M. de Lagarde feels confident enough to assert that

sous l'onction des formules et la subtilité des distinctions, on sent, page après page, s'affirmer avec une sérénité constante, bien qu'un peu etudiée, le plus décidé des anarchismes.⁵⁴

^{52.} Defensor Pacis, ii, c. 13, 14, 17 and 18.

^{53.} H. Van Leeuwen "L'Eglise, Règle de Foi chez Occam, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, xi. 249-288 has suggested a possible method of ascertaining Ockham's personal views in the jungle of argument and counter-argument. But his analysis, attractive as it is, must remain, in the lack of further corroboration, purely speculative.

^{54.} Naissance, iv. 45.

But we confess that the distinguished French scholar seems here to attribute to the *Dialogus* a consistency of purpose which is far from obvious. The remark which Mgr. V. Martin applies to the influence of the *Dialogus* in the century following Ockham's death might also serve as a criticism of M. de Lagarde's approach:

En exposant tour à tour, et avec la même force, les thèses les plus contradictoires, Ockham se prétait à toutes les utilisations. 55

Is it, in fact, possible, in the present state of research, to obtain hard-and-fast conclusions about Ockham's theories from an examination of the Dialogus? We think not; but we believe, paradoxically enough, that it is possible to draw up a provisional statement of Ockham's personal standpoint without reference to his enigmatic magnum opus. This may indeed seem like Hamlet without the Prince; we can only plead for indulgence in view of the present infancy of Ockhamist studies and of the dangers which await a too ambitious systematization of this elusive work.

We proceed, then, to the Octo Quaestiones, which present a somewhat easier problem. It is now generally recognized that the Responsiones at the end of each Quaestio embody Ockham's own views and it is on these Responsiones that we have relied in suggesting our interpretation of the treatise. 56

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It is with the second Quaestio ("...utrum suprema potestas laicalis proprietatem sibi proprie propriam habet immediate a

^{55. &}quot;Comment s'est formée la doctrine de la supériorité du concile sur le Papé. II: Les idées répandues par Marsile de Padoue et Occam touchant la constitution de l'Eglise," Revue des Sciences Religieuses, XVII, 289.

^{56.} This view of the *Responsiones* was originated by J. Haller (*Papsttum und Kirchenreform*, (Berlin, 1903), 77, note 2) and has been confirmed by Scholz's later discovery of the *Breviloquium* and other treatises in which the "impersonal" method was not employed.

Deo")⁵⁷ that new ground is broken. The main point of Ockham's attack is the Papal claim to be the channel through which secular power is derived and through which it receives the Divine sanction. Ockham counters this claim by a return to the old "Gelesian" distinction between two spheres of influence. The development of legal science since the date of that distinction enables Ockham to add an important qualification. This was the theory of 'casual' interference by either Empire or Papacy in the affairs of the other, provided there is a clear inability on the part of the institution affected to set matters right for itself. Thus an ingenious system of check and counter-check is adumbrated. This system is not purely a matter of positive law; it has in act the whole sanction of natural law behind it. ⁵⁹

The third question also covering perhaps the widest field of any of the eight, is cast in the form of a theological issue:

...utrum papa et Romana Ecclesia ex institutione Christi habeant quod committant imperatori et aliis principibus saecularibus iurisdictiones temporales et ipsi alias non habeant exercere.⁶⁰

There is some amount of repetition of the ecclesiastical arguments of the first Quaestio but the introduction of Aristotelean terminology and concepts draws the argument to a (from the political point of view) much more fundamental plane. The advocates of Papal supremacy themselves have provided the opportunity for this transition by arguing that the government of Christendom must be monarchical to conform to the requirements for the optimum principatum. Ockham commences

^{57.} Octo Quaestiones, II, 1. Sikes, op. cit., 69.

^{58.} Ibid., II, 8 and 9; op. cit., 69.

^{59.} Ockham does not say so in so many words, but we are justified in assuming that he wished readers to draw a conclusion similar to that explicitly stated by him in what he declares to be an analogous case - the internal affairs of any kingdom. Here, in opposition to those who would accuse him of disrespect for the principles of order and hierarchy, he says: "A king...is superior regulariter to all his kingdom and yet in casu he is inferior to the kingdom, because the kingdom in case of necessity can depose its king and hold him in custody. It has this [power] from natural law, as it is laid down in natural law that anyone may legitimately repel force by force, di.l, lus naturale." (Ibid. II, 8; op. cit., 6. The Canonical quotation is from Decretum, I, i, 7. Friedberg, op. cit., I, 2). May Ockham have had in mind the "modern" English example of the forced abdication and imprisonment of Edward II?

^{60.} Octo Quaestiones, III, 1; op. cit., 97.

his counter-attack by asserting that it is equally true on Aristotelean premises (which both sides tacitly accept as final) that "the first thing requisite for the optimum principatum is that it should be directed towards the common good of those subject to it, not towards the private good of the prince". Applying this to the Papal monarchy, Ockham reasons that "...blessed Peter received no power from Christ except for the purpose of the good estate of those subject to him that they might obtain the kingdom of heaven, so that he was not able to impose on them by precept anything other than that which was necessary for them in the attaining of the kingdom of heaven. And therefore the authority of Christ could not be used to attack the laws and liberties (iura et libertates) of the faithful conceded to them by God and by Nature..." 62

Do the two maxims of Aristotle contradict each other? No, says Ockham; a bridge can be found by considering, not the government, but the governed. Are the latter slaves? If they are, then a fundamental Aristotelean principle is violated, i.e. "that government over free men is better than government over slaves because the worth of a government is in proportion to the worth of those government. But free men are better than slaves; therefore government over slaves is not to be accounted the best government ".63 The Papalists, however, wish to reduce all Christians to the status of slaves of the Pope; their case is therefore obviously at fault. The analogy of religious orders is not valid, for even these do not demand unconditional obedience but only obedience "in all things which are not contrary to God and the Rule".64

Ockham has now established that possession by the governmental authority of plenitudo potestatis is not desirable. It remains to set forth the positive side of his theory. It soon appears that for Ockham the primary function of a government is that of coercion; 65 if this prime necessity is attended to, the

^{61.} Octo Quaestiones, III, 4; op. cit., 105-106.

^{62.} Ibid. III, 4; op. cit., 106.

^{63.} Octo Quaestiones, III, 6; op. cit., 112.

^{64.} Ibid.

^{65. &}quot;...it must be realized above all that although many things about which there could be much discussion (i.e. the granting and safeguarding of legal rights, the enactment of essential and just laws, the appointment of subordinate judges and other officials, the supervision of the community's trades and workers, the com-

rest of the story, hints Ockham with a traditional English distrust for doctrinaire political theorizing, may be left to look after itself. He even asserts that the question of the derivation of authority is immaterial, provided that the authority functions efficiently: "...since such authority or power ought to be referred to the common good, it does not matter by whom it is instituted (non refert a quo instituatur) as long as it is duly and carefully exercised and not neglected ... "66 This line of thought was not original with Ockham; it is a logical deduction from the traditional Patristic view of secular power as the punishment for sin and perhaps in Ockham's case the tradition was coloured by the ethos of his older contemporary, Duns Scotus. The new factor (which had been absent from Patristic thought and ignored by Scotus) is the Aristotelean bonum commune. The emphasis on this saves Ockham from the complete pragmatism which later overtook Hobbes and it also draws Ockham away from the English tradition, Nevertheless his treatment is sufficiently pragmatic to prove once more that Ockham's "pure" philosophy and his political reasoning are not so straitly interlaced as M. de Lagarde believes.

It is not surprising that, after such aversion to theorizing overmuch about the central authority's powers, Ockham should see no objection to a distribution of power of the type to which feudalism had accustomed Europe but which was not tending to pass away. The exemption of many subordinate authorities from the normal sway of the central power is not in his opinion inconsistent with the juridical supremacy of that central power. Ockham insists, however, that the central government may exercise a right of "casual" intervention when the common good is at stake; 67 similarly subordinate authorities may themselves intervene casualiter when the central authority abuses its power. 68

In the twelfth chapter of Quaestio III Ockham fills in the details of his ideal constitution, if one may so describe such

mandment to practise all virtues, and many other things) pertain to the princely authority, nevertheless [this authority] would appear to have been instituted principally for the correction and punishment of evildoers.* (*Ibid.*, III, 8, *op. cit.*, 112-113).

^{66.} Octo Quaestiones, III, 9; op. cit., 114.

^{67.} Ucto Quaestiones, III, 10; op. cit., 115.

^{68.} Ibid., III, 12; op. cit., 119.

a severely practical piece of thinking. In conformity with his conception of coercion as the prime reason for any political framework he emphasizes that an ultimate unity of authority is essential to the optimum principatum. "But," he continues, "it is not necessary for the unity of the subjects of the ideal commonwealth that the jurisdiction of all other subordinates should depend on that of the head of the state, because anyone can be exempted from this, although in no case should one be exempted from the possibility of punishment by the head of the state..." With this exception Ockham is prepared to grant very wide powers to the subordinate authorities.

It is at this stage that his road separates from that of Marsiglio, who had used the arguments of the evils attendant on divided jurisdiction within a community to justify his pleas for the abrogation of ecclesiastical participation in the judicial field. 70 The words in which Ockham poses the problem are so reminiscent of Marsiglio's own statement of it that it seems reasonable to conjecture the aliquis who forte obiiciet71 to be the Paduan himself. Ockham's solution is that "...it could have come about without any prejudice to the perfection of the ideal state that such persons...may have been exempted from the jurisdiction of the prince ...; and therefore ... it may be replied to the foregoing allegation i.e. the Marsilian objection that, if the head of the state and a subordinate exempted authority shall have called or cited the same subjects to their tribunals at the same time, either in such a summons they will have explained the reason for the summons or they will not have explained it. If they do not explain it [those summoned] ought to go to the head of the state; because they are not bound to obey...an exempted authority when the rights of others are in question, just as laymen are not bound to obey the Pope when the rights of the secular prince are in question... But if those who issue the summonses in such a simultaneous manner have explained the cause of the summons, no general rule to meet all cases can be given ... because in such matters, on account of the wide variety of cases which can occur, an infallible general rule cannot be given."72 There is no clearer expression

^{69.} Ibid., III, 12; op. cit., 117.

^{70.} Defensor Pacis, I, 17. Previté - Orton, op. cit., 90-91.

^{71.} Octo Quaestiones, III, 12; op. cit., 118.

^{72.} Octo Quaestiones, III, 12; op. cit., 118-119.

of Ockham's pragmatism than in this passage. A question over which Marsiglio has cudgelled his brains is set aside almost light-heartedly in the same spirit in which Ockham has previously gone so far as to say that "the ideal state is not ideal for all, indeed it may actually be harmful for some people." 73

This lack of interest in general political theory probably accounts for the ease with which Ockham in the same chapter makes the transition back to the ecclesiastical themes which are more congenial to him. The resumption of discussion of the Emperor's "casual" power to punish the Pope for heresy is natural, for Papacy and Empire were to Ockham the leading example of divided and mutually interacting jurisdiction. Ockham states Imperial claims in a more provocative manner than on previous occasions by alleging that even infidel Emperors may undertake to correct an erring Pontiff; they do so, not as judges of the Divine revelation, but in so far as the dispute over the Faith "can affect morals, damage the commonwealth or bring injury to any person..."74 This dictum, for which Ockham cites the authority of Gallio in the Acts of the Apostles, is obviously of far-reaching significance and it is here if anywhere that we must see Ockham's contribution to "la naissance de l'ésprit laïque". Such a statement, combined with Ockham's previous decision to leave questions of clashes in jurisdiction to be settled casualiter would be a powerful weapon in the service of Erastian tendencies.

Quaestio IV turns to a more specifically Imperial problem:

...utrum electio alicuius in regem Romanorum vel imperatorem sibi det plenam administrationem ex eo quod sua potestas est immediate a Deo. To Opinion on this point was divided between what may be called the "Roman" and "Frankish" views of the Empire, the first of these believing that succession to the title of Rex Romanorum gave full authority to the holder of the title, while the "Frankish" theory made a distinction between lands held by the Emperor in virtue of his descent from Charlemagne as King of the Franks and territory acquired as accessory to the Imperial dignity. The latter theory tended to become progressively a vehicle of

^{73.} Ibid., III, 11; op. cit., 115-116.

^{74.} Octo Quaestiones, III, 12; op. cit., 123.

^{75.} Ibid., IV, 1; op. cit., 126.

German national feeling by its placing of emphasis on the independent rights conveyed by Frankish tradition irrespective of the older tradition of the classical Empire.

Ockham does not hesitate to come out frankly in favour of the "Roman" conception. "It seems," he points out, "that the Emperors and Kings of the Romans are seen to have much more stability and strength from the fact that the Emperors after Charlemagne were successors of the first Emperors and Kings of the Romans, especially of those who were in the time of Christ and His Apostles...than from the fact that they are successors of Charlemagne...for concerning the legitimacy of the Empire or kingdom of those infidels we have the witness of Christ and the Holy Spirit, Who spoke through John the Baptist, the Apostles and Evangelists...We have not such impressive testimony for Charlemagne, indeed far less..." 76 Ockham goes on to insinuate that the Franks were in fact usurpers of Imperial rights in the days before Charlemagne.

Ockham bases the legitimacy of the translatio imperii to Charlemagne on the overriding authority of the populus Romanus. It was only with this transfer that the lands previously conquered by Charlemagne became his de iure. 77 In conformity with this Ockham asserts that the Frankish kingdom as such did not exist after Charlemagne, but was merged in the superior entity of the revived Western Empire. 78 The whole position of the "Frankish" school is thereby undermined and Ockham follows up his onslaught by insisting that the German nation is not to imagine that it possesses a permanent claim on the Imper. al title 79 - a logical deduction from the Inceptor's acceptance of the populus Romanus as the sovereign source of authority. One wonders how far such arguments would meet with sympathy at the Bavarian court; possibly Louis, if he is indeed to be identified with the vir venerabilis who propounded

^{76.} Octo Quaestiones, IV, 3; op. cit., 129-130.

^{77.} Octo Quaestiones, IV, 4; op. cit., 135-137.

^{78.} Ibid., IV, 5; op. cit., 137-139.

^{79. &}quot;...just as the Roman Empire was not translated from the Greeks to imply that no Greek ever ought to be Emperor, so its translation to the Germans did not imply that no one except a German ought to be Emperor." (*Ibid.*, IV, 6. op. cit., 143). Ockham cites the unfortunate examples of Richard of Cornwall and Alfonso of Castile as the exceptions which, however, to the modern observer, would seem emphatically to disprove the rule.

the whole eight questions to Ockham, 80 felt at this stage that he was getting considerably more than he had bargained for.

With Quaestio V we pass to the problem of the powers conferred by unction and coronation. Papalist supporters had been making much of this issue by insisting that the ceremonies symbolized the fact that the Pope was the source of the Emperor's temporal power. Ockham disproves this by asserting that, as unction is not of Divine institution, any power which it confers can only be derived from human agreement, i.e. the assent of the social community over which the monarch in question is to rule. 81

So Ockham returns to what may almost be described as his basic political axiom - the conception of a "social contract". We have noticed hints of this in the Opus Nonaginta Dierum, but a considerably fuller treatment is here embarked upon. "There are three ways," begins Ockham, "by which a monarchical form of government can be instituted;...|firstly|...through the will and ordinance of the people, because any people which lacks a king of its own and which is not subject to the Emperor or another king or lord can by the law of nations appoint a king for itself... Secondly ... by the Emperor or king who may have different peoples subject to him; for the Emperor can make new kings in provinces which have no kings; for a king having under him different provinces can, if he is not prevented by a legitimate ordinance of the people or of his predecessor or overlord, create new kings...[Thirdly]...by acquiring full dominium (plenum dominium) over a kingdom which it behooves to have a king. For if any man of standing acquires by purchase or a just war or in any other method full dominion over any province he can, if he is not forbidden by his overlord, assume for himself or give to another the name and substance of kingship over that same province." 82 At first sight it may be thought that the term "social contract" may be aplied to the first method only. But in the second alternative also we find the significant phrase "si per ordinationem legitimam populi...minime prohibetur", indicating that here too popular consent must be at least tacitly expressed. It is on the third

^{80.} Octo Quaestiones, I, 1; op. cit., 14.

^{81.} Octo Quaestiones, V, 3; op. cit., 159.

^{82.} Octo Quaestiones, V, 6; op. cit., 162.

alternative that opponents of the view that ()ckham is upholding a contractual theory must chiefly rely. Here at least, they can point out, there is no mention, even implicitly, of consideration of the popular will. If we turn to the Breviloquium, however, we find that Ockham, while discussing the concrete instance of the acquiring of plenum dominium over the classical world by Rome by such methods as our third alternative lists, takes pains to show that Rome assumed power, not by virtue of armed conquest, but by the consent (at least tacit), of the populations concerned. We shall discuss the details of Ockham's treatment when we deal with the Breviloquium as a whole: here it is sufficient to note that the material available in the later treatise, enables us to assert that contractual elements were present in Ockham's third alternative. We can only guess at the reasons which prevented Ockham from elaborating in the present passage; perhaps he did not yet realize the applicability of his contractual presuppositions to this tertium modum; perhaps it was his later rôle of apologist for Roman Imperialism which forced him to a decision on the question.

With his attention still concentrated on proving the human origins of the coronation ceremony, Ockham proceeds: "...just as anyone in bequeathing or giving his property can impose whatever condition or law that he wished and finst as anyone is for his own property director, legislator, judge and executor as regards the thing commanded, so those who voluntarily institute a monarchical government and freely submit themselves to a king and his successors can impose what law they wish as long as it is not unreasonable and wicked, nor against the rights of an overlord. Wherefore a people subjecting itself to anyone as king and to his heirs can impose a law that any king succeeding by heredity may, immediately on his predecessor's death, have all power which he is to enjoy over temporalities without any official ceremony; it could, on the other hand, impose a law that a king succeeding by heredity may not have power over temporalities before coronation."83 This doctrine is clearly one of contract; Ockham is as zealous a defender of the rights of property as John Locke.

Contractual theory is no contradiction to the fundamental premises of Ockham's thought; it conforms with his attempt, originally confined to the ecclesiastical field to distinguish

^{83.} Octo Quaestiones, V, 6; op. cit.. 162-163.

between the proprietorial and official aspects of authority. He had been fighting to prevent the blurring and obliteration of this distinction by overzealous Papal supporters; he was not, after such a struggle, prepared to allow to temporal authority, under the guise of Divine Right, what he had previously denied to the head of the Church himself. It was only in the Will of God Himself, held Ockham, that dominium and potestas became one; and in so believing he was registering agreement with a long tradition.⁸⁴

It is important to emphasize the derivative character of Ockham's thought on this basic question; for a realization of this is a safeguard from the error of seeing him as an innovating revolutionary in politics. Such an error can hardly be avoided if one takes, as has been customary of late, a philosophical rather than an ecclesiastical starting-point in the study of Ockham's politics; but Ockham himself did not start out to enquire into the political consequences of his Nominalist philosophy; he merely wished to restate what he regarded as traditional Catholic doctrine, threatened by distorting tendencies which, tragically enough, came from the highest places in the Church. It is not for the historian qua historian, to decide whether Ockham was right; but the defence of orthodoxy as he saw it was, we believe, his conscious aim.

Nowhere is this fact brought out more clearly than in Quaestio VII, where Ockham is dealing with the legality of Louis's coronation. Owing to the division among the Electors in 1314, Louis had been crowned by the wrong Archbishop (Mainz), although at the right place (Aachen). Ockham asks whether the Archbishop of Cologne does in fact possess an imprescriptable right to perform the ceremony. The argument turns on the issue of whether the Archbishop's right is de iure or de gratia, the former being defined as "that which ought not to be revoked at the will of the grantor or his successor" and the latter as "that which can be revoked at the will of the grantor or his successor". 85 If the Archbishop of Cologne's claim is in the

^{84.} G. Barraclough (Papal Provisions) has shown that the blurring of the distinction between proprietorship and administrative office was, by the thirteenth century, already observable in the system of distribution of ecclesiastical benefices. His view that this development was due to (a) the influence of the Germanic Landeskirchen concept, combined with (b) the permeation of canonical legislation with principles deriving from Roman Private Law, is highly relevant.

^{85.} Octo Quaestiones, VII, 2; op. cit., 172.

latter category the matter is at once settled; what the Emperor has granted the Emperor can take away. But, even assuming that the Archbishop's right is de iure, it ceases to be protected by the law if the Archbishop, by violating that law, puts himself outside the circle of privileges which depend on the complicated nexus of constitutional relations. 86 The plea that deprivation of the Archbishop's right is an attack on the iura et libertates of the Church is dismissed because "churches can on account of fault be justly and duly deprived casualiter of the privileges, rights and liberties conceded to them". 87

The strange thing about this statement is that it brings Ockham, although obviously still unconscious of the fact, into the same position which had been occupied by his old enemy, John XXII! John had contended that the Franciscan Conventuals, by abusing their previous Rule, had lost the right to retain it. Despite his long fight against Fapalist confusion between ownership and delegated office, in part perhaps as a result of that fight, Ockham had failed to realize that the Conventual position itself was open to the same charge. They too were assuming that they possessed dominium over their own rule; they forgot that their founder himself had accepted the Rule as a potestas from the Supreme Pontiff, to be used for the good of the Church, not as an end in itself.

Thus at the end of the Octo Quaestiones we feel that we are in a different world. The mists which obscure the writings of the 1330's have cleared and the outlines of a clearly-defined but hardly revolutionary theory of ecclesiastical and secular authority are beginning to emerge. Ockham's political thought is becoming both more precise and more conservative.

The Breviloquium, discovered by R. Scholz in 1928, is the most detailed "personal" statement of Ockhamist politics which we possess. As such it demands analysis.

The starting-point is as usual, a discussion and refutation

^{86.} Ibid., VII, 4; op. cit., 174-178. Ockham does not venture to determine whether the Archbishop in question had been guilty of legal delinquency, but this point, though of burning interest to Louis, hardly concerns us, as it does not affect the principles which Ockham is enunciating.

^{87.} Octo Quaestiones, VII, 4; op. cit., 176.

of exaggerated Papalist claims. 88 These, argues Ockham, are contrary to the "evangelical law of liberty", which is "not of greater but of less servitude than was the Mosaic law".89 After disclaiming any intention of subverting the social order by his doctrine of Christian freedom, he goes on: "But it [i.e., the evangelical lawl ought rather to be understood in a negative manner, i.e. that by the evangelical law no grave burden may be brought in and no one through it may be made the slave of another nor must there be imposed through it on Christians as great demands concerning the outward forms of worship of God as the Jews suffered. Because of this not only may Christians not be made the Pope's slaves through the evangelical law. but neither can the Pope by virtue of his fullness of power load any Christian, unwillingly and without crime or cause, with as many ceremonial burdens as were entailed in the ceremonies of the old law and, if he does in fact attempt to do so, his action is not legally valid but is rendered null by the Divine Law itself."90

The implications of this definition are considerable. The Aristotelean conception of the body politic as a corporate and developing organism, with its corresponding definition of "liberty" as the faculty of a human being for pursuing undisturbed its progress towards a Divinely-appointed end, is abandoned. Ockham's theory, as he says, is "negative"; it conceives liberty as release from Authority's exorbitant demands. Until the fourteenth century Christian European culture could not entertain the possibility of a basic divergence and even conflict between the concepts of liberty and authority; in such a statement as this of Ockham we see the beginning of a trend towards the more intensive exploration of the extremer implications of both concepts.

But how was Ockham himself led to this "negative" conception of liberty? The Breviloquium itself gives the clue. In the eighth chapter of Book II we find a clear distinction between the two types of authority which we have labelled respectively

^{88.} Book I, devoted to establishing the right of theologians to discuss the nature and limits of Papal power, is hardly relevant to our purpose and will not be dealt with here.

^{89.} Ibid., II, 3. Baudry, op. cit., 19.

^{90.} Ibid., II, 4; op. cit., 21.

as dominium and potestas. It occurs during a discussion of the anomalous position of Popes coming from religious Orders if the extreme Papalist identification of office and ownership is maintained. Ockham insists that possession of temporalia is a consequence of office and in this sense "religious" may legitimately use them; they would not in conscience be able to do so were Papal ownership on a strictly proprietorial basis. 91

Talis autem potestas [i.e. plenitudo potestatis] est proprietas et dominium earundem rerum. 92

It is plain that Ockham is merely re-emphasizing the traditional distinction between office and property. It is the concern to defend this that is behind his attacks on Papal authority. The liberty demanded by the "evangelical law", 'negative' as it was. was thus conditioned by its end - the duty of all Christians to repel the obliteration of the commission inherent in the Apostolic Succession, which was the Divine basis of ecclesiastical authority. Ockham believed that this doctrine was endangered by the Papacy's depreciation of the delegated and thereby limited character of its position in favour of a proprietorial conception which was distinguished in hardly any way from that of the secular sovereigns of the day. There is no doubt that Ockham regarded himself as a conservative and the later history of Catholic political theory (with its discarding of the idea of plenitudo potestatis) shows that in a sense he was: but it cannot be denied that his fight for the restoration of the old led in practice to the introduction of the new.

This pre-occupation of Ockham provides the key to the understanding of Book III, which is at first sight a mere mélange of incidental side-issues. The purpose of the Book is nearly summarized in the preamble to Chapter 9:

Cum appareat ex predictis quod aliqua distinctio est inter dominium proprium et potestatem appropriandi res temporales et similiter inter potestatem instituendi jurisdictionem et jurisdictionem, videndum est nunc quo jure dominium proprium quod vocatur proprietas sit introductum et quo jure jurisdictio sit introducta, divino videlicet an humano. 93

At once we perceive that the Franciscan controversy is the background of the argument; this should not be surprising as

^{91.} Ibid., II, 8; op. cit., 30.

^{92.} Ibid., II. 8; op. cit., 29-30.

^{93.} Ibid., III, 9; op. cit., 88.

it was, after all, the occasion and starting-point of Ockham's political thought. The shade of John XXII is still aboard. 94 In support of these principles, this Pope had been obliged to explore the question of the origin of property - did it exist before the Fall? John, following St. Thomas and the main Aristotelean tradition (which regarded Man, fallen or unfallen, as an "animal politicum et sociale", 95 believed that it did. For the Conventuals it was essential that this position should be controverted and they had behind them a considerable volume of Patristic and Classical legal and philosophical tradition, It would be beside the point to cite Ockham's "proofs" from the first chapters of Genesis; they are the usual stock arguments. sometimes (to us) bordering on the ridiculous 96 and in any case valueless from the point of view of political science. It is interesting, however, that he does not believe that his view of private property as ex ordinatione humana rules out the possibility of direct Divine intervention in special cases, Perhaps this is a natural result of his philosophical and theological voluntarism; but probably its more immediate cause is the necessity of reckoning with certain plain statements of Scripture. 97 The Papalist argument in favour of plenitudo potestatis is so closely bound up with John's claim to dispense with the original provisions of the Franciscan Rule that Ockham feels it necessary to devote space to discussion of the Patristic foundation-text of his opponents' position - St. Augustine's dictum': jure divino cuncta justorum sunt. Ockham meets this challenge by asserting that the text is a judgment

^{94.} His theories incur specific attack in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters of this Book. (op. cit., 96-100).

^{95.} For St. Thomas's views, see Summa Theologica, Il^a2^{ae}, 66, 2. The Angelic Doctor, while fully conscious of Patristic tradition in favour of original community of possession, maintains that the institution of private property is a legitimate addition by human reason to the body of natural law. But, as Carlyle points out (Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, v, 20) 'he understands the right of private property to be the right to acquire and to control the destination of material things, but not an unlimited right to use them for one's own convenience'. This again is an indication of the all-pervasive traditional differentiation between dominium and and potestas, on which St. Thomas's words are one more variation.

^{96.} E.g. the discussion whether Adam and Eve were or were not true proprietors of their fig-leaves! (Breviloquium, III, 9; op. cit., 89-90).

^{97. &}quot;After the first private property some private possessions were from Divine and some from human law." (Breviloquium, III, 10; op. cit., 90).

of ethical value, not a statement of political theory; the just may deserve to own the whole earth; that does not mean that they possess a legal title to its possession in the present dispensation. Thus the authority and possessions of infidels (e.g. Constantine before his baptism) are perfectly legitimate. In this respect Ockham agrees with St. Thomas that Natura non tollitur gratia.

These principles are now to be applied to the concrete touchstone of the Roman Empire. In the attempt to harmonize the two conceptions of the Divine and popular origins of Imperial sovereignty, Cckham has recourse to the distinction between "regular" and "casual" power. The Fope, for example,

aliquando casualiter, aliquando regulariter jurisdictionem exercet. Item regulariter nullus privandus est jure suo sine culpa et tamen casualiter potest.

Thus "after it has been received", political authority may depend "on God alone, so he who enjoys it recognizes it to be regulariter from God as from a superior". 101 Regulariter the Empire derives from God, casualiter from the people, Cokham is enabled to bring his theory of popular sovereignty into harmony with a quasi-sacerdotal conception of Imperial power by a skilful use of categories deriving ultimately from the complex de facto political organization of his own time, with its characteristic juridical division and subdivision. The theory is a key one for the understanding of Cckham's position as a bridge between, and possible synthesis of, medieval and modern conceptions of the State. Popular sovereignty on a basis of contractual representation, the supreme claims of Divine and natural law, the possibility of constitutional change by flexible adjustment, the importance of custom in law, the reciprocal and harmonious interaction of the ecclesiastical and secular orders, a solution of the perpetual tension between delegated authority and proprietorship, are all implicit in this remarkable conception.

Ockham is no more a "secularist" than he is a "clerical".

^{98.} Ibid., III, 12; op. cit., 92-94.

^{99.} Ibid., III, 13; op. cit., 94-96.

^{100.} Breviloquium, IV, 4; op. cit., 108-109.

^{101.} Ibid., IV, 5; op. cit., 110.

This is quite clear when we study his treatment of the alleged direct supernatural appointment of the Roman Empire. We may contrast his attitude with that of Dante, for whom the birth of Christ in the days of Caesar Augustus and His death under Fontius Filate was a manifest token of direct Divine sanction for Roman dominion, 102 Ockham cannot accept this reasoning; discussing the text Reddite quae sunt Caesaris Caesari, he remarks: "... Christ by those words granted nothing new to Caesar, but merely ordered those things which were his due to be rendered to him and thus he did not say: 'I appoint Casear as Emperor' or 'I give to him such-and-such a jurisdiction'. but He said: 'Render to Caesar the things which are his due by human law'," 103 Indeed, Ockham goes further and attacks the whole idea behind such theories, i.e. the pelief that Christ, while on earth, enjoyed the rights of a temporal king. This cannot be, argues Cokham, for Christ was homo passibilis et mortalis, 104

After this it is not surprising that Ockham treats the question of the legitimacy of Roman conquests with considerable caution. He regards Roman rule as verum et legitimum at least by the time of Christ, but beyond this he feels hardly competent to go. 105 He puts forward, however, several arguments in the Empire's favour. It may have been legitamized by a combination of two methods, both sanctioned by the ius gentium. One of these is voluntary association; the other is the just war. 106 A bad beginning may often be followed by a good end; so power acquired unjustly may obtain later legitimization. 107 Even the

^{102.} De Monarchia, II, 12 and 13.

^{103.} Breviloquium, IV, 7; op. cit., 112.

^{104.} Ibid., IV, 8; op. cit., 113.

^{105. &}quot;Sed quando et qualiter incepit esse legitimum atque verum non est facile per certitudinem diffinire et forte solus Deus novit et quibus ipse revelavit." (Breviloquium, IV, 10, op. cit., 119). "Quamvis enim a Christo et Apostolis habeamus quod eorum temporibus erat verum imperium, tamen ipsi minime expresserunt quando coepit esse verum imperium, Quod autem illi non diffinierunt, nec ego diffinire presumo." (Ibid., IV, 10; op. cit., 120-121).

^{106.} Ibid., IV, 10; op. cit., 119-122.

^{107. &}quot;For some tyrants have occupied unjustly different provinces, but nevertheless their successors have obtained just and legitimate authority, because some of them have been eminent in sanctity, as appears clearly from their life and

Dominical saying "Facite vobis aricos de mammona iniquitatis" is pressed into service. 108 Cckham's own theory of "discontinuity" in ethical acts, by which each moral or immoral action was judged in vacuo, would predispose him to support such post factum legitimization.

But if the legitimacy of the Empire is partly due to the popular consent of the conquered peoples, this does not mean that they in their turn may cancel this consent at will. That would be to deprive the Emperor of his rights sine culpa et absque causa. 109 Here we perceive the real gulf separating Ockham from later exponents of contractual theory.

Conclusion

Ockham's end, like his beginning, is wrapped in mystery. The indefatigable seventeenth-century annalist, Luke Wadding, mentions a tradition which cannot be traced back before the fifteenth century to the effect that on his death-bed Cckham submitted to reconciliation with the Papacy. 110 We also possess a document from the Vatican archives, 111 written to the Minister-General of the Franciscan Order by Clement VI in 1349, which is a faculty for reconciling the excommunicated Franciscans. including "Wilhelmus de Anglia", and sets out the form of abjuration of error which each should be required to make. Abbagnano throws doubt on the authenticity of the submission on the ground that it is completely out of keeping with Ockham's previous attitude. 112 This is surely a shallow criticism; the student of history (and of human nature) should not be surprised by such abrupt changes of direction, especially in matters of religion; on Abbagnano's standards the conversion of Constantine to Christianity would seem unlikely and the behaviour of St. Thomas Becket after his elevation to the see of Canter-

miracles." (IV, 11; op. cit., 123). It seems probable that Ockham is here thinking of such monarchs as St. Louis and St. Edward the Confessor, heirs of the Frankish and Saxon "usurpers" respectively.

^{108.} Ibid.

^{109.} Breviloquium, IV, 13; op. cit., 125-126.

^{110.} L. Wadding, Annales Minorum, viii, 10-17.

^{111.} B.F., vi, n. 508a, pp. 230-231.

^{112.} Abbagnano, N., Guglielmo di Ockham, Lanciano, 1931, 20-22.

bury quite incredible. In any case, as we have tried to show. there were elements in Ockham's thought which tended to draw him back to renewal of allegiance. It should be noted that the Clementine profession of faith required Ockham to repudiate the notion of Imperial interference in the appointment of Popes and his former support of Louis of Bavaria's illegal acts in Church affairs. It does not require him to abjure his assertion of the delegated nature of ecclesiastical authority and his defence of the secular power in its own field. Indeed, there is nothing in the profession which conflicts in any radical degree with the outlook of the Breviloquium. Perhaps Wadding is right when he attributes Ockham's long intransigeance to personal factors - dislike of John XXII and affection for Louis of Bavaria. In the last analysis our attitude to the authenticity of the tradition of Cckham's reconciliation will depend on our view of the development of his thought. Our own opinion is that the submission would have been a not unnatural development from Ockham's later writings.

Such a submission would also have been a fitting echo of the trend of the age. On all sides there appears a readiness to conduct the Papal-Imperial struggle à outrance; England and France felt the need of a truce to their still indecisive combat (despite Edward III's successes at Crêcy and Calais); all Western Europe was reeling under the ravages of the Black Death. The age of struggle for vast and impressive-sounding causes was (so it appeared) over; no one could have foreseen that within thirty years would come the Great Schism.

It was during these thirty years that the future of Ockham's reputation as a political thinker was to be silently decided. It was in that period that the later and more moderate "personal" treatises fell into oblivion (perhaps because they were so moderate that their preservation seemed inessential), leaving the longer 'impersonal' works to stand alone as a perfect target for misrepresentation. The use by Conciliar propagandists (such as Pierre d'Ailly) of extracts from the Dialogus as indicating Ockham's own convinctions on the supremacy of a General Council, etc., shows that by the end of the fourteenth century the process of misinterpretation had already begun.

Can M. de Lagarde be altogether absolved from the same criticism? At any rate, we feel compelled to question his presentation of Ockham's work as being primarily destructive

of the traditional synthesis.

We have observed that Ockham's main concern is the defence of a profoundly orthodox distinction between magistracy and ownership which attracted his attention when it appeared in a dispute within his own Crder; we have seen his exploration of this distinction lead him to the achievement of a still largely conservative synthesis; we have noted the complicating of this issue by problems of German and Imperial policy which caused Cckham to apply his reasoning to these fields also. Instances have been pointed out in which Ockham does indeed seem to look forward to fresh and (to his age) unknown developments; but through all he remains interpreter and defender of the achievements of the past.

Perhaps it is this very conservatism which makes him so significant as a type of the transitional age in which he lived. For many, the primary importance of that age lies in the fact that in it, if anywhere, is the gulf between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance fixed. Cur study of Ockham may have led to the conclusion that those are right who suspect that the gulf, in the absolute form in which we have been accustomed to imagine it, is nowhere to be found. In that case the radical antitheses which have been driven like a knife through the development of the Christianized West may be found to be largely artificial, and the difference between "medieval" and "modern" to be a difference of emphasis rather than of kind. The famous Ockhamist dictum itself might be applied with profit to historical interpretation: "Frustra fit per plures quod aeque bene fieri per unum." Western history is a seamless robe.

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NOMINALISMUS?

mag als müssig erscheinen, heute noch die alte Streitrfrage erneut hervorzuholen, ob die geistige Bewegung im 11. Jh. (und nur von dieser wollen wir im Folgenden sprechen), die sich an die Lehre Wilhelms von Ockham anknünft. mit dem Namen "Nominalismus" richtig gekennzeichnet ist. Kann man doch einwenden, dass es hierbei um eine blosse Namensfrage geht, die nicht allzu wichtig ist, dass es sich überdies um einen Jahrhunderte alten Brauch handelt, den in Frage zu stellen heute nicht mehr zweckmässig ist, ja, dass im Grunde doch wir alle, die wir wissen, dass Ockham sich selbst ausdrücklich von dem eigentlichen Nominalismus distanziert und einen "realistischen Konzeptualismus" 1 vertreten hat, uns trotzdem gelegentlich des nun einmal gebräuchlich gewordenen Namens "Nominalismus" für seine und seiner Nachfolger Lehre (die fast alle jedoch keine kritiklosen Anhänger von ihm gewesen sind) bedient haben. Die Gründe, die für seine Beibehaltung sprechen, hat schon Matthias Baumgartner² gegen Carl Prantls³ abweichende Meinung geltend gemacht, und Franz Ehrle hat in seinem reichen, aus der Fülle seines weiten Wissens schöpfenden Werk über Peter von Candia Baumgartners Ansicht gegen de Wulf u.a. in behutsamen und eindringenden Erwägungen unterstützt. Er zeigt dort, wie die ursprüngliche Bezeichnung der Ockhamschen Lehre und Schule als "Ockhamismus", die sich noch bei Peter von Candia am Ende des 14. Jh. ausschliesslich findet (übrigens auch ausserhalb der Universitätstradition z.B. in der bekannten Chronica de ducibus Bavariae gebraucht wird5), wenige Jahre später von Gerson durch die all-

^{1.} Cf. P. Philotheus Böhner, "The realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham," Traditio, IV (1946) 307-335; vgl. auch die überzeugenden sachlichen Einwände gegen die Bezeichnung von Ockhams Lehre als Nominalismus bei Ernest A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham (London, 1934).

^{2.} Friedrich Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie der patristischen und scholastischen Zeit (Berlin, 1915), 598-599.

^{3.} Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (Leipzig, 1867), III, 344.

^{4. &}quot;Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V." Franziskanische Studien, Beiheft 9, (Münster i.W., 1925), 106-112.

^{5.} Cf. Leidinger, Bayerische Chroniken des 14. Jh. (Hannover und Leipzig, 1918), 164: "Eodem tempore quidam fratres de ordine Minorum videlicet Franciscus [de

gemeinere Bezeichnung "Terminismus" ersetzt wird, an deren Seite dann erst im 15. Jh. neben vereinzelter Verwendung des präziseren Ausdrucks "Conceptistae" der Name "Nominales" für die Gegner der "Realisten" allgemein in Gebrauch kommt. Ehrle meint, die Aufgabe einer historisch so gut belegten Benennung könne mehr Schaden als Nutzen bringen.

Nun ist jedoch Tatsache, wofür ich an anderer Stelle schon einige Belege gegeben habe,6 dass sich bis in das 17. Jh. hinein Autoren finden, denen zwar der Ausdruck "Nominalismus" durchweg geläufig ist, die aber gerade Ockhams Lehre ausdrücklich von ihm unterscheiden, obwohl es sich hier um unbedeutendere Köpfe handelt, die sonst doch mit dem allgemeinen Strom zu schwimmen pflegen. Dabei war ihnen wohl kaum noch bekannt. was wir heute durch die nach Ehrles Buch erschienene Untersuchung von Johannes Kraus⁷ wieder wissen, dass der eigentliche Vertreter des echten Nominalismus im 14. Jh. der Oxforder Dominikaner Crathorn gewesen ist, der gerade den Gedanken Ockhams kritisch entgegengetreten ist, mit denen dieser den eigentlichen Nominalismus abgelehnt hatte. Von ihm aus gesehen wird völlig deutlich, wie berechtigt diese - gleichfalls Jahrhunderte alte - Unterscheidung der ockhamistischen Lehre vom Nominalismus ist, und dass es nicht mehr angängig ist, heute noch vom Nominalismus im 14. Jh. zu sprechen, ohne Crathorn zum mindesten Ockham gegenüberzustellen.

Aber auch von der heutigen Zeit aus gesehen erscheint es richtiger, die sachlich vorhandene Distanz zwischen Ockhamismus und Nominalismus terminologisch nicht zu sehr zu verwischen. Denn "Nominalismus" bezeichnet, wie Ehrle gezeigt hat, doch erst seit dem 15. Jh. eine bestimmte Lehrrichtung und wurde von da an überdies zu einem Kampfbegriff, also zu einem Wertbegriff mit negativem Accent, der, von den "Realistae" mit Recht über die Logik hinaus auf die gesamte Philosophie und vor allem auch die Theologie angewandt, den Gegner, d.h. die

Esculo et] Wilhelmus Okka, a quo quidam dyaletici vocantur Okkanistae, viri solempnes et litterati, graciam apostolici non habentes, venerunt ad imperatorem Ludwicum in Monacum..."

^{6. &}quot;Ockham-Forschung in Italien", Zeitschrift für Philos. Forschung, 1 (1947), 563.

^{7. &}quot;Die Stellung des Oxforder Dominikanerlehrers Crathorn zu Thomas von Aquino", Zeitschrift f. katholische Theologie, 57 (1935).

"Neuerer", die "Moderni" treffen sollte, die in der Theologie "fast nur spekulierten" und "die vernünftigen Sätze des hl. Thomas mit ihrer klaren nun einmal eingebürgerten Terminologie beiseiteschoben" (Ehrle). Es braucht kaum betont zu werden, dass auch in diesem Sinn bei Ockham von Nominalismus nicht die Rede sein kann. Er hat weder in der Theologie "fast nur spekuliert", noch waren in seiner Zeit die Lehren des grossen Aquinaten schon "eingebürgert". Auch war er, wie wir heute wissen, in seiner Zeit nicht "der" Neuerer, noch war die gesamte geistige Bewegung am Anfang des 14. Jh., der er angehörte, primär gegen Thomas von Aquino, sondern mit ihm gegen den Averroismus und radikalen Aristotelismus gerichtet. Wie sehr die bisherige Geschichtsforschung in die Irre ging, indem sie fast alles, was ihr aus der Zeit nach Ockham als "nominalistisch" erschien, dem Ockhamismus zuordnete, hat jüngst Ernest A. Moody deutlich gemacht in seinem ausgezeichneten Aufsatz über "Ockham, Buridan and Nicholas of Autrecourt", 8 in dem er letzteren, der bis dahin als ein Anhänger Ockhams gegolten hatte, als seinen Gegner erwies und ausserdem darlegte, dass das bekannte Pariser Dekret von 1340 nicht gegen, sondern für Ockhams Lehre eintrat, was für einzelne Sätze dieses Dekrets. unabhängig von ihm und von einander fast gleichzeitig auch P. Philotheus Böhner und der Verf. 10 gezeigt hatten.

Nun ist der Begriff des "Nominalismus", wie ihn das 15. Jh. geprägt hatte, auch von bedeutsamen Richtungen der neueren Philosophiegeschichte etwa seit der Mitte des 19. Jh. aufgenommen und weitergereicht worden. Er hat sich eingebürgert mit der Festigkeit des Gepräges, die ihm ein langer Gebrauch gegeben hat. Und darin liegt seine Gefahr. Aus dem Instrument der Forschung, mit dem man arbeitet, kann er nämlich – oft unbemerkt – zum hintergründigen Leitgedanken werden, der, allen modernen Erkenntnissen zum Trotz, die Blickrichtung des Forschers leise lenkt, die Zwischenergebnisse, oft nur wenig merkbar, färbt, um im Endresultat das alte, unveränderte Bild seines Siegels hervorzukehren. Das muss nicht so sein, aber es kann so sein. Und für beide Möglichkeiten haben wir in letzter Zeit wieder zwei

^{8.} Franciscan Studies, 7 (1947), 113-146.

^{9. &}quot;Ockham's Theory of supposition and the notion of truth", Franciscan Studies, 6 (1946) 275-279.

^{10.} Loc. cit., S. 571.

Beispiele aus der Ockhamforschung: in dem gründlichen und lehrreichen auf vortreffliche und weite Literaturkenntnis gestützten Buch von Robert Guelluy: Philosophie et Théologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham¹¹ und in der feinsinnigen und gedankenreichen kleinen Schrift von Paul Vignaux: Le Nominalisme au XIV^e siècle. 12

Guelluy geht mit der methodischen Strenge des echten Historikers an seine Aufgabe heran. Er will sich in seiner Arbeit freihalten von der Voreingenommenheit und Belastung durch unsere heutigen Problemstellungen (S. X), er will "penser autant que possible en médiéval avec les médiévaux" (S. 23). Ja. das ists: Denken wie sie in den ersten Dezennien des 14. Jhts. gedacht haben, mit dem Timbre des Gefühls, das auch bei den trockensten Gedanken noch mitschwingt, und auf dem Urgrund des Glaubens, der jede echte Philosophie trägt und bestimmt. Wer, wie einst der Verf., von der Ethik her Ockham zum ersten Mal gegenübertritt, wird diese grosse Forderung vielleicht am unmittelbarsten spüren. Aber sie stellt sich natürlich auch von jeder anderen Seite seines Denkens, Deshalb erscheint mir auch für jeden, der sich zum ersten Mal Ockham zuwendet, das schöne Buch von Paul Vignaux: Justification et Prédestination au XIVe siècle, 13 das selbstverständlich auch Guelluy vertraut ist, als die heute beste Einführung in die Art von Ockhams Denken, Wollen und Fühlen. Natürlich ist es ein Ideal, dass Guelluys Leitsatz ausspricht, und kein Historiker wird verlangen oder von sich behaupten können, es je schon verwirklicht zu haben. Man stutzt nur flüchtig, ohne ihm grössere Beachtung zu schenken, wenn bei Guelluy noch auf derselben Seite wieder das Wort von Ockhams "Nominalismus" fällt.

Nach einer präzisen Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse der bisherigen biographischen Untersuchungen in der Einleitung bietet das 1. Kapitel die Vorgeschichte des Themas von Alexander von Hales an und zeigt mit reichem historischen Wissen am Gegensatz der Aufgabenstellung der Theologie als einer scientia deductiva oder declarativa das Ringen um die Funktion der Ratio,

^{11.} Universitas Catholica Lovaniensis Dissertationes ad gradum magistri in Facultate Theologica vel in Facultate Iuris Canonici consequendum conscriptae, Series II, t. 39 (Louvain-Paris, 1947), XI und 383 SS.

^{12.} Conférence Albert-le-Grand (Montreal - Paris, 1948), 97 SS.

^{13.} Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des hautes études, t. XLVIII (Paris, 1934).

um die Möglichkeit einer strengen Wissenschaft in den Bereichen des Glaubens, für deren Versuche, sich sogar die Mysterien zu unterwerfen, Guelluy interessante Beispiele aus dem 13. Jh. anführt. Die extreme Gegenseite, deren Bedeutung für Thomas von Aquinos Frontstellung unbestritten ist und für die Erkenntnis der Stossrichtung des "Kritizismus" der geistigen Bewegung am Ende des 13. und Anfang des 14. Jhts., aus der Ockham hervorgeht, fundamental erscheint, der radikale Aristotelismus und Averroismus, wird nur gestreift. Siger von Brabant und Boetius von Dacien erscheinen nur in den Anmerkungen, Grabmanns bedeutsame Handschriftenfunde werden nicht herangezogen. Gewiss liegt ihre rein philosophische Ausrichtung abseits des eigentlichen Themas. Aber sie lieferte doch den Hintergrund und den Anstoss für die Aktion eines Mannes, den man hier gleichfalls vermisst: Etienne Tempier, den Bischof, der mit seinem Dekret von 1277 den offenen Kampf begann gegen die Versuche einer glaubensfernen Philosophie wie einer rationalisierten Theologie, den die grossen Franziskanerlehrer am Ende des 13. Jhts. dann aus ihrer eigenen Tradition heraus fortführten, - der überdies mit dem Artikel seines Dekrets über die Möglichkeit unmittelbaren Wirkens der causa prima ohne die causa secunda einen im 14. Jh. oft zitierten Grundgedanken dieser Bewegung ausgesprochen hatte. Und hinter diesem Gedanken steht bekanntlich ein grösserer, der gelegentliche Fragestellungen und Beurteilungen Guelluys modifiziert hätte, wenn er ihn eingehender berücksichtigt hätte: Anselms von Canterbury Lehre von der nur durch das Widerspruchsgesetz beschränkten Allmacht Gottes. Seine gewaltige Wirkung ist eigentlich zu bekannt, als dass man auf sie noch besonders hinweisen müsste; sie greift über die Schulunterschiede hinweg. Anselm ist bei Holkot z.B. die meist zitierte Autorität. Aber hat man wohl immer genügend bedacht, dass schon in diesem Allmachtbegriff Anselms die Forderung an den Theologen lag, Logiker zu sein? Dass die Wendung des beginnenden 14. Jhts. zur Logik, die diesem in der ganzen aristotelischen und - nicht zu vergessen - den Grundlehren der stoischen Logik zur Verfügung stand, hier, bei Anselm, ihre Wurzeln hat? Ockham beherrschte diese Logik souveran, wie uns Ernest A. Moody gezeigt hat, er handhabte sie mit der harten Unerbittlichkeit des Meisters: aber folgte er damit im Grunde nicht nur der Richtung, die Anselm gewiesen hatte? Ich glaube daher nicht, dass wir den Kern seiner geistigen Gestalt schon im Blick haben, wenn wir ihn als "christlichen Logiker" sehen. Als solcher aber erscheint er mehrfach in dem Buch Guelluys, bannt zeitweise seinen Blick, verschiebt gelegentlich die Accente in seinen Zitaten und lässt das andere nicht überall zur vollen Tiefe der Auswirkung kommen, das dieser ganzen harten Arbeit des Denkens doch überhaupt erst Sinn gibt: den tiefen, tragenden Glauben an die Allmacht Gottes. Man vergleiche nur einmal die Art, wie Ockham von der göttlichen Allmacht spricht, mit der seines wenig jüngeren Zeitgenossen Holkot. Hür Ockham ruht das alles auf dem grossen, echten "Credo in unum deum patrem omnipotentem." Bei Holkot aber wird die Lehre von der Allmacht eingeführt als eine "opinio communis"! Das ist mehr als nur ein Unterschied in der Ausdrucksweise.

Diese Hinweise wollen keineswegs besagen, dass Guelluy diesen Glauben Ockhams irgendwie in Zweifel gezogen hätte. Das ist nicht der Fall. Er setzt ihn als selbstverständlich voraus und zieht ihn sehr oft bei seiner Interpretation heran. Aber er accentuiert ihn nicht in dem Masse, wie man es von ihm erwarten könnte. Denn das ist gerade der unmittelbarste Eindruck, den sein Buch gibt: dass er den Theologen Ockham zeigt, dessen Denken im Sentenzenkommentar von theologi-schen en Problemen beherrscht und gelenkt wird und von ihnen bestimmt in die philosophischen Fragestellungen eindringt. Von Anselm aus gesehen versteht sich das von selbst: Hinter dem ganzen Denken Ockhams steht die polare Spannung von Allmachtglauben und Logik. Aber nach den knappen Thesen Vignauxs in seinem Artikel "Nominalisme" 15 und P. Böhners eindringenden Untersuchungen ist das hinterher nicht wieder so klar heraus-

^{14.} Man sollte m.E. Holkot überhaupt nicht so eng an Ockham heranrücken, wie es bisher üblich ist. Beider Sentenzenkommentare erscheinen mir trotz der geringen Zeitdifferenz nicht in einer geraden Linie verbunden. Holkots Kommentar zeigt im Vergleich zu dem Ockhams, abgesehen von den speziellen sachlichen Differenzen, schon eine gewisse Lockerung der strengen Argumentationsform, flicht gelegentlich abliegende Betrachtungen, auch eine historische (wenn auch wohl aus Augustin geschöpfte) Erötterung in den Gedankengang ein, möchte nicht mehr die Probleme vom Status der Engel und Seeligen aus diskutieren, weil dieser ihm zu dunkel für den Menschen ist. Vor allem scheint mir das für ihn vielleicht charakteristischste Werk, der Kommentar zum Buch der Weisheit, die Annahme zu rechtfertigen, dass dieses Mitglied der gelehrten Tafelrunde des Bischof Richard Aungerville de Bury in Durham in einer anderen geistigen Sphäre gelebt hat als Ockham. (Cf. J. de Ghellinck, S.J., "Un bibliophile au XIV" siècle: Richard Aungerville de Bury", Revue d'hist. ecclés., 18-19 (1922-1923).

^{15.} Dictionnaire de Théol. Cathol., t. XI, 1 (1931), col. 736.

nur dem schwachen Intellekt des "viators" evident sind. Auch die Ordnung ihrer Abhängigkeiten untereinander gilt absolut, weil sie in der inneren Logik ihrer Beziehungen gegründet ist, bis auf die letzten beiden: das abstraktive Erkennen setzt nicht notwendig das intuitive voraus. Gott kann ienes ohne dieses gewähren, denn er hat es schon getan. Wieder geht die apriorische Argumentation über blosse Möglichkeiten herab auf ein Factum, das sie in der Wirklichkeit verankert. Dieser ständig sich wiederholende Hinweis auf ein de facto so Sein, das "guilibet experitur", ist der andere Pfeiler der Ockhamschen Theorie, sein "Empirismus", wie ihn auch Guelluy auffasst, und der naturlich nicht, wie Vignaux (S. 17) hervorhebt, sensualistische Bedeutung hat, sich vielmehr überwiegend gerade auf die Gegebenheiten der "inneren" Erfahrung stützt und der, wie ich hinzüfugen möchte, vor allem auch deshalb nicht im modernen Sinne verstanden werden kann, weil für ihn das einmalige innere Erlebnis einer einzigen christlichen Seele, wie auch die Wunder und jede Offenbarungstatsache zu den Gegebenheiten dieser christlichen Erfahrung gehören.

Zwei Fragen aus dem Problemkomplex dieses Kapitels scheinen mir bei Guelluy noch nicht ganz geklärt. Die eine ist das bekannte Problem der "praedicatio rei de re", die Ockham vor allem zu Beginn des Kommentars des öfteren, aber immer mit dem Vorbehalt ihrer Möglichkeit erwähnt. Guelluy formuliert zunächst die Alternative, die Ockham hier sieht, gemäss dessen erster Erklärung in Prol. q. 1. QQ mit den Worten:

Si l'esprit peut former des propositions dont les prédicats soient constitués par les choses qu'il connait, il peut aussi... donner ce rôle à des concepts qui les représentent et qui n'ont, selon certains, d'autre réalité que celle d'un esse objectivum. (S. 108; vgl. auch S. 105-106 Anm. 1).

Vignaux, der hierin Guelluy im wesentlichen zustimmt, stellt dieselbe Alternative in etwas modifizierter Form dar:

Si le concept, cet objet non réel, ce fictum, peut être terme, pourquoi la chose connue en soi, cet autre objet ou cognitum, ne le serait-elle pas aussi?

und gibt dann den Gegensatz, um den es hier geht, in äusserster Zuspitzung:

Qu'il s'agisse de propositions composées, pour ainsi dire, de la réalité elle même ou de sa connaissance distincte... (S. 53).

Das eingefügte "pour ainsi dire" stumpft die Härte der These ab, findet aber bei Ockham selbst keine Unterlage, der ohne

Vorbehalt erklärt "praedicabilium de deo aliquod est vera res extra animam secundum unam opinionem," 16 und später in () uodl. III q. 12 (Paris): "Utrum propositio mentalis componitur ex rebus vel conceptibus" diese These ad absurdum führt, indem er die "res" in uneingeschränkter Konkretheit nimmt. 17 Nun will ich Guelluy gern einräumen, dass der Erklärungsversuch, den ich in meinen "Ockham-Studien" gegeben habe, nicht befriedigend ist, aber ich vermisse eine bessere bei ihm. Denn sein Hinweis, dass der Unterschied des "possible a priori" und des "possible de fait", d.h. des possibile de potentia absoluta und des possibile de potentia ordinata, den ich keineswegs übersehen habe. das vorliegende Problem erkläre, hat keine Grundlage in Ockhams Text, lässt überdies die Frage unverändert bestehen, wie - auch de potentia absoluta - eine vera res extra animam praedicabilis, d.h. Glied einer propositio sein soll. Ockhams zweite Erklärung geht überdies einen anderen Weg, der in neue Schwierigkeiten führt.

Totum quod dicitur (sagt er) de praedicatione rei in divinis debet intelligi secundum illam opinionem, quae ponit, quod intellectio non est subjectum nec praedicatum propositionis, sed objectum intellectionis, quam opinionem reputo probabilem. Secundum autem aliam opinionem, quam reputo etiam probabilem, scilicet quod omne subjectum propositionis in mente est intellectio vel aliqua qualitas inhaerens menti, debet dici quod propositio illa, quam format intellectus de divinitate non componitur ex re sed intentione distincta divinitatis, quae non est nobis possibilis, et secundum hoc proportionabiliter dicendum est de illa propositione sicut diceretur de propositione, si componeretur ex re. 18

Wenn dieser Text des Incunabeldruckes hier richtig ist (was mir zweifelhaft erscheint), so muss man ihn auf die bekannten drei Deutungen des Wesens der Begriffe beziehen, die Ockham zunächst nebeneinander als probabel hinstellt. So versteht ihn jetzt auch Guelluy (S. 156-157). Demgemäss wäre die erste "opinio" die Auffassung des Konzepts als eines "Fictum", das nur ein "esse objectivum" besitzt, gemäss der anderen opinio aber wäre der Konzept eine qualitas mentis oder eine intellectio, also ein esse subjectivum, d.h. eine vera res in anima. Bei dieser Meinung, so fährt Ockham nun erstaunlicherweise fort,

^{16.} Prol. q. 1. QQ (Guelluy S. 108 Anm. 1).

^{17.} Cf. z.B.: "Tertio, si subjectum et praedicatum essent res extra animam, tunc in illa propositione: canis comedit panem, subjectum vere comederet praedicatum" u.s.w.

^{18.} Prol. q. 2. Y, 24-35 (Guelluy S. 157 Anm. 1).

muss man sagen, "quod propositio ... non componitur ex re sed intentione distincta." Soll das heissen, dass die erstgenannte "opinio" der Ansicht entspricht, der gemäss die "propositio componitur ex re"? Guelluy bejaht das ohne Zweifel (S. 156), ohne den Gegensatz zu seiner S. 108 geäusserten Ansicht, die ich oben zitiert habe, zu beachten. Er übersieht dabei, dass (ganz abgesehen davon, dass es sich in beiden Fällen um cognitiones in conceptu handelt) für Ockham das Fictum als esse objectivum niemals eine "res" ist. 19 Er berücksichtigt auch nicht die dieser Textstelle widersprechende erste Deutung, die Ockham in Prol. q. 1. QQ gegeben hat:

Praedicabilium de deo aliquod est vera res extra animam secundum unam opinionem, quia quicquid potest intellectus intelligere mediante simplici notitia, potest componere cum alio vel cum seipso dicendo: hoc est hoc. Aliud praedicabile de deo est tantum conceptus habens esse objective tantum.

Vignaux dagegen beachtet das und argumentiert daher, wie oben zitiert, anders: Wenn das Fictum, "cet objet non réel" Terminus sein kann, "pourquoi la chose connue en soi, cet autre objet ou cognitum, ne le serait-elle pas aussi?" (S. 53) Aber diese Interpretation steht mit der angeführten zweiten Darlegung Ockhams in Prol. q. 2. 1, 24 - 35 nicht in Einklang; ihre Deutung der "res" als "cognitum in se", die sich auf Prol. g. 2. Y. 1 - 22 stützt aber auch in der genannten Stelle aus Prol. g. 1. 00 wie in anderen Wendungen Ockhams m.E. eine Grundlage findet 20 und daher die nächstliegende Erklärung ist, scheint mir überdies mit der genannten q. 12 des Quodl. III unvereinbar. Zudem ist noch nicht geklärt, inwiefern Ockham die Praedicierbarkeit einer solchen cognitio in se mit dem ständigen "si res possit praedicari" überhaupt in Zweifel ziehen kann. So lassen also auch diese neuen Interpretationen der Praedicatio rei de re einen Rest, der noch weiterer Erhellung bedarf. Im Hinblick auf spätere Ausführungen Guelluys möchte ich hier noch hervorheben, dass er in der kurzen Erörterung der Theorien des Begriffs treffend bemerkt, dass Ockhams Analysen des Wissens auf eine Klärung der Struktur der Wirklichkeit, also auf eine Metaphysik zielen. (S. 157)

^{19.} Cf. z.B. Prol. q. 3. H, 6-26 (Guelluy S. 186 Anm. 1).

^{20.} Ockham bezeichnet z.B. eine in ihrem Inhalt unveränderte intuitive Erkenntnis als "notitia intuitiva invariata in re" (cf. Anm. 32).

Die andere Frage, auf die ich hier die Aufmerksamkeit lenken möchte, ist das Problem der cognitio intuitiva von non-existentia. Vignaux hat es sehr sorgfältig behandelt, ²¹ P. Philotheus Böhner ihm eine besondere, ausgezeichnete Untersuchung gewidmet, ²² Guelluy spricht ihm keine grosse Bedeutung zu. (S. 102 Anm.) Es gehört aber doch wesensmässig zu dem Phänomen der cognitio intuitiva, führt überdies in seinen letzten konsequenzen auf eine metaphysische These, die zu denen gehört, die es uns heute schwer machen, "de penser en médiéval avec les médiévaux", und deshalb scheint es mir wert, hier etwas ausführlicher darauf einzugehen. Drei Themen sind m.E. in diesem Problem verschlungen:

- 1. Das göttliche intuitive Erkennen. Gott erkennt intuitiv die Dinge, die sind und die, die nicht sind. Dieses supernaturale, also theologische Factum, hatte ich in meinen "Ockham-Studien" nicht berücksichtigt, wie P. Böhner überzeugend nachgewiesen hat.
- 2. Das menschliche Erkennen eines nicht praesenten oder nicht-existenten Dinges de potentia Dei absoluta. Auch das ist. wie P. Böhner dargelegt hat, ein supernaturaler Vorgang. Es ist ein Wunder. Ockham wird bestimmte Berichte aus der Bibel dabei im Auge gehabt haben. Er ist auch nicht der erste, der diese Erkenntnismöglichkeit behandelt und anerkennt, was auch Guelluy hervorhebt (S. 361). Derselbe Gedanke findet sich, worauf ich früher schon hingewiesen habe, bei Matthaeus von Aquasparta und Heinrich von Harclay, ebenso bei Herveus Natalis, wie P. Böhner nachweist, und auch, wie Giacon 23 hervorhebt, bei Thomas von Aquino. Aber nur bei Ockham hat er, soweit ich sehe. Anlass zu einer eingehenden Diskussion gegeben, die ausging von Gilsons Ansicht, dass diese Lehre zu einer Erschütterung der Erkenntnissicherheit überhaupt bei Ockham führe. 24 Obwohl ich jede Auswertung der Thesen Ockhams in skeptischem Sinne immer abgelehnt habe - was auch Guelluy tut (S. 127) - , hatte ich schon in meinen "Ockham-Studien" dieselbe Besorgnis geäussert. Heute gebe ich zu, dass das zu

^{21.} Dictionnaire de Théol. Cathol. t. XI, I (1931), col. 767 f.

^{22. &}quot;The notitia intuitiva of non-existents according to William Ockham," Traditio I (1943), 223-275.

^{23.} C. Giacon, Guglielmo di Occam (Milano, 1941), I, 365.

^{24.} Cf. P. Böhner, loc. cit., S. 235 Anm. 28.

modern gedacht war. Das Wunder ist im christlichen Denken kein Argument gegen die Sicherheit der Wissenschaft. Darin stimme ich den kritischen Bedenken von Vignaux²⁵ und P. Böhner²⁶ gegen meine frühere Auffassung jetzt zu, denen auch Guelluys Interpretation (S. 360-361) entspricht. Dagegen erscheint mir P. Böhners Meinung, dass auch die intuitive Erkenntnis der Nichtexistenz eines Objektes, gleichviel ob Ockham ihre Möglichkeit erklärt mit der oder ohne die Annahme einer supernaturalen Bewahrung der notitia intuitiva nach dem Fortfall des Objekts, das sie naturaliter hervorgerufen hat, ausschliesslich eine supernaturale Erkenntnis, also gleichfalls eine rein theologische Frage ist, noch eine Erörterung zu gestatten.

Hier steckt noch ein 3. Problem innerhalb dieses Bereiches der cognitio intuitiva, das m.E. rein philosophisch ist. Neben der Frage der Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis eines nichtexistierenden Dinges steht, so scheint mir, noch die Frage nach der Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis der Nichtexistenz eines Dinges. P. Jöhner erkennt ihre Berechtigung an, meint aber, sie sei von mir in Ockham hineingelesen, von diesem selbst aber nicht gestellt. Darin vermag ich mich jedoch noch nicht für überzeugt zu erklären. Denn darüber herrscht wohl Einigkeit: Intuitiv ist für Ockham i e d e Erkenntnis, auf die hin ich evident urteilen kann, dass eine Sache ist, wenn sie ist, und dass sie nicht ist, wenn sie nicht ist. Diese intuitive Erkenntnis der Nichtexistenz eines Objektes ist von der intuitiven Erkenntnis eines nichtexistierenden Objektes, die in den von P. Böhner angeführten ()uaestionen von Franciscus von Mayronis zum Problem gestellt ist. 27 durchaus verschieden. Die notitia intuitiva ist von Ockham charakterisiert als die Grundlage affirmativer wie negativer kontingenter Existenzurteile, d.h. eines assensus bzw. dissensus zu derselben Existenzaussage. Wenn Vignaux 28 hier einwendet "que l'affirmation et la négation d'existence n'ont pas, dans la doctrine, la même place: l'affirmation d'existence, l'évidence du fait sont la donnée première: la négation évidente d'une réalité n'est qu'une possibilité ouverte devant l'esprit", so ist das sachlich richtig, gilt aber m.E. nicht für Ockhams

^{25.} Loc. cit., col. 769.

^{26.} Loc. cit., S. 235.

^{27.} Loc. cit., S. 239.

^{28.} Loc. cit., col. 767.

Lehre, der schon in der Wesensbestimmung der notitia intuitiva affirmative und negative Existenzerkenntnis auf einer Ebene nebeneinander stellt. Gewiss ist das problematisch, aber noch habe ich keinen Beleg dafür gesehen, dass es nicht ockhamistisch wäre. Wenn nun ein so hervorragender Ockham-Kenner wie P. Böhner überhaupt die Existenz eines solchen philosophischen Problems bei Ockham bestreitet, 29 so kann er sich dabei vor allem auf die Stelle in Sent. II q. 15. E stützen, wo Ockham in der Tat sagt:

Ideo oportet, quod cognitio intuitiva, qua cognosco rem non esse, quando non est, sit supernaturalis quantum ad causationem vel conservationem vel quantum ad utrumque.

Dass die supernaturale Kausation der Erkenntnis eines nichtexistierenden Objektes wie die supernaturale Conservatio ebendieser Erkenntnis Wunder sind, die ausschliesslich in den Bereich der Theologie gehören, ist unbestreitbar. Bei supernaturaler Conservatio einer natürlich en intuitiven Erkenntnis ist das aber nicht so eindeutig von Ockham bejaht. Denn in Bezug hierauf erklärt er andererseits am Abschluss derselben Erörterung ausdrücklich:

Et sic potest aliquo modo concedi, quod per cognitionem natural e m intuitivam iudico rem non esse, quando non est, quia per cognitionem naturaliter causatam licet supernaturaliter conservatam.³⁰

Aber abgeschen davon hat Ockham dieses rein philosophische Problem der natürlichen Erkenntnis der Nicht-Existenz eines Dinges in Prol. q. 1. RR tatsächlich selbst schon gestellt: "quaero, a quo causatur illud iudicium, quo iudicatur res non esse quando non est?" und er hat im Prol. q. 1. ZZ(worauf ich in meinen "Studien" hingewiesen hatte) auch eine rein philosophische Erklärung dieser negativen Existenzerkenntnisse zu geben versucht, bei der er den Gedanken einer supernaturalen Bewahrung der notitia intuitiva vermeidet, und die er, wie ich jetzt erst aus der von P. Böhner³¹ teilweise kritisch edierten q. 5. des Quodl. V ersehen habe, auch dort noch vertreten hat.

^{29.} Loc. cit., S. 228: "In order to obtain a correct understanding, we must not forget (lest right at the beginning we be already in the midst of confusion) that our problem and its solution is a theological one, and not a philosophical one, and that it regards by no means the question how a natural or an everyday proposition of non-existence is known to be true."

^{30.} Cf. auch Sent. II, q. 14-15 DD.

^{31.} Loc. cit., S. 231 Anm. 17.

Ihr zufolge sind das Objekt und seine notitia intuitiva Partialursachen für die affirmative Existenzaussage; bei Nicht-Existenz des Objekts aber wirkt nur die eine Partialursache allein und ermöglicht daher nur eine negative Existenzaussage. Von reiner Möglichkeit ist hier nicht die Rede. Die These bleibt im Tatsächlichen und gilt daher "pro statu isto", ist aber auch so mit zwei offenkundigen Fragwürdigkeiten belastet. Die eine: Wie kann eine notitia intuitiva eines Objekts fortdauern, wenn das Objekt nicht mehr praesent ist, wird schon im 6. Dubium berührt, 32 aber nicht gelöst (Guelluy S. 119). Dass eine - von Ockham nicht ausgesprochene - Verlegung des Problems in den supernaturalen Bereich für die Klärung nicht in Frage kommen dürfte, zeigt die zweite Schwierigkeit, die auch supernatural nicht unmittelbar zu beheben wäre: Wie soll ein Obiekt neben seiner intuitiven Erkenntnis auf den Sinn und Intellekt wirken? Auch Gott könnte im Menschen supernaturaliter nur die notitia intuitiva hervorrufen. Für diese eigenartige Vorstellung Ockhams scheint es mir jedoch eine bemerkenswerte Parallele zu geben im Raum der Substanzproblematik. Dort behauptet nämlich Ockham, dass jede Substanz, obwohl wir intuitiv nur ihre Accidenzien und niemals sie selbst zu erkennen vermögen, doch neben und unabhängig von den Accidenzien Wirkungen ausüben kann. 33 Dass auch dieser Gedanke uns befremdet, ist unerheb-

^{32.} Prol. q. 1 RR: "...Sed stante semper eadem notitia invariata in re judicat rem esse, quando est, et p o s t judicat eam non esse, quando non est."

^{33.} Prol. q. 2.0. Ockhams Lehre von der Unerkennbarkeit der Substanz war nicht neu. Franciscus de Marchia, der 1320 in Paris über die Sentenzen geleser nat (cf. F. Ehrle, Peter von Candia S. 253), hat bereits eine entsprechende Auffassung vertreten: "Ideo dico aliter, quod intellectus noster pro statu isto non habet aliquem conceptum proprium substantiae essentialem nec quidditativum per modum generis nec demonstrativum per modum differentiae, sed tantum habet conceptum proprium negativum et positivum proprium accidentalem.... Cujus ratio est, quia substantia pro statu isto non movet per se et immediate intellectum nostrum, sed tantum mediante accidente, quia non movet nisi mediante sensu, qui non est capax substantiae. Accidens autem non potest causare conceptum perfectiorem conceptu suo proprio... ideo intellectus virtute accidentis non potest habere proprium conceptum essentialem substantiae... Conceptus propriissimi et perfectissimi substantiae, ad quos reducimus omnes alios conceptus proprios substantiae, sunt isti duo, quorum unus conceptus proprius substantiae in ordine ad posterius, et iste est conceptus, quo concipimus substantiam substare per se et primo omnibus aliis posterioribus.... a quo conceptu imponitur nomen substantiae... Alius est conceptus proprius substantiae in ordine ad prius, et iste est conceptus, quo concipimus substantiam esse ens per se non in alio subjective. Et iste est conceptus proprius substantiae negativus." (Sent. 1, d. 3. q. 31. (Leipzig) U.B. Cod. ms. 352 fol. 46).

lich gegenüber der Tatsache, dass er von Ockham ausgesprochen worden ist. Es liegt mir fern, behaupten zu wollen, dass hier ein tieferer Zusammenhang auf dem Boden der Metaphysik besteht, da ich bislang keinen Beleg dafür gefunden habe. Aber schon die Parallelität dieser beiden von Ockham tatsächlich ausgesprochenen Thesen verdient, glaube ich, hervorgehoben zu werden, sie zeigt zudem, wie weit wir, allen sachlichen Bedenken zum Trotz, mit einem mittelalterlichen Autor gedanklich mitgehen müssen.

Die klare Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse dieses Kapitels, die Guelluy in den "Conclusions" gibt, stellt noch einmal die beiden Ordnungen, de potentia Dei absoluta und de potentia Dei ordinata, gegenüber, zeigt, wie Ockham grundsätzlich von der ersteren aus auf Grund des Prinzips des Nicht-Widerspruchs argumentiert, die eine abstraktive Erkenntnis Gottes für den "viator" zulässt, und gegen sie die de facto geltende Ordnung abtrennt, in der dem Menschen nur eine auf die Offenbarung gestützte Gotteserkenntnis in einem ihm eigenen, aber aus konnotativen und negativen Begriffen zusammengesetzten Begriff möglich ist.

Nun erhebt sich die schwerwiegende Frage der Möglichkeit einer Theologie als Wissenschaft. Auch ihre Beantwortung hält sich bei Ockham primär im Raum des "pur possible". Kann es von Gott, dem absolut einfachen Wesen, "de potentia absoluta" abstraktiv in sich erkannt, eine demonstrative Wissenschaft geben? Die Lösung des Problems setzt eine Klärung des Wesens der Wissenschaft und des Beweises überhaupt wie des Ockhamschen Gottesbegriffes voraus, bei dessen Darstellung der Aufgabe gemäss das begrifflich Fassbare den tragenden konkretreligiösen Gehalt zwangsläufig überschattet. Es sind ausgezeichnete Seiten, auf denen Guelluy im 3. und 4. Kapitel wiederum in behutsamstem Nachspüren des Ockhamschen Gedankenweges die von Aristoteles festgelegten Bedingungen ieder echten deduktiven Wissenschaft und die zentrale Funktion des Mittelbegriffes in ihr darstellt. Auch ihr Gegenstück, das induktive Verfahren, und die Voraussetzungen der Möglichkeit seines Hinausgreifens über den engen Rahmen der vollständigen Induktion, deren Erhellung wohl eine originale Leistung Ockhams ist, werden geklärt (S. 136-137). Nur glaube ich, wie ich früher schon dargelegt habe, dass nach Ockhams richtiger Auffassung dabei nicht nur das eine Prinzip vorausgesetzt werden

muss, dass die gleichen Ursachen immer die gleichen Wirkungen haben, sondern noch ein zweites notwendiges und evidentes "Medium" angenommen werden muss, nämlich, dass alle Exemplare einer Art gleich sind. 34 Erst diese beiden Prinzipien zusammen gestatten nach Ockham, gegebenenfalls sogar nur von einem Experiment aus, induktiv zu einem allgemeinen Gesetz, das allerdings nur de potentia ordinata gültig ist, fortzuschreiten.

Es ist hier nicht der Raum, die Fülle der sich vielfältig verästelnden Gedanken wiederzugeben, die Guelluy in diesen beiden Kapiteln dem Leser nahezubringen versteht. Ich muss mich auf einzelne ergänzende und kritische Bemerkungen dazu beschränken, die aber das grosse Verdienst, das sich Guelluy mit seinem Buch erworben hat, nicht verkleinern sollen.

Die Inadaequatheit des aristotelischen Wissenschaftsbegriffs in Bezug auf Gott, die Ockham feststellt, erfährt letztlich von zwei entgegengesetzten Einsichten her ihre Begründung: einmal, weil eine Reihe von Aussagen über Gott unmittelbar evident sind, also eines Beweises nicht bedürfen und daher von Aristoteles aus dem Bereich der Wissenschaft ausgeschlossen sind. Sodann, weil eine andere Reihe von Aussagen, als kontingente, nach Ockhams Meinung nicht beweisbar sind. Wenn er demgemäss der Theologie den Charakter als strenger Wissenschaft abspricht, so muss man sich klarmachen, was er damit gemeint hat. Der moderne Leser ist immer noch leicht geneigt, darin eine Kritik der Theologie, eine Minderung ihrer Dignität zu sehen. Im Gleichnis gesprochen würde das in Ockhams Sinne heissen: Es ist ein Mangel des Menschen, wenn ihm ein ererbter Anzug nicht passt. Ockham selbst aber hat darin einen Mangel des Anzugs. d.h. eine Unzulänglichkeit der aristotelischen Wissenschaft gesehen. Das nachzuweisen ist seine und seiner ihm verwandten Vorgänger und Zeitgenossen tiefste Intention. Sie geben eine kritische Begrenzung der Reichweite des Aristotelismus vom Standpunkt der christlichen Theologie, nicht eine skeptische Kritik der Theologie vom Standpunkt der aristotelischen Wissenschaft. Und was Ockham an Thomas von Aquino und Duns Scotus

^{34.} Prol. q. 2.0: "...Quia talis consequentia tenet per illud medium necessarium et evidenter notum: quicquid absolutum vel proprietas consequens absolutum competit alicui individuo, cuilibet individuo ejusdem rationis potest aliquid consimile competere. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod haec herba habet qualitatem talem, quae est principium sanandi talem infirmitatem, quaelibet talis herba poterit hoc habere."

kritisiert, ist nicht, dass sie zuviel geglaubt, sondern dass auch sie noch zu viel zu beweisen versucht haben. Guelluy hat die Grundtendenz dieses Denkens treffend formuliert:

Les docteurs du moyen âge devaient tenir tête à l'engouement pour la pensée paienne, et, pour cela, ils insistaient sur les limites de la raison.

(S. 255). (Nur kann man das m.E. nicht vom gangen Mittelalter behaupten, sondern nur vom ausgehenden 13. und beginnenden 14. Jh.). Trotz dieser richtigen Einsicht aber setzt nun beim Gottesbegriff Ockhams eine zwiespältige Gedankenreihe Guelluys ein, die einerseits weiterhin dem in diesen Fragen noch nicht völlig geklärten Text Ockhams treu zu folgen bemüht ist, andererseits aber bei seiner zweifellos schwierigen Interpretation zunehmend einer alten Neigung nachgibt, die man als einen Versuch zur "Nominalisierung" seiner Lehre bezeichnen kann, und deren Endabsicht erst auf der letzten Seite des ganzen Buches sich dem Leser in verblüffender Weise enthüllt. Es sind grösstenteils nur sehr feine Divergenzen zwischen dem Text und seiner Interpretation, in denen das bemerkbar wird, Nuancierungen oft nur des Ausdrucks, die aber eine gewisse Widersprüchlichkeit in die Darstellung hineintragen, über die man jedoch als kleine Ungenauigkeiten hinweglesen könnte, wenn nicht das Endergebnis erkennen liesse, dass sie ein keineswegs belangloses sachliches Gewicht besitzen. Diese Zwiespältigkeit manifestiert sich am deutlichsten in den Erörterungen über die Attribute Gottes, die konnotativen und allgemeinen Begriffe, die Lehre von den "Passiones" und weitet sich von da aus auch auf das Verständnis der Wirklichkeitsauffassung Ockhams aus.

Duns hatte die Attribute Gottes, des absolut einfachen höchsten Wesens, als denominative Begriffe gedeutet. Ockham dagegen spricht von den Attributen wieder als von den "Namen" Gottes. Er folgt darin (was schon Vignaux hervorgehoben hat) 35 dem älteren Sprachgebrauch der "antiqui", wie er sie selbst bezeichnet, während für ihn "modern" der Gebrauch des Ausdrucks "Attribut" ist. 36 Aber diese "Namen" sind für ihn nicht blosse Namen, sondern konnotative Begriffe, deren Wesen er darin sieht, dass sie ihren Ursprung in der

^{35.} Loc. cit., col. 756.

^{36.} Ouodl. III. q. 2. (Paris).

Erkenntnis mehrerer Dinge haben, die sie jeweils mitbezeichnen neben dem Objekt, für das sie gelten. Das besagt in Bezug auf Gott für Ockham nicht, dass eine Univocität im strengen Sinne des Wortes zwischen Gott und den Kreaturen besteht, weil nichts in den Kreaturen eine vollkommen eine Ahnlichkeit mit Gott haben kann. Aber im weiteren Sinn dieses Begriffes erkennt er doch eine gewisse Univocität hier an, 37 und das heisst, eine Realgrundlage in Gott und in den Kreaturen (wie sie auch für den Begriff des ens besteht), die die Anwendbarkeit dieser Begriffe auf Gott rechtfertigt. Diesen Sachverhalt stellt Guelluy in folgenden Sätzen dar:

La diversité des attributs divins n'a pas un fondement intrinsèque à Dieu: Dieu est simple; mais nous pouvons lui donner différents noms qui ne sont pas synonymes; la multiplicité des concepts connotatifs suppose uniquement une multiplicité d'opérations de l'esprit.

(S. 168) Ich sehe nicht, was uns hindern könnte, gemäss dieser Auffassung, die die konnotativen und allgemeinen Begriffe jedes wesensmässigen natürlichen Realbezugs entkleidet, Gott jedes beliebige, ihm nicht widersprechende Attribut zuzusprechen. Sie vereinfacht allzu sehr und verallgemeinert überdies, was Ockham sorglich geschieden hat. Denn nach seiner Ansicht gibt es in der Tat Aussagen über Gott, die konnotative und negative Begriffe verwenden, die doch keine notwendige Beziehung zu ihm haben. Das sind die Erkenntnisse der göttlichen Wesenheit "in conceptu aliquo modo simplici ... conno itivo et negativo sibi proprio", die nach Ockhams Erklärung nichts anderes sind als

cognoscere talem conceptum simplicem de ente particulariter sumpto. Sicut potest scire quod aliquod ens est simpliciter primum, quod aliquod ens est creativum vel causa prima vel purus actus, vel quod aliquod ens est immortale, est incorruptibile, ingenerabile, incausabile et sic de aliis. Et iste conceptus est simplex, quamvis distincta significat sive principaliter sive secundario, hoc est vel in recto vel in obliquo.

Einen solchen Begriff aber trennt er ausdrücklich von allen anderen ab, indem er ihn - und nur ihn - "ad placitum institutus ad significandum" nennt. D.h. seine Anwendung auf Gott, aber nicht seine Bildung ist willkürlich. 38 Insofern bildet er eine Ausnahme innerhalb der Erkenntnislehre Ockhams, die man jedoch keineswegs verallgemeinern darf. Seine Geltung

^{37.} Sent. I. d. 2. q. 9. U.

^{38.} Sent. I. d. 3. q. 2. F.

ist ebenso problematisch wie ein Teil der cognitiones in conceptu composito proprio, für die auch Guelluv keine neue Erklärung bietet. Die conceptus connotativi et negativi proprii simplices aber zieht er für seine Untersuchung nicht heran. Er greift vielmehr wenige Zeilen nach seiner überraschenden These wieder auf den oft von ihm zitierten fundamentalen Satz Ockhams zuruck: "Nunquam potest esse distinctio conceptuum nisi propter aliquam distinctionem a parte rei". 39 Dabei hat er übersehen. dass dieser Satz allein schon den Versuch ausschliesst, eine Vielheit von Begriffen "uniquement" aus einer Vielheit intellektueller Operationen zu erklären. Das wäre überdies der Nominalismus, der auch die, wie Guelluy meint, in gewisser Hinsicht analoge Universalienlehre kennzeichnen würde, den aber Ockham ausdrücklich abgelehnt hat und den z.B. Holkot meinte, als er sich gegen die Deutung der Begriffe als "flatus vocis" wandte: 40 nämlich die Lehre, die die natürliche und daher notwendige Realitätsbezogenheit der allgemeinen Begriffe leugnete. 41 Nun stellt Guelluv seine überspitzte These, dass die "multiplicité des concepts connotatifs suppose un i que ment une multiplicité d'opérations de l'esprit" schon auf der folgenden Seite im Sinne Ockhams stillschweigend richtig: "comme le concept connotatif, le concept commun suppose d'autres réalités que le concept propre quidditatif" (S. 169). Trotzdem tritt die sie bestimmende Anschauung auch in den 'olgenden Teilen des Buches immer wieder gelegentlich vor die zweite, wie wir sehen werden.

Zunächst aber ist noch eine andere Wendung in jener These in das Licht zu rücken, die Guelluy schon mehrfach mit stiller Selbstverständlichkeit gebraucht hat und die er im folgenden dann scharf accentuiert: "opérations de l'esprit". Die Erklärung dieses Ausdrucks gibt die folgende Seite:

^{39.} Prol. q. 2. LL.

^{40.} Super quatuor libros sententiarum I. q. 6. N. Ad nonum.

^{41.} Wenn Vignaux (Le Nominalisme au XIV^e siècle, S. 27) die "affirmation radicale de l'individu" als "typisch für den Nominalismus" ansieht, so wird man dem nicht widersprechen können. Aber aus der Wahrheit des Satzes, dass jeder Nominalismus den metaphysischen Individualismus einschliesst, folgt nicht die Wahrheit seiner Umkehrung. Das hiesse, neben anderen, den radikalsten Vertreter des metaphysischen Individualismus, Leibniz, zu einem Nominalisten machen, und das wäre ein grosser Irrtum.

Les concepts communs, comme les concepts connotatifs, sont le fruit d'un travail de comparaison opéré par l'esprit. Dasselbe meint er offenbar auch, wenn er etwa sagt:

Seuls les concepts quidditatifs simples... sont tous fournis par les choses... à tout concept quidditatif propre répond une réalité, les autres concepts ne sont que des constructions de l'esprit sans réplique adéquate dans les choses (S. 173-174). ...il ne faut pas davantage chercher un correspondant réel aux concepts connotatifs, qui ne sont, eux non plus, que des associations d'autres connaissances. (Qu'on étende ce principe aux concepts connouns... et on tiendra tout son nominalisme (S. 193).

Man muss diese Formulierungen, von denen einzelne für sich in einem bestimmten Sinne richtig sind, zusammen lesen, um zu erkennen, wie ihre ostentative Kontrastierung ihren eigentlichen Sinn ausweitet und umdeutet, und man muss beachten. wie aus dem Fehlen einer "réplique adéquate", das Ockhams Lehre entspricht und auch von Guelluv in seinem Sinne gedeutet wird (S. 188), zwanzig Seiten später schon der Mangel jeglichen "correspondant réel" wird, was Ockhams Lehre widerspricht. Es ist charakteristisch und dieser Neigung zum Nominalisieren der Ockhamschen Begriffstheorie gemäss, dass in dem ganzen Buch eine für Ockhams Auffassung des Begriffs wesentliche Bestimmung nur einmal (S. 361) erwähnt wird, nämlich dass ieder Begriff "similitudo quaedam objecti" ist. Wozu man zugleich ergänzend hinzufügen muss, dass die Allgemeinbegriffe in der ihre Gültigkeit tragenden Ähnlichkeit der sie kausal erzeugenden Objekte ihre Realgrundlage haben. Diesen Gedanken der natürlichen Entstehung der Begriffe, der das Fundament der ganzen Erkenntnislehre Ockhams ist, hebt Guelluy auf, wenn er in die Bildung allgemeiner und konnotativer Begriffe eine "opération de l'esprit", deutlicher eine "travail de comparaison opéré par l'esprit" hineinschiebt. Nun spricht Ockham in der Tat gelegentlich von "operationes" oder "fabricationes intellectus". Er gebraucht zuweilen auch die Wendung, dass die konnotativen Begriffe - aber nur diese - "per comparationem" entstehen (S. 179 Anm.), oder erklärt, dass sie einem complexum "aequivalent" sind, "ita quod quicquid importatur per hoc complexum importatur etiam aliquo modo per illud incomplexum", hält aber, wie ersichtlich, das stets nur durch die Spontaneität des Geistes, und d.h. bei ihm des Willens, gebildete Complexum von dem naturhaft im Geiste sich bildenden Incomplexum deutlich getrennt. Guelluy übersieht das zunächst keineswegs ganz und fügt sich in seiner sorgfältigen

Interpretationsweise den Darlegungen Ockhams an, wenn er auch die Aequivalenz des konnotativen Incomplexum zum Complexum stärker als bisher betont. Aber dann bricht er mit einem Mal gleichsam aus, erweitert bedenkenlos Aequivalenz zu Identität und erklärt:

Un concept connotatif, comme une définition matérielle, ne disent pas si une chose est; leur contenu est le fruit d'une comparaison opérée par l'intelligence: ce s o n t des connaissances complexes (S. 218).

Ein Beleg dafür aus Ockhams Text fehlt. Der Satz zeigt krass, was Guelluy unter "opération de l'esprit" versteht. Wäre er richtig, so hätte er bei der engen Verwandtschaft von konnotativen und allgemeinen Begriffen eine umstürzende Bedeutung für das Verständnis von Ockhams Begriffstheorie: dann wäre sein "Nominalismus" enthüllt! Und darauf zielt Guelluy. Denn auf der folgenden Seite kontrastiert er wiederum die conceptus proprii simplices als Ergebnisse der Wirkung der Dinge selbst und die anderen Begriffe als Schöpfungen des Geistes. Diese letzteren

dérivent d'une opération intellectuelle, qui ne manque pas nécessairement d'objectivité, mais dont le résultat n'a pas comme réplique

(das gemäss der vorhergehenden Behauptung allein sinnvolle "adequate" fehlt wieder)

une entité réelle. C'est tout le nominalisme d'Ockham, c'est tout son empirisme... c'est toute sa conception de la structure du réel, toute sa métaphysique (S. 219).

Man sieht, welches Gewicht Guelluy auf seine Auffassung der konnotativen und allgemeinen Begriffe Ockhams legt. Allerdings soll, auch nach seiner Meinung, dieser angebliche Nominalismus Ockhams nicht "introduire en philosophie le scepticisme" - "semble-t-il" fugt er jedoch bemerkenswerterweise jetzt hinzu (S. 363). Nicht ohne Überraschung liest man sogar:

Ockham n'a pas nié la valeur objective de nos concepts et de nos jugements; il n'a pas considéré les notions abstraits comme des symboles sans correspondant réel, il estime que les concepts sont des images fidèles des choses (S. 362).

Und er erkennt an, dass die objektive Gültigkeit der Erkenntnis kein Problem bildet, sobald man zugibt, dass die Begriffe natürliche Zeichen der Dinge sind (S. 363). Aber so bedeutsam diese Feststellungen für seine abschliessende entgegengesetzte Bewertung der Position Ockhams sind, so ist doch unverkennbar, dass ihnen in den vorausgegangenen Darlegungen das Fundament

fehlt, und dass sie mehr behaupten, als der ocknamsche Text hergibt. (Ganz zu schweigen von der Frage, mit welchem Recht man das noch "Nominalismus" nennen kann.)

Dass die Begriffe "getreue Abbilder der Dinge" sind, sagt mehr, als Ockham meint. Das hat nicht einmal für den conceptus simplex proprius Geltung, den Guelluy im Gegensatz zu den allgemeinen und konnotativen Begriffen gelegentlich geradezu ein "double exact" des betreffenden Einzeldinges nennt (S. 166). Selbst bei der Fictum-Hypothese wäre ein solcher Begriff als "aliquid tale in esse objectivo intelligibili quale est ipsa res extra", 42 wenn er real "extra mentem" produziert werden könnte, dem Einzelding nur ähnlich, für das er gilt, Welche Grenzen der Möglichkeit seiner vollen Adäquatheit im übrigen gezogen sind, habe ich in meinen "Studien" dargelegt 43 und füge hier noch ergänzend hinzu, dass Ockham im Quodl. V g. 7. (Paris) gerade wegen dieses Similitudo - Charakters die Möglichkeit solcher Begriffe, auch im natürlichen Erkennen, überhaupt bestreitet. Dass die anderen Begriffe gleichfalls nicht "Abbilder" sein können, ergibt sich aus Guelluys eigenen Darlegungen. In Bezug auf diese allgemeinen und konnotativen Begriffe muss man aber weiterhin fragen, wie sie auch nur "natürliche" Zeichen der Dinge sein können, wenn sie, wie Guelluy meint, "Ergebnisse der vergleichenden Arbeit des Geistes", ja sogar "complexa" sein sollen? Das bliebe, vom Standpunkt Ockhams aus, völlig unverständlich. Denn er macht hinsichtlich der Aktivität des Geistes bei der Begriffsbildung nicht den scharfen Unterschied zwischen den conceptus proprii und den anderen Begriffen, den Guelluy sehen zu können glaubt. Das hat er besonders in Sent. II g. 25. sehr ausführlich dargelegt, wo er sich mit 21 Argumenten für die Aktivität des Intellekts auseinandersetzt und uns dabei einen Blick in die Werkstatt des Geistes tun lässt, wie er sie gesehen hat. Für ihn ist die Begriffsbildung ein "natürlicher" Vorgang im Geiste, der ausschliesslich ausgelöst wird von der unmittelbaren, nur vereinzelt auch mittelbaren Einwirkung der Objekte. Die Verschiedenheit der Begriffsarten aber resultiert nicht aus einer "multiplicité d'opérations de l'esprit", sondern aus der Verschiedenheit ihrer objektiven Verursachung, wie es auch allein Ockhams

^{42.} Sent. I. d. 3. q. 3. M.

^{43.} Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham (Berlin, 1927), 109-110.

Grundsatz, dass jede Differenz der Begriffe eine solche der Objekte voraussetzt, gemäss ist. Wie er sich diese "natürliche" Entstehung der Begriffe denkt, hat Ockham in Sent, II q. 25. O erklärt, auf die sich auch Vignaux gestützt hat. 44 Seine Auffassung entspricht hierin der meinigen. Ockhams Erklärung: "si intellectus sit activus, est naturaliter activus non habens in potestate sua actionem suam" 45 verbietet in jedem Fall, an eine Aktivität des Geistes im modernen Sinn zu denken, wie es Guelluy bei seiner Entgegenstellung der Entstehung des conceptus simplex proprius einerseits und des conceptus communis bzw. connotativus andererseits offensichtlich tut. Bei letzterem müssen wir noch etwas verweilen, zumal er für das Verständnis der proprietates oder passiones wichtig ist.

Wie schon erwähnt, sagt Ockham gelegentlich, dass die konnotativen Begriffe "per comparationem" sich bilden. Er will damit seinen Gegensatz zu Duns' Auffassung betonen, für den sie das Ergebnis einer Analyse des Subjekts waren. Vignaux interpretiert das sehr vorsichtig, und m.E. richtig, indem er schreibt:

Ces passiones connotativae ne résultent pas d'une analyse de leur sujet, mais comme on l'a dit d'une comparaison, à tout le moins d'une coexistence, avec ce qui n'est pas lui. 46

Der Ausdruck "coexistence" charakterisiert, wenn ich Vignaux richtig verstehe, die Eigenart dieser konnotativen Begriffe wieder von der Art der Objektgegebenheit her. Guelluy aber rückt diese "comparatio" an den "actus comparativus" heran, wenn er in ihnen Ergebnisse von Urteilen sieht, ja sie geradezu mit solchen identifiziert: "La comparatio est l'activité de l'intelligence formant une proposition, une connaissance complexe." (S. 179 Anm.) Das aber führt, wie mir scheint, zu unlösbaren Schwierigkeiten. Denn ganz abgesehen davon, dass "comparatio" hier "Verbindung", "Nebeneinander tellung" "coexistence" (wie

^{44.} Dictionnaire de Théol. Cathol. t. XI, 1. 'col. 753.

^{45.} Sent. II. q. 25. N; cf. ferner: Sent. I. d. 7. q. l. N: "Praeterea: nihil debet attribui enti reali propter fabricationem intellectus nisi praedicata importantia tales fabricationes vel operationes intellectus vel alia sequentia ex talibus operationibus intellectus.... tamen quod propter quamcumque operationem intellectus circa hominem et albedinem vel alias res homo dicatur albus vel niger vel calidus vel musicus et sic de aliis praedicatis non importantibus actus intelligendi, est impossibile.

^{46.} Le Nominalisme au XIVe siècle, 60-61.

Vignaux sagt) und nicht "Vergleichung" bedeutet und jene diese nicht voraussetzt, ist der "actus comparativus" für Ockham, wie jede "formatio complexi", ein freier, vom Willen abhängiger Akt. Er ist in der Tat ein Produkt der geistigen Spontaneität, die Ockham allein im Willen sieht:

Ideo dico quod iste actus comparativus causatur sufficienter a notitiis incomplexis terminorum et actu voluntatis, quo vult apprehensa simplici apprehensione comparare diversimode, quia sine actu voluntatis non potest actus comparativus causari, quia aliter semper causaretur habita simplici notitia terminorum, quod est manifeste falsum.⁴⁷

Hätte die "comparatio" diesen Sinn, wären also die conceptus connotativi wirklich complexa, dann wäre bei ihnen der strenge Kausalzusammenhang zwischen Objekt und Begriff, der allein die Gültigkeit des letzteren gewährleistet, durchbrochen. Dann wäre ihre Entstehung keine "natürliche", und sie könnten daher auch unmöglich natürlich ezeichen sein. Sie wären in der Tat "comme des définitions nominales" (S. 218). Eine solche Sonderstellung des konnotativen Begriffs aber sehe ich bei Ockham nirgends ausgesprochen. Vom conceptus simplex proprius unterscheidet er den konnotativen Begriff durch die Bestimmung "quod significat multa". Das gilt jedoch auch für die Allgemeinbegriffe, aber diese bezeichnen ihre Gegenstände "aeque primo", während der konnotative Begriff etwas "primario" und ein anderes "secundario" bezeichnet, wie es Moody so klar dargestellt hat. 48

Guelluys Theorie des konnotativen Begriffs beeinflusst naturgemäss auch seine Deutung der Lehre von den passiones, den "propriétés". Er spricht ganz allgemein von einer "réduction des propriétés a des concepts connotatifs" (S. 193). Diesen allen also würde der "natürliche", ihre Geltung sichernde Realbezug genommen, wenn seine Deutung dieser Begriffe richtig wäre. Aber noch von einem anderen Blickpunkt aus löst sich ihm die Realgrundlage dieser "passiones" in eine rein logische Entität auf. Ockham setzt bekanntlich den für das Problem der Wissenschaft massgeblichen logischen Sinn der passio als conceptus praedicabilis gegen den ontologischen Sinn der passio als accidens oder forma alicui inhaerens realiter ab, 49 bezieht sie aber insofern wieder auf einander als die passio im ontolo-

^{47.} Sent. II. q. 25. P.

^{48.} Ernest A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham (London, 1935), 55.

^{49.} Prol. q. 3. D (Guelluy S. 182); Sent. I. d. 2. q. 4. S.

gischen Sinne "importatur" durch die passio im logischen Sinne. 50 Gestützt auf die Stelle in Prol. q. 3):

...dico quod passio potest accipi multipliciter: uno modo pro aliqua re, quae dicitur alicui rei competere, alio modo accipitur pro illo quod praedicatur de aliquo...

erklärt nun Guelluy, indem er das ontologische "competere alicui rei" im Sinne des logischen "praedicari" auffasst und demgemäss das erste Glied der Alternative im Sinne der oben erörterten "praedicatio rei de re" (so wie er sie erläutert hat) versteht: "Au début du texte que nous venons de citer, on reconnaît l'opinion qui n'accorde pas au concept une réalité proprement dite mais un esse objectivum." (S. 182 Anm. 1). Die Unmöglichkeit dieser Deutung habe ich oben bereits nachgewiesen. Sie zeigt aber, in welchem Masse hier das Reale selbst konzeptualisiert wird und somit die Grundlage der passiones sich völlig ins Logische verflüchtigt, indem die logische passio nicht mehr auf ein reales Sein, sondern wiederum nur auf ein logisches "esse objectivum" bezogen wird, das als solches selbst prädicabel wäre und somit nicht im Gegensatz zum zweiten filied der Alternative, der passio praedicabilis, stehen würde. Damit aber würde der eigentliche Gedanke Ockhams verfehlt. Denn so gewiss für ihn z.B. die visibilitas kein objektives Korrelat im mittelalterlich-realistischen Sinne hat, so sicher bedeutet für ihn das "posse videre" keine bloss logische Möglichkeit und ist mehr als eine reine "entité forgée par l'esprit" (S. 187), denn sie meint auch eine reale Fähigkeit, die im jeweiligen actus videndi, wie Guelluy selbst mehrfach anerkennt, empirisch feststellbar ist. 51 Dem entspricht, wenn Guelluv im Gegensatz zu seiner obigen These später sagt:

La réalité mentionnée dans la notion d'une propriété est, de sa nature, capable d'agir sur l'intelligence (S. 273),

oder:

Pierre et capable de rire sont des concepts différents, qui mettent en cause des réalités diverses (S. 328),

oder:

Nous ne les substances connaissons que par leurs accidents; ceux-ci nous permettent de discerner leurs propriétés (S. 347),

^{50.} Prol. q. 3. H (Guelluy S. 186).

^{51.} Cf. z.B. Prol. q. 9. H (Guelluy S. 283 Anm. 1); ibid., T (Guelluy S. 292-293 Anm. 1).

und endlich:

Une propriété ne se démontre pas, elle se constate (S. 218).

Wie sollte letzteres bei einer logischen Entität möglich sein?

Den eingehenden Analysen des Wesens der Wissenschaft und des Beweises folgt dann im 5. Kapitel die entscheidende Frage nach der Möglichkeit der Theologie als Wissenschaft, die auf die Offenbarung gegründet ist. Hiermit kommt das Thema des Buches unmittelbar zur Darstellung, Wiederum breitet Guelluy die weitgespannten, subtilen Erörterungen, die Ockham diesem Problem gewidmet hat, sorgsam vor dem Leser aus. Ockham diskutiert hier, wie Guelluy sagt (S. 223), die Grenzen der apriorischen Argumentation in Bezug auf das Göttliche, und damit zugleich, so muss man hinzüfugen, die Grenzen, die der Anwendbarkeit des aristotelischen Wissenschaftsbegriffs auf die christliche Theologie gezogen sind. Es ist ein entscheidender Punkt. den Guelluy trifft, wenn er sagt: "Tout le Prologue est l'oeuvre d'un croyant" (S. 239). Vom Glauben aus, nicht um den Glauben, geht die Diskussion. Und die Verneinung der thematischen Grundfrage trifft nicht die Wahrheit der Theologie, sondern die wissenschaftliche Form der Begründung, die man ihr zu geben versucht hat, und deren Inadäguatheit gerade in der aussersten Strenge, in der Ockham sie versteht, am unmittelbarsten und radikalsten offenbar wird. Das besagt nicht die Ausschliessung der Philosophie aus der Theologie, Aber ihre Aufgabe ist die der Deklaration, nicht der Deduktion der theologischen Wahrheiten, Ockham ist, wie Guelluy unterstreicht und mit zahlreichen Beispielen belegt, nicht der erste noch der einzige in seiner Zeit, der diese Anschauung verstreten hat, es ist vor allem Duns, dem er hierin folgt. Und auch andere, wie Hervé de Nédellec und Durand de Saint-Pourcain waren ihm darin vorangegangen. Aber die Kritik der Philosophie, die Ockham bietet, trifft diese nicht nur in ihrer Beziehung zur Offenbarung, sondern auch, wie Guelluy weiterhin zeigt, in sich selbst. Die Unterscheidung der cognitio in se und der cognitio communis nimmt dem Ontologismus Anselms die Grundlage, zieht der Erkennbarkeit Gottes enge Grenzen, dessen Existenz allerdings, wie man hervorheben muss, auch für Ockham aus dem Begriff des Erhalters beweisbar bleibt, und die Einsicht in die Unmöglichkeit einer, modern gesprochen, analytischen Kausalerkenntnis zwingt die Wissenschaft ihre Basis in der intuitiven Erkenntnis, der cognitio experimentalis, wie Ockham sagt, d.h. in der Erfahrung zu suchen. Derselbe Gedanke dominiert auch in der Kritik des

skotistischen Versuches, die Theologie vermittels der Annahme einer distinctio formalis als eine auf die Analyse des Gottesbegriffes gegründete deduktive Wissenschaft darzustellen, die das 6. Kapitel bietet im Zusammenhang mit den Fragen des Unterschiedes der Wissenschaften und des Gegenstandes der Theologie, die, wie Guelluy klar zusammenfassend sagt,

comporte diverses connaissances specifiquement distinctes selon leur objet: certaines d'entre elles sont spéculatives et les autres, pratiques (S. 307),

und deren Verhältnis zur Metaphysik in der Möglichkeit der Gemeinsamkeit des Subjekts ihrer Wahrheiten und in ihrer Zentrierung um Gott als der ersten Ursache gekennzeichnet ist. Damit ist die Behandlung des eigentlichen Themas und zugleich die eindringende und sorgfältige Interpretation des ihm zugrunde gelegten Textes, des Prologes zum Sentenzenkommentar, abgeschlossen.

Im Rückblick zusammenfassend kann man sagen: Drei grosse traditionelle Ideen beherrschen das Ganze: die der Allmacht Gottes, des Widerspruchsprinzips und der absoluten Singularität alles Realen. Schon in ihrem Zusammenwirken offenbart sich die unlösbare Verflechtung von Religion und Philosophie, Aus ihnen resultieren weiterhin die beiden Grundgedanken, deren Gewicht Guelluy immer wieder betont: die der Distinction und der Kausalität. Diese beiden allein erklären das Phänomen der Realerkenntnis: sie ist eine kausale Wirkung der Objekte. verschieden nur gemäss der Einzigkeit oder Vielheit der wirkenden Objekte und zugleich der Vollständigkeit oder Unvollständigkeit ihrer an diesen Wirkungen beteiligten realen Accidenzien. Der Geist bildet die Begriffe nicht, sie werden in ihm mit natürlicher Notwendigkeit gebildet. Sie sind also keine Schöpfungen des Geistes, sondern im Geiste. Keine spontane, d.h. nach Ockham keine willkürliche Operation des Geistes vermag - der leitenden Idee nach - diesen Mechanismus der Erkenntnis zu durchbrechen. Erst das Urteil ist spontan, also willentlich gebildet, und deshalb darf man nicht von einem "mécanisme de la science" bei Ockham sprechen. Der Begriff des "natürlichen" Zeichens verankert den Gedanken des notwendigen Realbezugs der Erkenntnis auch in der Logik, die, von der Stoa nicht weniger beeinflusst als von Aristoteles, in ihrer Suppositionstheorie auf dieser natürlichen Zeichenbeziehung zum Objekt ruht. Kann das, im präzisen Sinne des Wortes,

"Nominalismus" sein?

Es ist offenbar ein besonderes Anliegen Guelluys, diese Frage, deren langsame Vorbereitung in seinen bisherigen Ausführungen ich herauszustellen mich bemüht habe, in dem letzten Kapitel seines Buches noch zu untersuchen. Sein Ergebnis ist ihre uneingeschränkte Beiahung. Aber der Gedankengang, in dem er das zu begründen versucht, wächst nicht in überzeugender Geradlinigkeit aus den zuvor dargestellten Thesen Ockhams heraus. Er hat etwas Schwankendes und Sprunghaftes, nicht nur wei! Begriffe und Auffassungen herangezogen werden, die im bisherigen schon sich als undeutlich, schillernd, unzulänglich erwiesen haben, wie der Begriff der "propriété", die Deutung der Begriffsbildung, das Verständnis des Realbezuges der Begriffe, sondern vor allem auch weil der Begriff des "Nominalismus" unscharf, wechselnd und immer abweichend von seiner eigentlichen Bedeutung genommen wird. Indem tragende Gedanken und Anschauungen Ockhams in Formulierungen gebracht werden, die die eingehende Sachkenntnis Guelluys erneut bestätigen und denen man ohne weiteres zustimmen kann, aber zugleich doch gleichsam abseits davon danach gesucht wird, was als "Nominalismus" charakterisiert werden könnte, bekommt man den Eindruck, dass hier eine alte, lange Zeit traditionelle Auffassung Ockhams die eigene intensive Arbeit Guelluvs störend überlagert.

Diese alte, traditionelle Deutung pflegt den "Nominalismus" Ockhams in der angeblichen Leugnung der Realbezogenheit der Begriffe zu sehen, die aus den Problemen der Realwissenschaften rein logische Probleme werden liess und im Agnostizismus endete. Diesen allzu einfachen, die wahre Lehre Ockhams vergewaltigenden Weg kann Guelluy nicht gehen, Aus seiner eigenen Arbeit war ihm die richtige Einsicht erwachsen und von ihm mit Nachdruck ausgesprochen, dass Ockham die objektive Geltung unserer Erkenntnisse nicht bestritten hat. Daher zeichnet er ein anderes, ziemlich vielfarbiges und nicht immer harmonisches Bild von diesem "Nominalismus", analog dem, das er von der Metaphysik Ockhams gibt. Vor allem stimmt er Maréchal zu, dass die Leugnung der objektiven Gültigkeit der Realerkenntnisse nicht das Specifikum des Nominalismus überhaupt sei, sondern die Behauptung "que l'abstraction ne consiste pas à dégager l'essence des choses" (S. 370). Aber er macht von dieser Namengebung, die jeden, der einer ganz

bestimmten Metaphysik und Abstraktionstheorie nicht zustimmt, zu einem "Nominalisten" stempelt, keinen unmittelbaren Gebrauch. Ockhams "Nominalismus" sieht er vielmehr einmal in der Lehre, dass die Allgemeinbegriffe (wie die konnotativen) nur "des associations d'autres connaissances" seien (S. 193), für die er einen Nachweis aus Ockhams Texten allerdings nicht erbringt, ein anderes Mal in der Leugnung der Erkennbarkeit der Substanzen der Dinge "pro statu isto" (S. 361), eine Lehre, die aus Ockhams Auffassung der intuitiven Erkenntnis folgt und die man bisher richtiger als "Empirismus" (in dem für Ockham möglichen Sinne) bezeichnet hat, die übrigens auch den Skotisten Franciscus de Marchia in die Reihe der Nominalisten stellen würde. 52 Andererseits aber nennt er als

thèse fondamentale de son nominalisme: si un sujet est représenté par divers concepts, c'est que ceux-ci n'en fournissent pas une connaissance quidditative propre (S. 281),

wobei er, wie die weiteren Ausführungen zeigen, die allgemeinen und konnotativen Begriffe meint, die er, wie gezeigt. entgegen Ockham, als "entités forgées par l'esprit", als Produkte von intellektuellen Operationen, ja geradezu von Urteilen fasst. Wäre das Ockhams Lehre, so müsste man ihn in der Tat einen Nominalisten nennen. Aber sie ist es, wie dargelegt, nicht. Im Grunde tendieren jedoch auch die übrigen Argumente in dieser Richtung. Sie stützen sich im wesentlichen auf Ockhams Behandlung des Problems der Distinction (S. 310. 333, 365). Seine Anschauung von der Unterschiedenheit der Dinge, der eine Unterschiedenheit der Begriffe entspricht, welcher letzterer andererseits jedoch keine Unterschiedenheit in einem Einzelding, für das sie gelten, zugrunde liegt (ohne dass dabei die objektive Gültigkeit zunächst bestritten wird): Das soll "Nominalismus" sein. Um das zugeben zu können, müsste man an zwei grundlegenden Gedanken Ockhams vorbeisehen, die er niemals in Frage gestellt hat und auf denen seine Erkenntnislehre ruht. Seine Begründung der Signification und Supposition und die Lehre von der "similitudo". Guelluy behandelt die Theorie der Supposition wie eine Annahme, die - wenn sie zugegeben wird - , den Unterschied zwischen logischer und Realerkenntnis erklärt (S. 342), und meint, die Fähigkeit eines Begriffs, Zeichen für Dinge zu sein, erfordere keine Erklärung (S. 343). Eine solche Interpretation nähert Ockham

^{52.} S. Anm. 33.

wiederum dem Nominalismus, aber - auch sie verfehlt seine echte Lehre. Für Ockham ist die personale Supposition (und auf diese kommt es hier an) keine blosse Annahme, sondern das notwendige logische Korrelat der Signification, die sie voraussetzt und auf der sie gegründet ist. Und die Signifikationsfähigkeit eines Begriffs ist eine natürliche, d.h. sie hat ihre Erklärung und Rechtfertigung in der naturnotwendigen kausalen Beziehung zu den den Begriff unmittelbar oder mittelbar verursachenden realen Dingen. (Dass die de potentia absoluta mögliche Verursachung einer Erkenntnis durch Gott kein Argument für eine nominalistische Deutung ist, bedarf wohl keiner besonderen Erklärung). Diese Dinge sind voneinander unterschieden, aber sie haben keine Unterschiedenheit, vor allem nicht von real allgemeiner und singulärer Natur, in sich, und, sofern sie einfach sind, auch keine Teile: "Seipsis different". Trotzdem aber ist Ockhams Welt kein Mosaik aus isolierten Einzeldingen. Denn diese stehen nicht nur in der Ordnung einer "mutuelle dépendance" zueinander, die auch Guelluy zugibt (S. 179 Anm.), sondern auch in der alten, für Ockham noch unbesehen gültigen Ordnung der Gattungen und Arten. Wenn er diesen zwar eine allgemeine Realität in den Dingen abspricht, sie als blosse Begriffe auffasst, so nimmt er sie doch als solche, denen die verschiedenen "Ahnlichkeiten" der Dinge untereinander als objektive Korrelate entsprechen: "Seipsis conveniunt". 53 Für Ockham ist, soweit ich sehe, diese "Similitudo" unbezweifelbar. Er nimmt sie als etwas objektiv Gegebenes, Feststellbares sowohl im Verhältnis zwischen Erkenntnis und ihrem Objekt wie zwischen den Dingen. So betont auch Vignaux in seiner ausgezeichneten Erörterung dieses Problems: "deux individus peuvent réellement convenir l'un avec l'autre par eux-mêmes - seipsis - par tout leur être qui ne se laisse aucunement diviser ... Leur similitude allant de tout l'un à tout l'autre, les individus semblables sont en même temps foncièrement, totalement divers." 54 Man trägt jedoch den Nominalismus in Ockhams Gedanken hinein, wenn man, wie Guelluy an der einzigen Stelle, an der er die "Similitudo" erwähnt, von "concepts établissant (!) des similitudes entre des

^{53.} Sent. I. d. 2. q. 6.00: "Per hoc patet ad secundum, quod est major convenientia inter Sortem et Platonem, quam inter Sortem et istum asinum; non propter aliquid aliquo modo distinctum, sed seipsis plus conveniunt."

^{54.} Le Nominalisme au XIVe siècle, 90.

choses multiples" spricht (S. 361). Die Konzepte beruhen bei Ockham auf den realen Ähnlichkeiten, aber "etablieren" sie nicht. Es ist auch nicht zu sehen, wie sie das anders als in der Form willkürlicher Setzungen könnten. Und das wäre wiederum extremer Nominalismus, aber nicht Ockhams Lehre. Diese nominalisierende Interpretation Guelluys kommt vielleicht am klarsten zum Ausdruck da, wo er versichert, "que l'unité du genre, de l'espèce ou des propriétés n'appartient qu'à des concepts groupant des réalités différentes" (S. 333), während es nach Ockhams Darstellung im vollen Gegensatz dazu "réalités semblables" hätte heissen müssen. Und dieser Gedanke Ockhams von der die Universalität der Begriffe tragenden objektiven Ahnlichkeit unterschiedener Dinge ist, wie Vignaux zeigt, schon angelegt im Skotismus. Dass sie im Grunde nur eine Verallgemeinerung ist der skotistischen Lehre von der begrifflichen Univocität des Seins in Gott und den Kreaturen, die doch iede reale Gemeinsamkeit ausschliesst, halte ich für eine ebenso einleuchtende wie wichtige Erkenntnis von Vignaux. 55

Nachdem Guelluy sich beim Universalienproblem der veralteten Deutung angeschlossen hatte, drängte sich ihm zwangsläufig auch deren skeptische Ansicht über die Möglichkeit einer Realwissenschaft bei Ockham auf. Er spricht in dem letzten Kapitel nur noch in Anführungsstrichen von der "science réelle" (S. 341, 370) und meint, dass Ockham die Möglichkeit einer Wissenschaft vom Geschaffenen überhaupt kompromittiert habe (S. 367). Schliesslich stösst dann zwangsläufig er, der wiederholt aus seiner eigenen eindringenden Sachkenntnis fast bis zuletzt versichert hatte, dass Ockham die objektive Gültigkeit der Erkenntnis (S. 342, 362 u.ö.) und das Prinzip der Kausalität (S. 351) nicht in Frage stelle, trotzdem zu dem letzten und aussersten traditionellen Argument gegen Ockham vor: dass sein System "normalement" zum Zweifel am Kausalprinzip und zu einem "agnosticisme assez radical" geführt habe (S. 376). Die Grundlage dieser These aber ist weniger Ockhams Lehre selbst als die Ansichten von Jean de Mirecourt und Nicolas d'Autrecourt. Wie unsicher jedoch solch ein Rückschluss aus den vermeintlichen, für Ockham noch nicht im einzelnen genügend untersuchten Wirkungen ist, zeigt die oben zitierte Abhandlung von Moody, die Nicolas d'Autrecourt als einen Gegner,

^{55.} Loc. cit., p. 91. Vgl. auch Sent. I. d. 2. q. 9. U: "...Et ideo dico quod sine omni compositione ex parte dei aliquid est univocum sibi et creaturae..."

nicht Anhänger Ockhams aufgewiesen hat. ⁵⁶ Dass im übrigen die "Anhänger", ja selbst die unmittelbaren Schüler im Mittelalter ihren Lehrern sehr frei und selbständig gegenüberstehen konnten, dafür zeugen nicht nur die "Ockhamisten", sondern auch mehrere Skotisten und Thomisten. Ein besonders schönes Beispiel bietet Peter von Candia, der in seinen Principia wie im Sentenzenkommentar seinen "reverendissimus magister" Gerhard von Calcar in voller Freimütigkeit kritisierte.

Blickt man vom Schluss aus noch einmal zurück auf Guelluys Buch im ganzen, so muss man feststellen, dass seine letzten Thesen und die Kritik, die sie forderten, im Grunde doch nicht die Substanz seiner Arbeit berühren. Ihre Entwicklung verläuft meist mehr oder weniger verdeckt, im Hintergrund hinter dem eigentlichen Gedankengang, der der von Ockhams Prolog selbst ist. Ich habe sie stärker hervorgehoben, weil ich sie, wie gesagt, für Ausstrahlungen einer alten Auffassung halte, die Guelluy nicht unmittelbar allein aus seiner eigenen Forschung erwachsen ist. Sein eigentliches Ergebnis aber sehe ich in den Zusammenfassungen, wie er sie S. 310 und 369 gibt und in denen er uns Ockham nicht mehr als den christlichen Logiker, sondern als den christlichen Theologen zeichnet, dessen Fundament der Glaube an die Allmacht ist, und als den strengen Logiker, dessen Instrument das Widerspruchsprinzip ist, der von beiden aus der Funktion der reinen Philosophie im christlichen Weltbild nur einen sehr relativen Wert beimisst und doch nicht der Ratio zu Gunsten eines Fideismus ihren Platz und ihre Bedeutung bestreitet. Anselms Gedanke der Verknüpfung von Allmacht und Widerspruchsgesetz, so möchte ich hinzufügen, den Ockham auf eine Anselm zwar sehr ferne aber höchst konsequente Weise zu Ende denkt, erhellt zugleich das Zwielicht, in dem zuweilen seine Stellung zu Aristoteles erscheint. Der christliche Theologe, der die aristotelische Wissenschaftslehre ganz ernst nimmt, muss - verstärkend - einstimmen in das "Nein", mit dem die geistige Bewegung am Ausgang des 13. Jht. dem Aristotelismus und Averroismus entgegengetreten war, und doch eben diese Lehre im Rahmen der Allmacht auswerten. Diesen christlichen Theologen in Ockham und seine theologische Grundproblematik in den Vordergrund gerückt zu haben, ist ein wertvolles Ergebnis von Guelluys sachgemässer Methode, einen mittelalterlichen Text zu lesen, und seines schönen Leitgedankens: "de penser

^{56.} S. Anm. 8.

autant que possible en médiéval avec les médiévaux". Indem man ihm darin folgt, kann man auf die Frage: Nominalismus? nur antworten: Nein!

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NOTE SUR ESSE BEATIFICABILE:

Passio Theologica

ans la belle analyse qu'il a donnée des questions de Guillaume d'Ockham sur le Prologue des Sentences, l'abbé Guelluy a attiré l'attention sur l'importance dans le nominalisme de la notion de propriété: passio. 1 Nous avons nous-même signalé une classe remarquable de propriétés: les passiones theologicae dont la détermination revient au théologien. Ainsi factibile sine omni causa secunda extrinseca, separabile ab omni alio absoluto, caractères de tout creabile qui permettent de l'envisager de potentia Dei absoluta: ce mode fameux d'argumentation appartient à une théologie du créé, applicable à tout objet possible d'appréhension autre que Dieu même. 2 A côté des passiones theologicae de la créature en général, il y a également intérêt à considérer des propriétés de la nature raisonnable telles que son aptitude à la béatitude: esse beatificabile, à laquelle se lie, dans l'ordre établi du salut, l'aptitude à recevoir la charité infuse: posse habere caritatem. 3 C'est sur le rapport dans l'ockhamisme de la propriété: beatificabilis a son sujet: anima intellectiva que nous voudrions brievement réfléchir.

Quand on parle de passio, même theologica, il s'agit en effet de prédicable dans une proposition nécessaire: ici, anima in-

^{1.} R. GUELLUY, Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham, Louvain-Paris, 1947, estime, en conclusion de son ouvrage, "légitime de supposer que l'interprétation que notre auteur fait de l'universel dérive de celle qu'il a construite à propos des propriétés..." p. 373. Il compte avec raison parmi "les données du Prologue" la thèse que "les propriétés ne sont pas des réalités, mais des concepts exprimant des possibilités", p. 321. – Conception ockhamiste que la présente note suppose connue, cf. notre opuscule Nominalisme au XIVe siècle, Institut d'Etudes médiévales, Montréal, 1948, pp. 58-61.

^{2.} OCKHAM, Prol., Q. IX, C C (Nous citons d'après l'édition de Lyon, 1495): "dico quod theologia est de omnibus incomplexis ... quia non est aliquod incomplexum de quo non praedicatur aliqua passio theologica... quia istae passiones: creabile, annichilabile, perpetuabile et separabile ab omni alio absoluto, factibile sine omni causa secunda extrinseca sunt passiones theologicae, et multae aliae; et istae passiones, vel omnes, vel multae, de omni incomplexe praedicatur; et in nulla alia scientia ostendantur nec considerantur, sed tantum in theologia considerantur." - Cf. Nominalisme au XIVe siècle, p. 20.

^{3.} Prol., Q. IX, G, "Quarto arguo sic ... Quinto arguo sic ..." Cf. Nominalisme au XIVe siècle, pp. 62-63.

tellectiva est beatificabilis. Du moment qu'il y a nécessité d'attribution, autre que la pure identification de la quiddité à la quiddité même, nous sommes devant un cas de relation "propriété-sujet": peu importe qu'il entre dans la signification de la première quelque chose de plus parfait, - la béatitude, union à Dieu, - qu'en celle du second - la nature intellectuelle finie. Ce cas d'implication dans la passio de plus de perfection, d'être, nous interdit d'accepter la définition scotiste du sujet dans la question classique de subjecto theologiae: ce dernier ne se définit point par sa primauté sur des propriétés sortant de lui dans le développement d'une science analytique, - le subjectum de Scot était primum in continendo. 5

Quand il discute, pour la rejeter, la notion scotiste du rapport de la propriété au sujet, Ockham tire à deux reprises argument d'esse beatificabile, passio creaturae rationalis.⁶

Le premier argument part de la conception analytique des scotistes - secundum istum Doctorem: pour qu'un objet en fasse connaître un autre, il faut que le premier contienne le second. Cette relation de contenant à contenu ne peut exister entre un sujet et des passiones respectivae vel connotativae telles qu'esse beatificabile. Utilisant contre les adversaires une de

^{4.} Ibid. "Ouinto".

^{5.} *Ibid.* "Quarto ...Si instetur ... quod istae non sunt passiones proprie loquendo, quia semper subjectum est perfectius sua passione... Hoc non valet: quia illae propositiones, cum sint necessariae, oportet quod sint per se primo modo vel secundo modo... Et quando dicitur quod subjectum non est imperfectius sua passione, dico quod, sive passio in se sit perfectior sive imperfectior, aliquando aliquid importatum per passionem est perfectius ipso subjecto, sicut est in proposito; et ita, cum notitia imperfectioris non continet virtualiter notitiam perfectioris secundum istos, sequitur quod subjectum non continet virtualiter notitiam illius importati per passionem, neque per consequens notitiam passionis". - Cf. SCOT, Ox., Prol., Q. III, n. 4: "... dico quod ratio primi subjecti...". - La question de subjecto theologiae est analysée par GUELLUY, op. cit., pp. 266-300.

^{6.} Prol. Q. IX: "... quaero utrum Deus sub propria ratione Deitatis sit subjectum theologiae ... A ... In ista quaestione est una difficultas quid est de ratione subjecti primi alicujus scientiae; ideo primo videndum est de ea ... B. Circa primum est una opinio, quod ratio primi subjecti est continere in se virtualiter primo omnes veritates illius habitus... G. Contra istam opinionem probo quod non sit de ratione subjecti continere virtualem notitiam passionis... Quarto arguo sic: ... Minor patet: quia esse beatificabile est passio creaturae rationalis ... Quinto arguo sic: ... Falsitas consequentis patet: quia si sic, omnes tales essent evidenter cognoscibiles: anima intellectiva est beatificabilis...

^{7.} Ibid. G: "Quarto arguo sic: secundum istum Doctorem nihil ducit in cognitionem

leurs objections, le Venerabilis Inceptor montre que son argumentation vaut spécialement dans le cas de ces propriétés qui connotent quelque chose de plus parfait que leur sujet: il met consciemment les disciples de Scot en opposition avec euxmêmes - secundum eos⁸ ... contra eos.⁹ Ce raisonnement par la perfection impliquée dans beatificabilis n'intervient qu'en second lieu; l'argumentation repose d'abord sur le caractère relatif, ou connotatif, de ce prédicat: ista passio nullo modo potest cognosci nisi cognita beatitudine.¹⁰ Si nécessaire qu'il soit à titre de possibilité, le rapport de l'âme à la béatitude¹¹ reste inconnaissable à qui ne connait point d'abord ce qu'est cette béatitude: in particulari sans doute, et non in communi, comme le suggère une comparaison avec une propriété théologique de toute créature: esse creabile - a tribus suppositis subsistentibus in una natura, ¹² précision suggestive à la théo-

alterius nisi quod continet ipsum virtualiter vel essentialiter; sed multae sunt passiones respectivae vel connotativae secundum alium modum loquendi ...* Pour la suite, cf. infra.

^{8.} Texte cité supra n. 5.

^{9.} Le dernier argument d'Ockham avant sa prima conclusio, F, considère encore la perfection impliquée dans certaines passiones: "Praeterea aliquando passio important aliquid perfectius subjecto sicut esse in potentia ad formam quae est perfectior ipsa materia; sed perfectius isto modo non continetur in imperfectiori; tunc enim notitia imperfectioris contineret virtualiter notitiam perfectioris contra eos". Ibid. E.

^{10.} Ibid. G *... sed multae sunt passiones respectivae, vel connotativae secundum alium modum loquendi, quae nullo modo possunt cognosci nisi prius cognito aliquo quod non continetur in subjecto nec virtualiter, nec essentialiter ... Minor patet: quia esse beatificabile est passio creaturae rationalis, et ista passio nullo modo potest cognosci nisi cognita beatitudine: quia - si sit respectiva, cum notitia illius respectus dependeat ex notitia sui termini, portet quod terminus praecognoscatur, - eodem modo, si sit connotativa. Similiter esse creabile est passio creaturae. Similiter posse habere caritatem est passio creaturae rationalis. Et similiter esse informabile est passio materiae. Et tamen forma, caritas, beatitudo et hujusmodi, quae sunt vel termini istarum passionum, vel connotantur per istas passiones, non continentur in istis subjectis nec virtualiter nec essentialiter, et per consequens notitia istarum non causatur a notitia subjecti.*

^{11.} Notons que le P. Allan WOLTER, Duns Scotus on the natural desire for the supernatural, in NEW SCHOLASTICISM, XXIII (1949), p. 305, interprète le fameux appétit naturel de la béatitude comme une relation: "The natural appetite ... is simply an ontological relation that exists between the will and anything that is capable of perfecting it".

^{12.} *Ibid*. G [dernière objection à "Quarto arguo"]: "non tantum sunt istae passiones ut important aliquid in communi, sed ut important aliquid in particulari, sicut esse creabile a tribus suppositis subsistentibus in una natura".

logie ockhamiste du créé, d'un créable par le Dieu trine de la Révélation. Dans la classe des passiones respectivae vel connotativae inaccessibles par analyse de leur sujet, Ockham joint en effet aux aptitudes de l'esprit à recevoir la gloire ou la grâce, esse creabile, passio creaturae et même esse informabile, passio materiae: ¹³ esse in potentia ad formam. ¹⁴

La notion, capitale dans sa doctrine, ¹⁵ de concept connotatif le conduit à l'idée de propriétés transcendant leur sujet, lequel ne saurait en engendrer la connaissance par explicitation de son contenu; ¹⁶ nous nous trouvons en face de possibilités qui ne se laissent pas déterminer à *priori*, mais seulement à partir d'un fait: donnée de l'expérience ou de la Révélation.

Dans le cas qui nous intéresse: esse beatificabile, posse videre divinam essentiam, il n'y a pas, selon Guillaume d'Ockham, de connaissance naturelle possible. Le caractère purement surnaturel de la simple connaissance qu'il est possible de voir Dieu et avoir part à sa béatitude, tel est le fondement de la seconde preuve d'une définition du sujet par sa primauté sur des propriétés qui en dériveraient analytiquement. The ci encore, comme on argumente sur l'aptitude de l'esprit à la béatitude, on pourrait raisonner sur une passio theologica de toute créature: esse perpetuabile, — propriété qu'on ne saurait lire dans la nature de la chose, qu'on lui attribue sans doute en considération de la toute-puissance de son créateur. 18

^{13.} Texte cité supra n. 10.

^{14.} Texte cité supra n. 9.

^{15.} Point de vue de GUELLUY, op. cit. p. 167: "Tout concept exprimant autre chose que la quiddité d'une chose est le fruit de cette comparaison d'une chose à une autre; tout concept non quidditatif est connotatif".

^{16.} Texte cité supra n. 10, ad finem.

^{17.} Ibid. G: "Quinto arguo sic: si subjectum sic contineret praedicatum etc..., sequeretur quod cognito aliquo subjecto quaelibet passio posset de eo evidenter cognosci. Conclusio est simpliciter falsa. Consequentia patet: quia posset haberi notitia passionis virtute notitiae subjecti, et hiis habitis posset haberi notitia praemissarum, et tandem notitia conclusionis. Falsitas consequentiae patet: quia, si sic, omnes tales essent evidenter cognoscibiles: anima intellectiva est beatificabilis, homo potest videre divinam essentiam, potest habere caritatem – quae tamen non possunt cognosci naturaliter, sed tantum supranaturaliter".

^{18.} Ibid.: "... Similiter, esse perpetuabile in infinitum est passio istorum inferiorum, et tamen non potest evidenter cognosci quantumcumque subjecta distincte cognoscantur". Notez perpetuabile dans l'énumération du texte cité n. 2.

L'homme peut-il naturellement, dans une connaissance philosophique, de sa nature intellectuelle, se reconnaître capable de la fin divine que lui assigne la révélation chrétienne? Question déjà posée en tête du Prologue de Scot, Ockham n'ignorait pas l'idée que l'inconnaissance par l'âme de sa capacité suprême vaudrait seulement pro statu isto; 19 aujourd'hui encore des interpretes du Docteur Subtil admettent que, dans sa doctrine, un homme affranchi des limites imposées par l'état d'après le péché à la connaissance de soi - sublata imperfectione status istius quoad cognitionem - pouvait se découvrir capable de voir Dieu. 20 Pareille connaissance, pour le Venerabilis Inceptor, passe non seulement notre état de fils d'Adam. mais toute nature intellectuelle finie se saisissant comme telle: donnez-vous un esprit qui connaisse un esprit, soi ou un autre, autant qu'il le peut connaître; il ignorera encore la possibilité pour un entendement fini d'être ordonné à l'intuition constitutive du salut. Ille finis a nulla natura intellectuali est naturaliter cognoscibilis; 21 naturellement inconnaissable aux anges et aux hommes, même comme pure éventualité, telle est, dans l'ockhamisme, la transcendance de la vision divine à l'égard du savoir.

Ce caractère surnaturel de la béatitude, à titre même de possible, se présente au théologien comme une donnée de la Tradition, une exigence de la foi: secundum omnes Sanctos tenendum talem finem nobis esse possibilem requiritur fides, et si posset naturaliter, non esset fides necessaria. ²² Que l'âme puisse jouir - frui - de l'essence divine, et pas seulement

^{19.} Ibid.: "Si dicitur, sicut dicit iste Doctor, quod anima vel potentia intellectiva non est nobis naturaliter cognoscibilis sub ista ratione propria et speciali sub qua ad talem finem ordinatur ... Non enim cognoscitur a nobis anima nec natura nostra pro statu isto nisi sub ratione aliqua generali abstrahabili a sensibilibus sub qua non ordinatur ad beatitudinem, nec ad visionem divinae essentiae. Et ideo istae passiones non possunt a nobis cognosci virtute notitiae subjecti nobis possibilis pro statu isto". - Cf. SCOT, Ox. Prol., Q. 1 n. 11.

^{20.} Cf. WOLTER, art. cit., p. 311. - Nous avons nous même touché cette question dans un article déjà ancien: Humanisme et théologie chez Duns Scot, in La France Franciscaine, 1936, pp. 201 sq.

^{21.} *Ibid.*: "Contra: anima nostra sub illa ratione est naturaliter cognoscibilis vel a se, vel ab aliqua alia natura intellectuali; et tamen ille finis a nulla natura intellectuali est naturaliter cognoscibilis".

^{22.} I Sent., d. I, Q. IV, D.

le fait qu'elle soit appelée à cette fin, voilà le mere creditum. 23 La béatitude une fois révélée, le prédicat beatificabilis se laisse nécessairement attribuer au sujet anima: à partir du second argument, nous retrouvons le point de vue du premier. Dans un monde d'objets dont tous ne sont pas naturellement connaissables, il y a des propriétés nécessaires qui ne se fondent pas analytiquement dans leur sujet: passiones theologicae qui sont des passiones connotativae. En déclarant audelà de toute connaissance la possibilité même de l'ordre de la grâce: béatitude et charité, le théologien logicien du XIVe siècle s'oppose par avance à l'"intrinsécisme" qu'engendre le principe leibnizien: praedicatum inest subjecto. En lui annonçant le salut et ses conditions, la Révélation découvre à l'esprit des propriétés paradoxales, lui revenant de nécessité et transcendant tout regard sur soi.

L'enseignement de la question IX du Prologue est confirmé par celui de la question IV du Livre I, distinction 1, à laquelle nous venons de nous référer. Il s'agit là de la béatitude: jouissance en laquelle la volonté, faculté d'aimer, se repose comme rassasiée – fruitio quietans et satians voluntatem – en aimant au degré suprême, ce qui, en soi, mérite cet amour – aliquid summe diligendum, summe diligitur ... propter se. "Jouir" ici consiste en une adhésion d'amour à l'objet pour cela même qu'il vaut: objectivité, pourrait-on dire, et désintéressement ... – amore inhaerere illi propter se. Ockham se demande si la raison naturelle nous assure que nous sommes capables d'aimer ainsi, au point d'entrer dans l'absolu de la béatitude: Utrum naturaliter possit probari quod aliqua fruitio quietans et satians voluntatem sit nobis possibilis? 24 Comme nous l'avons dit, la

^{23.} *Ibid.* F: "... non potest naturaliter demonstrari quod talis fruitio divinae essentiae est nobis possibilis: *quia istud est mere creditum*, et ita non potest demonstrari naturaliter". Cf. K: "... de facto talis fruitio est ponenda; sed hoc tantum est creditum, et non per rationem naturalem notum est".

^{24.} I Sent., d. I, Q. IV: Utrum solus Deus sit debitum objectum fruitionis... - B: ... primo distinguendum est de fruitione; secundo respondendum est ad quaestionem. - G: Circa primum sciendum est quod fruitio est duplex, scilicet: ordinata et inordinata. Ordinata est illa quando aliquid summe diligiendum summe diligitur. Fruitio inordinata est illa qua summe diligitur et propter se ... Sed fruitio ordinata est duplex: quaedam est quietans simpliciter voluntatem, qualis dicitur esse fruitio patriae; alia non simpliciter quietans, sed patitur secum, etiam naturaliter, anxietatem et tristitiam, qualis et fruitio viae. - Circa secundum: primo videndum est: Utrum naturaliter possit probari quod aliqua fruitio quietans et satians voluntatem

réponse est négative: connaître en ce domaine relève de la foi pure. D'ailleurs, les philosophes ont étudié le problème de la fin dernière des actes humains sans pouvoir la reconnaître telle qu'elle nous est révélée: selon toute vraisemblance la solution ne nous est pas naturellement accessible. 25 Il est d'ailleurs possible comme nous allons le voir, de montrer l'inefficacité des raisons que l'on a apportées en faveur d'une connaissance naturelle de la possibilité de la béatitude liée à la vue de Dieu. 26

La discussion par Ockham des arguments adverses nous découvre les limites dans sa doctrine de l'analyse philosophique des facultés de connaître et de vouloir ou d'aimer.

Si l'on demeure sur le plan de la raison naturelle, impossible de passer de la notion de *l'être* comme premier objet de l'entendement à la possibilité d'une vision de l'Etre divin.

En effet, rationnellement, du point de vue philosophique, l'être ne possède pas parmi les objets de l'intellect une primauté emportant que tout singulier inclus sous cet universel constitue un objet possible d'appréhension intellectuelle. On peut seulement, du même point de vue, envisager le primum objectum potentiae comme un communissimum dont la considé-

sit nobis possibilis; secundo: utrum talis de facto sit ponenda; tertio: quid sit objectum talis fruitionis... Circa primum est una opinio quae ponit quod potest probari naturaliter quod talis fruitio est nobis possibilis. Iloc probatur ... [six preuves rejetées plus bas, Gl.- D. Contra: quod talis fruitio est nobis possibilis, non potest naturaliter probari: videtur quia philosophi investigantes ... [infra n. 25] Praeterea omnes rationes ... [infra n. 26]..; praeterea: secundum omnes Sanctos [cf. supra n. 22]. E. Ideo quantum ad istum articulum dico primo quod non potest naturaliter demonstrari ... [texte cité n. 23]. Secundo dico quod non potest naturaliter demonstrari ...quod voluntas non possit satiari nec quietari in aliquo extra Deum. Cujus ratio est: quia si ... non..., [1] aut ... [2] aut ... [3] aut ... Primo modo non potest probari ... Nec secundo modo ... Nec potest tertio modo ... Ideo dico ... Tertio dico quod non potest naturaliter probari quod voluntas sit per quemcumque actum quietabilis... nec rationes illorum aliquam istarum conclusionum probant sufficienter. G. Ad primam ... [contre les six pre ves exposées plus haut, C]... Et ita non videtur quod opinio Avicennae ... II... ' .. K. Circa secundum dico quod de facto ... [texte cité n. 23]. L. Circa tertium .t una opinio ... M. Sed illa opinio videtur esse simpliciter falsa: quia frui aliquo est amore inhaerere illi propter se ...

^{25.} *Ibid.*, D: quia *Philosophi* investigantes diligenter quid sit finis ultimus operum humanorum non potuerunt ad illum finem attingere; ergo non est verisimile quod hoc possit naturaliter probari.

^{26.} Ibid., D: Praeterea: omnes rationes adductae ad probandum hoc sunt solubiles...

ration ne garantit point que tout être compris en son extension tombe distincte et in particulari sous les prises de la faculté de connaître. Au sens où la notion de premier objet impliquerait la possibilité de la vision divine, la raison ne peut l'appliquer à l'être; au sens précis où elle use validement de cette notion, celle-ci n'assure plus que la béatitude soit possible. 27 A qui propose l'idée d'une intuition intellectuelle de l'être divin, on pourrait opposer la connexion avec le sens de l'entendement donné en l'homme: apparemment, Guillaume d'Ockham juge impossible d'écarter cet obstacle par le raisonnement. 28

La vigueur de sa critique ne s'exerce pas seulement sur la théorie de l'intellect, mais sur celle aussi de la volonté: considérons ce que ne nous apporte pas une analyse strictement rationnelle de cette puissance de l'âme.

La doctrine de la question IX du Prologue sur les propriétés et leur sujet nous interdit d'admettre une connaissance de la nature de l'esprit et du vouloir qui impliquerait la connaissance

^{27.} Ibid., C [troisième des six preuves mentionnées dans la note 24]: naturaliter est cognoscibile quod ens est primum objectum intellectus; ergo naturaliter est cognoscibile quod quodlibet contentum sub ente est distincte cognoscibile ab intellectu; ergo naturaliter potest cognosci quod divina essentia potest nude et perfecte videri ab intellectu. G. Ad tertiam dico quod aliquid esse objectum primum alicujus potentiae et hoc loquendo de primitate adaequationis, potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quia est illud cujus quodlibet contentum in particulari et sub propria ratione est apprehensibile ab illa potentia ... vel quia est communissimum inter omnia quae possunt apprehendi ... Primo modo dico quod non potest naturaliter cognosci quod quodlibet contentum sub ente est sic cognoscibile ab intellectu; secundo modo est possibile [sc. naturaliter probari?] Sed tune non est naturaliter notum quod omne contentum sub tali primo objecto est naturaliter cognoscibile distincte et in particulari a tali potentia.

^{28.} Quand il envisage que la volonté ne trouve pas de repos en deça de Dieu propter universalitatem objecti voluntatis, ibid. E, "secundo dico ...[2] aut ..." cf. supra n. 24, Ockham reprend la notion d'objet premier: "Nec secundo modo probari [potest], quia non potest naturaliter cognosci quod quandocumque aliquid commune est apprehensibile ab aliqua potentia, quia potest esse impedimentum propter improportionem alicujus contenti vel propter defectum alterius causae. Exemplum primi... [cf. infra]. Exemplum secundi: si esset aliquod objectum quod nullo modo possit apprehendi ab intellectu nisi prius apprehenderetur a sensu, si esset aliqua natura intelligibilis cui repugnaret ille sensus, talis intellectus posset apprehendere unum commune ad omnia ista; non tamen posset in particulari apprehendere quodlibet contentum. - Confirmatur: intellectus noster pro statu isto potest apprehendere unum commune ad substantiam et accidens, et tamen non substantiam secundum istos [les scotistes?]

de la fruitio patriae, fin de la vie spirituelle. ²⁹ L'idée de la volonté comme capax boni infiniti ne peut fournir de principe à un raisonnement philosophique: il y a là détermination surnaturelle, passio theologica. ³⁰

Les raisonnements que nous avons faits pour l'intellect et la vision valent pour le vouloir et la fruitio. Comme on ne peut naturellement prouver la possibilité pour nous de connaître Dieu autrement qu'ici-bas; on ne saurait prouver la possibilité de l'"avoir" autrement, en tant qu'objet d'amour. 31 De même que l'entendement, concevons la volonté comme une faculté de l'être: pas de garantie que soit possible la vision de la divinité; pas davantage, et pour la même raison, que soit possible la pleine jouissance de l'amour divin. 32

Cette notion classique d'une fruitio quietans, d'un repos du vouloir possible en Dieu seul, au terme d'une inquiétude que tout le reste alimente, Ockham ne voit pas qu'une évidence

^{29.} Ibid. C. Circa primum... Hoc probatur: [les deux premières des six preuves mentionnées n. 24]. Primo sic: cognita potentia aliqua distincte et perfecte potest cognosci omnis actus ad quem naturaliter ordinatur... Praeterea: omni causato cognito potest cognosci causa a qua naturaliter dependit, sed talis fruitio est finis voluntatis ... G: Ad primam: major est falsa sicut prius dictum est in quaestione de subjecto theologiae [Prol. q. IX]... Ad secundam dico quod quocumque causato cognito potest cognosci qualibet causa in universali, puta quod habet finem et efficientem ... sed illud quod ex causa non potest ex quocumque causato in particulari cognosci.

^{30.} Impossibilité de prouver que la volonté ne trouve pas de repos en deça de Dieu propter capacitatem voluntatis: quia scilicet est capax boni infiniti, ibid. E, "secundo dico ..." [3] aut ..., supra n. 24. - Nec potest tertio modo probari: quia non potest probari quod voluntas est capax talis boni, cum hoc sit solum supernaturale, et non naturale.

^{31.} D'où l'échec de la sixième preuve, *ibid*. C. Circa *primum*... Hoc probatur ... [supra n. 24]: Praeterea: quodoumque bonum potest appeti a voluntate; ergo summum bonum potest appeti a voluntate et per consequens non potest quietari in summo bono. - G: Ad ultimum: non potest probari sufficienter quod omne bonum quod potest appeti: a voluntate potest ab ea aliter haberi quam habetur.

^{32.} Quatrième preuve, ibid. C. Circa primum... Hoc probatur [supra n. 24]: "Praeterea: objectum voluntatis est ens; ergo non quietatur nisi in perfectissimo contento sub ente. – Ad aliud ... quoniam non quodlibet contentum est distincte et in particulari cognoscibile ab illa potentia, non oporteret quod non posset quietari nisi in summo". – La troisième preuve, partiellement citée n. 27 s'achève en concluant de l'entendement à la volonté: "... et per consequens eadem ratione [naturaliter] potest cognosci quod fruitio divinae essentiae est voluntati possibilis". – Ockham se réfère de même à l'intellect pour réfuter l'argument propter universalitatem objecti voluntatis, cité n. 28.

rationnelle l'impose. Sans développer son analyse de la volonté, constatons qu'il n'estime pas fondé en raison naturelle l'idée que la liberté du vouloir signifierait dépassement de tout objet fini. 33 Point de preuve naturelle que, devant tout créé, nous ayons du mouvement pour aller plus loin, que la faculté spirituelle d'aimer ne puisse, comme une faculté sensible, se trouver satisfaite d'un de ses objets qui ne serait pas le plus parfait. 34 Rien n'interdit à la pure raison d'admettre un amour comblé en deça de Dieu. 35 Mais rien non plus ne l'oblige d'accepter, même en présence de l'objet divin, l'idée d'un acte qui comble la volonté, l'empêche de passer à un autre objet. 36 Ce n'est pas seulement quant à sa réalisation, mais déjà comme possible, dans sa notion même, en ce qu'elle a d'unique, d'absolu, que la béatitude appartient à l'ordre de la Révélation.

Considérons davantage la situation de l'homme devant cette transcendance dans la possibilité qui paraît ici typique du surnaturel: nous ne sommes pas dans une doctrine seulement où l'Absolu ne constitue pas un objet comme les autres, étant dans

^{33.} A l'argument propter libertatem voluntatis, ibid. E, "secundo dico ...[1] aut ... [cf. n. 24] quia scilicet voluntas, ex hoc ipso quod est libera, potest appetere quodcumque volibile, et illa nunquam satiari potest nisi in ultimo", - réplique d'Ockham: *lbid.* "Primo modo ... non potest naturaliter probari quod voluntate habenti actum respectu cujuscumque finiti, poterit appetitus seu voluntas appetere perfectius bonum".

^{34.} Réponse à la quatrième des six preuves, G [supra n. 24 et 32]: "... deberet probari quod potentia non quietatur nisi in perfectissimo contento sub objecto communi; quia si sensus potest habere delectationem respectu plurium sensibilium, si esset aliquid sensibile minus perfectum quod semper approximaretur illi sensui, necessario quietaret illum sensum, quia excluderet omnem tristitiam contrariam illi delectationi; et tamen non esset perfectissimum contentum sub illo communi. Similiter ... [ici l'argument rapporté n. 32]". - La même comparaison avec une faculté sensible se retrouve plus bas E:texte cité à la note suivante. - (comparaison semblable à propos de la critique scotiste d'Avicenne: ibid. J, Ad secundum ...

^{35.} Conclusion de la discussion de la possibilité d'une satisfaction en deça de Dieu, *Ibid*. E: "Ideo dico quod non potest naturaliter probari quin voluntas possit recipere unum actum ab aliquo ente creato sicut a causa totali immediata qui satiet totum appetitum voluntatis, sicut non potest probari quod nullum delectabile sensibile potest quierare appetitum sensitivum quamdiu sensus retinet omnem dispositionem praeviam illi delectationi".

^{36.} Ibid. E, "Tertio ... [cf. n. 24]... non potest naturaliter probari quod voluntas sit per quemcumque actum quietabilis, quin, quocumque actu possibili posito in ista voluntate possit libere velle aliquid aliud, et tristari si careat illo. Et ita nec potest probari quod voluntas satiabilis et quietabilis fruitione quam de facto ponimus...".

sa "particularité" libre de se montrer ou de demeurer caché à ses créatures; ³⁷ à celles-ci demeure également caché, s'Il ne la révèle pas, leur aptitude à Le voir et aimer en Lui-même, sans intermédiaire.

De fait, la tradition philosophique assigne à l'esprit de l'homme dans la hiérarchie cosmique une place telle qu'il ne peut rejoindre le Premier Etre dans une immédiation de vue et d'amour: la vision intuitive suppose en effet une action immédiate de l'objet sur l'intellect, une initiative comparable à la création, comme il ne convient pas du Dieu de l'aristotélisme arabe d'en exercer sur les êtres de ce monde. 38 Dans cette doctrine où la raison naturelle ne saurait établir que, dans sa quête de la béatitude, l'âme ne peut s'arrêter, trouver son repos en deça de l'Absolu, c'est une vaine entreprise que de tenter avec Duns Scot une réfutation rationnelle de l'avicennisme lorsqu'il conçoit une union bienheureuse avec l'intelligence immédiatement supérieure, bien au dessous du Premier. 39

Pour manifester que la béatitude selon Avicenne constituerait pour un esprit une situation instable, intenable, le Docteur Subtil invoque l'expérience intérieure de l'inquiétude selon laquelle l'homme, au delà de tout bien, en désire un plus grand, aussitôt qu'il lui apparait: devant la finitude de l'intelligence où il devrait s'arrêter, le désir de l'âme monterait plus haut. Deponse d'Ockham au nom des philosophes: dans la stricte hiérarchie qu'admettent ces derniers, l'inférieur ne peut conce-

^{37.} IV Sent., Q. XII, M. cf. Nominalisme au XIV^e siècle, p. 14.

^{38.} I Sent., D. I, Q. IV, E. "Secundo dico... supra n. 24 et n. 28 Exemplum primi: secundum Philosophum ens primum est improportionatum ad causandum immediate aliquem effectum in istis inferioribus; et ideo, si intellectus non potest aliquid cognoscere intuitive et in particulari nisi moveatur immediate ab objecto vel causetur aliquis effectus novus immediate ab objecto, ideo non potest cognoscere Deum intuitive et in particulari".

^{39.} SCOT, Ox, 1, d. 1, Q. 1, n. 3. - OCKHAM, loc, cit., GHJ: "Et ita non videtur quod opinio Avicennae quae ponit quod intelligentia inferior beatificaretur in intelligentia superiori possit per rationes naturales sufficienter improbari".

^{40.} SCOT, loc. cit.: Si autem [intelligentia inferior] videt eam [intelligentiam superiorem] esse finitam, igitur potest intelligere aliquid posse eam excedere; ita enim experimur in nobis quod possumus apprehendere ultra quodcumque bonum, aliud quod ostenditur majus bonum et per consequens potest appetere vel amare illud majus bonum; et ita non quietatur in illa intelligentia. - Cf. OCKHAM, loc. cit., ll.

voir que soit modifiée sa relation au supérieur; en désirant un bien plus élevé que celui qui lui est assigné, il s'écarterait de la droite raison; si nous connaissons l'inquiétude dont parle Scot, c'est que notre volonté veut l'impossible, d'un vouloir déraisonnable. On ne saurait contraindre le philosophe à sortir de son point de vue: l'expérience intérieure ne conduit pas à la notion d'une béatitude en Dieu seul; comme nous l'avons déjà remarqué, cette idée n'a de consistance que par le Révélation.

Dans l'ockhamisme, un homme purement homme, sans foi, pourrait aimer Dieu par dessus tout, mais sans désirer Le voir (si son désir demeurait réglé par la raison): il ignorerait, en effet, que cette vision lui soit possible. 42 Envisager cependant un amour naturellement droit du Bien suprême, n'est-ce point professer sur la nature humaine un optimisme difficilement compatible avec le sentiment, non moins ockhamiste, de la force qu'il y a dans des erreurs philosophiques telles que la conception hiérarchique qui sépare l'homme de Dieu? - Question peut-être fondamentale, qui porte sur l'équilibre de toute une pensée, aux aspects divergents: confiance dans les forces du libre arbitre; défiance de la raison naturelle dans les matières métaphysiques. - Un texte du Commentaire d'Ockham indique la voie d'une réponse: si les philosophes ont erré et se sont perdus, c'est pour avoir donné leur assentiment à des conclusions de raisonnements qui n'étaient point nécessaires, 43

^{41.} OCKHAM, *Ibid.*, J, refuse le passage, dans l'intelligence inférieure, de la connaissance de la finitude de l'intelligence supérieure et de l'idée d'un degré plus élevé au désir de ce degré: "non sequitur, quia intelligentia inferior non potest appetere aliquid *contra rectam rationem*". - En effet, l'intelligence du plus bas degré ne peut "avoir" comme objet dont elle jouit, l'intelligence la plus haute, autrement qu'elle ne "l'a", à son degré de la hiérarchie: "Nunc autem dicerent alii quod impossibile esset quod illa prima intelligentia aliter habeatur ab intelligentia infima quam habetur, et ita non potest aliter appeti" (Sur cet aliter haberi, cf. supra n. 31). - D'où, critique de l'expérience intérieure: "Et per hoc patet quod experimentum quod nos habemus non cogeret sic opinantem, quia voluntas nostra potest velle impossibile, et non sic voluntas illa, et ita non est simile".

^{42.} Cf. Ibid. N, [in fine]: aliquis ex puris naturalibus sinė fide potest frui Deo, quia summe diligere eum super omnia; et tamen propter hoc non oportet quod desideret illam visionem: quia potest ignorare an talis visio sit sibi possibilis.

^{43.} III Sent., q. VIII, C, [une preuve de la thèse fameuse selon laquelle "Deus potest aliquem acceptare in puris naturalibus..."] f "non est impossibile quod Deus ordinet quod qui vivit secundum dictamen rectae rationis sic quod non credat aliquid nisi illud sit sibi naturali ratione conclusum tanquam credendum sit dignus vita

Tel serait dans l'ockhamisme le sens de la "critique de la philosophie par elle-même" qui permettrait de le situer par rapport au scotisme et d'interpréter plus exactement l'histoire doctrinale du XIVe siècle. 44

C'est une opinion et une erreur des philosophes qu'il n'y a pas d'autre connaissance possible à l'homme que celles înaturellement accessibles: on ne saurait prouver là contre, par raison naturelle, la possibilité d'être théologien. Es l'idée d'une fin transcendante de notre vie est, comme le veut Guillaume d'Ockham, inaccessible à la connaissance rationnelle, on ne peut concevoir d'introduction à la théologie qui montre par avance la place de cette discipline, laissée vide par les disciplines simplement humaines. Sa possibilité nous est seulement donnée dans le fait de la Révélation qui en apporte, à la foi pure, l'idée avec le contenu: mere credibile, mere creditum. Le par les disciplines dans le fait de la Révélation qui en apporte, à la foi pure, l'idée avec le contenu: mere credibile, mere creditum.

Telle est la perspective que nous suggère, sur l'ockhamisme, la considération d'esse beatificabile: passio theologica.

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aeterna. Hoc patet: quia ideo philosophi errabant et non fuerunt digni vita aeterna quia adhaerebant talibus quae non potuerunt rationi naturali probari necessario.

^{44.} Cf. notre article Sur l'histoire et la philosophie au XIV^e siècle, dans Etienne Gilson philosophe de la Chrétienté, Rencontres, (Paris, 1949), pp. 142-156.

^{45.} OCKHAM, Prol. Q. VII, J: Quidam sicut philosophi tenent quod ad omnem scientiam nobis possibilem possumus naturaliter attingere, et ideo nihil est credibile mere quin potest sciri evidenter; sed ista opinio non potest improbari per rationes naturales, sed tantum per auctoritatem sicut alias patebit [I Sent., d. l, Q. IV, loc. cit.?]

^{46.} Cf. supra n. 45, n. 22 et n. 23.

OCKHAM AND AEGIDIUS OF ROME

I

wat takes little more than a glance at the writings of William of Ockham to reach the conclusion, much stressed by the histories of scholastic philosophy, that Ockham was intensely hostile to certain of his contemporaries or predecessors, and to certain doctrines which they upheld. But it is less easy to specify these immediate adversaries, since Ockham scarcely ever cites an author by name except where he considers him to be someone of established authority, or of real weight and worth. Thus, although Ockham often cites Duns Scotus by name, and gives painstaking restatements and criticisms of his arguments, it is obvious that he does not number Scotus among the moderni doctores whose views he attacks with hostility and scorn. The same may be said with respect to St. Thomas Aguinas, whom Ockham mentions only rarely, but who seems to be included by him among the doctores catholici whose teachings, though not infallible or immune to criticism, are based on reason and command respect. 1

The bitter recriminations found in the De sacramento altaris very likely reflect the accusations against Ockham's orthodoxy made by John Lutterel in 1322 and subsequently. Yet Lutterel can scarcely be credited with sufficient originality or importance as a teacher, to be counted as author of the doctrines which Ockham attacks so repeatedly and passionately throughout his philosophical and theological writings. Walter Burley, who may have been at Oxford when Ockham was there, and who criticizes some of Ockham's teachings in his own writings, has been suggested as the principal adversary against whom Ockham directed his polemics. But while it is fairly evident

^{1.} Cf. De sacramento altaris, ed. by T.B. Birch, Burlington, Iowa, 1930, pp. 184-6, for reference to St. Thomas, and passim (e.g., p. 436) for references to Scotus. These citations are in marked contrast to Ockham's scomful references to the moderni, as on p. 116: "Et ideo lice! aliqui moderni forte stimulante invidia illam opinionem tamquam erroneam non argumentis sed detractionibus lacerarent; antiqui tamen doctores, quamvis eam non intelligerent, non tamen haereticam circa fidem vel mores reputaverunt." Also p. 126: "Si autem per doctores intelligant doctores modernos mutuo se reprobantes publice et occulte et etiam in scriptis, concedo; sed negare eos non est inconveniens..."

^{2.} P. Doncoeur, "La théorie de la matière et de la forme chez Guillaume Occam," in Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, (Jan. 1921), 21-52 (esp. pp. 32-3). Also C. Michalski, "La physique nouvelle et les différents courants

that Burley attacked Ockham, there is little to show that Ockham attacked Burley, as Baudry shows rather convincingly in his examination of the arguments of Doncoeur and Michalski.³

In default of more accurate knowledge of Ockham's adversaries, the histories of philosophy have contented themselves with saying that Ockham attacked and criticized the Scotists and Thomists. While this is no doubt true, at least if we construe these labels broadly enough, we may nevertheless find some significance in the fact that ()ckham's attitude toward these moderni was decidedly different from his attitude toward St. Thomas and Duns Scotus. And furthermore, it is perhaps significant that Ockham, in attacking doctrines reputedly Thomist, did not go to the works of St. Thomas for the formulations of these doctrines, but expressed them in a terminology sufficiently different from that of the Angelic Doctor to make there seem like crude varicatures of the delicately nuanced discussions of St. Thomas. 4 Nor can we safely assume that Ockham was expressing these doctrines in crude or distorted form, in order to refute them more easily. For when Ockham criticizes doctrines of Duns Scotus, he is careful to give very

philosophiques au XIVe siècle, in Bulletin international de l'Academie polonaise des sciences et des lettres, Classe d'histoire et de philosophie, Avril-Juin, 1927 (Cracovie 1928), 122.

^{3.} L. Bandry, "Les rapports de Guillaume d'Occam et de Walter Burleigh," in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age, IX, (1934), 155-73. As Baudry points out, the conjecture that Burley is object of Ockham's criticism is largely based on the fact that the editors of the Lyons edition of Ockham's Commentary on the Sentences indicate occasionally, on the margin, that the doctrine criticized is attributable to Burley. But little can be based on this type of evidence; indeed, in one of the editions of Ockham's Summulae in libros Physicorum, on the margin of the passage (Part I, Ch. 25) where Ockham attacks the theory of a forma totius, the editors, state: Burlei placitum impugnatur. But Baudry points out that Burley does not use the expression "forma totius," and that he does not invoke the authority of Aristotle's Metaphysics VII, which in Ockham's text is mentioned as basis for the opinion.

^{4.} A good example of this is Ockham's criticism of the real distinction between essence and existence, in his Summa logicae III, II, ch. 27 (ed. Venice 1508, fol. 70r): "utrum etiam esse et existentia rei sunt duo extra animam distincta inter se, et mihi videtur quod non sunt talia duae...Item, si essent duae res non esset contradictio quod deus conservaret entitatem in rerum natura sine existentia vel e converso..." St. Thomas would surely not have acknowledged this formulation as his own, and might indeed have agreed with Ockham that essence and existence are not duae res.

faithful and literal restatements of them; he was not out for cheap victories, and his examinations of the positions of others are, as a rule, exhaustingly painstaking. It seems more likely that Ockham did not have St. Thomas im mind at all, in many of the criticisms which have been taken to be directed at the teachings of the Angelic Doctor. There is often sufficient resemblance to justify the characterization, in a rather broad sense, of "Thomist;" but there is nearly always sufficient difference to make it doubtful whether the direct objects of Ockham's criticism are doctrines which can be fairly saddled on St. Thomas Aquinas.

Now of all the doctrines on which Ockham expends the fire of his criticism, there seem to be two which arouse his most vehement protests and most recurrent criticisms. One of these is the theory of the absolute essence, or real universal, that is neither one nor many, neither in the mind nor outside the mind - the equinitas tantum of Avicenna, which seems to have peen the prototype of the theories of essence developed in various ways by Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and some of the late 13th century realists of Thomist background. But another doctrine, closely related to this, was attacked by Ockham with equal intensity and frequency. This was the doctrine that quantity is a res absoluta wholly distinct from substance and quality, such that substances and qualities are not per se numerable or divisible or extended, but acquire this through the accidental inherence in them of a distinct entity called "quantity." The De sacramento altaris and De corpore Christi, which contain Ockham's most impassioned protests against the moderni doctores, are concerned entirely with this doctrine of separate quantity. But it occupies a very large place in Ockham's other writings as well - the Commentary on the Sentences, the Quodlibeta, the Expositio aurea, Summa logicae, and Summulae in libros Physicorum, all contain strenuous polemics against this theory of quantity. The formulation which Ockham gives of this theory is not that of Duns Scotus nor that of St. Thomas: yet he says that it is the communis opinio modernorum, and holds that it is a view which none of the ancient philosophers or theologians took to be evident.5

^{5.} Cf. the long discussion in Ockham's Summa togicae 1, ch. 44-5. Thus, in ch. 44 (ed. cit. fol. 17r), he says: "Et quia ponitur communiter a modernis quod quaelibet quantitas est quaedam res distincta realiter et totaliter a substantia

If we could have positive and decisive identification of the modern doctors who were, in Ockham's eyes, the authors and advocates of this theory of absolute and separate quantity, much light might be cast on Ockham's relations to the 13th century scholastic tradition, and to St. Thomas in particular. For though St. Thomas treated quantity and extension as accidental properties of material substance, and suggested that sensible qualities determine matter by way of quantity and in the case of the Sacrament determine quantity itself as a subject, the expression res absoluta distincta totaliter et realiter a substantia et qualitate is quite alien to St. Thomas, and possibly the meaning to pe attributed to it is equally alien to his thought. One method of identifying Ockham's adversaries, requiring thorough research and meticulous care, is that of tracing these linguistic formulations and technical terms to their original sources. But a more conclusive method, in default of the naming of names by Ockham, is to discover, in his presentations of the doctrines of the moderni which he is attacking, quotations from other men's works. It is this second kind of evidence which I am able to present in this paper, found in Ockham's Expositio super libros Physicorum, in the commentary on Book IV, chapter 8. Text 71. The adversary, whom Ockham takes as spokesmen for those who hold that quantity is a res absoluta totaliter distincta a substantia et qualitate, is allowed to speak for himself through two lengthy extracts from his Commentary on the Physics. This adversary turns out to be none other than Aegidius of Rome.

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Ockham's Expositio super libros Physicorum exists in no printed editions, and the manuscripts are neither numerous nor

et qualitate, ut quantitas continua est unum accidens medium inter substantiam et qualitatem quae ponitur esse subiective in substantia et esse subiectum qualitatum, similiter ponitur quod quantitas discreta est quaedam res distincta a substantiis et qualitatibus, et idem ponitur de loco et tempore, ideo primo de ista opinione scrutandum est. Propter quod mihi videtur quod de intentione Aristotelis est quod quantitas non est res absoluta realiter et totaliter distincta a corpore. Et ideo contra illas communes opiniones modernorum intendo aliquas rationes recitare... Again (fol. 18v): Tenentes autem communem opinionem modernorum dicerent quod punctus est aliqua res totaliter distincta a linea copulans et continuans partes lineae ad invicem. The "real distinction" is always given as that between duae res, with a sense that scarcely applies to St. Thomas' "real distinction" or to Scotus' "formal distinction."

free from detects. But it is undoubtedly an authentic work. and an early one. The Quaestiones super libros Physicorum. likewise extant only in manuscript, appear to be largely based on the content of the Expositio. They do not, however, seem like a compilation by a writer other than Ockham, but give indications of having been written by Ockham himself, with utilization of his own carefully worked out discussions in the Expositio. Such at least is the relation between the two works which seems to be indicated, by the portions dealing with the problems raised in Ockham's commentary to Physics IV. Text 71. The treatment in the Quaestiones is differently ordered, more condensed and incisive, but obviously closely related in content and in many literal borrowings, to the Expositio; vet it is not the work of a compiler, but of an author handling his own ideas with freedom and mastery. My own conjecture concerning the relation of these two works in physics, is that both were written in connection with Ockham's work as a teacher or lector at Oxford, the Expositio being written first in connection with the less advanced course, and the Quaestiones being prepared for the more advanced course which normally followed on the literal explication of the Aristotelian text.

For the Expositio I have used Ms. Merton College 293 as the basic manuscript, correcting it occasionally from Ms. Assisi, Franc. Conv. 294. The latter manuscript, though easier to read, seems decidedly inferior. The commentary to Physics IV, Text 71, occurs on fols. 97r-99r of the Merton manuscript, and on fols. 61r-62v of the Assisi manuscript. The Quastiones in libros Physicorum, which I have consulted only in one manuscript, Cod. Vat. Lat. 956, contain four Questions treating the same problems as the commentary on Text 71; these, by the correct numbering, would be Qu-89-93, though in the manuscript they are numbered 87-91, occurring on fols. 47v-48r.

The problem discussed in Ockham's commentary on Text 71, is raised in connection with Aristotle's argument against the possibility of motion in a void; Ockham formulates the basic issue in the manner which had become customary since the time of St. Thomas, asking whether the temporal character of motion is determined solely by the material resistance of the medium, or whether it is sufficiently caused by the quantity of space traversed in the motion. Before turning to Ockham's text, and to his criticism of Aegidius of Rome, we may summa-

rize the background of scholastic discussions of the problem, in which St. Thomas Aquinas played a leading part. 6

Aristotle devotes four chapters of the fourth book of his Physics to the proplem of the void. One of his most famous arguments occurs in the eighth chapter, in the passage known as Text 71 (215a 24 - 215b 20). This argument is based on the assumption, expressed in Aristotle's laws of the proportion of velocities of motion to forces and resistances, that the speed with which a heavy body falls, through corporeal media of diverse density, is inversely proportional to the densities of the resisting media. Thus, to the degree to which the medium is rarer, the speed of natural motion through it will be faster. From this it follows that if the medium were of no density at all, a heavy pody would fall through it with infinite speed, since the ratio of density of a corporeal medium, such as air, to the zero density of the void, is infinitely great. But since the traversal of a whole series of diverse parts of space, in no time at all, seems impossible, Aristotle argued that the impossibility of this consequent implied the impossibility of the initial assumption of motion in a void.7

The first to offer a serious challenge to this argument seems to have been the Arab philosopher Ibn-Badga, known to the Latins as Avempace. His criticism of Aristotle is known to us only through Averroes, who recites Avempace's arguments in a lengthy digression following on his exposition of the Aristotelian text. Averroes summarizes Avempace's criticism in these words:

Avempace, however, here raises a good question. For he says that it does not follow that the proportion of the motion of one and the same stone in water, to its motion in air, is as the proportion of the density of water to the density of air, except on the assumption that the motion of the stone takes time only because it is moved in a medium. And if this assumption were true, it would then be the case that no motion would require time except because of something resisting it - for the medium seems to resist the thing moved. And if this were so, then the heavenly bodies, which encounter no resistant medium, would be moved instantaneously. And he says that the proportion of the rarity of water to the rarity of air, is as

^{6.} This summary is based on a much more extensive study which I have been preparing, and hope shortly to publish, on the history of scholastic criticisms of Aristotle's law of motion, largely developed in connection with this famous Text 71 of Physics IV, from the time of Averroes to that of Galileo.

^{7.} Aristotle, Physics IV, ch. 8, 215a 24 - 215b 20.

the proportion of the retardation occurring to the moved body in water, to the retardation occurring to it in air..... And if this which he has said be conceded, then Aristotle's demonstration will be false; because, if the proportion of the rarity of one medium to the rarity of the other, is as the proportion of accidental retardation of the motion in one of them to the retardation occurring to it in the other, and is not as the proportion of the motion itself, it will not follow that what is moved in a void would be moved in an instant: because in that case there would be subtracted from the motion only the retardation affecting it by reason of the medium, and its natural motion would remain. And every motion involves time; therefore what is moved in a void is necessarily moved in time and with a divisible motion; and nothing impossible will follow. This, then, is Avempace's question. 8

Averroes devotes considerable space to the task of refuting this argument of Avempace, and to showing that an external resistant medium is essential to the movement of simple or inorganic natural bodies. His main point is that every motion requires a distinction of nover and moved, and since inorganic natural bodies are not divisible into a mover distinct in actu from the body as moved, the notion must arise from a dynamic relation between the heavy body as a whole, and the external medium which is pushed aside by it. Or again: since the form of a natural body is not distinct in actu from its matter, then, if the form is principle of the body's motion, it cannot act directly on its own matter, but it moves the body only per accidens, by overcoming the resistance of the external medium. In addition to this metaphysical argument, Averroes also shows that Avempace's law of velocities, whereby the ratio of densities of diverse media determines only the proportion of accidental retardation to be subtracted from the "essential" velocities which the bodies would have in vacuo, is incompatible with Aristotle's "laws of motion" as given in Physics VII, ch. 5.

When Averroes' commentary came to be studied by the western scholastics in the 13th century, each commentator was faced with the problem of deciding between the positions of Avempace and Averroes on this question. Albert the Great, who seems to have been the first to take account of the issue, rejected Avempace's arguments and sided fully with Averroes. But his pupil Thomas Aquinas took the opposite course, and rejected

^{8.} Opera Aristotelis....cum Averrois commentariis. (Venetiis, 1560), t.IV, fol. 131v. (Italics mine).

the arguments of Averroes as "trifling" - Sed haec omnino videntur esse frivola. In defending Avempace's theory, St. Thomas based himself on this principle: since it is impossible for a magnitude of limited size to be simultaneously in diverse parts of a magnitude of greater size, the necessity of time being required for traversal of an extended space or medium, is determined primarily and essentially by the extended character of the space or medium, irrespective of any material or qualitative resistance which may happen to be present in that medium or space traversed. Thomas' discussion occurs in his exposition of the Physics, immediately after his literal explication of the Aristotelian text.

But against this argument of Aristotle there arise several difficulties. The first of these is, that it does not seem to follow that if there were a motion in the void, it would not have a proportion in its speed to the motion which occurs in the plenum. For any motion whatever has a determinate velocity by reason of the proportion of the power of the mover to the mobile body, even if there be no resistance. And this is apparent both by example and by reason. By example, in the case of the heavenly bodies, whose motion is not resisted by anything; yet their speed is determinate, according to a definite time. By reason, however, because from the very fact that in a magnitude traversed by the moved body, a prior and posterior part is to be assigned, it follows that a prior and posterior part is to be assigned in the motion; and from this it follows that the motion is in a finite time.

The main argument of Averroes, that since the matter of an elementary body is not distinct *in actu* from its form, it cannot offer the resistance to the motive power which is required, by Aristotle's laws of motion, to determine a definite velocity, is rejected by St. Thomas in a rather interesting statement.

In heavy and light bodies, if the form which is given them by that which generated them is removed, there will remain, for thought (per intellectum), extended body; and this, from the very fact that it is a magnitude, existing in an opposite position, will offer resistance to the mover. For no other resistance can be understood in the heavenly bodies with respect to their movers. 10

This conception of "mathematical resistance" determined by the impossibility of a magnitude being simultaneously in diverse places or positions, came to be designated in the later

^{9.} Divi Thomae Aquinatis. In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Lib. IV. Lect. 11 (ed. Leonina, Romae, 1884), p. 186.

^{10.} St. Thomas Aquinas, loc. cit. p. 187.

scholastic discussions as incompossibilitas terminorum or distantia terminorum. St. Thomas was the recognized advocate, or even originator, of the thesis that distantia terminorum is the essential and sufficient cause of the temporal character of motion; of this we have the testimony of Siger de Brabant, and of John of Jandun, who opposed the argument and gave their own support to Averroes.

The prominent Franciscans of the 13th century, including Roger Bacon, Peter John Olivi, William of Ware, and Duns Scotus, supported Avempace's position, and invoked the thesis which St. Thomas had made decisive in his support of Avempace – that the temporal character of motion is essentially due to the extension of the medium, and only accidentally modified by reason of the material resistance of the medium. Thus they all concluded that if a vacuum were posited, the heavy body placed in it would fall at finite speed toward its place of rest below. 12

This conclusion, and the principle by which St. Thomas had defended it, received the first extensive and serious rebuttal from Aegidius of Rome. Aegidius wrote his Commentary on the Physics in the year 1277, and though it was in that year that Etienne Tempier issued his famous condemnation of Averroist teachings, with Aegidius himself as theological adviser, the position taken by Aegidius on the issue of Text 71 is wholly

^{11.} Siger de Brabant, Impossibilia, ed. P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant, vol. 2 (Louvain, 1908), p. 84. In his later Quaestiones in libros Physicorum, recently edited by Ph. Delhaye, Siger switches his position and supports the arguments of St. Thomas almost verbatim - perhaps as a result of his misfortunes in 1277. John of Jandun, in his Quaestiones in libros Physicorum, IV, Qu. 11 (ed. Venice 1552, fols. 60v-61r) associates Avempace's theory very explicitly with St. Thomas and his followers (eius sequaces).

^{12.} Anneliese Maier, An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft, (Essen, 1943), pp. 223-32, reviews the attitudes taken by these 13th century scholastics toward Avempace's theory, citing the relevant texts.

on the side of Averroes. 13 After giving his literal exposition of Aristotle's text, Aegidius raises three dubia: (1) Whether the whole cause of time being required in motion is the resistance of the medium? (2) Whether the quantity of space is what causes motion to require time? (3) Whether motion would take place instantaneously in a void? His answers to the first and third questions are in the affirmative, while his answer to the second is in the negative. Thus his position is squarely and completely opposed to that of his teacher, St. Thomas Aguinas; and we may take this as one more indication, to be added to many others which have been noted by recent scholars, that Aegidius of Rome was not a Thomist, but very much an Aegidian. His influence was certainly very great, especially in the fields of metaphysics and natural philosophy; as Jean Paulus remarks, in discussing the question of whether Henry of Ghent attacked St. Thomas' doctrine of essence and existence, it was the doctrines of Aegidius of Rome, rather than those of St. Thomas, which became the live issues in philosophy after 1276.14

The arguments which Aegidius develops, in reaching his answers to these questions, need not detain us here; for they are quite fully quoted, and sufficiently criticized, by William of Ockham, to whose discussion, in the Expositio super libros Physicorum, we will now turn.

Ш

The first portion of Ockham's commentary on Text 71 of Physics IV gives his literal explication of Aristotle's text, with a preliminary "sciendum" removing sophistical difficulties that might be raised on verbal grounds. This part covers only 1¾ columns of manuscript page. The rest of the comment, which takes up 5½ columns, is devoted the controversal issue of whether the whole cause of time being required in local motion is the resistance of the medium. This discussion has the structure of a Quaestio. The initial arguments, which are to the affirmative, are drawn entirely from the text of Aegidius'

^{13.} For the dating of Aegidius' commentary as of 1277, cf. Anneliese Maier, Die Vorlaufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert (Rome 1949), p. 31. The text of Aegidius, dealing with Text 71, occurs in his commentary on Book IV, Lectio 13; in the edition of Padua 1483, which I have used, this is on fols. 95v-97r.

^{14.} Cf. J. Paulus, Henri de Gand (Paris, 1938), pp. 283-4.

commentary. There then follows a criticism of these arguments, terminating in a resolution of the question in the negative. This is the part which is of primary interest for our inquiry, since it serves to identify Aegidius of Rome as advocate of the theory of separate quantity which Ockham attacks so constantly throughout his writings. I shall give the text of this portion in its entirety, first presenting Ockham's statement of the initial arguments, with the corresponding Aegidian texts in a parallel column; then, after discussing this briefly, I will give the whole text of Ockham's criticism of these arguments.

The remainder of Cokham's discussion, though of considerable intrinsic interest, is less pertinent to our present concern with Cokham's relation to Aegidius of Rore. While Cokham's criticism of Aegidius was dialectical, in that it sought to refute Aegidius' position on the basis of Aegidius' assumption that quantity is a res absolute distinct from substance, his treatment of the question in the last part of the commentary is based on his own view that quantity is nothing other than material substance or quality, connoting its essential divisibility into really distinct parts. From his own principle Ockhar reaches the same conclusion which he had derived dialectically from the opposed principle of Aegidius; this conclusion, which is St. Thomas' thesis that distantia terminorum determines that motion is temporal, is shown to be compatible with what Cokham takes to be the real grounds of Averroes' criticism of Avempace. Since this constructive part of Cckham's commentary does not bear directly on the arguments of Aegidius, nor contribute to the historical problem of identifying Cokham's adversary on the issue of the metaphysics of quantity, I will quote only a short part of it.

(Ms. Merton Coll. 293, f. 97vB):

Secundo notandum quod Commentator, commento 71, movet quaestionem utrum motus sit in tempore praecise propter impediens. Et dicunt hic quod tota causa quare gravia et levia moventur in tempore est impedimentum medii, intantum quod si esset quantitas spatii sine resistente medio, non posset grave moveri deorsum in tempore. Primum declaratur sic:

(Ockham)

Corpora quaedam moventur ex se, quaedam non moventur ex se, Quaecumque autem moventur ex se, non determinantur ad unam differentiam positionis tantum, sed quadam modo

(Aegidius, ed. cit. f. 96r)

Dicendum quod quaedam corpora moventur ex se, quaedam non moventur ex se; quaecumque enim moventur ex se non determinantur ad unam differentiam positionis tantum, sed quodam habent quod moventur ad plures' differentias positionis. Animal enim, quod movetur ex se, habet se ad plures differentias positionis; sic etiam et caelum, quod ex se movetur, quodam modo movetur ad plures differentias positionis. Sol enim, ut alia astra, per motum caelestem non solum tendunt ab oriente ad occidens, sed per illum eundem motum revertuntur ab occidente in oriens.

Ea vero quae non moventur pèr se, ex se et essentialiter, secundum suum motum naturalem et proprium determinantur ad unam differentiam positionis tantum, sicut patet de gravibus et levibus.

Et ideo, si loquimur de proprio motu gravium et levium, quae non moventur ex se, patet quod tota causa quare requiritur tempus in motu est impedimentum medii. Gravia enim non sunt in potentia essentiali ut sint deorsum, immo ex sua essentia et per se semper habent quod sint deorsum.

(Ms. Merton Coll. 293, f. 98^rA)

Et ideo vel sunt actu deorsum, vel si non sint actu ibi, sunt solum in potentia accidentali ut ibi existant.

Sed quando aliquid est in potentia accidentali ad aliquid, ad hoc quod competat ei illud, non indiget nisi removente prohibens.

Cum ergo gravia sint in potentia accidentali ut sint deorsum, si tollatur prohibens et impediens, statim erunt deorsum; et quia impediens vel prohibens in tali

modo habent quod moveantur ad plures differentias positionis. Animal enim, quia movetur ex se, moveri habet ad plures differentias positionis.

Sol enim et alia astra, per motum caelestem non solum tendunt ab oriente in occidens, sed per illum eundem motum ab occidente revertuntur ad oriens.

Ea vero quae non moventur ex se, per se et essentialiter, secundum suum motum naturalem et proprium determinantur ad unam differentiam positionis tantum, ut gravia habent tantum deorsum et levia sursum....

....si loquimur de proprio motu gravium et levium, quae non moventur ex se, patet quod tota causa quare requiritur tempus in tali motu est impedimentum medii. Gravia enim non sunt in potentia essentiali ut sint deorsum, immo ex forma sua essentialiter et per se semper habent quod sint deorsum. Generans enim quantum dedit gravi de forma gravis, tantum dedit ei de loco deorsum: quamdiu ergo grave habet formam gravis. tamdiu essentialiter et per șe competit ei esse deorsum. Gravia igitur numquam sunt in potentia essentiali ut sint deorsum sed vel sunt actu deorsum, vel si non sunt actu'ibi, sunt solum in potentia accidentali ut ibi existant. Non enim possunt esse in potentia essentiali ad talem locum, cum ex se et essentialiter semper habeant quod ibi existant. Sed cum aliquid respectu alicuius est in potentia accidentali ad hoc quod competat ei illud, non indiget nisi removente prohibens. Ouia ergo gravia sunt in potentia accidentali ut sint deorsum, si tollatur prohibens et impediens, statim erunt deorsum; et quia impediens et prohibens in tali motu

motu est solum corpus medium, ideo tota causa quare requiritur tempus in motu gravium et levium, est resistentia medii.

Sed de motu illorum quae moventur ex se, dicitur quod talia secundum quod huiusmodi non habent quod sint in uno loco tantum. Sol enim non habet de se quod sit semper in oriente vel in occidente.

Et ideo cum est in oriente, ad hoc quod sit in occidente non est in potentia accidentali solum.

Et ideo quia sol, quando est in oriente, de se non habet quod sit in occidente semper, si tollatur medium impediens, non statim est in occidente. Et ideo, quod motus corporum supercaelestium sit in tempore, non est causa resistentia medii. est solum corpus medium, ideo tota causa quare requiritur tempus in motu gravium et levium, est resistentia medii. Patet ergo quid dicendum sit de motu talium.

Sed si non sit quaestio de motu gravium et levium, sed de motu eorum quae moventar ex se, talia secundum quod huiusmodi non habent quod sint in uno loco tantum. Sol enim non habet de se quod semper sit in oriente vel quod semper sit in occidente. Cum ergo est in oriente, ad hoc guod sit in occidente non est in potentia accidentali solum. Non ergo loquendum est de motu caeli vel de motu solis sicut de motu gravium vel levium. Gravia enim cum sunt sursum. quia de se semper habent quod sint deorsum, si tollatur omne impediens, statim erunt deorsum. Sol vero cum est in oriente, quia de se non habet quod sit semper in occidente, si tollatur medium impediens, non statim erit in occidente; propter quod in motu gravium et levium tota causa quare requiritur tempus est resistentia medii; sed in motu caelestium et astrorum, et universaliter in motu eorum quae moventur ex se, tota causa quare requiritur tempus non est impedimentum medii, ut patet per habita.

Secundum, quod etiam si esset quantitas spatii sine medio resistente, non posset grave moveri deorsum, declaratur sic:

(Ockham)

quia motus localis minus habet de transmutatione mobilis, quam aliquis alius motus. Per huiusmodi enim motus minus transmutatur mobile quantum ad suam substantiam quam per aliquem alium motum. Quod quidem non facit ad exigentiam temporis in aliis motibus, multo minus facit in motu locali.

Videmus enim quod causa quare in motu ad formam requiritur tempus, non est quantitas, sed est contraria dispositio existens in materia.

(Aegidius)

Dicendum quod motus localis minus habet de transmutatione mobilis, quam aliquis alius motus. Per huiusmodi enim motus minus transmutatur mobile quantum ad suam substantiam quam per aliquem alium motum. Quod ergo non facit ad exigentiam temporis in aliis motibus, multo minus facit in motu locali.

Videmus enim quod causa quare in motum ad formam requiritur tempus, non est quantitas, sed est contraria dispositio existens in materia. Si enim materia esset sufficienter disposita ad aliquam formam, et non haberet contrariam dispositionem illi formae, in illo instanti in quo appropinquaret sufficiens activum illi materiae, introduceretur talis forma in tota ista materia; nec refert utrum materia illa esset parvae quantitatis vel magnae: sicut patet de illuminatione aeris a sole, propter quod aer non habet contrariam dispositionem ad lucem.

Sicut ergo est in motu ad formam, sic suo modo est in motu ad ubi, propter quod sicut ratione quantitatis non formam, sed ratione contrariae dispositionis, sic in motu ad ubi non requiritur ratione quantitatis spatii, sed ratione resistentiae vel ratione medii impedientis. Hoc igitur in motu gravium et levium facit medium impediens, quod in motu ad formam facit contraria dispositio in subiecto; quare si esset aliquod spatium vacuum et in eo tolleretur omne medium resistens, mobile pertransiret illud spatium in non tempore. 15

Si enim materia esset sufficienter disposita ad aliquam formam, et non baberet contrariam dispositionem illi formae, in illo instanti in quo appropinquaret sufficiens activum illi materiae, induceretur talis forma in tota illa materia; nec referret utrum materia illa esset . parvae quantitatis vel magnae, quia quantaecumque quantitatis esset, per approximationem ad sufficiens activum, et in instanti, susciperet debitam formam. Videmus enim quod quia aer non habet contrariam dispositionem ad invicem (! lucem?), in illo instanti in quo appropinquat sol ad emispherium nostrum, sol illuminat totam partem aeris sibi obiectam. Sicut ergo est in motu ad formam, sic suo modo est in motu ad ubi, propter quod sicut ratione quantitatis non requiritur tempus in motu ad formam, sed ratione contrariae dispositionis, sic in motu ad ubi non requiritur tempus ratione quantitatis spatii, sed ratione resistentiae vel ratione impedimenti medii. Hoc ergo in motu gravium et levium facit medium impediens, quod in motu ad formam facit contraria dispositio in subjecto; quare si esset aliquod spatium vacuum et in eo tolleretur omne medium resistens, mobile pertransiret illud spatium in non tempore.

^{15.} Cf. Ockham's Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, Qu. 89 (Cod. Vat. Lat. 956, fol. 4°v): "Ad hoc dicitur quod causa propinqua quare gravia et levia moventur motu recto est propter impedimentum medii resistentis mobili; enius ratio est quia illud quod est causa successionis in aliis motibus et est causa successionis in motu locali recto. Sed hoc est contraria dispositio existens in materia, quia si materia non haberet contrariam dispositionem, statim forma introduceretur in instanti; sicut patet in illuminatione medii. Igitur codem modo contraria dispositio, sine resistentia medii ad mobile, est sufficiens causa successionis in motu locali recto." Ibid., Qu. 90 (fol. 47v): "Iterum, quod si esset quantitas spatii separata sine omni medio resistente, corpus grave non posset moveri deorsum in tempore, sed tantum in instanti. Quod probatur, quia quantitas spatii non est causa successionis in aliis motibus, puta in motu alterationis et augmentationis; igitur non in motu locali. Consequentia est manifesta; antecedens patet, quia causa successionis in aliis motibus est contraria dispositio in materia, qua amota, introducitur forma in instanti."

The comparison of texts shows without any question that Aegidius' commentary on the Physics provided Ockham with his arguments to the affirmative on the questions raised. Indeed, he omitted very little from Aegidius, for the first of the above extracts is almost the entire text of Aegidius' resolution of the first dubium raised in his commentary, while the second extract (though here and there abridged) contains most of the resolution of Aegidius' second dubium. The argu ment in the first extract is drawn by Aegidius from Averroes: but the argument in the second, directed against St. Thomas' thesis that quantity of space determines the temporal character of motion, is not used by Averroes, and appears to be Aegidius' own argument. We shall see that Ockham neatly turns the tables on Aegidius, in this second argument, exhibiting it as implying exactly the opposite of the conclusion Aegidius draws from it. Ockham's criticism of these arguments will now be given in its integrity, after which we may consider its historical significance.

In istis continentur multa falsa, secundum quod ea intelligunt dicentes. Primum est, quod ponit quod tota causa quare motus est in tempore, est impedimentum medii, ita quod quantitas spatii non sufficeret, si poneretur. Hoc enim falsa est secundum principia istorum, quia ipsi ponunt quod praeter substantiam et omnem qualitatem est quantitas media, quae nullo modo est activa et per consequens non potest resistere cuicumque et hoc positive, quomodo isti loquuntur. Sed si poneretur talis quantitas sine omni substantia et omni qualitate quacumque, non resisteret; immo, posito quod posset secum compati mobile, adhuc motus gravis esset in tempore. Probatio istius: quia omne mobile quod debet pertransire ab extremo ad extremum, necessario prius perveniet ad medium quam ad extremum. Sed omne quod prius perveniet ad medium quam ad extremum. movetur successive et per consequens in tempore. Ergo tale mobile, in tali medio quanto separato ab omni substantia et qualitate, moveretur in tempore. Confirmatur, quia nullum corpus potest moveri de extremo ad extremum nisi attingendo medium; ergo tale mobile attingeret medium. Aut igitur, quando attingit medium, est in extremo, aut non. Si sic ergo idem corpus est simul in duobus locis, quod est impossibile. Si autem non est in extremo, et postea erit in extremo, ergo non in instanti sed in tempore transit de extremo ad extremum. 16

^{16.} Cf. Quaestiones super libros Phys., Qu. 90 (ms. cit. fol. 4'(v): "Contra: Secundum eos quantitas est forma media inter substantiam et qualitatem, quae nullo modo est successiva (! activa?); et per consequens ista quantitas, si ponatur, non potest resistere cuicumque positive. Sed si poneretur talis quantitas sine omni substantia et qualitate quacumque, non resisteret; sed (!si?) posset secum compati mobile, adhuc motus gravis in illis spatiis esset successive et in tempore. Quod probatur primo sic: Omne mobile quod debet transire ab extremo ad extremum,

Ratio autem qua probatur ista conclusio est ad oppositum. Nam contraria dispositio non potest esse causa quare motus est in tempore nisi quia contraria dispositio, et forma inducenda, non possunt esse simul in subiecto. Si enim contraria dispositio esset compossibilis cum forma inducenda, propter contrariam dispositionem non esset talis motus in tempore. Sed sicut contraria dispositio est incompossibilis formae inducendae, ita quod subiectum non potest esse simul sub forma et sua contraria, ita una pars quantitatis spatii est incompossibilis alteri parti, et in situ opposito, ita quod idem mobile non potest simul esse in duabus partibus quantitatis spatii sibi aequalibus. Ergo sicut contraria dispositio est causa quare motus ad formam est in tempore, ita dispositio partium quantitatis spatii sibi aequalium est causa quare motus ad ubi est in tempore; quia idem mobile non potest esse simul in diversis partibus quantitatis spatii sibi aequalibus. 17

Ideo, quantum ad istum argumentum, dicendum est quod si esset aliquis locus vel spatium carens quocumque alio a quantitate, dummodo esset ibi vera quantitas, et esset ibi extremum distans ab extremo per medium realiter distinctum ab utroque, sive illud medium resisteret mobili illi, sive non, et si posset esse mobile in isto medio, vere iste motus in isto medio esset in tempore; quia ex quo idem mobile non potest simul esse in distinctis locis, necessario prius attinget unam partem medii sibi aequalem, quam aliam; et ita in tempore transiret totum, et non in instanti. 18

necessario prius pervenit ad medium quam ad extremum; sed grave motum in tali spatio est huiusmodi; igitur etc. Tunc ultra: Omne mobile quod prius pervenit ad medium quam ad extremum, movetur successive et in tempore; igitur grave movetur successive in tali spatio separato ab omni substantia et qualitate. Confirmatur, quia nullum corpus potest moveri de extremo ad extremum nisi attingendo medium. Aut igitur grave motum in tali spatio, quando attingit medium, erit in extremo, aut non. Si sic, igitur idem corpus simul est in duobus locis situaliter distinctis, naturaliter; quod est impossibile. Si non, et postea grave erit in extremo, igitur non transit de extremo ad extremum in instanti sed in tempore.

17. Cf. Quaest. in libr. Phys., Qu. 90 (ms. cit., fol. 48r): "Ad probationem illius antecedentis, dico quod illa ratio est ad oppositum. Nam contraria dispositio non est causa quare motus ad formam est in tempore, nisi quia contraria dispositio et forma inducenda non possunt esse simul in subiecto; quia si contraria dispositio esset compossibilis formae inducendae, propter contrariam dispositionem non esset talis motus in tempore. Sicut igitur subiectum non potest esse simul sub forma inducenda et sub contraria dispositione, et ideo motus ad formam esset in tempore et successivus secundum eos, ita una pars quantitatis spatii est incompossibilis alteri mobili (! parti?), ita quod idem mobile non potest esse in duabus partibus quantitatis spatii aequalibus; et ideo ille motus in tali spatio erit in tempore."

18. Cf. Qu. in libr. Phys., Qu. 90 (ms. cit. fol. 48r): "Ideo dico, quod si esset aliquod spatium carens quocumque alio a quantitate, dummodo esset ibi vera quantitas, et esset ibi extremum distans ab extremo per medium realiter distinctum ab utroque, sive illud medium resisteret mobili sive non, et mobile simul posset esse in isto medio sive non (sic!), vere motus in isto spatio esset in tempore in (et?) successivus; quia ex quo illud mobile non potest simul esse in distinctis locis aequalibus, necessario prius attingeret unam partem sibi aequalem quam aliam, et in tempore transiret totum spatium et non in instanti. Ex quo patet quod successio in motu locali recto est praecise propter quantitatem spatii."

(fol. 98r B)

Et quando dicitur quod per motum localem minus transmutatur mobile. quantum ad substantiam suam, quam per aliis motibus, ergo quod non facit ad exigentiam temporis in aliis motibus multo minus in motu locali - dicendum quod si propositio sit universalis, consequentia non valet; quia quamvis quantitas non faciet ad exigentiam temporis in aliis motibus, facit tamen hoc in motu locali. Et ratio est quia in aliis motibus, puta in motu ad forman, tota quantitas potest simul recipere et simul retinere formam ad quam est motus, sicut totum corpus potest simul recipere et simul retinere albedinem et aliam qualitaten, ad quam potest esse motus. Sed tota quantitas secundum quam debet esse motus localis, non potest simul recipere nec simul retinere mobile; immo, quando mobile est in medio inter sursum et deorsum, nec est sursum nec deorsum. Et ideo, quamvis quantitas non faceret motum ad formam esse in tempore, faceret tamen motum localem esse in tempore, sicut declaratum est. Et ita, minus habere de transmutatione mobilis, vel non minus, minil facit ad hoc quod quantitas facit motum esse in tempore vel non esse in tempore. 19

Item, aliud falsum accipitur in praedicta declaratione, quia aliquando potest motus esse in tempore, quamvis non sit in subiecto contraria dispositio. Sed de hoc magis patebit in fine.

Item, aliud falsum accipitur in praedicta declaratione, videlicet quod quaecumque moventur se ex se, non determinantur ad aliquam differentiam positionis; quia, sicut ostendetur octavo huius, gravia et levia moventur ex se et tamen, sicut ibi ostendetur, moventur ad determinatam differentiam positionis. Et ibi solventur auctoritates quae videntur esse in contrarium.

Item, aliud falsum accipitur ibidem, quod tota causa quare requiritur tempus in motu gravium et levium est resistentia medii, secundum intentionem suum quod quantumcumque medium esset realiter quantum, si non resisteret non faceret motum esse in tempore. Hoc enim falsum est, quia sola distantia terminorum in quibus mobile non posset simul esse, sufficeret ad hoc quod motus esset in tempore, si antecedens esset possibile.

Item, aliud falsum dicitur ibi, scilicet quod causa praecisa quare gravia moventur in tempore ex resistentia medii, est quia gravia non moventur ex se. Nam tunc, quod movetur ex se, quanvis medium non resisteret, posset moveri in tempore; quod falsum est, quia si animal, quod movetur ex se secundum istos, vellet moveri, ita moveretur in tempore sicut grave. Nec plus faceret eum moveri in tempore, quia movetur ex se, quam faceret grave quia non movetur ex se.

^{19.} Cf. Qu. in libr. Phys., Qu. 90 (ms. cit. fol. 48r): "Ad rationem in oppositum dico quod quamvis quantitas spatii non faciat motum alterationis esse in tempore, tamen facit motum localem rectum in tempore; et ratio est, quia in motu alterationis potest totum mobile simul recipere, sicut simul retinere; mobile localiter immo. Ad quam (2) quando mobile est in una parte quantitatis non est in alia, sicut quando mobile est in medio inter sursum et deorsum, nec est sursum nec deorsum. Et ideo, quamvis quantitas non faciat motum ad formam esse in tempore, tamen bene potest facere motum localem rectum esse in tempore."

Ideo dicendum est breviter, quod sola distantia terminorum in quibus non potest mobile esse simul et in eodem tempore, sufficeret ad hoc quod mobile moveretur in tempore; ita quod, hoc posito, omni alio circumscripto, mobile non posset moveri nisi in tempore, sive illud mobile moveatur ex se sive ab alio. Et ratio est, quia mobile non potest esse simul in diversis locis. Sicut, si aliquid deberet transire de albedine in nigredinem mediantibus omnibus coloribus mediis, ex hoc ipso quod colores medii non sunt compossibiles nec inter se nec cum albedine nec nigredine, requiritur tempus in quo fiat ille transitus, ita quod non potest fieri in instanti - ita quod mobile non potest simul esse in diversis locis, sicut idem subiectum non potest simul colorari diversis coloribus. Propter hoc, si mobile debeat moveri ab uno extremo ad aliud per medium, sive moveatur a se sive ab alio, sive medium sit compossibile cum mobili sive non, necessario requiritur, ut (et?) iste motus sit in tempore et non in instanti. 20

Before considering the import of Ockham's discussion, from the historical angle of his relationship to Aegidius of Rome, we nay indicate the content of the remainder of Ockham's discussion. Having given his support to St. Thomas' thesis concerning the cause of motion requiring time. Cokham faces the counter-argument that he has committed himself to Avempace's theory that heavy bodies have a "natural velocity" determined with respect to pure distance, from which is subtracted an "accidental retardation" due to the material resistance of the medium, so that the speed of natural motion in a corporeal medium is not determined by the ratio of densities, but by the difference between the motive and resistive powers. Since this "law of motion" is incompatible with Aristotle's basic dynamic assumptions, it would seem that Cokham, in espousing St. Thomas' argument, had committed himself to Avempace's theory. This, however, Ockham denies, holding that St. Thomas' thesis does not entail Avempace's dynamic theory (as St. Thomas himself seemed to assume), and that the dynamic theory of Aristotle and Averroes does not entail the denial of the

^{20.} Cf. Qu. in libr. Phys., Qu. 89 (ms. cit. fol. 47v): "Contra: Sola distantia terminorum, in quibus mobile non potest simul esse, sufficit ad hoc quod motus sit successivus et in tempore; igitur etc. ... Praeterea: Si esset aeque possibile grave et medium esse simul, sicut accidens et suum subiectum sunt simul, adhuc grave moveretur successive; et tamen non propter spissitudinem vel subtilitatem medii, quia medium spissum dicitur magis resistere quam subtile quia cum maiori virtute dividi dicitur unum quam aliud, et eadem est causa quare idem mobile velocius movetur in uno medio quam in alio, quia facilius dividitur unum medium quam aliud. Sed si grave et medium, secundum omnes partes eius, possent simul existere sicut accidens et subiectum, tunc grave nullo modo divideret medium nec penetraret, et tamen tunc moveretur successive."

kinematic principle which St. Thomas had enunciated. Cckham raises this question, immediately after his critique of Aegidius' arguments, in this form:

Sed contra ista dicitur esse Commentator, primo, quia reprobat Avempace propter hoc quod ponit duplex tempus requisitum ad motum, sive unum naturale propter distantiam terminorum, et aliud propter resistentiam medii. Sed hoc idem ponitur in praedicta declaratione; quia ponitur quod si solum termini distarent, adhuc motus gravium esset in tempore; et manifestum est quod tempus requiritur propter resistentiam medii, secundum Philosophum et Commentatorem hic; ergo ista opinio coincidit cum opinione Avenpace, quam reprobat Commentator, dicens: "Ft si hoc quod dicit Avempace concedatur, tunc erit demonstratio Aristotelis falsa, quoniam si proportio subtilitatis medii ad subtilitatem alterius medii est sicut proportio tarditatis accidentis moto in altero eorum ad tarditatem accidentem ei in altero, non sicut proportio ipsius motus, non seguitur ut illud quod movetur in vacuo movetur in instanti, quoniam tunc non auferretur ab eo nisi tarditas quae accidit ei propter medium, et remanet ei motus naturalis, et omnis motus est in tempore; ergo illud quo movetur in vacuo movetur in tempore necessario et motu divisibili, et nullum sequitur indivisibile (! impossibile)." Ex isto patet quod de inventione Commentatoris est, quod motus talis non est in tempore propter solam distantiam terminorum, et quod tarditas motus non est accidentaliter a resistentia medii. 21

After adding four other arguments to the same effect, each one backed by a quotation from Averroes, Ockham, in his response to this first and principal argument, expresses his own conviction that St. Thomas' thesis is compatible with Averroes' position, and it does not entail the dynamic theory of Avempace.

Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod Commentator non reprobat Avempace propter hoc quod ponit quod sola distantia terminorum sufficeret ad hoc quod motus rectus esset in tempore, sed reprobat eum in hoc quod ponit quod quodlibet grave et leve habet unum motum naturalem, cui motui tamquam rei distinctae additur una tarditas accidentalis ex resistentia medii, quae tarditas sit alia res ab ipso motu naturali, per modum quo una linea distincta additur aliae lineae distinctae. Et contra istum intellectum procedit argumentum Commentatoris; quia tunc proportio temporis ad tempus non esset secundum proportionem subtilitatis medii ad subtilitatem, nec secundum proportionem impedientis ad impediens. ²²

Ockham then gives a long argument to demonstrate the incompatibility of Avempace's "law of motion" with that of Aristotle.

^{21.} Ms. Merton Coll. 293, fol. 98rB; the quotation from Averroes, from his commentary on Text 71, is the one translated ante, where the source is indicated in Note 7.

^{22.} Ms. cit. fol. 98vA.

The argument rests on the mathematical truth that if equal quantities are subtracted from two unequal quantities, the latter will not retain their original proportion. But on Avempace's theory, if one heavy body had twice the "natural velocity" of the other, as determined by motion in vacuo, then, if the two bodies moved in media of equal density, so that equal degrees of velocity would be subtracted from their "natural velocities," the body supposed to be of twice the motive power of the other. would not overcome the same resistance twice as fast. But Ockham accepts the basic conception of motive power, upheld by Aristotle and Averioes as capacity to overcome material resistance, measured by the time required to do so; thus, although he defends St. Thomas' thesis that local notion is temporal because the medium is extended, he denies that this kinematic definition of what notion is, constitutes a definition and measure of force. He concludes his argument as follows, with a clarification of the meanings of resistance, and with the conclusion that if the word vacuum is taken in its strict sense. motion in vacuo is a formal impossibility.

Et ita expresse patet quod Commentator improbat Avempace quia ponit quod tarditas ex resistentia medii est alia res distincta addita motui naturali; quod ego non pono, ideo ratio sua contra me non est quia ego pono simul cum hoc quod mobile posset moveri in tempore quantumcumque medium non resisteret positive. Sed compateretur secum quod quando est impediens medium, quod tunc eadem est proportio (impedientis ad) impediens qualis est temporis ad tempus et motus ad motum, et e contrario. Unde Commentator non improbat Avempace ex hoc quod ponit quod motus posset esse in tempore propter distantiam terminorum sicut isti false sibi imponunt, quia nec aliquod tale verbum recitat de eo.

Propter intentionem autem Commentatoris est sciendum, quod resistentia dupliciter accipitur; uno modo pro renisu et reactione, et talis resistentianumquam est sine violentia resistentis, quando vincitur. Sed loquendo de motu locali, semper tale resistens, si vincatur, movetur violenter; sicut patet quando aliquod corpus penetrat terram vel vadit contra aquam currentem vel contra motum aeris. Aliter accipitur resistentia magis improprie, et quasi negative, scilicet pro incompossibilitate alicuius vel aliquorum (ad) aliquid; sicut non esset possibile quod lapis esset simul cum aere ita quod per adventum lapidis non oporteret aerem expelli. Sed si idem locus, retinens aerem, posset simul recipere lapidem, tunc aer non resisteret lapidem primo modo accipiendo resistentiam, quia non oporteret aerem moveri ad motum lapidis. Tamen accipiendo resistens secundo modo, sic aer resistit lapidi; quod non est aliud quam dicere quod lapis non potest simul esse cum diversis partibus aeris sibi aequalibus.

Primo modo accipiendo resistentiam et resistens, semper vel frequenter de facto, quando aliquod movetur motu recto, est ibi resistentia medii, vel esse potest quando medium quiescit; tamen si esset possibile duo corpora esse simul, non oporteret ponere talem resistentiam. Sed secunda resistentia semper requiritur, quia impossibile esset motum localem rectum incipere (Ms. Assisi: esse in tempore), nisi medium isto modo resisteret; hoc est, nisi medium esset quantum habens partes equales mobili in quibus non posset mobile simul esse. Et isto modo accipit Commentator frequenter medium et resistens.

Sed tale medium et resistens non potest esse in vacuo; quia secundum intentionem Philosophi, vacuum ponitur esse illud in quo nulla est distinctio realis, et per consequens non est ibi in quo realiter deberet esse prius mobile et postea in alio. Et propter hoc, nullo modo motus in vacuo posset esse in tempore, cum non sit habens partes realiter distinctas, quod tamen requiritur ad motum localem qui oportet esse in tempore.

Et per ista patet evidenter ad primam auctoritatem, quod tarditas ex esistentia medii, sive accipiatur resistentia uno modo sive alio mode, ion est res addita motui, sicut imaginabatur Avempace.²³

Ockham's discussion and resolution of the controversy between Averroes and Avempace, as exhibited in the above excerpts, is of great theoretical interest in relation of the development of modern mechanics. For Ockham introduces the distinction, fundamental to our mechanics, between the condition of "being in motion," and the condition of "being moved" in the sense of being acted upon by a force. The kinematic problem is clearly distinguished from the dynamic one. Avempace had seen that motion is kinematically defined as traversal of extended magnitude in time, irrespective of material resistance; but he had construed this kinematic analysis of

^{23.} Ms. Merton Coll. 293, fols. 98vB - 99rA. The same distinctions are given, but less clearly, in the Qu. in libros Physicorum, Qu. 89, ms. cit. fol. 47v. The problem of vacuum, and of motion in it, is treated by Ockham in Quodlibet I, Qu. 6 (ed. Strasbourg 1491). He there distinguishes between vacuum in its strict sense, which is purely negative, and what may be called a spatium - i.e., a three dimensional continuum having really distinct parts, but devoid of substantial or qualitative form. It is this spatium, or pure magnitude separate in essence and being from substance and quality, yet having really distinct quantitative parts, which Aegidius, according to Ockham, posits; and Ockham's argument against Aegidius turns on the fact that since Aegidius concedes such a real spatium, he is unfaithful to his own principle in not conceding that motion in such a spatium would be successive and temporal. Ockham himself does not concede such a separate spatium (and apparently St. Thomas does not concede it either - cf. his Exp. in libr. Phys. Arist., IV, lect. 10-11). But Ockham insists that it is the spatial or quantitative extension of the corporeal medium, essential to the existence of material substance, rather than its qualitative condition, that is essential to the possibility of motion. Space, for Ockham, is the generalized property of all extensive continua which are real - but this property is generalized, without being hypostatized as an absolute separable accident.

motion as equivalent to a definition and measure of motive power or force. Averroes had clung to what is essentially a sound conception of force or motive power, as that which does work on materially resistant body; but he had assumed that motion under the action of no forces is impossible. Ockham was the first to separate what was true in the positions of these two Arabian philosophers, from what was erroneous, and to combine the sound kinematic insight of Averpace and St. Thomas, with the sound dynamic principle of Aristotle and Averroes. After Ockham, the discovery of the principle of inertia, and of the definition of force as what determines change in the condition of motion, rather than continuation of the same condition of motion, became philosophically possible. The first fruits of this contribution of Ockham's were gathered soon after he left Oxford, by Thomas Bradwardine and his "Mertonian" pupils, who developed kinematics independently of the dynamic question of the causes of motion, and provided the mathematical patterns, expressing the "how" of natural motions, to which Buridan and his "Parisian" disciples gave a new dynamical interpretation that prepared the way for modern mechanics. This aspect of Ockham's independently critical treatment of the problem of motion, involved in the text we have been considering, constitutes a still unwritten chapter in the history of mediaeval physics; but it belongs to another story, reaching far beyond our immediate problem of Ockham's relationship to Aegidius of Rome. To this question we may now return.

IV

In his presentation and criticism of the arguments of Aegidius of Rome, Ockham takes ample pains to allow his adversary to speak for himself, through quoting almost all of the part of Aegidius' commentary devoted to the question at issue. As far as the merits and force of Aegidius' arguments, and of Ockham's criticism, are concerned, little need be said. If Thomas Aquinas showed some slight impatience toward the abstruse reasonings of Averroes, dismissing them as "frivolous," William of Ockham may be excused for his lack of mercy toward the dialectical fog raised by Aegidius in arguing the same question. The clarity and literal accuracy of Ockham's language, and the conclusive force of his logic, came like a breath of fresh air into the atmosphere of late 13th and early

14th century scholasticism, overburdened as it had become with verbal intricacies verging on nonsense. The language of St. Thomas, conceived in a simpler age and in a simpler spirit, was no longer adequate to penetrate the maze of distinctions and dialectical obscurities developed by his successors. Ockham's language, as literal and unequivocal as anything short of mathematics itself could be, served in its own way to restore the simpler and clearer philosophic vision which the dialectic of Aegidius, of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, or of Duns Scotus and his pupils, had deadened and obscured. The texts which we have quoted speak for themselves; what Ockham has to say, makes sense.

The historical interest of Ockham's criticism of Aegidius lies in one fact: it identifies Aegidius of Rome as advocate of the theory of separate quantity which Ockham attacks so strenuously and repeatedly throughout his writings. The phrase which Ockham uses to describe the position he opposes, is always the same: Secundum eos quantitas est forma media inter substantiam et qualitatem. Taken by itself, this description seems applicable to the position of St. Thomas, who held that quantity follows on matter, and quality on form, and argued that since form, and what follows on it, presupposes matter, so quality determines matter by way of quantity. But St. Thomas does not press this analogical comparison to a literal theory treating quantity as a res absoluta distinct from the matter or substance which is a quantum, as if matter were itself indivisible and inextended, acquiring extension only per accidens in the way that the human soul was held to be accidentally extended by reason of its presence to the body. It is in this literal manner, however, that Ockham repeatedly formulates and criticizes the doctrine which he designates by the phrase mentioned - quantitas est res media inter substantiam et qualitatem. 24

Now at the very beginning of his criticism of the arguments of Aegidius, Ockham makes this statement: "Hoc enim falsa est secundum principia istorum, quia ipsi ponunt quod praeter

^{24.} This formulation recurs constantly throughout the *De sacramento altaris*, and in a long series of Questions (23-39 in the Strasbourg edition) of his fourth *Quodlibet*. E.g., *Quodl. IV*, Qu. 30, refers to Ockham's adversaries as tenentes quantitatem esse rem mediam inter substantiam et qualitatem. The same formulation occurs also in the *Summa logicae*, quoted ante, Note 4.

substantiam et qualitatem est quantitas media." And in the parallel passage from his Quaestiones in libros Physicorum, the same phrase recurs: "Secundum eos quantitas est forma media inter substantiam et qualitatem." The meaning of the doctrine of quantity, against which Ockham fought with such intensity, is to be sought, not primarily and perhaps not at all in the works of St. Thomas, but in the works of Aegidius of Rome. Ockham's text gives us this definite and suggestive clue. And if we follow it up, and make more detailed comparisons of the texts from Ockham and from Aegidius which treat the problem of quantity and matter, we find many confirmations of this identification of Aegidius as a principal adversary of William of Ockham. Thus, in Aegidius' Theoremata de esse et essentia we find this statement:

Quantitas extendit materiam et dat ei esse extensum. Ipsa ergo extensio materiae est quoddam esse eius quod recipit a quantitate. Debemus enim imaginari quod materia de se non dicit quid actu extensum, sed dicit aliquod quod est in potentia ut extendatur. Sed materia actu coniuncta quantitati vere actu extenditur et habet esse extensum.²⁵

It is clearly this doctrine that Ockham criticizes in these two excerpts, from his Summulae Physicorum and De sacramento altaris.

Sicut materia non habet partem distantem a parte ab alio sibi adveniente sine quo non posset habere partem distantem a parte, ita nec est extensa per talem rem; sed sicut distantia unius partis materiae ab alia non est aliqua res absoluta ab illis partibus, ita nec extensio, nec quantitas seu dimensiones sunt aliae res.²⁶

Item, omne quantum est extensum, sed nihil est extensum nisi una pars distet ab alia et sit extra aliam; non enim ad extensionem sufficit praesentia rei alicui quanto; tunc enim anima intellectiva esset quanta, cum coexistat et sit praesens toti corpori et cuilibet parti eius. 27

^{25.} Aegidii Romani Theoremata de esse et essentia, ed. E. Hocedez, (Louvain 1930), p. 93.

^{26.} Ockham, Summulae in libros Physicorum I, cap. 19 (ed. Rome 1637, pp. 23-24).

^{27.} De sacramento altaris, ed. T.B. Birch, p. 340. In this work, as well as in the series of Questions in Ockham's fourth Quodlibet, Ockham argues against two other theses of the moderni, which turn out to be theses of Aegidius. One of these is the thesis that material substances are not per se in place, circumscriptive, but acquire occupation of place by reason of the inherence in them of quantity; the other thesis is that rarefaction and condensation are not explained by local motion of the parts of the material substance rarefied or condensed, but by acquisition or

The theory of a forma tottus, criticized by Ockham in his Summulae Physicorum I, ch. 25, and which has been taken as something originated by Walter Burley, is definitely the theory of Aegidius. Possibly Aegidius did not originate the term, but he was the first to give it the special significance and wide currency which it had in the early 14th century. 28 Finally, we may again mention the formulation of the "real distinction" as one between duae res, which llocedez indicates is peculiarly characteristic of Aegidius of Rome. But Ockham, in all of his arguments against a real distinction, whether between essence and existence, or between Socrates and Socrates' humanity, or between that which is extended and its extension, invariably formulates the doctrine as a distinction between res and res, and it is in this form that he attacks it. 29

When we add these scattered indications together, guided by the clue which Ockham furnishes in his commentary on Text 71 of Physics IV, the figure of Aegidius Romanus emerges more and more convincingly as a primary adversary against whose teachings Ockham wielded his critical pen. During the early part of the 14th century the influence and reputation of Aegidius were at a peak, especially in the more conservative academic circles. Able as a teacher, prolific as a writer, respected and honored for his upright character and solid learning, he was the incarnation of routine scholasticism - the successful second rate mind, normally in control of established institutions of learning. In contrast to St. Thomas, Duns Scotus, and Ockham, whose writings can still be exciting to the modern

loss of an accidental entity inhering in them, called quantity. The views of Aegidius on these two issues are indicated by Anneliese Maier, "Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert," pp. 29-41, who points out the marked differences between Aegidius' theory of quantity, and the theories of his predecessors.

^{28.} Cf. Aegidius' Theoremata de esse et essentia, ed. cit. pp. 39-46 and passim, where Aegidius gives extensive development to the notion of the forma totius. Concerning its attribution, or misattribution, to Walter Burley, cf. L. Baudry, in the article cited supra Note 2. The ascription of this conception of forma totius to Burley is found, without indication of source or evidence, in George Sarton's "Introduction to the History of Science," Vol. III, Part 1, p. 564; here Burley is credited with having created new entities, including privatio and the forma totius.

^{29.} Cf. E. Hocedez, op. cit., pp. 52-57, on Aegidius' "reification" of the real distinction. Ockham's criticism of the distinction between essence and existence, formulated in terms of duae res, can be found in the Summa logicae III, II, cap. 27, from which we have quoted a few lines, supra, Note 3.

reader, the tomes of Aegidius are impressively tedious and uninspired. But who reads Christian Wolff, or the other eminent professors of philosophy who were the great authorities of their time? Yet Kant read him, and if we wish to understand Kant we should read him too. The first rate thinkers of the past have developed their new insights and powerful doctrines, as a general rule, in consequence of their disgust with the commonly accepted ideas of their time. But the spokesmen for such commonly accepted ideas - for the communis opinio modernor-um - are not the great thinkers whose works still find readers. They are men of ability, industry, and solid character, who have achieved well earned success in an established field - men like Aegidius of Rome, who was made official doctor of his religious Order, in his own lifetime.

Ockham's philosophy was developed, with critical fervor and in a spirit of protest, as the reaction of a brilliant and passionately logical mind to the second rate scholasticism which had become established in the universities during the late 13th and 14th centuries. His criticisms are rarely directed against the "ancients," and where they bear on teachings of Duns Scotus they come nearer to being interpretations or discussions of doctrine, than critical attacks. Ockham's unnamed adversary, for whom he has little sympathy and less respect, is the communis opinio modernorum. And in the years when he was a student at Oxford, coming mostly before 1320, there was perhaps no more eminent or authoritative representative of the communis opinio modernorum than Aegidius of Rome, His qualifications to fill the place of Ockham's "adversary", as a foremost representative of the body of doctrine which Ockham deplored as a modern corruption of the philosophic heritage of the ancients, are perhaps worth examining in more detail.

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COMMENTARY

A RECENT PRESENTATION OF OCKHAM'S PHILOSOPHY

e Wulf's llistoire de la Philosophie Médiévale belongs to the standard histories of medieval philosophy. More personal than Gever's work, Die Patristische und Scholastische Zeit, it runs the risk of being more subjective as well. Whilst Geyer carefully collects the results of the latest studies in the particular fields, De Wulf apparently aims at a more rounded picture of the philosophers under consideration. In such a synthesis, however, there is a greater danger of being led by preconceived ideas or the consistency of an imaginary system and in consequence arriving at a subjective interpretation. We still believe that history should first ascertain facts, and it should attempt to reconstruct a "system", if there is any, only after a thorough acquaintance with the sources. We also believe that history should be absolutely impartial. We do not deny that history has also the task of judging; but its judgment must be guided by something more important and more objective than the personal convictions of the historian. And above all, the historian should with due regard to human frailty always be ready to understand the thought of a philosopher in the better and more intelligible sense, whenever his statements permit it. Scotus promulgated this golden rule of interpretating texts and judging about them when he said: Ex dictis eorum volo rationabiliorem intellectum accipere quem possum (Ox. I, d. 8, q. 5, n. 8). We are convinced and intend to prove that such sound rules of historical research have not been observed in De Wulf's treatment of the philosophy of Ockham.

We were reluctant at first to make an issue of this, especially since the man whose work we were to criticize, is justly regarded a pioneer in the field of the history of medieval philosophy. We were even more hesitant of censuring his work on learning of the death of this great historian. But can we strictly adhere to the rule of charity, De mortuis nil nisi bene, if a dead man's work still lives and perpetuates what are clearly errors and misunderstandings manifest to those who went through the tedious labor of checking his work against the historical facts? We believe, we can adhere to the rule, if we separate the person from his work, and avoid setting one personal conviction against the other. With this understanding, we shall in spite of our original hesitation undertake, at the request of several friends, an objective criticism of De Wulf's presentation of Ockham's philosophy. And while we shall have to point out almost incredible errors, still it is only these errors we wish to expose, not the man, whom we admire and to whom we are indebted. For that reason we shall not refer to De Wulf in the following pages, but only to the Histoire. Our criterion will be the evidence of the texts.

Ockham's philosophy is treated on pp. 27-51 of the third volume of the *Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale*, published in 1947. We shall read one paragraph after another, indicating each by its number in the *Histoire* and then shall offer our comment.

Nr. 377 deals with the life of Ockham and his works. This part, as is acknowledged, was rewritten partly by making use of our own research. There is one sentence, however, which in the face of the sources is hardly admissable.

Quand Louis de Bavière voulut légitimer le marriage adulterin de son fils, contrairement aux lois de l'Eglise, Guillaume défendit l'omnipotence de l'Etat en matière politique (p. 29).

It will be very difficult or rather impossible to prove this sweeping statement on the basis of Ockham's text itself in the work that he has written about this matrimonial cause. We shall refer to it in the edition of H.S. Offler (Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera Politica, Manchester 1940). Ockham discusses this individual case under the assumption that the marriage under question is not valid (cfr. p. 281, 24-27) - an assumption which was later confirmed by the Church in 1349. He further maintains that the emperor has no jurisdiction as to the purely spiritual and sacramental character of a marriage case.

In specie autem de sacramento matrimonii... dicitur quod ad imperatorem inquantum solummodo imperator, eo quod pluries existit infidelis, causa matrimonialis quantum ad illa quae specialiter ultra legem naturae et ius gentium et leges civiles sunt in scripturis sacris prohibita vel praecepta, minime spectant (p. 282-283, n. 30-2); cfr. almost the same words a little further, p. 283, 9-13).

Matrimonial cases amongst infidels have to be decided by the Emperor as successor of the old Roman emperors. For the rest, Ockham seems to admit that the Emperor has the right to interfere, though Ockham is not fully decided in his answers, since he is constantly giving alternatives. In any case, Ockham declares that the marriage under question can be declared to be annulled by the emperor, since it is proven that no true marriage exists. The emperor can do this either because he has this power as successor of the Roman emperors, or because he has the right to use epikeia (p. 282, 1), owing to urgent necessity and the impossibility of recourse to the Pope.

This is all that remains of the alleged omnipotence of the state according to Ockham.

In the same number on p. 30 we read: "Dans la seconde partie de sa carrière, Guillaume mène campagne contre le Pape, dont il conteste les droits temporels et la suprématie politique." It is true that Ockham has denied the political supremacy of the Pope, which, after all, is correct teaching. However, Ockham has never denied the temporal rights of the Pope, on the contrary, he believes that a Pope, by the fact that he is instituted the Supreme Pontiff, is free and subject to no secular jurisdiction (cfr. Dialogus, pars III, tract. I, lib. 1, c. 17; and Octo quaestiones..., q. 3, c. 3; ed. Sikes, p. 105).

Nr. 378. We read: "Duns Scot est son principale adversaire..." (p. 30). The statement that Scotus was the main adversary for Ockham can be correctly or incorrectly construed. It is true that none of the great scholastics has been more criticized by Ockham than Scotus. One has but to read the Venerable Inceptor's writings in order to find overwhelming evidence for it, so much, indeed, that a fruitful study of Ockham requires constant use of Scotus's works as well. However, if the statement means that Ockham is always in opposition to Scotus, it is definitely exaggerated. Ockham admires Scotus and he has learned much from him, inspite of his differences. We could say that Ockham has developed his own philosophy and theology in constant critical discussion with Scotus. He has performed a true "crisis", a discrimination, discarding many Scotistic doctrines, but

also retaining an equal if not a greater number of them.

In this connection we would like to expose the peculiar manner in which the *llistoire* distorts quotations from Ockham's works. We read on p. 32:

Réalisme outré.., réalisme modere... et surtout formalisme des scotistes.... sont tour à tour déclarés absurdes, remplis de contradictions, impensables: falsa, absurda, irrationalis (Logica, I, c. 16).

Here we have an express reference to the sixteenth chapter of the first part of Ockham's Summa Logicae. In this chapter Ockham only rejects the formal distinction of Scotus in regard to the problem of universals. The only text which substantiates one third of the alleged quotation is this: "Sed have opinio videtur esse irrationabilis." We suspect that the rest was taken from Ockham's criticism in the Ordinatio, but, to be sure, not of Scotus, but of the others, for in d. 2, q. 6 where Ockham criticizes Scotus by naming him neither the term "absurd", nor "irrational" occurs. In fact, it does not even occur in the chapter of the Summa Logicae quoted by the Histoire; for the fides codicum testifies that instead of irrationalis or rather irrationabilis Ockham wrote: omnino improbabilis.

In Nr. 379. On pp. 31-32 we are informed about the terrible individualism and pluralism of the Venerable Inceptor. We read:

Individualisme et pluralisme renforcés: telle est la thèse fondamentale et elle est énoncée à satiété. Tout être est individuel par tout ce qu'il est. Etant d'une pièce, farouchement isolé, et réellement distinct de tout autre, il ne contient rien qui soit semblable ou commun entre lui et quelque autre individu. L'universel n'existe donc à aucun titre dans la nature.

The last sentence is unquestionably true for Ockham, and that is about all. However, it is definitely not true that, according to Ockham, an individual does not contain anything that is similar or common with another individual. Unfortunately the wording of the Histoire is equivocal. We can hardly believe that "common" means here something which is identically the same in two individuals. For such a universality has been denied by everyone of the classical scholastics. "Common" can also hardly mean, something which is not individual in a concrete existing being; for it is just this commonness which is resented by Thomists in the solution of Scotus formal distinction between the common nature and the individual difference. The Thomists, too, defend the thesis that everything in an individual is individual, even if they prefer to say, individualized. But that which is individualized is individual. Hence "common" can mean only "similar". Therefore, the assertion of the Histoire will only apply to Ockham, if and only if, he denied similarity between the individuals. Only then could we speak of an isolationism. Unfortunately the facts, that is the texts of Ockham, clearly affirm what the Histoire denies. How else, could Ockham write (Reportatio III. a. 9. 0):

...uno modo accipitur [univocum] pro conceptu communi aliquibus habentibus perfectam similitudinem in omnibus essentialibus sine omni dissimilitudine, ita quod hoc sit verum tam in substantialibus quam in accidentalibus, sic quod in forma accidentali non est reperire quod est dissimile cuilibet formae in alia forma accidentali.... Et sic accipiendo univocum, conceptus solus speciei specialissimae est univocus, quia in individuis eiusdem speciei non est reperire aliquid alterius rationis in uno et alio.

It is true, as the *Histoire* maintains, that in Ockham's system there is no place for an Aristotelian or Thomistic abstraction; the reason, however, is not this isolationism, but the denial of any principle of individuation which is according to Ockham "vide de sens", as the *Histoire* correctly states.

Passing over a few lines of equally dubitable correctness, we read:

Il n'est de distinction possible que la distinction reelle, car la distinction de raison (virtuelle) et la distinction formelle sont des vains artifices n'ayant pas plus de valeur que le realisme thomiste ou scotiste dont elles sont fonction.

We wonder why Ockham can say just the opposite (Quodl. I, q. 3): ... quia omnis distinctio vel est formalis vel realis vel rationis. And furthermore, if this statement of the Histoire were correct, it is hard to understand, why Ockham, even in one of his latest works, can speak of a formal distinction and explain it in the sense of Scotus' formal non-identity? In the Summa Logicae, part II, c. 2, Ockham says:

Non est aliud dicere, quod essentia et tres Personae distinguuntur formaliter secundum unum intellectum, nisi quod essentia est tres personae et persona non est tres personae...

In fact, Ockham has always admitted the formal distinction in its negative wording (and probably more scotistic meaning), but only in God, not in creatures.

After a few lines of fairly correct statements we are stopped short by a quite inaccurate exposition of Ockham's doctrine on the categories. We read (p. 33):

...les accidents "absoluts" ne sont pas distincts de la substance, et se reduisent a des concepts répondant a des aspects de cette substance.

In other words - another confirming text will be given a little later - according to the Histoire Ockham maintains that the only things (res) in this world are substances or the parts of substances, viz. matter and form; all accidents are reduced to concepts. We have not the slightest idea, on which text in Ockham's collected works this statement is, or possibly could be, based. It is true that, according to Ockham's clearly favored and often defended theory, quantity is not an entity distinct from substance or quality; quantity is only a mode of being of material substances or corporeal qualities, for it is their mode of having parts outside parts. However, and this was apparently overlooked by the Histoire, a material substance can exist without the mode of having parts outside parts, as the body of Christ does in the Holy Eucharist; hence to say: "Des lors, comme pour Descartes, l'étendue se confond avec l'essence du corps," is incorrect. For actual extension has nothing to do with the "essence" of a body or material substance, since it can be absent, as in the case of the body of Christ existing in non-quantitative manner in the Holy Eucharist. But still for another reason the identification of extension with the essence of bodies is incorrect, since corporeal qualities are quantitative in the same manner that bodies are.

But what about quality? According to the sweeping statement mentioned before, the absolute accidents, hence also the qualities, are not real entities distinct from their substance. This the *Histoire* even expressly maintains:

"A leur tour les qualités corporelles se confondent avec la substance" (p. 33). In other words, according to the Histoire, Ockham teaches that corporeal qualities are the same as substance and they are only different aspects of substance in the same manner as quantity is. This is expressly stated as regards all the four species of qualities distinguished by the scholastics: "Aucun des quatre types de qualités reconnues par les scolasticques (a la suite d'Aristote) ne trouve grâce devant le franciscain" (p. 33). If only Ockham's most explicit words, time and again reiterated, would have found grace before the Histoire. However, in this case, we can even quote the Histoire against itself. A few lines further the Summa Logicae is quoted to the effect that relation is not a distinct entity from substance and quality - which is correct; but we are surprised to read here: Praeter res absolutas, scilicet substantias et qualitates, nulla res est imaginabilis (Sum. totius log., 1ª p., c. 49) (p. 34). Thus the Histoire quotes a text against its own statement. There is no text to be found in Ockham's works where he has ever denied that certain qualities, though not all, are distinct entities (res) and are not identical in any way with substance. For further evidence we shall quote the following text from the same work quoted by the Histoire (c. 49).

Sunt autem quaedam in genere qualitatis, quae important res distinctas a substantia, ita quod illa res non est substantia, sicut sunt albedo et nigredo, color, scientia, lux et huiusmodi. Quaedam autem sunt, quae alias res a praedictis qualitatibus et substantia non important, cuiusmodi sunt figura, curvitas, rectitudo, densitas, raritas et huiusmodi.

This text also proves the futility of the restriction quoted, strangely enough - from a non authentic work.

Ont seules une réalité propre autre que la substance les qualitès qui sont affranchies de liens avec l'étendue, à savoir les actes conscients: visio, intellectio, dilectio et omnes actus anime cognitivi et appetitivi sunt qualitates reales in anima. Tractatus de principiis theologiae, p. 120.

What is most amazing is, that at the bottom of the same page this exclusive statement of the *llistoire* is falsified even by the *Tractatus*. For there we read: *Ideo gravitas*, *levitas*, *color*, *sapor et huiusmodi....sunt res inherentes* (p. 120s):

Nr. 380 deals with Ockham's Psychology. This part again, is a strange mixture of truth and fiction. We noticed with satisfaction that the explanation of Ockham's doctrine on intuitive and abstractive cognition (pp. 34 s) is fairly correct. Certain serious misunderstandings of the intuitive cognition of non-existents do not reappear in the Histoire. The only critical observation we wish to make here is that we have not found any evidence in the texts of Ockham to show that he limits abstractive cognition to intellective cognition alone. On the contrary in Ordinatio (prol. q. 1, TT) Ockham equates phantasia with notitia abstrativa.

Likewise the short account of Ockham's theory of signification is fairly correct, except for two probably minor misunderstandings. First, the *Histoire* maintains that Ockham's term for the function of signification is notare; we have no evidence for that. On the same page (36) connotare and "consignifier" seem to be brought into a similar relation. In Ockham's language it would be more appropriate to call the significative function of the syn-

categoremata like "Every", "and" etc. co-signification, because such terms signify only in connection with categorematic terms. The categorematic terms are to be subdistinguished into absolute and connotative terms. Connotative terms have signification and no co-signification since they signify an object or usually individuals. "White" is for instance a connotative term, since it directly signifies an individual that has whiteness. "Whiteness", however, is an absolute term and not a connotative term, and so is "intellection" according to Ockham, which, however the Histoire, unfortunately uses as an example of connotative term. We hope that it is only a misprint, since it should be "intellectus". In fact, according to Ockham "intellectus" is a connotative term which signifies directly the soul and indirectly an intellection.

If after these misunderstandings we continue to read the *Histoire*, we find ourselves in a swamp of confusion and ignorance of Ockham's technical language. We read (p. 36):

Or, tandis que les termes du language et de l'écriture ont avec le réet signifié un rapport de signification conventionelle (suppositio materialis), le terme qui désigne un individu (suppositio personalis) et le terme abstrait (suppositio simplex) sont liés de façon naturelle aux objects pensés.

Let us try somehow to disentangle this confusion of suppositio, impositio and intentio. We have given a complete explanation of these terms and connected theories in the Franciscan Studies (VI, 1946, 143 ss, 261 ss) and hence will only explain what the terms mean. A term has personal supposition when it is used in a proposition - this applies to simple and material supposition as well - and signifies its object; it does not matter, whether the term is a concept or an intention of the mind, or a spoken or a written word. When we use the term "word" as predicate in a proposition it signifies every word and has personal supposition. The spoken or written word "man" was instituted at will (ad placitum) to signify individual men; when it is used in this significative function, it has personal supposition. Furthermore, the term "man" is instituted by human beings in order to signify real objects which are not words or concepts, in a word, which are not signs; for that reason the word "man" is called a name of first imposition. On the other hand, the term "word" is instituted to signify words, like "man", "noun" etc., hence it signifies objects which are signs instituted at will. The term "word" is a sign of a sign, and for this reason is a word of second imposition. Ockham also distinguished first and second intention, only making now the distinction between intentions of the mind and intentions of the mind which signify intentions which in turn signify objects outside the mind. Every concept and every spoken and written word, when used in its original signification, which is natural in the case of concepts and arbitrary in the case of words, has personal supposition. When not used in its significative function it may represent either the intention as such or the material word, be it spoken or written. In the first case the term has simple supposition regardless of whether it is a first or second intention that is represented. When the term represents the material spoken or written word whether it be of first or second imposition, it has material supposition. It is somewhat ironical to find the Histoire attributing to Ockham the very idea of simple supposition that he so often rejected namely that in simple supposition the term supposits for its abstract signified object, for instance that

"man" supposits for "humanity" or "white" for "whiteness". Ockham writes:

Ex quo sequitur quod falsum est quod aliqui ignorantes dicunt, quod concretum a parte praedicati supponit pro forma, videlicet quod in illa: Sortes est albus, ly "albus" supponit pro albedine. Summa Logicae, p. 1, c. 63.

A similar confusion of various theories is found on the following pages (p. 37-39). They deal with the nature and the value of universals. The Histoire asks: "Les signes sont-ils en rapport avec les êtres qu'ils signifient et quel est ce rapport?" A distinction is required, we are told. The acts of sensation or of intellective intuitive cognition bring us in direct contact with the real, with the experienced. Abstractive cognition, on the contrary, is but a fiction and applies only to thought objects. However, the most explicit texts of Ockham militate against such a distinction. For instance:

Idem totaliter et sub eadem ratione a parte objecti est objectum intuitivae et abstractivae notitiae ... Ordinatio, prol. q. 1, CC.

It is not difficult to indicate the cause of this misunderstanding. The Histoire fails to do what Hochstetter has masterly done, namely to distinguish between two theories of Ockham in regard to the nature of concepts. According to the first theory which was later completely abandoned, the concept or universal is a fictum, that is a mental picture which exists only as thought object or has an "esse objectivum", since it is not a reality or a thing, but only a thought, or more exactly, the object of a thought. The term "ideal" being would probably apply to this "esse objectivum", since it is constituted by an act of thinking. Unfortunately the *llistoire*, inattentive to Ockham's terminology, calls this fictum a figmentum. Ockham, when dealing with this theory, has never called the concept, for instance of man or of cause, a figmentum, but always a fictum. For a figmentum, as Ockham explains in the same context, is something which is an impossibility as "chimaera", a hircocervus (stag-goat) etc. A figmentum, is of course the result of a fictio, and thus can be called a fictum; but not every fictum is a figmentum. Since a fictum is the product of mental picturing of something that is real or can be real, it has not the connotation of "unreal" as the modern word "fiction" has. Figmentum, however, has this connotation. For that reason, Ockham can maintain, that fictum and fictio (as the act of producing a fictum) are related to reality, that is, that a fictum is a concept which is similar to things in their subjective, that is, their real, being. Now let Ockham speak for himself.

***...universale non est aliquid reale habens esse subjectivum nec in anima nec extra animam, sed tantum habet esse obiectivum in anima, et est quoddam fictum habens esse tale in esse obiectivo, quale habet res extra in esse subjectivo. Et hoc per istum modum, quod intellectus videns aliquam rem extra animam fingit consimilem rem in mente, ita quod si haberet virtutem productivam, sicut habet virtutem fictivam, talem rem in esse subjectivo numero distinctam a priori produceret extra.... Illud fictum in mente ex visione alicuius rei extra esset unum exemplar. Ita enim, sicut domus ficta, si fingens haberet virtutem productivam realem, est exemplar ipsi artifici, ita illud fictum esset exemplar respectu sic fingentis... *Ordinatio d. 2*, q. 8*, E.

This certainly exposes as untenable the following lines (p. 37) of the Histoire.

..il (l'universel) n'est q'une fiction forgée dans l'âne de toutes pièces: abstractio quae non est nisi fictio quaedam. Pures etiquettes mentales qui servent à cataloguer les individus réels dans les cadres génériques et spécifiques, les notions abstraits n'attaignent pas ces individus que par la surface et le dehors, et non par le dedans.

All this is being said on the basis of that theory which Ockham held when he lectured on the Sentences, but which was gradually abandoned when he worked on his Ordinatio. When he wrote his Summa Logicae and the Quodlibeta he definitely rejected it as false. However, of this important development in Ockham's teaching, the Histoire makes no mention. The second and truly Ockhamistic theory about the nature of concepts, namely that a concept or universal is the act of knowing itself, and therefore a quality of the mind and a real entity in the soul, because as such it is more similar to the object known, is only mentioned by the Histoire at the end of this treatment without attaching much importance to it. Hence the exposition of Ockham's theory is deficient in two respects: First, too much emphasis is put on the theory which Ockham abandoned at an early stage of his career, and secondly, this theory itself is misrepresented.

This misrepresentation is revealed in the following passage.

Toutes attaches avec l'extramental étant brisées, les universaux deviennent un materiel logique que les sciences conbinent. Tout se passe comme si les vues de l'esprit s'adaptaient aux individus réels, mais elles ne les atteignent pas....

There is no text in Ockham's works which substantiates these lines, and, of course, no quotations are given. However, we would like to ask, what does "atteindre" really mean? As far as we are able to make out, it can only mean that our concepts, according to Ockham, to not "reach" the individuals, because they do not represent them. If this is meant, it is contradicted by Ockham everywhere where he deals with this topic. For, as we have seen before, he insists in the character of similarity between concepts and individual natures. For that reason, we believe that Ockham's "Nominalism" or rather Conceptualism is closer, if not much the same, as the theory of Abaelard, which the Histoire denies, and precisely for this reason very far from the conceptualism of Kant with whom the Histoire associates Ockham. The interested reader may get more informations and also textual evidences from our article "The realistic conceptualism of Ockham," in Traditio Vol. IV (1946).

Setting aside all the other partially true and partially false statements of the *Histoire*, let us select only the following incorrect statement:

La notion abstraite d'être perd son charactère univoque (Scot) ou analogique (Thomas) (p. 38).

No reference to any work of Ockham is given. In fact, no reference could be given, because Ockham defends the univocity of the term "being", following Scotus and dissenting in an extremely mild manner from St. Thomas, for he admits univocity and also analogy in a certain sense. Let the texts speak for themselves.

Pro univocatione [entis] nescio nisi tantum unam rationem, in cuius virtute omnes aliae rationes tenent, et est ista: Omnes concedunt quod aliquam notitiam incomplexam habemus de Deo pro statu isto, et etiam de substantia creata materiali et immateriali....... Igitur oportet necessario pónere, quod intelligendo Deum pro statu isto cognoscam eum in conceptu communi sibi et aliis...

In virtute rationis praedictae tenet ratio prima Joannis [id est Scoti!] de conceptu dubio et certo, aliter non... Report. III, q. 9.

In the same question Ockham also explains in which sense one can speak of analogy.

The scanty remarks expressing convictions more than accurate facts and the few lines of Ockham's speculative psychology shall be passed over here.

Nr. 381. The presentation of the *Theodicee* of Ockham suffers under all the shortcomings pointed out in our previous discussions. Only here they have the cumulative effect of making Ockham's serious and important theodicy simply a caricature. We have written a detailed critical review of this part which will appear early next year in *Franziskanische Studien* (Vlünster). Hence we shall single out only a few of the extremely surprising statements of the *Histoire*.

We should not be surprised, of course, to read on p. 41 that our notions in regard to God and especially the notion of causality are of no help.

...la notion de cause est un figmentum de l'esprit. Le principe de causalité ne peut établir avec rigeur l'existence de Dieu, car il est difficile, sinon impossible de démontrer que les causes ne peuvent s'enchaîner à l'infini, et sans point d'arrêt. Quia difficile est vel impossibile probare contra philosophes quod non est processus in infinitum in causis eiusdem rationis (I Sent., d. II, q. 5).

We charitably suppose that the author of the *Histoire* has never seen the context of his quotation. First, because the quotation is wrong, it is to be found in I, d. 2, q. 10, Q. Secondly, because it has quite the opposit meaning in its context. For we read:

Dico ergo quantum ad primum articulum, quod ratio probans primitatem efficientis est sufficiens, et est ratio omnium philosophorum. Videtur tamen, quod evidentius posset probari primitas efficientis per conservationem rei a sua causa quam per productionem, secundum quod dicit rem accipere esse immediate post non esse. [And now follows the text quoted by the <code>Histoire</code>]. Cuius ratio est, quia difficile est vel impossibile probare contra philosophos quod non est processus in infinitum in causis eiusdem rationis.

As the reader can ascertain for himself, Ockham expressly states that the primacy of a first efficient cause can be proved and even demonstrated – the latter is clearly maintained by Ockham in one of his latest works, the Quaestiones super libros Physicorum. However, the worst of all is this: the words quoted by the *listoire* do not even prove the point which it intends to make. In fact, an extraordinary blunder has been committed. Which scholastic has ever maintained that a process ad infinitum is impossible in the order of causae eiusdem rationis. Eiusdem rationis is dropped in the French text. St. Bonaventure and a few others, yes; but not St. Thomas nor Duns Scotus nor most of the other scholastics. How else could St. Thomas maintain that in the case of the generation of one man from another a process ad infinitum is possible? For he says:

Unde non est impossibile quod homo generetur ab homine in infinitum. Esset autem impossibile, si generatio huius hominis dependeret ab hoc homine, et a corpore elementari, et a sole, et sic in infinitum. Summa Theol. I, 47, 2, ad 7^{um}.

Unfortunately the immediately following lines of the *Histoire* are of the same type:

Que si, pour éviter une regression à l'infini dans la série des causes, on s'ar-

rête à un premier efficient, celui-ci prime sans doute tous les autres êtres; mais pourquoi serait-il le plus parfait possible? Conclusion: l'existence de Dieu est objet de foi et non de démonstration. Non potest seiri evidenter quod Deus est (Quodl. I, 1).

Here again, we are forced to show that the text of Ockham was not understood and that a maimed text is used to prove something that Ockham has denied. The **Bistoire** uses the expression "primer," which means "to surpass" and "to be the first". There would be no harm in using this expression in the latter sense, viz. to be the first, if the **Bistoire** had abstained from adding that it is the first in regard to all other things. By this addition the **Bistoire** makes a supposition which Ockham denies; for, if this first efficient cause surpasses all other beings, it follows according to Ockham, that it can be but one and is also the most perfect being that is possible. But it is exactly this notion of God, viz. that God surpasses all other beings, which according to Ockham cannot be the result of any demonstration possible to us. In order to give the reader a clear picture of the really distorted presentation of Ockham's teaching in the **Bistoire**, we have to go into closer discussion of the text quoted from the **Quodlibeta**.

In Quadlibetum I, I the question is asked: Whether it can be proved by natural reason that there is but one God. In answering this question Ockham gives two definitions of the term "God". One meaning is: Deus est aliquid nobilius et melius omni alio a se. It is obvious and also later emphasized by Ockham, that that which is more noble and better than anything else, surpasses all other beings. A second meaning of the term "God" is this: Deus est illud quo nihil est melius et perfectius. This definition expresses that God is first only in the sense that He is not surpassed by anything else, but not in the sense that He surpasses everything else. After this Ockham gives an answer to the question according to the two different descriptions of God. First, he answers according to the first description of God. In order to enable the reader to judge for himself how inadequate the quotation in the Histoire is we shall quote the entire answer of Ockham and italicize the text selected by the Histoire; we also add in parenthesis a few words which are in most of the manuscripts but not in the edition used by the Histoire:

Dico quod accipiendo Deum secundum primam descriptionem non potest demonstrative probari, quod tantum est unus Deus. Cuius ratio est, quia non potest evidenter sciri, quod Deus est (sic accipiendo Deum); ergo non potest evidenter sciri, quod est tantum unus Deus, sic accipiendo Deum.

It is or rather should be obvious that Ockham's denial of a demonstrative proof of God's existence refers only to the first description of God. Ockham's indication that he is speaking of God in the first meaning occurs twice in the edition used by the *Histoire* and even three times in the original form of the *Quodlibeta*, and thus it shows, how anxious Ockham was not to be misunderstood.

Unfortunately, it did not help him. Nor did his express and absolutely unequivocal affirmation that God's existence can be demonstrated, if "God" is taken in the meaning of the second description. And, strangely enough (from the viewpoint of the *Histoire*) the reason Ockham gives is that otherwise there would be a process ad infinitum. Let the text speak for himself:

Sciendum tamen, quod potest demonstrari Deum esse accipiendo. Deum secundo modo prius dicto, quia aliter esset processus in infinitum nisi esset aliquid in entibus, quo non est aliquid prius et perfectius.....

We abstain from commenting on the rest of this Number, since it would lead us too far and would mostly be a matter of favorable or unfavorable interpretation.

Nr. 382. Here the *Histoire* deals with Ockham's Ethics and Logic. Ockham's Ethics is still little explored and probably less understood. This is reflected in the scanty remarks of the *Histoire* which are at least exaggerated. However, let us discuss a few of them. On p. 42 we read:

Il n'y a ni bien ni mal en soi, la différence entre l'un et l'autre reposant sur un décret de Dieu qui eût pu renverser l'ordre existant.

Dieu est un autocrate qui pourrait, sans tenir compte de ce qu'il y a de rationnel ou non dans ses volontés, provoquer chez l'homme des actes d'amour aussi bien que des actes de haine (II Sent. q. 19).

According to Ockham at least one act is bad in itself, so that it can never be good, viz. to disobey God; and there is one act that is absolutely good, so that it can never be bad, viz. to obey or to love God. For the latter part of our statement we quote the following text.

Nam iste actus [quo Deus diligitur super omnia et propter se] est sic virtuosus, quod non potest esse viciosus, nec potest iste actus causari a voluntate creata nisi sit virtuosus: Tum quia quilibet pro loco et tempore obligatur ad diligendum Deum super omnia, et per consequens, iste actus non potest esse viciosus; tum quia iste actus est primus omnium actuum bonorum. Quodl. III, 13.

In other words, Ockham admits one absolute norm of Ethics, viz. the obligation to obey God, Ockham has never maintained that anyone, not even God, can dispense from this obligation. However, to obey God means to love God. But here, a difficulty arises. Does Ockham not maintain that it is possible that God can command that a creature hates Him? According to the evidence of the texts, it cannot be doubted that Ockham admitted this. However, in order to understand this correctly we must not overlook that "potest" in Ockham's language has two meanings. In one meaning it has the sense of consistency or rather lack of contradiction; this is subdistinguished into a possibility based on the lack of logical contradiction or contradiction with a necessary truth, and a possibility based on the lack of contradiction with contingent facts. From this logical possibility we have to distinguish psychological possibility or capability. When Ockham maintains that God can command hatred of Him it is only in the first sense; never in the second. By this he means that such a command is not selfcontradictory on logical grounds. How does he prove that? It is based on the theological truth that God is the primary cause of every effect. Now, a creature can command to hate God, this act of commanding the hatred of God is caused by God as first cause and by the creature as second cause. Hence it cannot include a contradiction - on purely logical grounds - that God can command hatred of

Up to now, we have dealt with the logical possibility as such. Let us now assume that God would command that a created will hates Him. There, according to Ockham, would be a genuine perplexity or ethical antinomy. In such a case, the created will simply could not act. For if it obeys, and

consequently hates God, it would love God. Let us listen to Ockham himself, who presents this case in a slightly milder form.

Si dicatur, quod Deus potest praecipere, quod pro aliquo tempore non diligatur Ipse, quia potest praecipere quod intellectus sit intentus circa studium et voluntas similiter, ut nihil possit illo tempore de Deo cogitare...

Respondeo: Si Deus posset hoc praecipere, sicut videtur quod potest sine contradictione, dico tunc, quod voluntas non potest pro tunc talem actum elicere, quia ex hoc ipso quod talem actum eliceret, Deum diligeret super omnia, et per consequens impleret praeceptum divinum, quia hoc est diligere Deum super omnia, diligere quidquid Deus vult diligi. Et ex hoc ipso quod sic diligeret, non faceret praeceptum divinum per casum, et per consequens sic diligendo Deum diligeret et non diligeret. Quodl. III, 13.

To qualify Ockham's position as ethical positivism is perhaps more a matter of words. For the Venerabilis Inceptor knows one invariable norm of Ethics, viz. the obligation to obey the will of God or to love God. For the rest, ethical norms are commanded by the will of God and have to be obeyed in virtue of the general and absolute ethical norm. Thus Ockham does not base his ethics on some anonymous and impersonal law pervading nature, or on something to which God Himself is subject, for instance on "ethical values" of which the Histoire speaks. Ockham bases his ethics on one Personal principle, on God who is most powerful, most good and most wise and most just. Hence it is absolutely incorrect to say that ethical laws depend on the subjective viewpoint of those who consider and judge them, as we read in the Histoire:

Puisque les valeurs morales ne sont pas des absolus, elles varient suivant le point de vue subjectif de qui les considère et les juges.

No text reference is given, since there is no text in Ockham which substantiates this statement.

The following short remarks on the Logic of Ockham are rather vague. The Histoire does not explain what Ockham, and almost all the scholastics meant by "demonstration", namely something that modern scholastics no longer strive for. To some extent, we think they are right. In Aristotelean Axiomatics a demonstration is a necessary conclusion obtained by a syllogistic process from necessary and evident premisses. It was not Ockham's fault that such high and almost impossible requirements were demanded of a demonstration, since it was Aristotle who, under the influence of Mathematics, wrote the Posterior Analytics. But Ockham was not such a fool to believe, that:

Tout ce qui n'est pas démontrable est relégué dans la sphère des conclusions probables (p. 42).

For, Ockham not only knew of propositiones per se notae and immediate formal consequences, but also of absolutely evident contingent propositions based on experience. In all these cases absolute certitude is given and no fear of deception. But even a "probable" syllogism or a dialectical proof which often is a persuasio, as the Histoire rightly mentions, may give the highest degree of certitude. Ockham says concerning the "probabile" in the Summa Logicae, part III, I, c. 1:

Sequitur etiam aliud, quod non omnis syllogismus topicus facit semper praecise dubitationem et formidinem, sed etiam frequenter facit primam fidem sine omni dubitatione, quia ita aliquando adhaeremus probabilibus sicut evidenter notis.

What is said about science on page forty-three is of such a nature that we hardly believe that Ockham would recognize this as his own doctrine:

Tout se ramène à une technique (comme dans la logique mathématique moderne) et celle-ci ne peut conduire à un enrichissement du savoir, car le sujet et le prédicat des propositions analytiques sont identiques.

It is definitely not the case that analytical propositions enter a science - at least as long as it is not logic.

The famous razor of Ockham must, of course, also appear in the *llistoire*. There is nothing wrong about this, for the principle was known to Aristotle and every philosopher is bound to use it. For philosophy is a science, and a science has to prove what it affirms. However, it is not quite historical to impute the wording: *Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate ponendi*, to Ockham. These exact words are found in the non-authentic *Tractatus de principiis Theologiae* (ed. Baudry p. 125). Ockham has several forms for it. The most common one is: *Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate*. We also find the form: *Frustra fit per plura*, quod potest fieri per pauciora. The most explicit form is this: *Nihil debet poni sine ratione assignata nisi sit per se notum vel per experientiam scitum vel per auctoritatem scripturae probatum.* (Ordin. d. 30, q. 1 E).

In Nr. 383 the *Histoire* deals with Ockham's physics. Here we find the expression: "La qualité étant réduite à la quantité..." Before we read that quality was reduced to substance. As our texts have shown both statements are in disagreement with Ockham's most express words. Only certain qualities are not distinct from substance whilst quantity is not distinct from substance or quality.

Nr. 384 deals with the relation between Philosophy and Theology. We certainly can abstain from a detailed discussion of this part, since a masterly Dissertation has been published about this by Guelluy. Let us simply confront two quotations.

The Histoire reads (p. 45):

D'une part la sphère des vérités chrétiennes est inaccessibles à la raison et réservée à la foi; d'autre part, la théologie doit renoncer à établir ses affirmations par la voie du raisonnement. Articuli fidei non sunt principia demonstrationis, nec sunt probabiles, quia omnibus vel pluribus vel sapientibus apparent falsi (Summa t. log. III, 1 - to be more correct: III, I, 1). C'est la condemnation de la théologie spéculative et toute collaboration avec la philosophie est impossible.

After only mentioning here that to render "demonstrationis" with "du raisonnement" only emphasizes the fact that the meaning of demonstration is unknown to the *Histoire*, we quote now Guelluy's *Philosophie et Théologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham* (Louvain 1947, p. 364).

Notons, d'autre part, qu'Ockham refuse de séparer le domaine de la théologie de celui de la nétaphysique...

Le Venerabilis Inceptor ne semble, dans aucun des textes que nous avons étudier, se donner pour but d'opposer la foi et la raison ou de soustraire le domaine de la révélation à toute investigation intellectuelle...

To this statement of a scholar who has studied this problem ex professo in the text of Ockham himself, we add a passage from one of the latest works of Ockham:

Contra: Nisi eadem veritas posset probari in scientia naturali et Theologia, Philosophia non iuvaret ad Theologiam. Quodl. V, 1.

The following reflexions are therefore without any foundation in the texts of Ockham.

Much criticism could be applied to the following number on the political doctrines of Ockham. Most of it is fiction as can be gathered from the article of Morrall in this number of the Franciscan Studies.

We have led the patient reader through a veritable forest of misunderstandings wildly grown up, not so much because of the fault of one man, but because of careless and sloppy treatment of a scholastic who per fas et nefas must serve as the explanation of the decadence of scholasticism. All this only proves that we need serious studies on the Theology and Philosophy of Ockham in order to find out what he really thought and wrote. Only after that we have the right to judge, to condemn or to praise.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Thomas-Lexikon. (Second edition). By Dr. Ludwig Schuetz. (Paderborn, 1895). Reprinted New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949. Pp. x-889. \$20.

A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas. By Roy J. Deferrari, Sr. M.I. Barry, C.D.P. and I. McGuiness, O.P. Fascicle I (A-C); Fasc. II (D-H). Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1948-1949. Pp. x-495. \$12.50 per fascicle; \$62.50 for complete set of five fascicles.

Students of St. Thomas's philosophy and theology will welcome the appearance of these two valuable Lexicons. The second and enlarged edition of the Thomas-Lexicon of the late Dr. Ludwig Schuetz, printed in Paderborn, Germany, 1895 has been well known to students of medieval thought. Long out of print, Dr. Schuetz's work was especially useful not only as a dictionary of Thomistic terms and their German equivalent, but also as a collection of the more important loci where Aquinas's teaching on a particular subject could be found. The method used by Dr. Schuetz was, where possible, to let St. Thomas define a philosophical term in his own words.

The present edition is simply a photo-offset reprint of the German 1895 edition without alteration. As the work of Dr. Schuetz was compiled before the critical studies of Mandonnet and Grabmann were completed, we are not surprised to find quotations or references to some ten minor works that are no longer included in the canon of authentic works of Aquinas, to say nothing of those additional works accepted by Grabmann and rejected by Mandonnet. However, as every serious student of Aquinas can be reasonably expected to know which works ascribed to the saint are dubious or spurious, this reprint of Dr. Schuetz's monumental work will still be a practical acquisition to any philosophical or theological library.

Whereas the Thomas-Lexikon is primarily a dictionary of philosophical terms, the Lexicon of St. Thomas of Aquinas is of more general philological interest and hence will be useful not only to budding Thomistic philosophers or theologians but to students of Medieval Latin in general. This was to be expected in view of the fact that the Lexicon was prepared by two specialists in the field of Greek and Latin, Dr. Deferrari and Sr. M. Inviolata Barry, C.D.P. with only the technical collaboration of Father Ignatius McGuiness, O.P. Hence we find in the Lexicon not only philosophical but also other terms. As the authors tell us in their "Foreword", "It includes all the words of the Summa Theologica and such other words from the remaining works as seem in the judgment of the authors to be of great importance." (Fasc. I, viii) In an attempt to discover what norm the authors used in selecting "passages from his other works", the reviewer cursorily compared the Lexicon with Schuetz's Thomas-Lexikon, to which the authors express their indebtedness, and has come to the conclusion that Dr. Deferrari and Sr. Inviolata have done little more than add the quotations and references of Dr. Schuetz's work to their own collection from the Summa; for only those words of the Lexicon which can be found also in the Thomas-Lexikon include references to or words from works other than the Summa. Hence from a philological viewpoint the present work might be more appropriately titled a "Lexicon of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas", although from the philosopher's viewpoint, it has all the value of Schuetz's Lexikon.

This heavy dependence on Schuetz's work for all references outside those of the Summa explains perhaps the strange fact that so many of the dubious or spurious works listed by Schuetz were also incorporated apparently in the list of Thomas's works used by the authors of the Lexicon. Not that the inclusion of references to these other works might not have an independent value, particularly to one interested in the genesis of philosophical thought, but it is somewhat puzzling to find them in the present work, especially since the Lexicon makes no pretense of completeness in its rather limited selections from works other than the Summa. To say nothing of the works rejected by Mandonnet (which might understandably be included in view of Grabmann's more recent study, Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aguin, (Beitrage etc. Munster, 1931), we find six works not included even in Grabmann's "kritischer Katalog", namely the two ()puscula de universalibus, and the De dilectione Dei et proximi (all three of which, though attributed to St. Thomas, are included among the "sicher unechte Schriften"), plus the two Aristotelian commentaries on De Somniis and De Somno et Vigilia, and the Opusculum de natura syllogismorum.

Fortunately, however, the usefulness of the *Lexicon* is not seriously impaired since it is primarily a dictionary of terms found in the *Summa Theologica* and seldom quotes or refers to the spurious works. We call attention to this defect, however, in view of the intention of the authors, who — as they tell us in the "Foreword" — plan a systematic continuation of the *Lexicon* (perhaps in the form of supplements?) until every other work of St. Thomas will have been combed as thoroughly as the *Summa* was by the present authors "until eventually a *Lexicon* of St. Thomas of Aquin complete for all his works, will have appeared." Also in this connection, we might note that even from a philological point of view, it might be of interest to a student attempting to discover precisely St. Thomas' use of terms rather than that of his students or "auditores", if the authors were to indicate those portions of his works which in whole or part are "reportationes".

Particularly commendable in the present Lexicon is the inclusion of biographical and geographical data regarding those proper names quoted in the Summa theologica. One regrettable feature about the present Lexicon is its extremely high price which undoubtedly will prevent many who might profit greatly from its use, from acquiring it for their private libraries. This however is probably beyond the control of the authors who have put so much time and effort into giving us this useful work.

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No Greater Service. By Sr. M. Rosalita, I.H.M. Detroit, Mich.: Evans-Winter-Hebb, Inc., 1948. Pp. xx-833-Index. \$15.00 per set.

Achievement of a Century. Edited by Sr. M. Rosalita, I.H.M. Detroit, Mich.: Evans-Winter-Hebb, Inc., 1948. Pp. xiii-299. \$15.00 per set.

The present two volumes were written to describe and commemorate the achievements of a century by the Sisters, Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, 1845-1945 of Monroe, Mich. (p. 729-740) definitely approved as a

religious community of simple vows by Pope Benedict XV in 1930 (p. 567).

Today, according to the Catholic Directory (p. 675-164) there are three distinct and independent Congregations of the Sisters, Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary (IHM), the one having its General Motherhouse at Monroe (Detroit) Mich., founded in 1845; the second, with its headquarters at West Chester, Pa. (1872); the third, with headquarters at Scranton, Pa. Whereas Sister Rosalita aptly demonstrates the origin of the last two communities from that at Monroe, her first volume is devoted primarily, and the second exclusively to the Monroe foundation, its convents, and schools.

The Sisters, Servants of the IIIM, in their familiar blue habits, owe their existence, under God, to the Rev. Louis Florent Gillet, C.SS.R., pastor of St. Mary's Church, Monroe, Mich. who interested "four women in his plan for founding a religious institute devoted to the education of youth" (p. 36).

The young community, after overcoming its initial hardships of finding convenient housing quarters and becoming acclimated to the severe winters, was destined to meet other and greater external and internal difficulties, not the least of which was the matter of increase and expansion. The latter point especially, due to a question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction both within the diocese of Detroit and the community on the one hand, and on the other between the representatives of the Diocese of Detroit and of the Diocese of Philadelphia was particularly acute. The spread of the community to Susquehanna, in fact, threatened almost to destroy this young plant in the garden of Mother Church.

The internal difficulties of the community at Monroe referred to a question of autonomy and jurisdiction within the Congregation. Who was the official head of the Sisters: the Bishop, the Spiritual Director, or the Mother General? This was but one instance of identical differences which were to harass practically all communities of Sisters under simple vows throughout the XIX century until finally in 1900 Pope Leo XIII in virtue of his now famous Conditae a Christo brought clarity out of chaos.

But, religious communities seem to thrive on vicissitudes and trials. Commenting on the status of the Congregation in the late "Sixties" the authoress narrates that "the Novitiate [was] often without one postulant or novice and sometimes none", whereas "in none of the few missions were there at any time more than three Sisters and at the Motherhouse only a dozen or so Sisters" (p. 241). But fleeting time and the designs of Divine Providence change everything. The Sisters, Servants of the IIIM emerged successfully from their saga of trials in life's darkest hours. The appointment or election of each new successive Reverend Mother and her achievements as recorded by Sister Rosalita showed that God was blessing the Congregation and watching over its development. On December 8, 1947 the decision was made to change the title of the community to: "Sisters, Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary". At the same time the color of the habit was changed from black, which resembled somewhat that of the Redemptorists (p. 59), to "sky-blue" (pp. 77-78).

The various Spiritual Directors too, prominent among them, besides Father Gillet, Msgr. Edward Joos (d. May 18, 1901) for almost forty-four years (since November 1857) (p. 110) Director and superior of the Congregation (p. 482); and intermittently the Redemptorists (from 1845-1855; and from 1907-1917) (p. 190), either as Directors or friends of the community, con-

tributed in no small degree to the spiritual life and temporal advancement of the Sisters. Due to the interest of the Redemptorists in the community St. Alphonsus has ever been looked upon as patron of the congregation.

Today, after a century of labor, sacrifices, and blessings from on High, the Congregation of Sisters, Servants of the IHM, so whimsically small, like the proverbial biblical mustard seed in its beginning, has grown to a mighty tree under the shade of whose branches, now extended far and wide, the Sisters work for the salvation of souls and the glory of Mother Church. As of the beginning of 1949 the community numbered 1,171 Professed Sisters, seventy-four Novices, and thirty-four Postulants. The Sisters, as of 1949, conducted one college (Marygrove) with 770 students (it opened on January 15, 1846 with forty pupils and four boarders - p. 68); one academy; thirty-nine high schools; sixty-two grammar schools; one orphanage; and one boys boarding school. The Sisters (of the Monroe Congregation) are represented in the Archdiocese of Chicago and Detroit, and in the Dioceses of Cleveland, Grand Rapids, Lansing, and Saganaw; also in San Juan, P.R.

But, aside from the saga of their origin and the story of their growth and progress, Sister Rosalita has entered upon many other relevant topics of general interest to all historians.

Of special interest to Franciscana - are the notices that "St. Clare Female Academy under the directions of the Poor Clares [was] the first religious community to teach in Detroit" (p. 19); that "the river that to Father Louis Hennepin was a most agreeable and charming strait still flowed on unchanged when the Redemptorist, Reverend Louis Florent Gillet arrived in Detroit" (ibid.); that Father Gillet was baptized in "the old Franciscan Church of St. Anthony" at Antwerp (p. 21); that "on one side five steps away we [Father Gillet and Father Francis Poilvache, C.SS.R.] had Lake St. Clair - on the other side forests, where bears and wolves dwell" (p. 26); that Msgr. Joos (d. March 18, 1901), the long-time Director of the Sisters of the IHM "was trained by the Franciscans" (p. 419); and finally that the Sisters at Monroe were honored on May 5, 1910 by a visit from his Excellency, Most Rev. Diomede Falconio, O.F.M., Apostolic Delegate to the U.S.A. (p. 512). En passant, it might also be mentioned that for the past number of years Sisters of the IHM have been attending the Summer School of St. Bonaventure's College, Allegany, New York.

There is a good workable index; a sizeable - and I dare say - complete bibliography, at least as far as documents were available to the authoress; whereas the fifty-four pages of documentary footnotes, evidently show that Sister Rosalita did not write her history from hearsay. Particularly good is the authoress' delicate and charitable characterization of Mother Theresa during her "Saga of Suffering" (p. 226-228).

The Sisters, Servants of the IHM are indeed to be congratulated on their achievements during the past century of their existence and the dedication of their lives to the promotion of the cause of Mother Church in her great work of religious education and social advancement. In recording the events of her community of the past century Sister Rosalita has merited well not only of her own Congregation but also of every other historian and educator interested in the progress of the Catholic Church in America. It only remains now for the other two communities of the IHM at Reading and West Chester to write their centenial story to get a complete picture of the work done by

all the Sisters, Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary in the United States.

RAPHAEL M. HUBER, O.F.M. CONV.

Catholic University, Washington, D.C.

Religious Life in Christ. By Theodosius Foley, O.F.M. Cap. Milwaukee, Wis.: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1948. Pp. vii-163. \$2.50.

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MICHAEL HARDING, O.F.M.

Holy Name College. Washington, D.C.

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
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